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SUMMARY:

:,:.

Federal/Civil

Timely

These curve-lined appeals have also been

straight-lined with the petition for certiorari in Macon v.
Joiner, et al., No. 82-1974 (Summer List 9, Sheet 1).

They

present the question whether the~inimum wage and overtime
provisions of the FLSA may constitutionally be applied to the
employees of av;ublicly owned and operated mass transit system.

wth. . ~~~~ ~.R. ,~ ~~~~

w

~ ~~~~- ~~}~

·~ ~ ~ ~ ~~I>.S\'J ~ ~ ~~ ··~~ ~ ~

-2-

2.

FACTS AND DECISION BELOW:

Until May 1959, public

transportation in San Antonio was provided by a private transit
company.

At that time, the City of San Antonio created a city-

owned transit system and purchased the private company.

In March

1978, appellee SAMTA, a regional transit authority created
pursuant to Texas law to serve the San Antonio Metropolitan Area,
acquired the facilities and equipment of the city-owned nonrail
system and commenced operations.
In September 1979, the DOL's Wage and Hour Administration
rendered an opinion that appellee's operations were not
constitutionally immune from the application of the FLSA.
Appellee then filed this action for a declaratory judgment that
it was exempt from the FLSA and moved for summary judgment.

The

Secretary of Labor counterclaimed for enforcement of the FLSA's
overtime and record-keeping provisions, appt Garcia intervened in
support of the Secretary, and appellee APTA intervened in support
of SAMTA.

The~

found
________.

that local, publicly operated mass

~

transit systems constitute integral operations in an area of
traditional governmental functions, and entered judgment for
~~~pellee.
~-

VVV

This Court vacated the DC's judgment and remanded for

further consideration in light of United Transp. Union v. Long

~ Island R.R., 455

u.s.

678 (1982).

On remand, the DC found "nothing in LIRR that compels a
change in its previous conclusions ..•• "

Although the DC

recognized that "[t]he historical record is not one of
predominately [sic] public ownership and operation of transit
services," it concluded that the "record of state regulatory

activity indicates that mass transit has traditionally been a
state perogative [sic] and responsibility, not a federal
concern."

The DC recognized that, under LIRR, lOth Amendment

immunity is precluded where it would "erode federal authority
over previously private functions recently converted to public
ownership," but held that granting immunity to publicly owned and
operated mass transit systems would not have that effect.

The

FLSA, unlike the Railway Labor Act, is not "a current
manifestation of a traditional federal concern" since private
transit operators were not subjected to the Act's minimum wage
provisions until 1961 and public employers remained entirely
exempt until 1966.

The recent vintage of the amendments

subjecting public transit employers to the FLSA, the DC
concluded, precluded a finding that a long-standing federal
regulatory scheme would be eroded by a grant of immunity. The DC
then considered the NLRA, the UMTA, and other federal statutes,
and concluded that "[n]o .•• federal authority exists to be
eroded in the area of transit."
The DC's analysis ended with an examination of other factors
indicating that a function is a state prerogative. It was unable
satisfactorily to distinguish mass transit from fire and police
protection and other public services classified as traditional
state functions in National League of Cities.

The DC expressly

rejected the CA3's holding in Kramer v. New Castle Area Transit
Auth., 677 F.2d 308 (CA3 1982), cert. denied, 103

s.

Ct. 786

(1983), that the critical role played by federal grant funds in
stimulating the conversion of transit systems to public ownership

\

differentiates the emerging public role in transit operation from
traditional state functions.

Public transportation, moreover,

benefits the whole community, is provided at a heavily subsidized
price, cannot realistically be provided on a for-profit basis,
and is primarily provided by government.
3.

CONTENTIONS:

Appt Garcia:

The DC's holding is contrary

to decisions of three CAs that have unanimously decided, in light
of LIRR, that the FLSA's minimum wage and maximum hours
provisions may constitutionally be applied to publicly owned
transit companies.

See Dove v. Chattanoga Area Reg. Transp.

Auth., 701 F.2d 50 (CA6 1983); Alewine v. City Council of
Augusta, Ga., 699 F.2d 1060 (CAll 1983), petn. for cert. pending
sub nom. Macon v. Joiner, No. 1974; Kramer, supra.

The only

question is whether the DC's aberrant decision should be
summarily reversed.

Appt relies heavily on the CA3's decision in

Kramer to argue that nonrail mass transit systems are not among
the functions traditionally performed by state and local
governments, that such systems have long been subject to federal
regulation, and that the traditionally private systems have
become predominantly public due to federal aid.
Appt Donovan:

~

The SG argues that the DC's decision

~~~onflicts with National League of Cities, LIRR, and
~hree circuits. Provision of mass transit services

decisions in
is

distinguishable in critical respects from "core state functions"
like public education, safety, health, etc.:
(1) Mass transit is not a traditional local governmental
function.

The DC erred in treating mass transit as an integral

-5-

component of a state's transportation system, and its conclusi6n
that historic state regulation of local transit service suffices
to render mass transit a traditional state prerogative cannot be
reconciled with National League of Cities since state regulation
of private enterprise is not equivalent to state operation of
transit services.
(2) The recent conversion of transit systems to public
ownership is not a local phenomenon, but is the result of
"cooperative federalism."

The shift was spurred by federal

legislation and money; as a result, the claim that operation of
mass transit by states and localities has become essential to the
states' separate and independent existence is untenable.

The

reasons offered by the DC for discounting the relevance of
federal funding are unpersuasive.
(3) Employment relations in the private transit industry had
long been subject to federal regulation when local governments
began to acquire transit systems in the 1960s.

In contrast to

the situation in National League of Cities, where the federal
government's intrusion affected settled patterns of state
administration, the municipality here entered a federally
regulated industry and thus subjected itself to the existing
regulation.

Although Congress did not extend full protection to

transit employees until 1974, it has long had the power to do so;
if states' acquisition of private transit operations extends
intergovernmental immunity thereto, federal authority is
necessarily eroded.

-6-

Appellee SAMTA:

(1) Mass transit satisfies the test for

immunity articulated in LIRR.

The crucial attributes on which

the LIRR Court relied do not exist in the case of local transit:
(a) Local mass transit is not part of a national transportation
network.

The characterization of public transit as an exercise

in "cooperative federalism" is irrelevant since many activities
exempted under National League of Cities have been described by
Congress in the same terms.

(b) Local mass transit has not been

subject to long-standing and comprehensive federal regulation.
There exists no scheme of federal regulation designed to provide
uniformity among transit systems, and the NLRA--a law of general
application applying to almost every private employer--cannot be
equated with the comprehensive federal statutes specifically
regulating railroads.

Because most transit employees have been

fully protected by the FLSA only since 1976, it is impossible to
characterize federal regulation as long-standing or
comprehensive.

(c) States and localities have historically

regulated local mass transit.

(d) State and local governments

are the principal providers of mass transit, and the states
clearly regard metropolitan transit authorities as essential
governmental functions.

(e) Appellee has never acceded to FLSA

coverage.
(2) Transit systems are analogous to hospitals: public
involvement in hospitals is not as well established as in the
transit field; federal funding played a significant role in the
development of hospitals; and hospitals have long been subject to
the very same statutes cited by appts as regulating transit.

-7-

(3) Federal funding of transit is irrelevant, and appts'
argument to the contrary is foreclosed by Jackson Transit Auth.
v. Amalgamated Transit Union Local 1285, 457

u.s.

15 (1982).

Since Congress "did not intend [UMTA] to create a body of federal
law applicable to labor relations between local governmental
entities and transit workers," id. at 27, the receipt of UMTA
funds cannot abrogate the lOth Amendment rights of those
governmental entities.
(4) Appellee's final argument, presented to but not
addressed by the DC, is that the FLSA's severability clause does
not authorize the application of the Act, which has been held
unconstitutional as applied to most of the class of public
employees it was intended to cover, to the remainder of the
class.

Application of the FLSA to publicly owned local mass

transit is impermissible absent an amendment to the Act.
Appellee APTA:

The motion to affirm offers no substantial

additional arguments other than the claim that the trend toward
public ownership of local mass transit was well established
before the enactment of UMTA.
4.

DISCUSSION:

7

~

The jurisdictional statements clearly

present a substantial federal question, and the lower court's
decision squarely conflicts with the decisions of three CAs, one
I

of which is also before the Court at this time.

As the

contentions make clear, summary disposition does not seem
appropriate.

LIRR may well prove dispositive, but the

possibility that the cases can be meaningfully distinguished is
sufficient to warrant plenary consideration.

'

"'. ;·

-~-

5.

RECOMMENDATION:

jurisdiction.

I recommend noting probable

Macon v. Joiner, which presents the same issue,

should be considered with, or held for, these appeals.
There are two motions to affirm and an amicus brief urging a
plenary hearing and affirmance.
August 25, 1983

'.'

Werder

Opin in juris. stmts.

Preliminary Memo
September 26, 1983 Conference
Summer List 21, Sheet 1
No. 82-1951
DONOVAN {Sec. of Labor)

Appeal from USDC, W.D.
Tex. {Shannon)

v.
SAN ANTONIO MTA, et al.
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SUMMARY:

2.

RECOMMENDATION:

jurisdiction.

Federal/Civil

Timely

Please see the memo in No. 82-1913.
I recommend noting probable

Macon v. Joiner, No. 82-1974, which presents the

same issue, should be considered with, or held for, these
appeals.
There are two motions to affirm and an amicus brief urging a
plenary hearing and affirmance.
August 25, 1983

.

'.

Werder

Opin in juris. stmt.

emo
September 26, 1983 Conference
~mmer

List 21, Sheet 1

~ . ;2~

GARCIA {SAMTA employee)

WD

v.
SAN ANTONIO MTA, et al.

Timely

Federal/Civil

No. 82-1951
DONOVAN {Sec. of Labor)

Appeal from USDC, WD
Tex. {Shannon)

v.
SAN ANTONIO MTA, et al.

1. SUMMARY:
brief.

Federal/Civil

Timely

Appellant in No. 82-1913 has filed a reply

It points out that appellees have basically ignored the

conflicting decisions of the CA3, CA6, and CAll.

Where appellees

have addressed these decisions, their attacks are meritless.

The

-2-

conflicting decisions properly relied on the fact that federal
funding had initiated the move toward public ownership of transit
systems.

Congress does not forfeit its authority under the

Commerce Clause by making generous grants under the Spending
Power.
2. RECOMMENDATION:

I continue to recommend noting probable

ju ~ ion.

August 31, 1983

Werder
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CHAMI!IERS OF

.JUSTICE

w .. . .J .

BRENNAN, .JR.

June 11, 1984

No. 82-1913) Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
) Transit Authority
)

) Donovan v. San Atonio Metropolitan
No. 82-1951) Transit Authority

Dear Harry,
I agree and I see no necessity for
reargument.
Sincerely,

p;)_c

~I

Justice Blackmun
Copies to the Conference

~u.prtm.t ~curl .of

lJtt lhtittb ~talt.s'

'Jia.-Jrington, ~. ~·

21T~'l~

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR

June 11, 1984

No. 82-1913
No. 82-1951

Garcia v. San Antonio MTA
Donovan v. San Antonio MTA

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE
Needless to say, Harry's circulation today
supporting a reversal of the judgment below and offering a
significant change in our approach to the Tenth Amendment
question is unexpected. Because our summer recess is right
around the corner, I, for one, would prefer that the case be
reargued rather than reassigned.
Sincerely,

..t'JtFtmt QI.mri &tf tJrt ~tb ,jtatts

._-aslthtghnt. ~. <q. 2ll~'l~
CHAMI!!IERS Of'

.JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

June 11, 1984
Re:

Nos. 82-1913 & 82-1951 Garcia v. San Antonio Met.
Transit Authority

Dear Harry:
I, too, favor reargument in this case.
Sincerely,

Justice Blackrnun
cc:

The Conference

.§tqn"tmt

atourt of tltt ]tniit~ .§taU•

Jfufringhtn. ~. <ij.

20p'l~

June 11, 1984

CHAMI!I!:RS 01'"

THE CHIEF .JUSTICE

Re:

82-1913 - Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth.
82-1951 - Donovan v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth.

Dear Harry:
I have your draft op1n1on in this case in which you
suggest the possibility for (1) reassignment; (2) carry
over for reargument.
At this stage - almost mid-June - a 30 page opinion
coming out contrary to the Conference vote on a very
important issue places those who may dissent in a
difficult position.
I think we should set the case over for reargument
and so move.
Regards,

Justice Blackmun
Copies to the Conference

<4ourt nf Up• 'Jlini:tt~ ~taftg
~agJritt.gtlllt. lB. <4. 20gt){.~

.:%lt}lrtlnt

June 11, 1984

CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE
Re: No. 82-1913, Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth.
No. 82-1951, Donovan v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth.
You will recall that the conference vote in these cases was
5-4 to affirm, with my own vote shaky on the affirming side. I
assume that it is because of this that the Chief Justice assigned the cases to me, on his frequently stated reference to
the "least persuaded."
I have spent a lot of time on these cases.
I have finally
decided to come down on the side of reversal.
I have been able
to find no principled way in which to affirm.
It seems to me
that our customary reliance on the ~historical" and the "traditional" is misplaced and that something more fundamental is
required to eliminate the widespread confusion in the area. The .
enclosed draft of a proposed opinion reflects my views.
I realize that this means (1) that the cases should be
reassigned and (2) that some of you may feel the cases should go
over for reargument.
Perhaps this can be discussed at conference.

.•

.•

•aprmu CJi.nui ~tf tJrt ~h

•tatt•

·-Jrinfbt~ ~.crt. 20~,
CHAMI!IERII Or

.JUSTICE .JOHN PAUL STEVENS

,June 1.2, 1984

Re:

82-1.913 - Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authority
82-1951 - Donovan v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authority

/

/

Dear Chief:
Your motion to reargue this case prompts me to
suggest that perhaps it would be useful to have a
conference discussion of the standard that should be
applied to such motions. I think our recent
discussion of the standards to be applied to a
dismissal of a writ as having been improvidently
granted when there are four iustices who want to
decide the case on the merits was constructive and
that we mjght profit by focusing our attention on the
reargument situation in an orderly way.
It occurs to me that there are four alternative
grounds for reargument:
(1) If five justices are unable to
agree on the proper disposition of a case
before the end of June, reargument is
certainly appropriate. That was the
justification for the reargument in
Pennhurst and Sony last year. I suppose
there is some possibility that that problem
may justify a reargument in Segura and in
Palmer v. Hudson, although I gather that
you remain optimistic about your ability to
circulate in the near future a proposed
Court opinion on which five people can
agree.

(2) If the circulation of the
majority op1n1on comes so late that there
is not adequate time in which to prepare a

~A/~.

J

.

~

-~~/
~

- 2 -

dissent, a reargument may be justified. I
would suppose, however, that we could hold
up adjournment for two or three days in
order to avoin setting a case over. Two
examples of this problem come to mind: Last
~erm I did not circulate my proposed
majority opinion in Ruckelshaus v. Sierra
Club, 82-242, until June 6; Bill Rehnquist
circuJated his dissent on June 20 and on
the following day you changed your vote.
Bill then circulated his draft opinion for
the Court on June 27 and thereafter I
converted my majority into a dissent.
There was a similar sequence of events
jn Buffalo Forge in the 1975 Term.
I
circulated my proposed majority on June 18,
1976, Byron circulated his dissent on June
21, and on June 25, you switched your vote
making it necessary for Byron to prepare a
majority which he was able to do on June
28, and I then circulated my dissent.
In the case under discussion now, I
find it difficult to believe that the four
Justices who have supported the motion to
reargue no not have the capacity to prepare
a dissent in the time which remains this
month. The various status reports that
have been circulated have led me to believe
that all four offices were quite current in
their work.
(3) The third possible basis for
reargument might be that a Member of the
Court is not certain as to his vote.
It
would not seem to me, however, that this
would justify reargument unless the vote
became critical to the disposition.

(4) Another possibility, of course, is
the thought that the membership in the
Court might change over the summer and
thereby produce a different outcome. In my

- 3 -

view, this would not be a proper ground for
reargument.
Accordingly, unless someone advances a persuasive
reason for reargument that has not yet been
identjfied, I plan to vote against your motion.
Respectfully,
.,

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference

.

~:,.

.

~I
(\"

'..;i'··1

'f!

June 12, 1984

82-1913 Garcia v. San Antonio
82-1951 Donovan v. San Antonio

Dear Harry:
In view of the approaching end of the Term (one
hopes), I prefer the reargument suggestion.

n

t

Sincerely,

'

·~

'

Justice Blackmun
"I

lfp/ss
cc:

The Conference

"~1)~~.~:.
"fC
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.§upunu <IJomf .ttf Ur~ ~ttlt ~hdt.tr
:JI'aglfinghtn. ~. <IJ. 20~'!~
CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

June 12, 1984

Re:

82-1913 - Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authorit¥
82-1951 - Donovan v. San Antonto
Metropolitan Transit Authority

Dear Harry:
Please join me.
Respectfully,

jrL
Justice Blackmun
Copies to the Conference

/

~upuntt <!fcurt cf

tlrt ~b ~taftg

'masJrin:gicn. ~. <!f. 2llc?'l~
CHAMBERS OF"

j

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

June 12, 1984

Re:

Nos. 82-1913 & 1951-Garcia v. San Antonio
Met. Transit Authority, etc.

Dear Harry:
I, too, do not favor reargument in this case.
Sincerely,

~·
.
T .M.

Justice Blackmun
cc:

The Conference

..

i\ltpfnttt QI&tlttt of tltt ~tb i\ta:Ue'

Jla,e'£rington. ~. OJ. 20c?-'~
CHAMBERS OF"

..JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

Re:

June 13, 1984

82-1913 - Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority
82-1951 - Donovan v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority

Dear Harry,
As would be indicated by my vote in previous cases
such as Maryland v. Wirtz and National League of
Cities, I am much taken with your opinion and could
join it if the case is not to be reargued.
If there is
to be a reargument, however, I would prefer not voting
on the merits at this time.
As for the reargument, I
shall await the discussion but would be inclined to
' follow your lead.
Sincerely,

. Justice Blackmun
Copies to the Conference

,jlqfrtut.t <lfoud of l4t ~ittb .ttalt,G'

Jlulfiqton, ~- <If.

2.0~'!'
'
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR

July 3, 1984

~~~~
Re:

82-1913) Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Authority
82-1951) IX>novan v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Authority

~

Dear lewis,
'lbe following is a possible fonn of order on the reargurrent of

this case:
"This case is restored to the calendar for reargurrent.
In addition to the questions presented in the petition for
writ of certiorari and previously briefed and argued, the
parties are requested to address and brief the following
question:
Whether I9r not t:h2 fraiJEWQrk of analysis of

Tenth Anendrrent questions as set forth in 1--------.
National league of Cities v .• Usery, 426 U.S.
833 (1976), smuld be reconsidered'?"
Sincerely,

Justice

P~ll

tke. ct
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.f3v1k

iVI

r'
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. t 1-e.c..
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e:;v~.r h-~ rt:t I ,..
~t-ll·ow nu J!.

jen 07/03/84
MEMORANDUM TO JUSTICE POWELL
From:
Re:

Joe
82-1913 & 82-1951 Garcia v. SAMTA
I 0 H..

I suggest as a

~~~ ~~~J

ques ~ on for ~e~~ nt

Pr~l--~~~

the following:

Whether National Ceague o { Cities v. Usery, 426

1\

u.s.

833 (1976), should be reconsidered.
This is the plain import of HAB's opinion.

On page 18,

it

rejects "as unsound in principle and unworkable in practice" the
rule that state immunity be based on whether a governmental function is integral or traditional.

It would hold instead that the

substantive limitations on congressional regulation of the States
under the Commerce Clause "demand no more than that the statute
at issue be a nondiscriminatory one."
the

opinion

states

that

that
the

suggests
Court

otherwise

"reaffirm [s]

P.

26.

is

the

the

The only part of
conclusion,

fundamental

which

premise

of

National League of Cities that Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause must accommodate the special role of the States in
the federal system."

P. 30.

ers" National League.

But plainly the opinion "reconsid-

Even if the parties read the above ques-

tion to allow them to argue that the States had no special role
in the federal system, that would not be bad.
Other possibilities:
1. Whether National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 u.s. 833
(1976), should be overruled. ~~~~
2.
Whether the soeer in e 1\ of National League of Cities v.
Usery, 426 u.s. 833 (1976), should be rejected.

.ittpTnttt <!Jltttrl

of tlrt J'nit~ jtalt$'

JkwJrin:ghtn, ~. <!J. 2Ubi~~
CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

Re:

July 3, 1984

82-1913 - Garcia v. San Antonio Metro.
Transit Authority
82-1951 - Donovan v. San Antonio Metro.
Transit Authority

Dear Lewis,
The proposed order on reargument is all
right with me.
Sincerely yours,

Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

/

.h.puuu ~ttttrl ttf tlft ~ttit.dt ~hUts
-~Jrittgtott. ~ . ~· 2!T,;t'1~
CHAMBERS OF

.J U STICE HARRY A . B L A CK MU N

July 3, 1984

Re: No. 82-1913, Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Authority
No. 82-1951, Donovan v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Authority
Dear Lewis:
Because I voted against reargument of these cases, I have no
standing to suggest changes in the proposed form of order.
I
venture to say, however, that if the question is to be presented,
National League of Cities just might end up being overruled. • In
the opinion I prepared this Term, and as to which some took
umbrage, it was not overruled.

Justice Powell
cc: The Conference

July 3, 1984

82-1913 Garcia v. San Antonio ~1etro. Transit AuthoritY
82-1951 Donovan v. San Antonio Metro. ~ransit Authority

MEMORANDU~

TO THE CONFERENCE:

Sandra and I suggest the following form of order:
"This case is restored to the calendar
for reargument. In addition to the questions
pr~sented in the petition for writ of certiorari and previously briefed and argued, the
parties are requested to brief and argue the
following question:
"Whether or not the principles of the
Tenth Amendment as set forth in National
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 u.s. 833
(1976), should be reconsidered?"

L.F. P., Jr.

ss

~.t.....

·,

.,'•

':7

'

.

July 3, J9S4

82-1913 Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Authority
82-1951 Donovan v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Authority

Dear Harry:
Sandra and I thought, in view of your op1n1on
critical of National League of Cities, that it was desirable
to focus the attention of the parties broadly on the principles followed by the Court in that case.
I am sure I speak also for Sandra in saying that
we would, of course, consider a different framing of the
question.

Sincerely,

Justice Blackmun
lfp/ss
cc:

The Conference

,jnvrttttt

<4l!Ufi ttf f!rt ~tlt ,jtldts

jlrasltingbm, ~. <4- 2llbl>1~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL , JR .

RECEIVEQ

I

cHAI1BC.RS 0. \liE
CHIEF !lSi\ ~.

July 3, 1984
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82-1913 Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Authority
82-1951 Donovan v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Authority

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:
Sandra and I suggest the following form of order:
"This case is restored to the calendar
for reargument. In addition to the questions
presented in the petition for writ of certiorari and previously briefed and argued, the
parties are requested to brief and argue the
following question:
"Whether or not the principles of the
Tenth Amendment as set forth in National
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 u.s. 833
(1976), should be reconsidered?"

L.F. P., Jr.
ss

~·.

jen 03/07/84

BENCH MEMORANDUM

Nos. 82-1913 & 82-1951
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority
Donovan v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority

March 7, 1984

Joseph Neuhaus

Question Presented
Does application of the minimum wage and overtime provisions
of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)
violate the Tenth Amendment?

-

to a city-owned bus

s y~tem

Facts & Decision Below
In 1979,

the Secretary of Labor amended his regulations to

include local mass transit systems in the category of government
activities

to which he

would

seek

to apply the

Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority
seeking

a

declaratory

judgment

that

(SAMTA)
its

FLSA.

The San

filed a complaint

operations

are

exempt

from the FLSA under the doctrine of National League of Cities v.
Usery,
force

426

u.s.

the act,

833 (1976).

The Secretary counterclaimed to en-

and a SAMTA employee

(Garcia)

intervened seeking

backpay: a trade association joined on SAMTA's side.
The DC (WD Tex, Shannon, J.)
FLSA to

SAMTA was

initially held that applying the

unconstitutional

under

National

League.

On

appeal, this Court remanded for reconsideration in light of Unit-----~

ed

Transportation

(1982}
court

(LIRR}.
held

that

Union

v.

Long

Island

The

DC

the

history of state

transportation systems"

reaffirmed

(i.e.,

its

R.

Co.,

original
involvement

455

u.s.

holding.
in

678
The

"regional

roads and highways}, and of state

regulation of local mass transit, showed that mass transit was

af;..c::::._

There was no
history of federal regulation that would be eroded by recognizing
Tenth Amendment immunity.
tinguishable

In addition, mass transit was not dis-

from other government functions--such

as hospitals

and schools--that were explicitly mentioned in National League as
protected

from

FLSA regulation.

Finally,

the court

applied

a

test for determining immunized government functions that was developed by CA6 in Amersbach v. City of Cleveland,598 F.2d 1033,
1037 (1979), and found that mass transit met that standard.

·'
'·

Discussion
"Traditional

1.

governmental

parties all agree that the

~nly

functions."

The

DC

and

the

-

que StiO';) n this case i-s whether

the mass transit system here satisfies the 't~ ird par1 ' of the test
for Tenth Amendment immunity set out i ~odel v. Virginia Surface
Mining

&

Reel. Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 287-288 (1981), i.e., whether

the States' compliance with the FLSA will "directly impair their (.;,_e

ability 'to structure integral operations in areas of
governmental functions'"

(quoting National League).

traditional )~
The Court

in ~

National League defined such "traditional governmental functions"
primarily by example: it listed (in

dictum) ~ e

~/

prevention, po-

~lice protection ~anitatio ~public heal ~ parks and recreation,

~chools, and ~ospitals.
these functions

426

u.s.,

at 851, 855.

The Court called

"typical" of those performed by state and local

governments, adding, "Indeed, it is functions such as these which
governments are created to provide, services such as these which
the States have traditionally afforded their citizens."
851.

v

The Court

---

tion.

It held

in

LIRR elaborated on this rather

that operation of a commuter

traditional governmental function.

Id., at

sparse defini-

railroad was not a

The Court relied in part on

intimations in National League itself, but also determined that

LJIJf.(

operation of passenger railroads traditionally was a function of

~--------------------

private industry,

-----·--two of 17

(Only

~-------------------------

not local governments.

commuter

owned by a public entity.)

railroads

in

u.s.,

at 685-686.

United

States were

455

the

The Court went on, however, to dis-

avow reliance on "a static historical view" of functions immune

·,

from federal regulation.

!d., at 686.

It restated the test as

"whether the federal regulation affects basic state prerogatives
in such a way as would be likely to hamper the state government's
ability

to

fulfill

its

role

in

the

'separate and independent existence."'

Unionand

endanger

its

!d., at 686-687 (emphasis

added).
Leaving to one side the question of tradition or history,

it

seems to me that the operation of mass transit systems today falls
into the kind of basic state prerogative,. that were listed in Na-

-------------..__......._..,

tional League.

_......__

- -

.

All pf those things listed are functions that the

State regards as essential and

that,

for a variety of reasons,

the market cannot profitably provide at rates that the State is
willing
these

to tolerate.

services,

Similarly,

The State does not profit from providing

but offers

them on a

6~

ef!',

basis~

free or subsidized

it appears that mass transit became a public function

precisely because the market could no longer provide the service
-------~

•

(presumably as a

~

twa=

,..........._

.... ... ....

:--..

result of the flight of the middle class from

the cities and the growing role of the automobile in middle class
life).

Its

provide @

operation
of

is

oe rating

heavily
revenue.

subsidized:
Moreover,

currently,
the

fares ~

provision of

mass transit service has become over the last 25 years overwhelm-

t1 t.ftrJ10

ingly the business of the public.

~ngers

~true

travel

on

publicly-owned

systems

(although

it

are privately held) .1

Footnote(s) 1 will appear on following pages •

. .{ . .

,

.

~
~J-rc

err

Over 9 ~ of mass transit pas- ~
remains

that slightly less than half of the systems in the country

,

~

The central question in this case is whether two other facts
..........._.., ---

r;:::

'-" - - ......... ---....-

about mass transit remove that function from the realm of immu-

nized

activities: ~·

the public role in mass transit

"traditional," but arose only in the last 25 years:

2

~

is ~ ~.

~, ~J7....--L
4

States' acquisition of mass transit systems was made possible by ~
-~----

massive federal grants.
2.

~---

-··-- ·----

The role of "tradition."

There is no question that the

Court in National League repeatedly emphasized that it was those
functions that States traditionally have afforded their citizens
that were immunized.

And the Court in LIRR relied first on "the

historical reality that the operation of railroads is not among

lThis paragraph essentially tracks the test for "integral"
or "basic" or "traditional" state functions derived by CA6 in
Amersbach. Although the test makes no reference to tradition or
history, considered infra, pp. 5-6, it otherwise appears
successfully to synthesize the functions listed in National
League and the considerations set out in that case and in LIRR.
See Legal Foundation Amicus Br.
2 The DC relied on the history of state and local
involvement in local transportation generally, and the history of
state and city regulation of privately-owned mass transit, to
find that operation of mass transit was a "traditional"
governmental function.
Reliance on the first certainly was
misplaced.
Under the first view, anything vaguely related to
local transportation--such as car sales, or operation of a
junkyard (cf. Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 u.s. 794
(1976))--would be immunized if taken over by the government. The
second view has more merit, because it shows the kind of state
interest that is important. But regulation alone does not
indicate that the operation of the activity itself is a central
state function.
Just because the State regulates land use and
strip mining, cf. Hodel, does not mean that strip mining is an
essential public service critical to the role of the States in
our federal system.
If the strip mining industry collapsed in
Virginia and was taken over by the State, that alone would not
make it an essential public function, despite a long history of
state regulation. A history of state regulation is not
irrelevant, but it does not prove very much.

'

•·

the functions traditionally performed by state and local governments."

u.s.,

455

at 686 (emphasis in original).

But, as noted,
~

LIRR also

--- --------------

explicitly

rejected

view of state functions."

reliance on

"a static historical

-------

The Chief Justice wrote for a

Ibid.

S"~
,..___.....,-?
~

unanimous Court

that the

role of

"tradition"

in defining state

functions is merely as a signal of those activities that are
tal

to the role of

constitute

"basic

States
state

in our society,

prerogatives."

that

Id.,

is,

at

those

v~

t~

686-687,

It

would seem that a like role can be played by the pervasiveness of
a public activity--a nearly universal pattern of state ownership
and

provision of

suggests

a

service,

that the activity

function.

Otherwise,

as

even

is a

if

recently arisen,

basic or

likewise

integral governmental

society evolves and new functions are

taken up by government, the new functions could automatically be
subjected
ever

to

federal

thereafter

control.

become

It

is unlikely that

immunized,

since one of

the

they would
factors

to

look to is whether the federal government has sought to regulate
the

activity

(see

infra,

p.

9).

Eventually,

as new functions

replaced 6r dwarfed the traditional activities of States, National League would qe rendered a dead letter.
Given
transit
s h ould

the

lack

systems,
be

of

it

.

a

is
.~.-t

tradition
likely
I(

espec1ally pervasive

that

of

state

modern

to show

operation of mass
state participation

that mass

transit

is a

basic state prerogative.

Whether mass transit meets that test is

not

evident

obvious,

for

it

is

that

a

substantia]..

number

of

small, private transit systems continue to exist.
Nevertheless,
•
the fact that these make up a very small part of the market,

..

~

which is now overwhelmingly public, and that the move to publicownership appears to be a continuing trend,
transit

now

is

a

"traditional"

schools, hospitals, and the like.
3.

UMTA gra,nts.

suggests

governmental

that mass

function,

like

~

The appellants emphasize the fact that

federal government has played a

large

role

in

the

transfer o ( .- .

mass transit systems from public to private ownership.
tor seems to me relevant in two ways: §

,

th==.~

This fac-

it casts doubt on

whether the collapse of the private transit market would have led
to any public transit systems--i.e.,

whether mass transit is an

essential governmental activity; ~,

it makes the choice of

the State to run these systems, as opposed to the federal government,

seem to be a matter not of constitutional significance--

i.e.,

it casts doubt on whether this function,

tionally"

-

governmen ~ l,

is

also

if it is "tradi-

"traditionally"

linked

to

the

State.
The first point is not persuasive.

The very passage of the

UMTA shows that the elimination of mass transit was viewed as a
'

calamity of the greatest moment.

All governments

involved were

willing to spend huge sums to ensure that mass transit was continued.
The second point is more difficult.
fact that States,

The argument is that the

rather than the federal government, ending up

owning and running the mass transit systems is of little impor-

~~~

tance because the feds after all were paying fo 7 , them.
mer v.
(CA3

New Castle . Area Transit Auth.,

1982)

(making

approximately

this

677 F.2d 308,

argument).

Cf. Kra-

310,

n.

1

Put slightly

-

differently, the federal government allowed the States to take on
this function, so it hardly can be said to impair their basic or
traditional role for the federal government to nullify state control over that function.

~ere

American

are three answers.
society

tells

e

us

our background knowledge of

that

local

quin te ssent ia lly non federa 1 function.

It

----------~--~------------------------

ceivable

that

the

mass

transit

is practically

federal government would

run

is

a T~

incon-

intracity buses

and the like; the source of the funding does not change the es-

__________ -

---·- -·--·-·--· Thus,

sential nature of the
function.
__________.,

no party here has suggest-

ed that the choice of this form of operation in the UMTA grants
was

the

groups.

result

of

politics

or

some compromise

among

interest

It apparently was assumed that the States would be the

ones responsible

for

running

the

systems,

just as they are re-

sponsible for running police departments, schools, and hospitals.
All

of

these

receive

thought to be plainly

substantial

federal

grants but all

immunized in National League.

were

~,

it

would be a peculiarly static sort of federalism that tied whether
a function is immunized or not to whether it became a state function with federal or state monies.

This is similar to the argu-

ment above with regard to "tradition."
opment of the
quirky

Not only would the devel-

National League doctrine be tied to the somewhat

tvvrtli~J:

~eae£al4S~a~~

arrangements of the past, but I suspect very

little would be left to the doctrine over time.

We can expect

that an increasing amount that States do will involve substantial
federal

funding.

If

enough

States

adopt

the

function,

or

function has been per formed by the State for enough years,

the
that

activity

safely may

be considered a

"basic state prerogative."

Third, it should not be forgotten that the States and cities that
purchased their

transit systems contributed large sums as well.

In fact, the system in San Antonio apparently was purchased without any federal funds whatsoever.
This does not mean that Congress has no control over the programs

it funds.

Even if the program were one touching a

state prerogative," Congress might be able

"basic

to require adherence

to the requirements of the FSLA as a matter of its Spending Power,

rather

than its Commerce Power.

has not yet hinged receipt of

(It is clear that Congress

federal

transp6rtation grants on

~------------~~--~'-----~------------~----------with the FSLA--the UMTA specifically grants

compliance~

States

-------------.----------

broad latitude in making arrangements to continue the collective
bargaining

rights

of

their

previously private

employees.)

The

extent to which the Tenth Amendment limits the Spending Power was
explicitly left open in National League.
appear that Congress' power

Nevertheless,

i _t _ would

is at its greatest when it seeks to

regulate a subject so closely tied to the funds it is providing
as here.
The appellants make several other arguments against affirming.

These can be disposed of briefly.
4.

Erosion of federal authority.

The appellants argue that

immunizing public transit operations would, as in LIRR, allow the
States to "erode Jederal authority in areas traditionally subject
to federal statu tory regulation."

455 U.S.,

nothing to this argument in my view.
are not subject to anything

at 6 87.

There is

Private transit operations

like the comprehensive and specific

regulatory scheme at issue in LIRR.

Here,

the FLSA did not even

apply to private transit workers until relatively recently (1966
as to some workers, and 1974 as to others).

The only significant

federal law that long has applied to private transit and that can
be avoided by becoming publicly owned is the NLRA.
is

true of virtually all

formerly private

But the same

functions,

since the

NLRA applies to nearly all private commerce and contains a blanket exemption for state employees.
Balance of federal & state interests.

5.

three-part test set out in Hodel,
may be

situations

in which

In addition to the

the cases indicate that there

"the nature of the federal

advanced may be such that it justifies State submission."

u.s.,

452

League,

at 288, n.

426

u.s.,

interest
Hodel,

29; accord wyoming; LIRR; see also National

at 856

(Blackmun, J., concurring).

The SG ar-

gues that the federal interest here is of such a nature because
it

is

intimately connected to

systems

cross

state

interstate commerce--many transit

.
boundaries--and

because

coverage of public

transit employees is necessary to prevent unfair competition with
the private sector.

/~

SG Br. at 4 6.

The link to interstate commerce seems tenuous: the matter is
essentially a
boundaries.

local concern,
Moreover,

even if the locality crosses state

such interstate systems probably are gov-

erned by Interstate Compacts, which provide Congress with a more
precise means of control
§10.

over

them.

See

u.s.

Const.,

Art.

I,

Finally, this case involves no such interstate system.
The need to prevent unfair competition is also unpersuasive.

There is nothing special about this particular goal of commerce

...

regulation.

It would be present whenever there is both a public

and private sector funded by user fees, as when schools or hospiThus,

tals are regula ted.

much that a State does.

this claim would strip immunity from

Moreover,

it seems fantastical to speak

of unfair competition with the private sector when the market is
overwhelmingly public

and

the

public

s]to~j, s

heavily

subsi-

dized.
5.
ices.
is

Absence of demonstrated effect

c

n structuring of serv-

One point that has bothered me about affirming the DC here

that

appellees

have not

pointed convincingly

to any direct

effect applying the FSLA will have on States other than increasing costs.

The Court

in National League showed in some detail

how the overtime provisions of the act would interfere with commonly

accepted

See 4 2 6

ways

.
U • S • , at

103 s.ct.

of delivering

8 50 •

'

Similarly,

1054, 1061, n.

police

fire

protection.

the Court in EEOC v. Wyoming,

11 (1983),

ferent context that an effect on

and

suggested in a slightly dif-

"underlying sovereign choices"

was of greater concern than interference with "a generalized interest in efficient management."

The holding of the Court there,

moreover, plainly required some threshold of increased burden on
the State before a federal law would be seen to "directly impair"
a state function.

In this case, while there is some mention of

the problem of split shifts for bus workers, see APTA Br. at 21,
there is no suggestion that the act would interfere to any significant degree with such sovereign choices.
There

are

two answers.

both emphasized

First,

National League and Wyoming

that such actual proof of effect was not neces-

sary as long as one could forsee a "direct and obvious effect
on the ability of the States to allocate their resources."
S.Ct., at 1063.

103

~

Such an effect presumably can be expected in the

extra costs that overtime wage requirements will certainly bring
about.
FLSA an

Second,

it

exemption

is noteworthy that Congress
for

transit workers.

The

included

in

existence of

the
this

exemption--which was not entirely removed until 1974, and at that
time was carefully phased out--suggests that applying the act to
transit workers will have a significant impact on the States.

1.

Recommendation.

Affirm.

•,

March 12, 1984
GARCIA GINA-POW
82-1913 and 82-1951

Garcia and Donovan v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authority

MEMO TO FILE
Joe's
dictate

bench memo

this

only

is

to

thorough

identify

and well-reasoned.

-

without

I

elaboration

points that seem to indicate, persuasively, that we should
affirm.

This

is my

tentative

view after

a

preliminary

reading of the briefs and Joe's memorandum.
The Question
Does the San Antonio mass transit system satisfy the
third

part of

Hodel:

the Tenth Amendment immunity specified in

Whether

"directly

compelling

impair

[San

integral operations

compliance

Antonio's]

with

ability

FLSA

to

will

structure

.._____

in areas of traditional governmental

functions", quoting National League.
Discussion
National
governmental
fire

League's
functions"

prevention,

health,

parks

police

and

examples
included

-

protection,

recreation,

"traditional

of
without

limitation

santitation,

schools,

and

-

public

hospitals.

These

were

said

to

be

"typical"

of

services

that

"traditionally [have been] afforded their citizens."
Over the past quarter century, the operation of mass
transit

systens

responsibility.

has
The

become

a

free market could
-~-

essential

public

basic

service

[city J

state

not operate this
._

.__..--.

profitably.

Mass

transit

has

become a public function as evidenced by the fact that 94%
of

its

passengers

systems.

Only

publicly owned

nation-wide

-

45%

of

the

systems come

travel

on

publicly owned

operating

revenue

from fares.

of

In short,

the
they

are heavily subsidized by government.
Arguments to the Contrary
It is argued that two other aspects of mass transit
distinguish

it

First,

transit

Long

mass

Island

"static

from

Railroad

historical

National

League

type

functions.

is not a traditional function.
explicitly
view

of

rejected

state

reliance

functions".

But
on

a

Public

-~

functions, as the history of this country in the past half
century
levels
public

emphasizes,

are not

increasingly have
needs

enterprise.

not

static.

played

within

the

Governments

larger

roles

capability

at

all

in meeting
of

private

9jL%

A

second

argument

is

that

government

'--------------

distinguish this case from National Cities,
for

grants

and the need

such grants emphasizes that mass transits are not a

traditional function.
There

are

several

funding, A mass

transit

answers:

~~

function;
_...

( i i)

depending

on

is

(i)

Despite

distinctly

a

federal

non-federal

A state function does not cease to be such
whether

substantial

federal

funding

is

provided; and (iii) The concededly "traditional" state and
local functions such as schools, health, police, provision
and

maintenance

of

highways

now

all

receive

federal

funding in varying ways and amounts.
Absence of Evidence of Adverse Effect
In
applying

National
FSLA

League,

would

the

Court

interfere

opinion

with

delivering police and fire protection.
comparable showing was made.

noted

accepted

ways

that
of

In this case, no

But both National League and

Wyoming emphasize that actual proof of adverse effect was

------

not necessary.

A state should be free to allocate its own

resources, and this includes the right to determine wages

and hours - and work schedules - of its employees.
LFP, JR.

82-1913 GARCIA v. SAN ANTONIO
82-1951 DONOVAN v. SAN ANTONIO

Argued 3/19/84
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CHAMI!li!:RS OF"

THE CHIEF" JUSTICE

March 31, 1984

Re:

Nos. 82-1913, Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority
82-1951, Donovan v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:
I have concluded to affirm in this case.
Regards,

lfp/ss 11/13/84
MEMORANDUM
TO:

Ms. Penny Hazelton

FROM:

Lewis F.. Powell, Jr.

DATE:

Nov. 13, 1984

First, my thanks for the very real help you have
given my Chambers in connection with our interest in federalism and the adoption of the Tenth Amendment.
If you should be available for further research, I

am interested in another aspect of the legislative history:
The National Labor Relations Act, 29 USC §152(2): and LaborManaqement Reporting and Disclosure Act, 29 USC §8402(e)J
the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 USC S652(5)

1

and

the Employee Retirement Insurance Security Act, 29 USC
SS1003(b) (1), 1002(32): the Federal Power Act, 16 USC
S824(f).
In each of these statutes - as well as several
others - Congress exempted the states and their subdivisions.

I am interested in knowing why Congress exempts

states from certain of its major regulatory statutes but not
from others.

For example, the Fair Labor Standards Act, as

a result of amendments since its enactment, is now fully
applicable to the states and their subdivisons.

Perhaps the

legislative history of one or more of the statutes mentioned
above sheds some light on this question.
With many thanks.
L.F.P., Jr.
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Memorandum
TO:

Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

FROM: Penny A. Hazelton c~
Assistant Librarian for Research Services
DATE: November 16, 1984
RE:

States and Federal Regulatory Agencies

Thank you for the kind words expressed in your November
13, 1984 memo. However, I confess that Sara Sonet found the
materials you received on the Tenth Amendment question. I
have conveyed your gratitude to her. I am glad the Library
could be of service.
I am working on your interesting question about the
states and federal regulatory agencies. I will have something
before the end of the day today (Friday) .

PAH/dp

December 19, 19A4

82-1913 and 82-1951

Garcia v . San Antonio Metropolitan
'f'ransit, et al

Dear Bi1 J :
My dissent in this .r::ase was circulated this afternoon.
I have tried to def~nd ycur fine opinion in National LPague
of Cities. flavil"g constdered your reAsoninq more carefullv,
I have even a higher opinion of what you wrote in Leaque of
Cities than formerly .

If you have anv inclination to write separately, I
would of course welcome it.
I am sendtnq copi.eC3 of thi.9 notr! to the Chief and
Sandra . Suggestions from any of you wi.ll be carefully consider("d.

Sincerely,

Justice Rehnquist
cc - ThP. Chief Justice
Justice O'Connor
LFP/vde

.iu.prtntt ~ourt af tqt ~ittb .italt.G'

'Jlulfhtgtan, ~. ~· 2.tT~'l~
CHAMBERS OF"

/

JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR

December 20, 1984

No. 82-1913
No. 82-1951

Garcia v. San Antonio MTA
Donovan v. San Antonio MTA

Dear Harry,
I realize a great deal has been said already in
your opinion and in Lewis' dissent. Nevertheless, I plan to
add a few words of my own and I will try not to hold you up
for long.
Sincerely,

Justice Blackmun

Copies to the Conference

,jupumt <!fllltri of t4t ~b .ibdtg

._uJringhtu. ~. Of.

21lbi~~

CHAMBERS OF"

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

Re:

December 20, 1984

82-1913 - Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority
82-1951 - Donovan v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority

Dear Lewis:
I join your dissent.
Regards,

Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference
PPS:

I may have some thoughts later, but I'd like to get
the ball rolling.

December 26 , 1984

PERSONAL

82-l<H3

Dear

Garci.a v . San l\ntonio \1etr.opolltan

San~ri):

Upon my return to the Court todav I was qlad to find
your letter to Harry indicatinq that you wi1.1 write in this
case .
You may recalJ that I expressed tl-te hope that you would
write . After all, you and I ~re the only members of thP
Court who have had extended exoPrience in state and local
government . Your experience, of course, was of a more important character ~s mine was ltmjted to servi~q on Boards
and Commissions .
I hope that also you will ioin my opinion . If there
are chanqes that vou would like for me to make , I probably
would he qlad to accept your views .
Sincerely ,

Justice O' Connor
LFP/vde

~~--------------------------------~--~~-
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,j~rtmt

Qj:111td cf tqt 11tnittb ,jtab.$'

Jhurftingtcn, !t <!J:.

211,?~~

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE SANDRA DAY o'CONNOR

January 24, 1985

Re:

82-1913) Garcia v. San Antonio MTA
)

82-1951) Donovan v. San Antonio MTA

Dear Lewis,
I will be circulating my dissent in this
case shortly.
I would like to join your e~ellent
dissent also, but, frankly, I do not feel~omrorcable
with the citations to City of Akron v. Akron Center
for Reproductive Health on page 3 and in footnote 3 of
your dissent.
If you would not object to deleting
those references, I would welcome the opportunity to
join your dissent.
Sincerely,

Justice Powell

,itqtrttttt

Qillltd o-f t4t 'Jni.ttb .itatt,&'

'Jl~lfington. ~.

QJ.

2ll'biJ!t~

CHAMBER S OF

JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR

January 30, 1985

82-1913
82-1951

Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority
Donovan v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority

Dear Lewis,
Please join me in your dissenting opinion.
Sincerely,

Justice Powell

Copies to the Conference

February 11, 1985

82-1913 & 82-1951

Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit
l\uth.

Dear Sanrlra:

Sinc~relv,

Justice O'Connor
Copies to the Conference
LFP/vtie

'·
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82-1913 Garcia v. San Antonio (Joe)
HAB for the Court 3/31/84
1st draft 6/11/84
2nd draft 6/13/84
WJB 6/11/84 - does not want to reargue
Joined by JPS 6/12/84
TM does not want to reargue
SOC wants to reargue 6/11/84
LFP voted to reargue

,·,

....

82-1913 Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan (Annmarie)
HAB for the Court 10/5/84
1st draft 10/23/84
2nd draft 12/21/84
Joined by JPS 10/23/84
TM 10/24/84
WJB 10/25/84
BRW 10/29/84
LFP dissenting
1st draft 12/19/84
2nd draft 2/11/85
Joined by CJ 12/19/84
SDO 1/30/85
SOC dissenting
1st draft 1/25/85
2nd draft 1/30/85
3rd draft 2/12/85
Joined by LFP 2/11/85
LFP will dissent 10/23/84
SOC awaits dissents and may write separate 10/23/84
SOC will dissent 12/20/84

' '
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CHAMIS£RS OF"

THE CHIEF ..JUSTICE

October 5, 1984

Re:

No. 82-1913- Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authority
82-1951 -Donovan v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authority

Dear Bill,
Since it is "your ox" that is being "gored," will
you take on a dissent?
If, for any reason you'd prefer not, let me know.

cc:

Justice Powell
Justice O'Connor

October 8, 1984

83-1913 Garcia v. San Antonio
83-1951 Donovan v. Ran Antonio

near

Ch~ef:

Bill and I have talked and ~e agrees r s~ouJ~
write the dissent if agreeahle to you an~ Sandra.
I '"i 11, of course, try to rJemonstrate that the
"goring" was not of Sill's "ox", ~ut of the ConEtitution.

Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
lfp/ss
cc:

Justice Rehnquist
Justice O'Connor

I

''

' '·

'~

'~,·

".

·t

'

,jnvrtmt C!fltltrt ltf tqt ,nitd ,jtatt.t¥
Jhts'lri:ngton, ~. at. 2ll.;t'! ~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR

October 9, 1984

No. 83-1913
No. 83-1951

Garcia v. San Antonio
Donovan v. San Antonio

Dear Lewis,
It is certainly agreeable with me if you
take on the dissent in this case. As I indicated at
Conference, I may want to add a few thoughts of my
own on the subject.
Sincerely,

Justice Powell

cc:

The Chief Justice
Justice Rehnquist

lfp/ss

10/18/84
MEMORANDUM

TO:

Annmarie

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

DATE:

October 18, 1984

82-1913 Garcia
I have now had an opportunity to read your first
draft

of

a

dissent

undertaking

in

essentially

circulated

this

advance

Necessarily,

opinion.
adhere

this

in

to

last Term.

we

case.
of

have

the

our

I

appreciate
seeing

assumed

reasoning

the

that

of

your
Court

HAB

the

will

draft

he

There certainly will be changes,

perhaps substantial ones.l
I now record random thoughts in this memorandum
both for

you and me as reminders to myself.

possible points to be made in our opinion.
in

no

particular

priority.

order,

and

suggest

I

identify

I state them
no

particular

In the end, some may merit including in a draft

and others perhaps not.
1.
opinion

in

we should be careful not to undercut WHR' s
National

League

1 I am dictating
HAB's draft of last Term.

of

this

Cities.

without

I

recognize,

having

reread

...

....

2.

Annmar ie,

that

previously

I

am

retreating

expressed

redefining

the

that

basic

we

somewhat

should

standard.

been

reiterated

repeatedly

speak

Lets

felicitous way of acomplishing this.

from

the

in

find

view

terms
some

more

As the standard has

(Hodel,

Long

Island

R.,

and

FERC), we should not join HAB now in condemning it.
standard
court

is a sound generalization,

must

address

and

weigh

interests that are at issue.
2.
Court's

use -

will,

opinion

federalism.
Harris,

we

There

u.s.

401

is

37

an

standard
quote

under

long

from

Long

federal

state

that

the

principles

of

in

v.

quote

Younger

that we should

to demonstrate the ongoing

See Pennhurst last Term.

balancing

Island

and

emphasize

accepted

excellent

explaining

the

in applying it a

(I believe at 44-45)

vitality of federalism.
In

the

course,

with other authorities -

3.

but

The

Your draft does this.

of

rejects

of

R.R.

the

application

approach,
at

we

page

can

686-as

of

the

use

the

to

the

application of the standard, and the fact that it is not a
static one.
4.

It may be helpful to demonstrate by examples

that the test is not static.

HAB's opinion last Term did

this

reason.

but

for

a

different

For

decades

the

.Jo

providing of public schools was not a traditional state
function in the sense that it had ancient roots.

Indeed,

we could argue that local transportation - purely in terms
of

tradition

other

-

fits

functions

collection,
streets.

more

such as

etc.

neatly

into the

schools,

standard

public health,

Transportation

depends

on

than

garbage

roads

and

State and local governments always have provided

these essentials of "transit":

e.,

i.

to facilitate the

movement of people so essential to any form of civilized
life.

Roads

services.

and

They

streets

have

been

are

still

improved,

state
and

the

and

local

means

of

transportation have changed from horse-drawn carriages to
streetcars,

buses and now subways.

To be sure, most of

these early methods of moving people about were privately
operated, but this could be left in private hands only so
long as they were economically viable.
providing

an

essential

public

The function was

service,

and

one

long

regulated only by the states.
Annemar ie,
too far or

I don't want to carry the foregoing

to overemphasize it.

It may be worth only a

footnote, but I'd like your thinking as to its merit.
5.

The

AFL-CIO's

brief

argues,

as

its

first

point, that the providing of all "goods and services" may

'*·

be subjected to federal regulation regardless of whether
the goods and services are viewed as traditional or not.
HAB' s

opinion goes

beyond

this

and would

hold

that

the

only limit on the Commerce Cause is the "structure" of the
federal system.
6.

You have commented on federal funding simply

in a sentence.

After we see HAB's new opinion, it should

be

-

pointed

out

perhaps

in

a

footnote

-

that

federal

funding has now become pervasive - and perhaps necessarily
so in view of the extent to which state and local revenues
have

been

excise

drained

taxes.

federal

If

off

primarily

"funding"

constitutional

by

income

and

the

scope

of

states

could

be

criticism

of

federal

determined

authority

the

abolished.

* * *
This
draft.
well

I

memorandum

think

written.

implies

no

the essence of your
No

doubt

the

draft

draft
will

your

is sound and
have

to

be

rewritten - and probably expanded - when HAB's opinion is
circulated.

L.F.P., Jr.

ss

lfp/ss 10/22/84

AN SALLY-POW
82-1913 Garcia

Comments on HAB's Opinion of Last Term:
Since

1913

Texas

has

regulate "carriage for hire".
provided

for

and other
hire.

franchising,

authorized

localities

to

Since 1915 San Antonio has

insurance,

safety requirements

regulations of passenger vehicles operated for

P. 2, 3.
Not until 1961 did Congress extend the FLSA to

employees of private mass transit systems.
In
extended

1966,

to

for

state

and

the
local

first

P. 4.

time,

government

the

Act

was

employees.

The

application of the Act to public schools and hospitals was
sustained

in Maryland v.

Wirtz overruled

respect

employees.

392 u.s 183

(1968),

in National League of Cities.

Not until 1974 was
with

Wirtz,

P. 5.

4,

P.

the Act made fully applicable -

to overtime

limitations

-

to mass

but
5.

even

transit

This history makes clear that Congress

was half-a-century behind Texas in regulating any aspect
of local transit systems.
The

DC

in

this

history of local regulation.

case

relied

heavily

on

this

P. 7.

,...

•'•

..

•·

2.

HAB

recognized

the

distinction

between

the

authority of Congress to regulate private activity and its
authority

to

impose

governmental entity.
some reason -

federal

regulation

of

HAB makes the point -

a

state

perhaps with

that if mass transit is exempt it must be

because it is owned and operated by the city rather than
because the operations are "local".

P. 8.

HAB devotes almost a full page of "string cites"
he says illustrates the difficulty of determining what is
a

"traditional

governmental

function".

P.

9,

10.

Annmarie can distinguish a good many of these cases.
Perhaps the centerpiece of HAB' s
Term was

the

principle"
the

in

"identifying an organizing

that places cases on one side of the line or

other.

headway

"difficulty"

argument last

He

says

in defining

that
the

"this

Court

has

made

scope of governmental

protected under National League of Cities".

little

functions

P. 10.

On the same page that HAB finds no "organizing
principle",

he

speaks of

the Court's difficulty

in Long

Island in developing a "workable standard for traditional
governmental functions".
HAB
standards

does

involve

recognize

that

many

"constitutional

'undoubted gray areas'", citing Fry v.

3.

u.s.

United States, 421

542, 558, and that we decide on a

"case-by- case" basis the applicability of the particular
constitutional provision.

P. 11.

As Annmarie has noted, HAB devotes several pages
to the argument that the Court's difficulty "in the field
of tax immunity"
in

the

is illustrative of the problem involved

application

of

the

League

of

Cities

Annmarie meets this argument very well.

standard.

We may think it

desirable to expand her response after we see Harry's new
opinion.
HAB states that in Long Island we "rejected the
possibility of making

immunity

[from federal

regulation)

turn on a purely historical standard of 'tradition'"·
15.

He

then

goes

on

to

say

that

the

defect

in

P.
the

historical approach is that:
It prevents courts from accommodating changes in
the historic function of states, changes that
have resulted in a number of once private
functions like education being assumed by the
states
and
their
subdivisions."
[see
also
footnote 9)
P. 15.
HAB concludes

that

"reliance on history as

an

organizing principle results in line drawing of the most
arbitrary sort".

P. 15.

Then, HAB rejects "non-historical standards" as
being "just as unworkable as a historical standard".

P.

16.

HAB

finds

"a

more

fundamental

problem"

in

applying the League of Cities standard - the same problem
"that explains why the Court was never able to develop a
basis for the governmental/proprietary distinction in the
inter-governmental tax immunity cases.

P • 16 ,

17 •

Th is

fundamental problem is that:
"Neither
the
governmental/proprietary
distinction nor any other that purports to
separate important governmental functions from
other ones can be faithful to the role of
federalism in a democratic society". P. 17
But

HAB's

explanation

unfaithfulness to the role of
follow.

of

his

theory

of

federalism is not easy to

Indeed, he devotes less than a page to an opaque

explanation of this

"more fundamental problem" before he

comes to his conclusion on p. 18:
"We therefore reject, as unsound in principle
and unworkable in practice, a rule of state
immunity from federal regulation that turns on a
judicial appraisal of whether a particular
governmental
function
is
'integral'
or
'traditional'". P. 18

5.

After

finding

a

"more fundamental problem"

for

rejecting the League of Cities standard (p. 16), HAB moves
forward a few pages to another

"more fundamental reason"

for

"the

this

rejection,

namely:

sovereignty

states is limited by the Constittuion itself".
It

is

recognized

significant

that

measure

the

of

states

sovereign

of

the

P. 19, 20.

"retain

a

authority"

(citing

my

dissent in Wyoming) , but HAB says they do so "only to the
extent

that

the

Constitution

has

not

divested

them

of

their original powers and transferred those powers to the
federal government".

P. 20.

He goes on to say the Court has "no license to
employ free standing conceptions of state sovereignty when
measuring

congressional

Clause".

P.

permits

the

sovereignty
This

view

In

21.

federal
except

simply

authority

other

words,

government
where

reads

to

explicity
the

Tenth

under
the

the

Commerce

Commerce

eliminate
granted

Clause

all
the

Amendment out

state

states.
of

the

Constitution.
Having disposed of the Tenth Amendment, HAB then
moves to his novel thesis that the Framers perceived that
state sovereignty would be protected by "the structure of
the federal government itself".

P. 22.

He finds that the

states

are

protected

because

the

states were

over

the

House

of

from

"overreaching

"vested with

by

Congress"

indirect

influence

Representatives and

the Presidency by

their control of electoral qualifications and their role
in

presidential

elections",

direct influence in the Senate".

As
government
which

illustrative

is

the

federal

of

states,

funds

they

and

how

more

P. 22. 1

protective

HAB cites the

are made

"given

were

available

the

federal

lavishness with
to

the

states -

including the funding of "such services as police and fire
protection, education, public health and hospitals, parks
and

recreation,

lavishness
benefit

and

sanitation".

P.

23,

24.

This

is more accurately explained by the political

seen

by

members

of

Congress

in

making

money

available to their home districts or states.
HAB cites
exempt

states

OSHA,

the

cites

these

Congress

and

Sherman

any

as

a

number

their
Act

time

could

statutes

subdivisions,

and

evidence

of

that

including

several others.

of

generosity.

make

all

of

expressly
NLRA,

P.

24.

HAB

Under

his

view

these

statutes

applicable to the states just as it has done with FLSA.

7.

HAB
example

of

says

"the

something

constitutional

scheme

fundamental
being

limitation

'fundamental')

imposes on

[another
that

the

the Commerce Clause to

protect the states as states is one of process rather than
one of result."

P. 25.

Finally,
restraint"

on

HAB

federal

identifies
authority

the
is

"a

"only

substantive

requirement

that

Congress not attempt to single out the states for special
burdens or otherwise discriminate against them".

P.

25.

HAB cites no case authority for this expansive view of the
Constitution.
retains

It will

be

interesting to see whether he

this extreme view when he writes for

the Court.

He does cite M'Cullough v. Maryland, as resting in part on
concerns about discrimination.

* * *
My rereading of HAB 's opinion again shocks me.
He

rejects,

sovereignty
explicitly

in

effect,

protected
stated.

by

the
the

existence

of

Constitution

He construes

any

state

except

where

the Commerce Clause as

preempting the Tenth Amendment even though several states
would

not

have

ratified

adoption of that Amendment.

the

Constitution

[Annmar ie:

without

the

Ask the library -

',

;-

'·

8.

perhaps Penny -

to give us the record evidence of why the

lOth Amendment was added.]
As I

now read HAB's opinion,

it goes beyond the

AFL-CIO brief's view that "all goods and servies" provided
by the states are

subject to complete

federal government.
L.F.P., Jr.
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No. 82-1913 Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit

Authority
No. 82-1951 Donovan, Secretary of Lal:x:>r v. San Antonio

Metropolitan Transit Authority

Dear Harry,
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Dear Harry,
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Justice Blackmun
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Dear Harry:
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dissenting opinion.
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GAR GINA-POW
To:

Annmarie

From:

LFP, JR.

Re:

82-1913 and 82-1951 - Garcia v. San Antonio
Over the weekend I read HAB's opinion of October

23 with some care.
opinion

of

last

present

opinion

I did not have with me at home his
As

June.
is

I

simply

significant additions.

recall,

a

large

incorporated,

but

part

the

there

are

You mentioned the omission of his

"discrimination" point.
In
myself,

any
I

event,

perhaps

note points

as

a

memory

refresher

that we may consider -

for

some quite

general and others specific.
1.

A major

curiosity

of

his

proports to support "federalism".

opinion

is

that

it

For example, he states

that League of Cities is "inconsistent with principles of

p.

federalism"

2.

Again,

no

"distinction"

that

"proports to separate our important governmental functions
can be faithful to the role of federalism in a democratic
society."

p. 17.

Federalism duel

federal

and

if

it means

state

anything

system

of

-

our

refers

to

country.

the
It

.,

,

'·'

2.

necessarily recognizes that the state's have a major role
that

cannot

concedes

be

that

the state

voided

by

the

federal

government.

"some sovereign authority

(p.

19),

but never

is

HAB

retained"

identifies it.

P.

20.

by
At

another point, HAB states that the "states unquestionably
do

'retain

a

significant

measure

(quoting my dissent in Wyoming).

of
P.

state
20.

authority'"

But he limits

that in the next few sentences of his opinion
[Annmarie:
It is important for us to
address what federalism means.
Some of the
decisions of this Court will be quite helpful.
[Secondary authority also should be examined.]
2.

HAB concedes that a "case by case" approach might

"develop a workable standard".
pages

of

his

"traditional

opinion

function"

are

P.

devoted

standard

of

But the first 18

11.

to

rejecting

National Cities.

then concludes that no

other standard is workable.

is

"balancing"

no

mention

of

a

the

analysis

that

He

There
is

familiar in constitional cases.
[Did
not
HAB
mention
balancing
his
concurring opinion in League of Cities? Do you
know of any decisions of this Court that apply a
balancing analysis in a Commerce Clause case?
We might ask Lynda or the Library for help on
this.]

so

3.

3.

You have a good answer to HAB's reliance on the

"governmental/proprietary"
taxation.

function

distinction

in

Were the earlier cases ever expressly overruled

or merely reinterpreted?

4.
interest

10,

In

n.

in

being

meaningless

15,

p.
free

HAB

from

genuflecting

as

refers

federal
he

to

the

"state

regulations"

subordinates

the

a
state

interest to the Commerce Clause.
5.

After

rejecting

HAB

considers

standard,

"uniquely

historial":

"traditional

functions"

as

and

"history":

"non-

function":

and

rejects

govermental

"necessary governmental services",
HAB

does

not

mention

(P. 15-16).

"balancing"

But again

weighing

or

a

the

respective interests of governments in the federal system.

6.
problems"

Harry has again identified two "more fundamental
with

League

standard can be
federalism".

of Cities.

found

that

P. 16-17.

is

The

first

"faithful

to

is
the

that

no

role of

On page 17, after this statement,

the opinion curiously seems to wonder off and talk about
the

opportunity

non-elected
interfere

of

states

federal
with

representatives".

to

judiciary
action

of

"experiment",
not

being

"elected

and

about

competent

a
to

legislative

P. 16, 17.

..

"..

'

.
<'
•I

•

4.

Annmarie, we may take a jab at HAB for this
sort of talk.
He is not concerned about the
competency of an unelected federal judiciary to
read
the
Tenth
Amendment
out
of
the
Constitution.
Nor
is
it
self-evident
how
conveying
virtually
unlimited power
on the
federal government enhances the ability of the
various states to "experiment".
HAB's "logic"
simply eludes me.
7.
finds,

Repeating

the

as a second

argument

he

made

last

"more fundamental reason"

Term,

HAB

for holding

that Congress has power to regulate wages and hours of all
state

and

local employees

is

that

"state sovereignty is

limited by the Constitution itself".
After

conceding

that

"some

P. 19.

sovereign

authority

is

retained", he does not identify it except the provision of
the

Constitution

integrity".
8.
P.

20.

protects

"state

territorial

P. 21.

The opinion relies on a quote from Justice Field.
The quotation,

purpose

and

substant

Field, dissenting
368,

that

401,

said

though quite general, supports the
of

the

Tenth

in B&O Railroad Co.
that

the

Amendment.
v.

Constitution

Justice

Baugh, 149

u.s.

"recognizes

and

perserves the autonomy and independence of the states .•• ",
and that federal "supervision over either the legislative
or judicial action of the states is in no case permissible

6.

Rather

than

supporting

HAB's

argument

that

the

structure protects the states, the rationale and decision
of the Court in this case make perfectly clear that the
"protection"
"grace",

that

exists

present

is

a

that can be withdrawn at any time.

must mean more than this.
system

at

if

authority

the
only

state
as

a

matter

of

Federalism

Can there be a genuine federal

components
matter

of

of

the

grace

by

system
the

have

federal

component?
11.

Of

Congress -

course,

HAB 's argument

and perhaps to a

is we can trust

the

less extent the President -

not to denigrate the role of the states because the people
of all of the states elect the legislative branch and the
head of the executive branch.

As we have discussed, HAB

cites no authority for this and we know of none with the
possible

exception

of

some

secondary

writing.

HAB's

opinion reflects a unrealistic - if not singularly naive view

of

how

the

political

system works

in our

country

today.
In the early years of our country, Congress met only
briefly in the course of a year.

Its members were drawn,

in large part, from citizens of some prominence in various
careers -

citizens who spent most of each year

in their

'<

•

'·

'
'. {

7.

home districts or

Now,

states.

professional politicians who by

law

against

branch of

the

holding

responsibilities.
relatively

new

phenomena

"special intersts group".
of these:

employment.

government.

Moreover,

is composed of

I believe - are restricted

private

national

Congress

as

in

They

we

have

national

They

have

are

no

state

discussed,
politics

a

is

the
the

For years there have been some

e.g., veterans groups

to join), and organized labor.

(but I was never willing

Today, the range of groups

and PACs that lobby regularly is legion.
12.
that

A major

his

flaw

reliance

in HAB • s

on

"structure"

"democracy"

federal government itself.

reasoning

focuses

only

on

is
the

His opinion overlooks the fact

that the most effective democracy

is at the lcoal level

where the people are close to the local problems, and know
and

have

access

to

the

people

who

are

councils and county board of supervisors.
these

levels

also

have

family

members

elected

to city

The people at
who

are

in

various services performed by the local goverments.
state
are

legislatures,

drawn

within

the

from

the

state.

the
The

none of which meet the year around,
various

professions

and

employments

A state legislature therefore

is far

more responsive to the state electrate than the Congress

.,, ..

8.

is to any particular state interest.
deal of writing
effect

that

processes
influential

- perhaps in some of our cases -

the

is
at

There must be a good

public

participation

greater,

better

the

and

state

in

democratic

informed,

local

levels

to the

and
than

more
in

the

Congress or the federal bureaucy.
13.

If HAB mentions the Tenth Amendment,

my reading of his opinion.
us

with

Amendment

some
and

history
its

of

purpose.

it escapro

I hope that Penny has provided
the

adoption

This

Court

of
also

the
must

Tenth
have

written about it a number of times.
LFP, Jr.

'.

5.

except

as

to

matters

by

the

Constitution

specifically

authorized or delegated to the United States."
nothing

in

authorizes

the

Commerce

Congress

state employees.

to

Clause

regulate

that

the

There is

"specifically"

wages

and

hours

of

The Commerce Clause is no more specific

than the Tenth Amendment in the language used.
9.

In purporting to illustrate the "effectiveness of

political

power"

(P.

23,

24),

HAB

emphasizes

federal

grants to state and local services such as police, fire,
schools,

santitation,

etc.

In

commenting

on

this,

we

could note that by virtue of the "spending power" Congress
has

exercised

substantial

control

over

state

and

local

affairs, but I

know of no decision that holds or implies

that

granting

the

mere

of

federal

funds

without

a

positive reservation of regulating authority - establishes
a

Commerce Clause

benefit

from

the

right
grants.

to control
See

the

activities

Pennhurst

I

that

that

may

be

relevant.
10.

HAB cites a number of federal statutes that have

not been extended to cover state employees or activities:
NLRB,

LMRA,

OSHA,

Power Act. - P. 24.

ERISA,

the

Sherman

Act,

the

Federal

~~~
~ ~
lfp/ss 09/07/84

82-1913 and 82-1951 Garcia v. San Antonio Transit

Donovan, Secretary of Labor v. San Antonio Transit
As

of

the

date

of

this

memo,

the

following

briefs have been filed in addition to those we had before
us last Term:

Principally two briefs supporting reversal,

one by the SG and the other by Larry Gold {and others) on
behalf of Garcia.
supporting

At least three briefs have been filed

affirmance,

two

that

are

rather

persuasive:

brief on behalf of National League of Cities and various - other

state organizations

{League of Cities brief), and

one - curiously enough - by the Colorado Public Employees
Retirement Association.

I have not seen a supplemental

brief on behalf of San Antonio Transit Authority.
The

additional

question

that

we

asked

to be

reargued was:
"Whether or not the principles of the lOth
Amendment as set for th in ::.:.Na=t~i~o==n.=::a.=l___;L=7-e=-a=-g""::u~e--:o:...::f=426 U.S.
833,
should be
Cities v. Usery,
reconsidered?"

Arguments for Reversal
The SG has filed a curious brief.
"some

••

~

j

clarification

of

the

test

for

He says that

intergovernmental

2.

immunity

established

desirable •
case

is

in

National

League

of

Cities

is

but the key principle articulated in that

,,

sound

and

enduring

constitutional

doctrine.

Exactly what "clarification" the SG thinks is appropriate
is not entirely clear.
reverse

the

DC.

Whatever it is, he would have us

Throughout

his

brief,

the

SG

"carries

water on both shoulders", arguing that federalism and the
lOth

Amendment

are

basically sound.
clarified

in

vi tal

and

that

League

of

Cities

is

Nevertheless, League of Cities should be

accordance

with

the

SG's

proposed

test

as

follows:
"
. the test must be whet h_er at the time the
federal goverment first entered the field with
regul a t ory-reg is lation, the states had generally
established themselves with fi"ied p atterns of
organization as p rovid e(_? _ p f
the particular
s.ervj.ce.
Absent ....such a long-sta'na 1ng tradi tion
of state activity in a field, federal regulation
simply cannot be said impermissibly to trench
upon state prerogatives."
In applying this test, the SG makes the familiar
argument:
municipal

transit
service

of

service
long

is

not

standing".

"an
It

established

was

a

private

enterprise until only about 20 years ago, and was feasible
only

because of

"massive

federal government.

financial

assistance"

from

the

When the Fair Labor Standards Act was

3.

amended

in

include

employees

would

1966

have

by

the addition of

of

public

suggested

unconstitutional.

transit

that

Thus,

language

companies,

the

Act

as

SG

says

that

the

that would
no

amended

one
was

appellee's

"argument depends entirely upon recognition of a rule of
creeping

unconstitutionality,

i.e.,

that

political

and

economic developments subsequent to enactment" resulted in
unconstitutionality.

Br., p. 27, 28.

* * *
My Comments on SG''s Brief

The
is

a

clever

argument of

"creeping

debating point.

It

unconstitutionality"

is consistent with

the

SG's proposed "test" which would focus on which government
"first entered the field with regulatory legislation - the
state or federal government".

Thus, the SG prefers a rule

that would establish constitutionality by "who gets there
first".
seems

On

their

appealing.

face,

neither

There

is,

of

these

however,

a

formulations
significant

difference.
As the amicus brief of National League of Cities
argues
state

rather
are

not

persuasively,
static.

Constitution was adopted:

They

the

legitimate

were

not

powers

frozen

when

of

a

the

4.

"Just as state powers are not a closed
catalogue, so too they are not static.
Rather,
they grow and change over time, as necessitated
by new economic technological and demographic
facts.
Thus,
over
time,
states and
local
governments have often begun to provide new
services needed by citizens; such services have
included
public
schools,
hospitals,
fire
departments,
sanitation
facilities,
airports
and, as in this case, mass transit."
Counsel

quotes

from

Wilson to the effect that:

a

publication

by

question

the opinion of

of

growth,

and

Woodrow

"The question of the relation
• be

cannot

of the states to federal government
settled

by

any one generation.
every

successive

is a

It

state

of

our

political and economic development gives it a new aspect,
makes it a new question • . • "

P. 13.

The relevant provisions of the Constitution have
not

changed

amendments
neither

since

were

the

substantial

its

added

in

adoption
1790.

federal

nor

state

number

of

the

commonplace:

schools,

and

Yet,

the
as

of

governments
services

hospitals,

first
that

ten
date,

provided

that

clinics,

are

any
now

garbage

collection, public sewerage, street lights, airports, etc.
Under
was

the
first

SG' s

argument whichever one of

undertaken,

or

subjected

to

these services
legislation,

.,.

-.

>

'·

,,

....
'

,.

5.

determined

which

government

could

constitutionally

regulate it.
Apart
result

in

states.

from other problems,

different
It

may

the SG's test would

constitutional

well

be

that

rules

some

in

different

cities

owned

and

operated their own mass transit before the FLSA purported

l ' 1,·-lf!Y1-~~ i

to cover municipal employees.

12.10

(.s-~ -5~' ~)

Brief on Behalf of Garcia (Larry Gold)
This
labor.

first,

be overruled.
state

"the

essential

that

the

position of

organized

It makes two

National League of Cities should

Second, even if it were correct in holding

sovereignty

Clause power,
(i)

reflects

It is straightforward and drastic.

arguments:

that

brief

places

a

limit

on

the

two reasons

that limit is inapplicable for

provision
part of

good~ and

of

t\

state

services

sovereignty",

and

Commerce

is
(ii)

not

an

"federal

regulation of political subdivisions of a state does not
infringe state sovereignty".
One can make a reasoned argument for overruling
League of Cities depending upon one's basic perception of
our federal form of government.
in

this

brief

majority of

...

are

so

extreme

The other arguments made
that

I

cannot

this Court would accept them.

If

believe

s

a

"good and
A

6.

services" are not a part of state sovereignty, the federal
government

could

regulations -

preempt

virtually

all

state

laws

and

including police and fire services, medical

services, etc.

* * *
Arguments of the Amici Briefs Urging Affirmance
I
rebuttal

of

have

noted

the

above

SG's

arguments.

affirmatively that applying
to harmonize
must

be

Justice

a

the

National

League of Cities'
Its

brief

argues

the principles of federalism

roles of federal and state governments

"balancing"

Blackmun,

in

process.
his

League

The

brief

of

Cities

11
..
l.
op1n1on,
argue d f or a b
a anc1ng
approac h •

notes

that

concurring

The brief also

says that Justice O'Connor made a similar argument in FERC
v•

Miss iss i pp i ,

others

favoring

4 56

U• S .

742 •

affirmance,

This

rely

on

brief,
Younger

as
v.

well

Harris

which states that federalism means:
~

as

"a system in which there is sensitivity <It' the
legitimate interests of both State and National
Goverments,
and
in
which
the
National
Government,
anxious
though
it
may
be
to
vindicate and protect federal rights and federal
interests, always endeavors to do so in ways
that
will
not
unduly
interfere
with
the
legitimate activities of the States.
It should
never be
forgotten
that this slogan,
'Our
Federalism,' born of the early struggling days
of our Union of States, occupies a highly

7.

important place in our Nation's history and its
future." p. 7,8.

The brief also relies on Fry v.
421

u.s.

United States,

542, 547, n. 7 - a case that I should review.

The

amicus

brief

filed

on

behalf

of

Colorado

Public Employees Retirement Association, makes an argument
that

has considerable appeal.

It urges

reaff irmance of

the

"fundamental

of

lOth

articulated

principles

the

in National League of Cities".
~

in that case is

"sensitive to balance of

must

between

be

system.

struck

1\

the

sovereign

Amendment

The decision
interests that

in

our

federal

It then states:

"When stripped of
tis broad constitutional
overtones, National League of Cities holds only
that Congress may not exercise its Commerce
power to legislate the " compensation paid~ to
employees
of
states
ana
their
politlcal
~
s~s1ons.
Congressionar-Tntrusion into the
I'_.... amount or revenues that a state may allocate to
f~
'-~ its employees is a direct assault upon a state's
~ability
to
maintain
its
'separate
and
,
independent existence. '
Indeed, a state onlx_
4
~
may act through its employees.
The instanc~
A - ~
case accordingly should not be used as a vehicle
_J.for
reconsidering ei"ther
the Constitutional
1 ,A~~ ~
~~
~
foundations of National League of Cities or the
Ov ~
test that has been developed for assessing
_j_~f J,o claims of state immunity from federal Commer~
Clause legislation.
Regardless of the ul tim'"te
~
limits of Tenth Amendment immunity, this case
~/1/f/ may b""' decided narrowly by following the rule

~

,.~~

'·

·.
'·

8.

formulated in National League of Cities and EEOC
v. Wyoming that the q om[>ensation p aid to state
employees, including public transit workers, may
not be prescribed by Congress." p. 4.
The
because

it

foregoing

would

be

makes

easy

a

to

lot of

apply.

sense,

primarily

It would

actually

extend National League of Cities since the greater part of
a

state budget -

subdivisions
provide
demands.

the

both

is
goods

for

the

devoted

to

and

state government and
employment

services

This probably would

that

of

the

people
public

its
to
now

be viewed as a broadening

rather than a limiting of National League of Cities.
The

brief

also

makes

a

good

point

in

following language:
"If there is to be consistent application of
constitutional
doctrine,
congress I
Commerce
Clause powers cannot be dependent upon judicial
resolution of the thorny fiistorical question of
whether some or ~ all states were the first
pi.QViders of a particular function or service.
In this case, the proision of transit services,
or more narrowly, the payment of compensation to
public transit eymployees,
is
the sort of
integral state function that should not be
regulated by Congress." p. 5.

* * *
Miscallaneous Points

the

9.

The SG argues that courts should be reluctant to
make

judgments

such

as

question

as

to

which

services

to

the

public

political process".
I

would

National
of

the

should

League

of

sovereigns
be

left

Cities.

should

to

the

The

perform

"national

See pp. 13, 16 of the SG's brief.
inquire

whether

it

would

not

be

more

democratic to leave this question, if it is to be left to
the political process,
the

respective

states.

to that process as it operates in
The

state

governments

are

far

closer to the people, and more familiar with their needs,
than

the

government

in

Washington.

Moreover,

they

are

less likely to be dominated by the special interest groups
that more often than not control federal legislation and
regulations.

~

f

~~~-

UfJ!..t?f!__

~ '\L--'

~~~~ .
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BENCH MEMORANDUM

To:

Justice Powell

From:

Annmarie

Nos.

82-1913 and 82-1951

September 22, 1984

Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority et al
Donovan v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority
et al
Background
JUSTICE

BLACKMON'S

general claims:
426

U.S.

833

~,
(1976)

proposed

majority

opinion

makes

three

that National League of Cities v. Usery,
correctly

held

that

the

federal

commerce

power is limited by the role of the states in the federal system:

~
limits,

that

t~ standard

i.e.,

"traditional

whether

which has evolved for

the

governmental

exercise
functions,"

...

of

determi~ing

federal
is

both

power

these

reaches

unworkable

and

l

2.

inconsistent with the principles of federalism on which National

rests; ~- that the states' role in the
~
, ......
1
federal system is amply protected by the f egislative process and
-----=;,___---..__::.____
League of Cities

-----~

thus

~

'U1Ii'L -

~

that

the only substantive protection necessary is that
--------~----------------------------I think
legislation not discriminate against states.

federal

there are a number of problems with these claims that should be

---------,

addressed in dissent.
Discussion
I have organized this discussion into two major sections.
Part

I,

I

--

discuss

alternative to the
enactments.

problems

with

test of state

In Part

II,

I

JUSTICE

BLACKMON's

In

proposed

immunity from Commerce Clause

address his criticisms of the test

that the Court has developed in National League of Cities and its

progeny.

r.
A. Procedural Protection for States as States
Although JUSTICE BLACKMON states that he accepts the holding
of National League of Cities that the role of the states in the
federal

system

limits

the

federal

commerce
.

h

explicitly eschews any attempt to def1ne t ose

clause
.

.

power,

1):-f

he

.

l1m1ts. ~ Follow1ng

JUSTICE BRENNAN's dissent in National League of Cities, JUSTICE

--------------BLACKMON argues

the exercise of

~

that the limitations the constitution imposes on
the commerce power

with

respect

inhere in the structure of the federal government.
Thus,

he

~--------------------------------

concludes

that

the

"fundamental

to the states
Draft at 23.

limitation

that

the

constitutional scheme imposes on the Commerce Clause to protect

,

3.

the

'States

result."

as

States'

is

one

of

process

rather

than one of

Id. at 25.

JUSTICE BLACKMON is surely correct that the Framers intended
the structure of the federal government to protect the interests
of the states.

Nevertheless, I think it is a long step from that

proposition to the view that the fundamental protection of state
sovereignty under the constitution is one of process and not of
JUSTICE BLACKMON's

substance.

dissent,
the

does

not

President

states

from

opinion,

explain

and

why

members

federal

of

like

JUSTICE

BRENNAN's

the

states'

roles

Congress

overreaching

under

protects
the

in
the

Commerce

While senators may be elected from the various states,
once in office they are members of the federal government.
JUSTICE

BLACKMON's

approach,

z=-

---

';

.

these

federal

judges of the limits of their own power.

officials

Under

are

the

It is not intuitively

-~

clear how the constitutional provisions providing for state input

\

in the electoral process guarantee that particular exercises of
the

Commerce

sovereignty.

Clause
JUSTICE

power

do

not

BLACKMON's

infringe

opinion

on

does

residual
not

state

explain his

reasoning on this point.
Moreover, as far as I can tell, the Court has never abdicated
responsibility for assessing the constitutionality of challenged
action solely beca! se affected parties theoretically are able to

----

look out for their own interests.
National

League

of

Cities,

a

As JUSTICE REHNQUIST noted in
much

stronger

argument

about

structural protections could have been made in Buckley v. Valeo,
424

u.s.

1 (1976) and Myers v. United States, 272

u.s.

52 (1926),

I••

'·"

'

"•

4.

than

can

be

Clause.

made

with

respect

In these cases,

arguably

violated
laws

the

"it

was

the

authority,

on

the

Commerce

no

respect to certain appointments and
concern

of

this

Court

Nevertheless,

Constitution."

unconstitutional

limitations

the President signed legislation which

limited his authority with
thus

to

because

President's

they

the

entrenched

consent

that

Court
on

the

law

held

the

presidential

notwithstanding.

JUSTICE

BLACKMUN's opinion does not address this point: nor does it cite
any authority for its contrary view.

11~,

B. Nondiscrimination as a Substantive Standard
JUSTICE BLACKMON's opinion recognizes

substantive ~~

only one

restraint on the exercise of the Commerce Clause power, that is
"that Congress not attempt to single out the States for special
burdens

or

otherwise

argues

that

this

discriminate

restraint

finds

against
its

them."

The

justification

~

...~

~ ~

opinion ~

"in ~

procedural nature of th[e] basic limitation" and is "tailored to ~ .
~-~ .. 1.ooC.
compensate for failings in the national political process rather
~
than

to dictate a

Draft

at

incoherent

25.
and

I

~c.~
I II
~....c.le

'sacred province of state autonomy.
believe

illuminates

that
the

this

argument

fundamental

is

tension

basically
in

JUSTICE

BLACKMUN's opinion as a whole.
In

the

first

inconsistent with
limitation
states:

on

the

place,
the

the

nondiscrimination

basic premise of

commerce

power.

standard

is

state sovereignty as a

JUSTICE

BLACKMUN' s

opinion

"The central principle of National League of Cities

is

---

·.

5.

proposed
the

by JUSTICE BLACKMUN

states

exactly

as

it

requires only that Congress

___,.

treats

private

parties.

treat

Far

from

"reflecting" the states special role in the federal system, this
standard seems to me to be incompatible with its existence.
In

the

second

place,

adoption

of

JUSTICE

BLACKMUN' s

Jl.non d.lSCr1m1nat1on
. .
.
stan d ar d,,d oes not mean t h at t h e federal courts
will

be

free

from

having

to

define

integral

governmental

functions or some equivalent realm of protected state functions.
The opinion notes in a footnote that

~t

"every statute that does

_____

single out the States for special obligations is unconstitutional
~--------~~----------;_

ipso facto." Draft at 27 n.20.
the

Court

is

to

decide

It is does not say, however, how

which

constitutional and which are not.

discriminatory

statutes

are

Given that the Court's purpose

in any such inquiry would be exactly the same as it is now under
National
Commerce

League

of

Clause

activities),

I

Cities

is

and

limited

think

its

progeny

with

respect

(i.e.,
to

whether

certain

the

state

the Court is likely to end up engaging in

precisely the same kind of analysis that JUSTICE BLACKMUN finds
objectionable.
opinion finds

.....

-

Thus,

the

one

- --

necessary leads

substantive
the Court

limitation

that

the

-

to precisely the place

JUSTICE BLACKMUN found objectionable in the first place.

--------------------------~-------~'-----_.------~------~--~~----#
II.
A.

The Unworkability of "Traditional Governmental Functions"
Section II of JUSTICE BLACKMUN's opinion argues that the test

of state immunity under National League of Cities is unworkable.
He

focuses

particularly

on

the

third

part

of

the

test

as

.,

explained in Hodel

u.s.

264

that

(1981),

obligation

must

structure

integral

governmental

state

"directly

impair

[the

operations

functions.'"

League of Cities).

compliance

452

in

u.s.

with

State's]
areas

at

the

ability

'to

traditional

of

287-88

federal

(quoting

National

To make this argument, JUSTICE BLACKMON cites

a long string of cases involving the question of state immunity
under

National

League

of

In

Cities.

"organizing principle" distinguishing

his

_ __

_____

--

is

no

In addition, JUSTICE

e~pe~~nce

field of state immunity from federal taxation."
____......___

there

the cases that have found

state immunity from those which have not.
BLACKMON relies heavily on the Court's

view

in "the related
He argues that

~ -- ~

the Court abandoned the governmental/proprietary distinction in
this field both because the Court was unable to "give principled
content" to the distinction and because it was unworkable.
It

-

is,

of

course,

governmental functions."'
recitation

of

protected or

a

difficult

to

define

/ ~ raditional

But it seems to me that the opinion's

"laundry

list"

of

functions

thought

to

be

unprotected by courts interpreting National League
\~

/I

of Cities is somewhat disingenous.

In each of the cited cases,

the courts considered the issue on the specific facts before it:
they did not make blanket pronouncements that particular things
inherently qualified as traditional governmental functions or did
not.

Taken out of context,

it

is

not surprising that JUSTICE

BLACKMON could find no "organizing principle" among the various
fun~

4

?U

V.be

1-' ~--r:,.

~ ~' . 1--f L.7J
·- '

~-~. ~~ ~

Moreover,

I

do

not

think

the

case

law cited

by

JUSTICE

BLACKMUN demonstrates his claim that the treatment of this issue

J....lA,<.-

~~

in the courts shows that the standard is unworkable.

----

/~

His opinion

cites five decisions by the courts of appeals finding "protected

- --

functions under National League of Cities."
Amersbach

v.

City of

Molina-Estrada
(CAl

1982) ,

1978)
(CA6
were

Puerto

involve

Standards Act,
Cities.

v.

Cleveland,

the

Rico

598

Two of these cases,

F.2d

1033

(CA6

Highway Authority,

scope

of

coverage

the same statute at

of

680

the

1979)

and

F.2d

841

Fair

Labor

issue in National League of

In two others, United States v. Best, 573 F.2d 1095 (CA9

and Hybud Equipment Corp. v. City of Akron,
1981),

the courts discussed

integral

governmental

whether

functions,

654 F.2d 1187

particular
but

the

activities

question

of

immunity under National League of Cities was not properly before
the courts.

1

The fifth case, Gold Cross Ambulance v. City of

1 In Best, an individual pleaded guilty to drunk driving on a
federal enclave. A United States magistrate sentenced him to a
jail term and a fine, and ordered that his sentence be suspended
pursuant to a California statute. Best moved to correct his
sentence on the ground that the magistrate had no power to
suspend his license. The DC denied the motion, and CA9 reversed
and remanded. Although CA9 spoke of the issuance of drivers'
licenses as an integral governmental function citing National
League of Cities, the issue in the case was not state immunity
from federal activity under the commerce power. Rather, the
question presented was whether a federal court could order a
state agency to suspend a state created privilege, in a case
where the state was not even represented in the relevant
proceedings. Thus, while this case involved federalism concerns,
they were not those implicated by the holding of National League
of Cities.
Similarly, in Hybud Equipment Corp. v. City of Akron, the
question was whether a city ordinance, which prohibited the
establishment of alternative waste disposal sites and required
that all "acceptable" garbage be deposited at a new recycling
Footnote continued on next page.

-~

8.

Kansas

City,

alternative
city

and

National

538
that

Supp.

federal

state
League

F.

from
of

956

(W.D.

antitrust

laws

On

1982)

could

appeal,

held

not

ambulance

regulating

Cities.

Mo.

in

the

prevent

the

services,

however,

the

citing

case

was

affirmed not on the National League of Cities ground, but under
the state action exemption to the antitrust laws.

705 F.2d 1005

(CA8 1983), cert pending, No. 83-183.
Thus,
cases

I

have

think
no

it

is

a

"organizing

bit misleading

to argue

Two

principle."

of

that

them

these

are

not

properly analyzed under National League of Cities principles in
the first place, one did not reach the National League of Cities
question at the CA level, and the other two came to precisely the
same conclusion about the Fair Labor

Standards Act as National

League of Cities did.
Similarly,

I

do

not

think

the

eight

cases

which

JUSTICE

BLACKMUN cites as examples of those where no state immunity has
been

found

discern

show

that

traditional

the

courts

governmental

have

found

functions.

it
Two

impossible
of

the

to

cases

simply do not involve the question whether certain activity is a
traditional governmental function.
Health Center,

Williams v.

Eastside Mental

Inc., 669 F.2d 671 (CAll), cert. denied, 459

u.s.

plant, violated the Constitution or federal law. CA6 noted that
waste disposal was a "customary area of local concern long
reserved to state and local governments." 654 F.2d at 1196
(citing National League of Cities). The case, however, did not
involve the authority of Congress to legislate against a claim of
state immunity, but rather the inverse question, whether state
law interferred with interstate commerce.

9.

976

(1982),

turned on whether the application of the Fair Labor

Standards Act

to employees of

State as State.
house

was

a

halfway house would reach

The CA held that it would not, since the halfway

not

a

state

institution

with

state

Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 552 F.2d 25
434

u.s.

DC's

the

employees.

In

(CA2), cert. denied,

902 (1977), CA2 rejected New York City's claim that the

order

that

it

enforce

a

plan

under

the

Clean

Air

Act

violated National League of Cities on the ground that the plan in
question was developed by the State and City.
cases

cited

identifying
their

by

JUSTICE

traditional

facts,

I

do

BLACKMUN

address

governmental

not

think

Although the other
the

functions,

they

show

problem

when

that

viewed

the

test

of
on
is

"unworkable."
I
the

lf/1-/S 5

think the opinion is on strong ground, however,

Court's

But

d iff icul ties

although

in

the

the

analogous

distinction

York v. United States, 326

u.s.

in

,,

terms.

For

immunity

field.
the

abandoned
this

field,

see

New

r-t....<-~

572 (1946), it has not taken the
""\

drastic approach of defining the states'
procedural

tax

has

Court

"governmental/proprietary"

n

in citing

---

~

example,

in

tax immunity solely in

Massachusetts

v.

United

States, 435 U.S. 444 (1978), JUSTICE BRENNAN wrote for the Court
..,.----,

that the states could have no constitutional objection to federal
taxes

that satisfied a

three prong test:

discriminate against the states;

(2)

fair

that

approximation of

use;

( 3)

(1)

that the tax not

that the tax be based on a
the

tax

be

structured

to

produce revenues not in excess of the total cost to the federal
government of providing the relevant benefits.

Thus, while the

.•
~-

··-

....

-·.·

..

10.

Court has abandoned the governmental/ proprietary distinction, it
nevertheless

subjects

revenue

measures

to

some

substantive

---------------------------------------------

restraints •

......____

B. Traditional Governmental Functions and Federalism
JUSTICE
define

BLACKMUN 1 s

traditional

principle"

because

opinion

also

governmental
no

maintains

functions

distinction

"that

that
are

efforts
"unsound

purports

to

to
in

separate

important governmental functions from other ones can be faithful
to the role of federalism in a democratic society."
argues that the states must be free
that

their

rule

of

citizens choose
immunity

state

"traditional,"

for

"integral,"

or

"invites an unelected federal

"to engage in any activity

the common weal,"

which

The opinion

on

relies
"necessary"

and that any
distinguishing
functions

state

judiciary to make decision

about

which state policies it favors and which ones it dislikes."
This

is a clever attempt to turn National League of Cities

against itself.
fare

no better

It seems to me, however, that this argument can
than JUSTICE BLACKMUN 1 s

protection

of

the

states

standard.

To

the

extent

and

the

that

the

argument for

use

of

a

structural

nondiscrimination

structure

of

the

federal

government cannot be shown to provide adequate protection for the
states,

then the federal

judiciary, whose clear province

it is

"to say what the law is," must review legislation to determine if
Congress

has

overstepped

states.

Judicial

review

its
in

authority
this

with

context

justification from that which it always

h~s.

respect

needs

no

to

the

different

In addition, given

that JUSTICE BLACKMUN 1 s concession that not all legislation which

11.

discriminates against the states is necessarily unconstitutional,
the federal

judiciary is likely to play the same role under his

approach as it does under the National League of Cities approach.
Conclusion
Despite
neither

JUSTICE

his

BLACKMUN's

structural

assertions

approach

to

the

to

the

protection

contrary,
of

state

sovreignity, nor his substantive nondiscrimination standard,
rooted uniquely in the value of federalism.
of

them

opinion
League

prot cts
is
of

the

states

inconsistent
Cities,

a

with

premise

as

states.

the

central

which

the

is

In addition, neither
To

this

premise
opinion

extent,
of

the

National

purports

to

embrace.
JUSTICE BLACKMUN is, of course, correct that National League
of Cities is difficult to apply.

I think he is wrong, however,

to argue that the basic approach of the case is unsound.
the

cases

decided

under

National

League

of

Cities,

Neither
nor

the

Court's experience in the tax immunity field, suggest that a case
by case approach

to a substantive definition of state

from Commerce Clause enactments is unworkable.
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82-1913 and 82-1951 San Antonio Transit Authority Case
The brief amicus filed on behalf of 25 states,
and

apparently

Massachusetts,

written

by

the

is particularly

Attorney

General

interesting.

of

It strongly

supports reaffirmance of the basic principle

(federalism}

of National League of Cities, and urges us to affirm the
DC's

decision.

analytical
whether

But

the

approach.

the

brief

It

function

at

argues

rejects
issue

is

for

a

analysis

different
based

"traditional",

upon

and

is

particularly critical of the "rigid and myopic historical
approach"
whether

urged

by

the

the municipal

SG

-

an

approach

function was a

that

looks

to

traditional one at

the time the FLSA was adopted.
The states' brief argues for a "balancing test"
one

that

would

require

a

court

exercising

review to weigh the strength of the federal

judicial

interest in

regulating the states as states against the seriousness of
the

intrusion

congressional

on
action

state
(here

sovereignty".
the

FLSA}

The

specific

should be analyzed

>,

.•

•'

.. in light of

the

functions

constitutional scheme 11 •
One factor

served by

the states in the

P. 42.

to be assessed is

11

the proximity of

the federal action to the core concerns of the Commerce
Clause ...

The

Founding

Fathers

integrated national economy..
absence

of

state-imposed

wished

to

assure

11

an

that can exist only in the

barriers.

The

impact

of

the

state activity on interstate commerce must be assessed to
determine

whether

regulation.

This

the
11

state

must

submit

to

federal

does not focus on whether the state is

engaged in commercial activity, but instead inquires into
the degree which that activity affects the core concerns
of the Commerce Clause 11 •
whether

the

regulation

The question, therefore, is not
of

wages

and

hours

of

transit

workers is within the scope of the Commerce Clause .
rather,
i.e.

the

how

created

relevant

much
by

of

a

exempting

inquiry
burder

is an assessment of degree
on

publicly

interstate
employed

commerce

transit

workers

from the FLSA? 11 P. 42-45.
The states' brief goes on to say that:
0nce the strength of the federal interest and
the impact of the state activity have been
ascertained, they may be balanced against the
injury to state sovereignty posed the federal
regulation ...
11

is

Finally,
states,

as

there must be

I

understand

recognition

the

that

brief

by

the

the Constitution

established "a frame of government within which democratic
choice

is guaranteed.

sovereignty

should

For

not

this reason,

be

assessed

injury to state

in

terms

of

the

substantive merit of a particular state policy, but rather
in terms of the effect upon self government." P. 51- 52.
The brief concludes, not surprisingly, that the
"balance
mass

tips"

transit.

against
These

the

extension of

transit

systems

rather than national concerns".
been

regulated

remained

by

subject

the
to

processes" and regulation.
Finally,

the

relate

to

"local

Moreover, they have never

federal

"local

FLSA to public

government,

political

but

have

decision-making

P. 61, 62.

point

is

made

that

the

"assured

provision of public transportation is an essential feature
of

the

daily

lives

of

many

children, the elderly, etc."

people

-

commuters,

school

The point also is made that

the "intrusion of the national government into this local
political process
range

of

choice,

[and local service] not only limits the
but

demonstrates

to

state

and

citizens that the local government is not theirs".

~·

\

...

'

local
P. 64.

Brief

of

American

Public

Transit

Association

(Bill

Coleman)
This wordy supplemental brief on behalf of this
party (one of the appellees) argues that the "principles"
of League of Cities are sound and should be reaffirmed.
It is emphasized that four subsequent cases
Island

Railroad,

v.

FERC

(Hodel,

Mississippi

(opinion

Long
by

Blackmun), and EEOC v. Wyoming) have reaffirmed League of
Cities and its "principles".

P. 7-15.

I should have said that on p.
the

two

"constraints

on

Congress 1

2 of this brief,

exercise

of Commerce

Clause power in direct regulation of the states and their
political subdivisions, are "the principles of federalism"
and the Tenth Amendment.
Commencing
that

"the

subsequent

three

at

p.

part

cases,

is

32 of

test
a

in

fully

the brief,
Hodel,

and

workable

it

is said

applied

doctrine

in
that

insures thorough consideration of all legitimate state and
constitutional
scrutiny
each

is

in

sovereign 1 s

Court 1 s

tests

effect a

.

.~ .:.,p;· •

....

}

r

result

of

such

balancing of

the

importance of

interests
and

-

a

precedents

understandable criteria".

,

The

interests.

P. 33.

balancing
provide

for

judicial

which

objective

the
and

I note that this "balancing test" is similar to
that which is the centerpiece in the brief on behalf of 25
states that I discuss above.

Reply Briefs on -ehalf of Appellants
The SG's reply brief is weak and adds little to
the

SG's

original

flawed

arguments by the SG' s

Indeed,

effort.

off ice

for

me

the

in this case are about the

weakest I have ever seen emerge from that quality group of
lawyers.

For my comments on the SG's brief, see my memo

of September 7.
The

reply

brief

appellant

of

Garcia

is

scholarly, well written - and will be well argued by Larry
Gold - but it reiterates the extreme position advanced in
prior

briefs.

Federalist

Following

elaborate

from

The

(that could be matched easily with quotations

emphasizing federalism),

the brief presents an absolutist

view of the Commerce Clause:
whether

quotations

exercised

with

it is supreme over state law

respect

to

private

persons

or

directly as a regulation or restriction on the action of
state and local governments.
"goods

and

regulation.

Under this view,

services"

would

The brief

supports

be

subject

all local

to

this view by the

federal
facile

observation:

''

·.•·

l.

"The fact that, as to any given good or service,
some entities [private corporations] that are
not sovereign provide the service while some
entities [cities] that are sovereign do not,
demonstrates that such activity 1s not an
essential attribute of state sovereignty".
This
and
upon

it also
whether

observation

identifies
a

service

undercuts

the

SG' s

argument,

the logical weakness of reliance
is

"traditional",

"essential" or

"core".
These observations implicitly suggest the merit
of the "balancing test" urged by the brief on behalf of 25
states.

The

Garcia

brief,

as

an

alternative

to

its

"basic position", agrees with the "Secretary of Labor (the
SG)

that if the states are to retain the current form of

commerce power

immunity,

the immunity should be confined

to the functions the states have historically performed "
P. 14.

* * *
In light of my examination of

these and other

briefs, and in view of problems identified in the analysis
of League of Cities, I am inclined to agree generally with
a balancing test

in which a

reviewing court would weigh

,.

..

..

. .
~.,

'..

't..

,.

'

the factors identified in the states' brief.
to discuss with Annmar ie who has

I will want

thought about the case

more intensively than I have recently.

L.F.P., Jr.
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GARCIA40 SALLY-POW

Note: This a rough redraft of Part IV, the purpose being
to make somewhat clearer the broad scope of the Court's
decision.

* * *
The question presented in this case is the
applicability of the FLSA to the wages and hours of
employees of a city-owned transit system.

The effect of

the Court's decision and holding is far broader.

In

National League of Cities, the power to regulate the wages
and hours of employees of fire and police departments was
at issue.

The overruling of that decision and the broad

sweep of today's opinion apparently authorize federal
control by virtue of the Commerce Clause over tne terms
and conditions of employment of all state and local
employees.

,.

)

The Court thus rejects the distinction, for

2.

purposes of federal regulation, between public and private
employers engaged in commerce that had been .carefully
~awn

in League of Cities.

This conclusion reflects a

misunderstanding if not indeed a rejection of the history
of our country and the intention of the Framers of the
Cbnsti tution. 1
Here I return to the test approved in National
~ague

of Cities, and accepted in Hodel, Long Island R.

Co., and FERC v. Mississippi:

whether the service or

activity at issue is one that "the states and their
political subdivisions have traditionally afforded their

1 see the opinion of the Court in National
League of Cities that makes clear that the very essence of
a federal system of government is to impose "definite
limits upon the authority of Congress to regulate the
activities of the states as states by means of the
commerce power.
See also in this connection the Court's
opinion in ~ supra, at 547, n. 7.

3.

citizens".

National League of Cities, supra, at 855.

The

application of this test requires a balancing approach.
See, ante, at

As Justice Blackmun observed in

concurring in National League of Cities:
"[I]t seems to me that [the Court's opinion]
adopts a balancing approach, and does not outlaw
federal power in areas such as environmental
proctection, where the federal interest is
demonstrably greater and where the state
facility compliance with imposed federal
standards would be essential." Id., at 856.

There is no holding in this case that the
"federal interest is demonstrably greater" than the
clearly traditional state interest in controlling the
employment terms and conditions of its own employees.

No

such holding could have been made, as the state interest
is compelling.

The financial impact on a state and its

localities of displacing their control over wages, hours,
overtime regulations, pensions, and labor relations of

• 1,•,

4.

their employees could have a serious - and sometimes
unanticipated - effect on state and local budgeting and
taxes. 2

Moreover, as was said in National League of

Cities, federal control "displaces state policies
regarding the manner in which they will structure delivery
of those governmental services that citizens require".
Id., at 847.
The Court emphasizes that municipal rather than
private operation of an intra-city mass transit system is
reltively new in the life of our country.

It nevertheless

is a classic example of the type of service traditionally
provided by local government.

It is indistinguishable in

2 rn his dissent in Maryland v. Wirtz, supra,
Justice Douglas - joined by Justice Stewart - observed
that the Court's extention of the FLSA could "disrupt the
fiscal policy of the states and threaten their autonomy in
the regulation of health and education".
!d., ·at 302.

5.

principle from the traditional services of providing and
maintaining streets, public lighting, traffic control,
water, and sewerage systems. 3

It is precisely services of

this kind "with which citizens are more 'familiar[) and
minutely conversant.'"

The Federalist, No. 46, at 316.

State and local elected and appointed officials, in their
respective communities, ofcourse must be intimately
familiar with these services.

Nor are such officials

unaware that their constituents as well as the press are
responsive both to the adequacy, fairness and cost of
these services.

It is this kind of state and local

control and accountability that the Framers understood

3 In

Long Island R. Co. theunanimous Court
recognized the truism that the "traditionally governmental
functions" test is not a static concept as our history
shows.
(citation}

6.

would insure the vitality and preservation of the federal
system that the Constitution explicitly requires.

See

National League of Cities, supra, at 847-852.
Although the Court's opinion purports to
recognize that the states retain some sovereign power, it
does not identify even a single aspect of state authority
that would remain where the Commerce Clause is invoked to
justify federal regulation. 4

In Maryland v. Wirtz, supra,

overruled by National League of Cities and today
reaffirmed, in a comparatively narrow opinion the Court's

4 The Court's one effort to reassure the
states was to identify major statutes that not yet have
been made applicable to state governments as distinguished
from the private sector:
{Annmar ie, list the statutes
with the reference to HAB's opinion).
The Court does not
suggest that this restraint will continue after its
decision is understood, or that special interest groups
will not accept the now open invitation to urge Congress
to extend these and other statutes to apply to states and
their local subdivisions.

7.

sustained an extension of the FLSA to certain hospitals,
institutions and schools.

Justice Douglas, in dissent,

wrote presciently that the Court's reading of the Commerce
Clause could enable "the National Government [to] devour
the essentials of state sovereignty, though that
sovereignty is attested by the Tenth Amendment".
205.

Id., at
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As contrasted with democracy at state and local
levels, one must compare this with the way the federal
government works realistically.

Legislation is

d~afted

primarily by the staffs of the congressional committees.
In view of the hundreds of bills introduced at each
session of Congress and the complexity of many of them, it
understandably is impossible for even the most
conscientious legislators - other than those who serve on
theresponsible committeees - to be truly familiar with
many statutes that are enacted.
beginning of the process.

But this is only the

The federal departments and

agencies usually are authorized to write the regulations
that often are more important than the text of the

..

..
~

2.

statutes.

Again these are drafted largely by staff

personnel.

And the administration and enforcement of

federal laws and regulations necessarily are in the hands
of staff and civil service employees.
In recognizing that this is the way the system
works, I imply no criticism of these employees or of the
senior officials who are in charge.

For the most part,

they are conscientious and faithful to their duties.
this is not the question.

But

Rather, if one believes in

democracy it is clear that the immense federal bureaucracy
know less about the services traditionally rendered by
states and localities, and are less responsive, than the
state legislatures, city councils and board of supervisors
of the 50 states.

With all respect, therefore, I think it

fair to say that the Court is simply out of touch with the

'I

3.

reality of how our system operates in holding that the
"structure of the federal government" itself "ensure[s)
the role of the states in the federal system".

Ante, at

22.*

*The Court also observes that the standard approved in
National League of Cities "disserves the principles of
democratic self government". The Court looks myopically
only to persons elected to positons in the federal
government in Washington. It disregards entirely the far
more effective role of democratic self government at the
state and local levels.
* * *
Note to Annmarie:

What do you think of

something like the above to be added to my redraft of Part
IV at some appropraite point?

Feel free to redraft this

entirely. The point can be made in more elegant language
and perhaps it need not be this long.

Rider A,

7
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Note: This a rough redraft of Part I
rpose being
to make somewhat clearer the broad scope of the Court's
decision.

* * *
The question presented in this case is the
applicability of the FLSA to the wages and hours of
employees of a city-owned transit system.

The effect of

the Court's decision and holding is far broader.

In

National League of Cities, the power to regulate the wages
and hours of employees of fire and police departments was
at issue.

The overruling of that decision and the broad

sweep of today's opinion apparently authorize federal
control by virtue of the Commerce Clause over the terms
and conditions of employment of all state and local
employees.

The Court thus rejects the distinction, for

2.

purposes of federal regulation, between public and private
employers engaged in commerce that had been carefully
drawn in League of Cities.

This conclusion reflects a

misunderstanding if not indeed a rejection of the history
of our country and the intention of the Framers of the
Constitution. 1
Here I return to the test approved in National
League of Cities, and accepted in Hodel, Long Island R.
Co., and FERC v. Mississippi:

whether the service or

activity at issue is one that "the states and their
political subdivisions have traditionally afforded their

1 see the opinion of the Court in National
League of Cities that makes clear that the very essence of
a federal system of government is to impose "definite
limits upon the authority of Congress to regulate the
activities of the states as states by means of the
commerce power.\) See also in this connection the Court's
opinion in f£Yj supra, at 547, n. 7.

.,

',,

3.

citizens".

National League of Cities, supra, at 855.

The

application of this test requires a balancing approach.

/1..,

~ t-v< "'1--t:.../"- !-< . . ? .,.t./~·' - ~
~~" 1 /,.1/~
See, ante, at - - - · 1\ ~ Justice Blackmun_,p~b&er u~d- ....in .P_,~
1\

al L

e~itie-s· : -,

/""(/~~
~·

~~

v~-.~;
"[I]t seems to me that [the Court's opinion]
adopts a balancing approach, and does not outlaw
federal power in areas such as environmental
proctection, where the federal interest is
demonstrably greater and where the state
fucility compliance with imposed federal
standards would be essential." Id., at 856.

There is no holding in this case that the
"federal interest is demonstrably greater" than the

cJ.Qarly traditional state interest in controlling the
employment terms and conditions of its own employees.

No

such holding could have been made, as the state interest
~

compelling.

The financial impact on a state and its

localities of displacing their control over wages, hours,
overtime regulations, pensions, and labor relations of

·,. \'"(,

4.

their employees could have a serious - and

~s

unanticipated - effect on state and local budgeting and
taxes. 2

Moreover, as was said in National League of

Cities, federal control "displaces state policies
regarding the manner in which they will structure delivery
of those governmental services that citizens require".
Id. , at 84 7.
The Court emphasizes that municipal rather than
private operation of an intra-city mass transit system is
reltively new in the life of our country.

It nevertheless

is a classic example of the type of service traditionally
provided by local government.

It is indistinguishable in

2 In his dissent in Maryland v. Wirtz, supra,
Justice Douglas - joined by Justice Stewart - observed
that the Court's extention of the FLSA could "disrupt the
fiscal policy of the states and threaten their autonomy in
the regulation of health and education".
!d., at 302.

·"

5.

principle from the traditional services of providing and
maintaining streets, public lighting, traffic control,
water, and sewerage systems. 3

It is precisely services of

this kind "with which citizens are more 'familiar[) and
~nutely

conversant.'"

The Federalist, No. 46, at 316.

State and local elected and appointed officials, in their
respective communities, o ~ourse must be intimately
c_ ...L~k~~4~
familiar with these services.
Nor are such offi~ ials
~

.

1\

4/P

C aJ4u

unaware that their constituents as well as the press; are
responsive both to the adequacy, fairness and cost of
these services.

It is this kind of state and local

control and accountability that the Framers understood

3 In

Long Island R. Co. theunanimous Court
recognized the truism that the "traditionally governmental
functions" test is not a static concept as our history
shows.
(citation)

would insure the vitality and preservation of the federal
system that the Constitution explicitly requires.

t<Btional League of Cities, supra, at 847-852.

r

See

~y

Although the Court's opinion purports to
recognize that the states retain some sovereign power, it
does not identify even a single aspect of state authority
that would remain where the Commerce Clause is invoked to
justify federal regulation.

4

In Maryland v. Wirtz, supra,

overruled by National League of Cities and today
reaffirmed, in a comparatively narrow opinion the Court's

4 The

Court's one effort
to reassure
the
states was to identify major statutes that not yet have
been made applicable to state governments as distinguished
from the private sector:
(Annmarie, list the statutes
with the reference to HAB's opinion).
The Court does not
suggest that this restraint will continue after its
decision is understood ... or t:Ra< special interest groups
r-- - -W
--.1.,.-,;-l"""' ae-4! accept the now open in i tation to urge Congress
to extend these and other statut s to apply tol sta ~ es and
their local subdivisions.
~

•'

7.

sustained an extension of the FLSA to certain hospitals,
institutions and schools.

Justice Douglas, in dissent,

wrote presciently that the Court's reading of the Commerce
Clause could enable "the National Government [to] devour
the essentials of state sovereignty, though that
sovereignty is attested by the Tenth Amendment".
205.

Id., at
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Annmarie:
footnote

What do you think of adding at some place a

like this:

r

/

~~~

';)_ g_J

---

In criticizing National League of Cities, the
Court states that it would "invite[s] an unelected federal
judiciary to make decisions about which state policies it
\\

favors and which ones its

dislikes ~

Then curiously
1

enoag+r.., the Cour t; t ~ cites Justice Brandeis' famous

Observation in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285
262, 311 (1932)

u.s.

to the effect that under the "traditional"

~~at-~~~~
governmental function analysis "the states cannot serve as
~

laboratories for social and economic experiment".
at 17.

Ante,

Apparently the Court is saying that where "an

2.

unelected federal judiciary" makes decisions as to whether
a particular function is one for the federal or state
governments) ~

the states no longer may engage in

"social and economic experiment".

Ante, at 17.

easy to understand this argument.

1-Me-ee ,_. i t! s ---re1rult

_,.
u~

1/L/

.

It is not

~

t he Court's ruling that these decisions are to be
1\

~

"'\

made by the federal government alone . will leave the states
A
with little or no opportunity to serve as the
"laboratories" perceived by Justice Brandeis.

'

~;.,

lfp/ss 12/10/84

Rider A, p.

(Garcia)

GARZ SALLY-POW
Annmarie:

What do you think of adding at some place a

footnote like this:

In criticizing National League of Cities, the
Court states that it would "invite[s] an unelected federal
judiciary to make decisions about which state policies it
favors and which ones its dislikes.

Then curiously

enough, the Court's opinion cites Justice Brandeis' famous
cbservation in New State Ice Co. ,v . Liebmann, 285
262, 311 (1932)

u.s.

to the effect that under the "traditional"

governmental function analysis "the states cannot serve as
laboratories for social and economic experiment".
at 17.

Ante,

Apparently the Court is saying that where "an

..

2•

unelected federal judiciary" makes decisions as to whether
a particular function is one for the federal or state
governments that the states no longer may engage in
"social and economic experiment".

Ante, at 17.

It is not

easy to understand this argument.

Indeed, its result

under the Court's ruling that these decisions are to be
made by the federal government alone will leave the states
with little or no opportunity to serve as the
"laboratories" perceived by Justice Brandeis.
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Note to Annmarie:
opinion in Wyoming.

We have talked about my dissenting
I continue to think - subject to

discussion with you - that a footnote might be added
referring to the view of the Commerce Clause at the time
the Constitution was adopted and citing my opinion.

Here

is a draft:

The emasculation of the powers of the states
that can result from today's decision is predicated on the
Commerce Clause as a power "delegated to the United
States" by the Tenth Amendment.

All that the Constitution

says affirmatively is that "Congress shall have power
• to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the

2.

several states and with the Indian tribes."

Art. I, §8.

It is of interest that Section 8 identifies a score of
powers, with authority to lay taxes, borrow money on the
credit of the United States, pay its debts, provide for
the common defense, and for the general welfare listed
~fore

the brief reference to "Commerce" is made.

It is

clear from the debates leading up to the adoption of the
Constitution that the commerce to be regulated was that
which the states themselves were powerless to regulate.
Indeedthe language of the clause itself focuses on
activities that only a national government could regulate:
cnrnrnerce with foreign nations, Indian tribes and "among"
the several states.
To be sure, this Court has construed the
Commerce Clause - and extended its reach - to

accommoda~

~:.

3.

unanticipated changes over the past two centuries,
commencing with transportation and communication.

As

these changes have occurred, this Court has been the
arbiter to decide whether the federal government has
extended its authority to activities beyond the capability
of a single state to regulate or beyond legitimate federal
interests that outweighed the authority and interests of
the states.

For a discussion of the place and

understanding of the Commerce Clause, see EEOC v. Wyoming,

____u.s. ____ ,
dissenting}.

at p. ____ - ____ (1983} (Powell, J.,

lfp/ss 12/17/84
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than are state legislatures, city councils, boards of
supervisors, and state and local commissions, boards and
agencies.

It is at these state and local levels - not in

Washington as the Court so mistakenly thinks - that
"democratic self government" is best exemplified.
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Annmarie:
Note 7 makes some excellent points, but perhaps
it could be reframed along the following lines:

Late in its opinion, the Court suggests that
after all there may be some "affirmative limits the
constitutional structure might impose on federal action
affecting the states under the Commerce Clause".
27.

Ante, at

The opinion then hastens to say that "in the factual

setting of [some identified] cases the internal safeguards
cl the political process have performed as intended."

!d.

But the Court identifies no standards as to when and under
what circumstances the "political process" may have failed

2.

and naffirmative limitsn are to be imposed.

Presumably,

such limits are to be determined by the Judicial Branch
even if it is nunelectedn.

But today's opinion has

rejected the balancing standard approved in the several
cases it has overruled, and now suggests no other standard
that would enable a court to determine that there has been
a malfunction of the npolitical processn.

The Court's

unwillingness or inability to specify the naffirmative
limitsn on federal power that it mentions, are when and
how these limits are to be determined, may well be
explained by the transparent fact that any such attempted
would be subject to precisely the same objections it
relies on today to overrule National League of Cities.

·~··

;~

.
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The "structure" relied upon, as today's decision
itself reflects, is not the authority of the Judicial Branch
unquestioned since Marbury v. Madison to determine the
allocations of powers within the federal system.
~e

Rather,

"structure" said to "ensure the role of the states in

the federal system is their function in "the selection of
both the Executive and Legislative Branches of the federal
government".

Id., at 27.

To ensure no doubt about its

intention, the Court renounces its decision in National
League of Cities because it "inevitably invites an
uneelected federal judicial to make decisions about which
state policies its favors and which ones it dislikes".
Ante, at 17.

In other words, the extent to which the states

may exercise their authority now is to be determined from
time to time by political decisions of the Congress and the

2.
President, decisions the Court said should not be subject to
judicial review.

!d.

I note in passing, it does not seem

to have occurred to the Court that it - and uneelected
majority of five Justices - today rejects almost 200 years
of the understanding of the constitutional status of
federalism.

In doing so, there is only the barest mention

of the Tenth Amendment.

Nor is so much as a dictum from any

Court cited in support of the view that the role of the
states in the federal system properly depends upon the grace
of elected federal officials rather than the Constitution
itself.

The foregoing, a rough draft, might with some
editing be a substitute from the part marked B at the bottom
of page 7 to the pointed marked End at the top of page 9.
This may not be an improvement, but I would like to see how
it looks.

lfp/ss 12/05/84

Comment as to pp. 15 and 16 (Garcia)

COMMENT SALLY-POW
Note to Annmarie:
Subpart B (p. 16) commences with the statement
that the Court holds that the "fundamental limitation that
the constitutional scheme imposes on the Commerce Clause
to protect the states as states is one of process rather
than on of result".
HAB's opinion does say this.

But is this a

different protection of the states from HAB's reliance on
the "structure" of the Constitution that vests the
electoral power in the states.

It seems to me that

without some elaborate explanation of why the two
"protections" are consistent, it may be better simply to

2.

omit from the beginning of the paragraph on p. 15 to the
point marked end near the bottom of page 16.
In others words, Subpart B could begin with the
~ntence

that commences:

explain . •

." .

"Today's opinion does not

lfp/ss 12/05/84

Rider A, p. 7 (Garcia)

RIDER7 SALLY-POW
Note:

Perhaps on page a footnote along the following

lines - after some improvement to insure preciseness of
language - might be appropriate:

The Court's decision reverses the purpose and
meaning of the Tenth Amendment.

Rather than guaranteeing

that all powers not expressly granted to the federal
government are reserved to the states, today's decision in
effect says that all powers not express guaranteed to the
states (e.g., electoral rights and guaranteed borders),
are vested in the federal government.

At least this is

true with respect to the Commerce Clause - a provision
expanded to encompass an undreamed of array of activities.

2.

Until today, the restraint against the ultimate
encroachment upon state authority under that clause had
been the power of judicial review - a power the Court also
apparently would nullify by today's decision.

''

..

•,

lfp/ss 12/06/84

Rider A, p. 29 (Garcia)

GARCIA29 SALLY-POW
In emphasizing the need to protect traditional
governmental functions, we identified the kinds of
activities engaged in by state and local governments that
affect the daily lives of people.

These are services that

people have the ability to understand and evaluate as well
as the right, in a democracy, to participate and
oversee. 10

We recognized that "it is functions such as

these which governments are created to provide

.,"and

that the states and local governments are better able to
perform than the national government.

lfp/ss 12/06/84

Rider A, p. 40 (Garcia)

GARCIA40 SALLY-POW
Note:
This a rough redraft of Part IV, the purpose
being to make somewhat clearer the broad scope of the
Court's decision.
The question presented in this case is the
applicability of the Fair Labor Standards Act to the wages
and hours of employees of a city-owned bus system.

The

effect of the Court's decision and holding is far broader.
In National League of Cities, the power to regulate the
wages and hours of employees of fire and police
departments was at issue.

the overruling of that decision

and the broad sweep of today•s opinion apparently
authorizes federal control by virtue of the Commerce

J' .....

ir'."J

,f

.. 1> •

.

'

2.

Clause over the terms and conditions of employment of all
state and local employees.

It no longer is questioned

that the provisions of the Act apply to private employers
engaged in commerce.

Obliterating the distinction between

the authority of the federal government over state conduct
and private conduct reflects a misunderstanding if not
indeed a rejection of the history of our country and the
intention of the Framers of the Constitution. 1
No state action with respect to employment is
subject to federal control.

Here I return to the view

expressly recognized in National League of Cities, Hodel,

1 see

the opinion of the Court in National
League of Cities that makes clear that the very essence of
a federal system of government is to impose "definite
limits upon the authority of Congress to regulate the
activities of the states as states by means of the
commerce power.
See also in this connection the Court's
opinion in~ supra, at 547, n. 7.

3.

Long Island R. Co., and FERC v. Mississippi:

that the

service or activity at issue is one that "the states and
their political subdivisions have traditionally afforded
their citizens".
855.

National League of Cities, supra, at

The application of this test requires a balancing

approach.

As Justice Blackmun observed in agreeing that

fue "result" in National League of Cities:
"[I]t seems to me that [the Court's opinion]
adopts a balancing approach, and does not outlaw
federal power in areas such as environmental
proctection, where the federal interest is
demonstrably greater and where the state
facility compliance with imposed federal
standards would be essential." Id., at 856.

There is no holding in this case that the
"federal interest is demonstrably greater" than the
clearly traditional state interest in controlling the
terms and conditions of its own employees.

Indeed, it

fairly can be said that the state interest is compelling.

4.

The financial impact on a state or its localities of
displacing their control over wages, ours, overtime
regulations, pensions, labor relations and the like, can
have a serious - and sometimes unanticipated - effect on
state and local budgeting and taxes.

Moreover, as was

said in National League of Cities, federal control
"displaces state policies regarding the manner in which
they will structure delivery of those governmental
services tht citizens require".

!d., at 847.

While it is

true that municipal operation of an intra-city mass
transit system is reltively new in the life of our
country.

It nevertheless is a classic example of local

self government.

Providing this modern means for citizens

to go to and from their work and for inner-urban
transportation for all of the familiar purposes, is

.

'

5.

indistinguishable in principle from the acknowledged
traditional services of providing and maintaining streets,
public lighting, traffic control, water, and sewerage
systems.

It is precisely services of this kind "with

which citizens are more 'familiar[] and minutely
conversant.'"

The Federalist, No. 46, at 316.

State and

local elected officials, in their respective communities,
also are intimately familiar with these governmental
activities, and they are not unaware that their
constituents and the press are responsive both to the
adequacy, fairness and cost of these services.

It is this

kind of state and local control and accountability that
the Framers understood would insure the vitality and
preservation of the federal system that the Constitution

6.

explicitly requires.

See National League of Cities,

supra, at 847-852.

v
Althought he Court's opinion purports to
recognize that the states retain some sovereign power, it
has failed to identify even a single aspect of state
authority that would remain after the Commerce Clause is

.
2
invoked to support federal regulation.
In Maryland v. Wirtz, supra, overruled by
National League of Cities and today reaffirmed, in a

2 The Court's one effort to reassure the
states was to i .dentify major statutes that not yet have
been made applicable to state governments as distinguished
from the private sector:
{Annmarie, list the statutes
with the reference to HAB's opinion).
The Court does not
suggest that this restraint will continue after its
decision is understood, or that special interest groups
will not accept the now open invitation to urge Congress
to extend these and other statutes to states and their
local subdivisions.

7.

comparatively narrow opinion the Court's sustained an
extension of the FLSA to certain hospitals, institutions
and schools.

Justice Douglas, in a dissent joined by

Justice Stewart, made the relevant point that this
extension of that Act could "disrupt the fiscal policy of
the states and threaten their automony in the regulation
of health and educaton".

!d., at 203.

Indeed, Justice

Douglas wrote presciently that this reading of the
Commerce Clause could enable "the National Government [to]
devour the essentials of state sovereignty, though that
sovereignty is attested by the Tenth Amendment".
205.

,

.

Id., at

lfp/ss 12/07/84

Rider A, p. 17 (Garcia)

RIDER17 SALLY-POW
Annmarie:

Note 7 is excellent.

In an effort to make it

somewhat stronger, I have reframed it along the following
lines.

Feel free to edit, or I could go back to your

draft.

* * *
Late in its opinion, the Court suggests that
after all there may be some "affirmative limits the
constitutional structure might impose on federal action
affecting the states under the Commerce Clause".
27.

Ante, at

The opinion then states that "in the factual setting

of [some identified] cases the internal safeguards of the
political process have performed as intended."

Id.

But

the Court identifies no standards as to when and under

2.

what circumstances the "political process" may have failed
and "affirmative limits" are to be imposed.

Presuma6ly,

such limits are to be determined by the Judicial Branch
even if it is "unelected".

But today's opinion has

rejected the balancing standard approved in the several
cases it has overruled, and suggests no other standard
that would enable a court to determine when there has been
a malfunction of the "political process".

The Court's

unwillingness or inability to specify the "affirmative
limits" on federal power that it vaguely mentions, or when
and how these limits are to be determined, may well be
explained by the transparent fact that any such attempted
would be subject to precisely the same objections it
relies on today to overrule National League of Cities.

'

,·.
'

'

lfp/ss 12/07/84

Rider A, p. 9 (Garcia)

GAR9 SALLY-POW
In the opinion that follows, I will address in Part II its
criticism of the rationale of National League of Cities
and the standard it applied.

Part III will review briefly

the understanding at the time of the ratification of the
Constitution and the extent to which this Court, until
today, has recognized that we have a federal system in
which the states retain a signficant measure of
sovereignty.

Part IV will consider the applicability of

the FLSA to the indisputable local service provided by an
urban transit system.

,. ·~
'

.

lfp/ss 12/07/84

Rider A, p. 7-8 (Garcia)

RIDERB7 SALLY-POW
The "structure" said to "ensure the role of the
states in the federal system is their function in "the
selection of both the Executive and Legislative Branches
of the federal government".

Id., at 27.

To leave no

doubt about its intention, the Court renounces its
decision in National League of Cities because it
"inevitably invites an uneelected federal judicial to make
decisions about which state policies its favors and which
ones it dislikes".

Ante, at 17.

In other words, the

extent to which the states may exercise their authority,
where Congress purports to act under the Commerce Clause,
now is to be determined from time to time by political
decisions made in Washington, decisions the Court says

2.

will not be subject to judicial review.

!d.

I note in

passing, it does not seem to have occurred to the Court
that it - and uneelected majority of five Justices - today
rejects almost 200 years of the understanding of the
constitutional status of federalism.

In doing so, there

is only the barest mention of the Tenth Amendment.

Nor is

so much as a dictum from any court cited in support of the
view that the role and authority of the states in the
federal system depend upon the grace of elected federal
officials rather than the Constitution itself.

..

I

lfp/ss 12/07/84

Rider A, p. 18, 19 (Garcia)

GAR18 SALLY-POW
Note to Annmarie:

Again, I admire your note 9 with the

excellent cites to secondary authority.
Kaden is on target.

Your quote from

What would you think of adding,

following that quote or perhaps at some other place, a
more specific reference to the innumerable special groups
with powerful lobbies that also make generous campaign
contributions to selected members of Congress.

These

groups now have a far greater influence on the voting of
many members of Congress than unorganized individual
opinions in their districts or states.

Indeed, the

average individual often feels incompetent to understand
the complex legislation that may, when it is applied,

,.

·"'

~

......

~~· ~

2.

diminish the opportunity for democracy to work at the
local level.

aml 11/9/84

Garcia

v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority
Outline for a Second Draft of the Dissent

Introduction
This section is basically your rider on stare decisis.

I. Federalism
The

~

attempts to rationalize its result by claiming

that any attempt to define traditional governmental functions is
inconsistent with federalism. But-(1) HAB's opinion is inconsistent with any usual
understanding of federalism & indeed never describes what the
majority thinks federalism entails.
(2) Majority plays lip service to state sovereignty, but
mentions the Tenth Amendment only once.
(3) Federalism is a dual system of government; states play a
major role.

The Federalist outlines the founders' view of the

importance of the states, as do cases of this Court.

A detailed

discussion of federalism goes here.
(4) Majority's unprecedented view means that Congress is
free to usurp state power whenever and however it can agree to do
so; this view realizes the worst fears of the opponents of the
Constitution. It ignores the fact that the Constitution would not
have been ratified without the promise of the Tenth Amendment.

.

.

•• <

- 2 II. Majority's Approach
The majority opinion argues that no standard for defining
traditional governmental functions can be "faithful to
federalism," because any such standard (somehow)
the freedom of states to experiment.

interferes with

More fundamentally, HAB

contends that "state sovereignty is limited by the Constitution
itself."
(1) As for faithfulness to federalism,
giving Congress unlimitedL

~rev~w&Ql~

~ ~ "'Ud ~~-----.-. ~
ie h~rg tc •Qe ~ow ---~

i~

authority to treat States

just as it does any private individual or entity is faithful to
,.b~~~~
the role of the States in our federal system;
it rs-~iSo-u~

~~Q~~~o~~s~ tt! ~~~ t?to ~
experiment4

"\
s~nce Cong~
ean~ow

cqnstitut:i,.enal-oheek "!rom

~he

th.,.v+. ~a

..1'L.t,.. 2.71']] .... ,·
i~~~S~Q~~~~~-~-L-~-~~~-~-~H~~~~~~~-

courts-..

~ e;v-W-

(2) Re: HAB's claim that the traditional government function
standard "invites an unelected fed. judiciary to make decisions
about which state policies it favors and which ones it dislikes."
Of course it isn't the Court's job to judge the wisdom of
particular policies.

But the majority provides no basis for its

assertion that the courts "inevitably" must do so when ruling in
this area.

The Tenth Amendment provides a substantive check on

what Congress may do with respect to the States.
(3) Re: the argument that the fundamental limitation on
Congress' power under the Commerce Cl. is one of process.

The

Court expressly rejected this argument in National League of
Cities, and for good reasons: the view is illogical and
inconsistent with fundamental constitutional principles.

'.

'

d~ -:-r

P\c.. - ~

- 3 -

(a)

The majority offers no explanation of how the

electoral role of the States guarantees that Congress will not
exceed its authority.

Congress is part of the federal

government.
(b)

The fact that the States are politically

successful in obtaining funds and exemptions from some federal
laws does not show that political processes are the proper means
of enforcing constitutional limitations.

Moreover, what

exemptions Congress gives today it can take away tomorrow.
Surely the States are entitled to more protection than whatever
the

curr~nt

political situation allows.

(c) The majority effectively makes federal officials
the judges of their own power.

This is inimical to the

fundamental pricniples of constitutional government.

It is the

settled province of the courts "to say what the law is."
Judicial review needs no different justification in the context
of the Commerce Clause from that which it always has.
(d) The Court has never before abdicated responsibility
for deciding constitutional questions on the ground that the
affected parties can take care of themselves.

JUSTICE REHNQUIST

responded to the "inherent structural protections" argument in
National League of Cities; the majority does not address his
argument at all.
(e) For all the majority's talk about "democracy," it
does not

acknowledge that the State governments are also

democratic institutions, and in many ways provide more, and more
effective, opportunities for citizen participation.

Contrast the

- 4 "audience" of the Congress with that of State legislatures and
local governments.

III. Defining Traditional Governmental Functions
(1) HAB says that the test of traditional governmental
functions has proved unworkable.

The cases he cites do not

support that claim.
(2) HAB says that the Court's experience in the tax field
shows that it is impossible to devise a satisfactory test of
traditional functions.

But in the tax area, the Court has not

retreated to the position here adopted by the majority.
Discussion of tax cases goes here.
(3) HAB does not even discuss the possibility of a balancing
test, which is, after all, what his concurrence in National
League of Cities adopted.

This is unfortunate, because a

rearticulation of the factors which the Court's decisions have
balanced (implicitly, at least) helps to clarify the test and
shows that the "unworkability" problem is a red-herring.
In deciding whether an enactment under the Commerce
Clause violates the States' sovereignity, we should balance how
closely the challenged action implicates the core concerns of the
Commerce Clause, i.e., the promotion of a national economy and
free trade among the States, against the impact on the States if
forced to comply with particular federal policies.
(4) Applying the balancing test as described above, it is
clear that the application of the FLSA to SAMTA violates State
sovereignty.

r·

'•

-·

-
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GARM SALLY-POW
MEMORANDUM

TO:

Annmarie

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

DATE:

November 13, 1984

Garcia
I comment on the outline of our opinion.

It is

thorough and identifies the principal points very well.
On further reflection, I am not sure that it is
best to put the federalism argument as Part I.

It

certainly will be the most important part of our opinion.
Yet, it seems more logical to follow generally the order
of discussion in HAB's opinion.

After the introductory

portions (that I have dictated as Part I and want you to
feel free to revise and edit), we would have a Part II
that responds to HAB's rejection of League of Cities.

Our

2.

purpose is to demonstrate that the Court reads it far too
narrowly, either to justify its attack on federalism or
simply because of a misconception of the League of Cities'
basic approach.
The "traditional governmental functions" test
cannot fairly be read as narrowly as the Court does today.
The test actually contemplates a balancing or weighing of
the respective interests of the two components of our
federal system - the states and the federal government.
HAB himself viewed the League of Cities test in precisely
this light in his concurring opinion in that case.

Our

dissent could identify the weaknesses in HAB's denigration
of League of Cities, and conclude this part of our dissent
with a summary exposition of the proper balancing test.

3.

It is important, Annmarie, to keep this portion
of our dissent reasonably concise, ignorning or relegating
to summary footnotes some of our possible criticisms.

For

example, I would dispose of HAB's tax case analogies in a
brief footnote.
The second major part of the dissent, Part III,
of course, would be the discussion of federalism - the
most distinctive feature of our dual system of government.
Again, there will be a temptation perhaps to overwrite as
there is a great deal that can be said.

So long as it is

written well, this will not concern me.

The Court opinion

is 29 pages, and we are free to equal it.
L.F.P., Jr.
ss

. -,,

/ i--1
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GARl SALLY-POW
82-1913 and 82-1951 Garcia

JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting.
The Court today,

in its 5-4 decision overrules

u.s.

National League of Cities v. Usery, 426

833 (1976), a

Congress ~~

case in which we held that

requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act on state and
local governments.
I

There

are,

of

course,

numerous

examples

over

the

history of this Court in which prior decisions have been
reconsidered

and

overruled.

I

can

recall,

however,

no

case in which the principle of stare decisis was ingored
as

flagrantly

Court

in

applied

as

we

National
there,

have

now w1. tness.. uTh e

League

of

been repeatedly

past eight years

.~ational

been

quoted,

cited

opinions

and

joined

by

Cities,

and

the

of

t he

principle

reiterated over

the

League of Cities itself has

since

every

.
reason1ng

its

member

decision
of

the

in

1974,

present

in

Court.

v

2.

Hodel v.
264,

452

u.s.

United Transportation Union v.

Long

Virginia Surface Mining

287-293

Island R.

(1981);

Co.,

455

u.s.

678,

&

Reel. Ass 1 n,

684-686

(1982); and Federal

Energy Regulatory Commission v. Mississippi, 456
764-767 (1982).
R.

Co.,

a

u.s.

742,

Less than three years ago, in Long Island

unanimous

Court

reaffirmed

the

principles

of

National League of Cities but found them inapplicable to
the regulation of a railroad heavily engaged in interstate
commerce.

The Court stated:

"The key prong of the National League of Cities
test applicable to this case is the third one
[repeated and reformulated in Hodel], which
examines whether 1 the states 1 compliance with
the federal law would directly impair their
ability to structure integral operations in
areas of traditional governmental functions. 1 "
Id., at 684.
The Court

in that case recognized

times be a difficult one",
considered

in

that

id.,

unanimous

that the test "may at

but

its application was

decision

as

settled

constitutional doctrine.
Justice Blackmun, the author of today 1 s reversal
of

National

League

of Cities,

wrote

the opinion of

the

Court in FERC v. Mississippi, supra, decided June 1, 1982.
It is of interest that the four Justices who join Justice
Blackmun today were the four who joined his opinion in its

3.

entirety in FERC v. Mississippi.

In that case, the Court

then said:
"In National League of Cities v. Usery, supra,
for example, the Court made clear that the
State's regulation of its relationship with its
employees is an 'undoubted att'r ibute of state
sovereignty.'
Id., at 845.
Yet, by holding
'unimpaired' California v. Taylor, 353 u.s. 553
(1957) , which upheld a federal labor regulation
as applied to state railroad employees, 426
u.s., at 854. n. 18, National League of Cities
acknowledged that not all aspects of a State's
sovereign authority are immune from federal
control." !d., n. 28, p. 764.

v

The footnote in FERC quoted above did say that even where
the requirements of the National League of Cities standard
are met,
federal
state

"there are situations in which the nature of the
interest

advanced may

submission".

The

joint

regulation in FERC was such a

be such

that

it

federal/state

justifies
system

of

"situation", but there was

no hint in Justice Blackmun's opinion that National League
of Cities - or its basic standard that he reiterated - was
subject to the infirmities discovered today.
It
does

not

case as

is

true

that

apply

with

the

the doctrine of stare decisis
same

force

in a

constitutional

it does where the meaning of the Constitution is

not at issue [Annmarie, cite authority].

This distinction

usually has been recognized where a new Justice comes to

4.

the Court,

bound by his oath faithfully

to construe the

Constitution, and views a constitutional issue differently
from

one

however,

or

more

predecessors.

In

the

present

case,

the five Justices who compose the majority today

participated

in National

reaffirming it. 2

League of Cities and

the cases

The stability of judicial decision, and

with it respect for

the authority of this Court, are not

served by the abrupt overruling of precedents we witness
in

this

case.

[Annmarie,

perhaps

you

can

find

some

authority for supporting stare decisis and its importance
that could be included in a footnote].
Whatever effect the Court's decision may have in
weakening the application of stare decisis, this is likely
to be less important than what the Court has done to the
Constitution

itself.

States

its

federal

and

implicit

is

Constitution
itself.

Despite

some

concept of federalism,

The

unique

feature

system
in

the

genuflecting

of

the

guaranteed
name
in

of

our

language

United

by

the

country
to

the

today's decision can be viewed as

2 Justice O'Connor succeeded Justice Stewart
in September 1981, and participated in Long Island RR. and
FERC.

5.

reading the Tenth Amendment out of the Constitution.
holding

is

that

the

Fair

Labor

Standards

Act

The

(FLSA)

"contravened no affirmative limit on Congress' power under
the Commerce Clause" to determe the wage rates and hours
of employment of all state and local employees.
27.

In

rejecting

the

traditional

view

of

Ante, at

our

federal

system, the Court states:
"Apart from the limitation on federal authority
inherent in the delegated nature of Congress'
Article I powers, the princip ~ means chosen by
the Framers to ensure the role of the states in
the federal system lies in the structure of the
federal government government." Ante, at 21, 22
(emphasis added) •
The "structure" relied upon is the fact that the
states have "a role in the selection of both the Executive
and Legislative Branches of the federal government".
No

mention

is

made

of

the

Tenth

Amendment,

"means"

are

states,

and no authority is cited for

identified

as

"ensur[ing]"

the

no

role

Id.

other
of

the

the ~~at

the

"'(

role of states in the federal system is not rooted in the
Constitution

itself.

states may exercise

Rather,
their

the

extent

to

which

the

~~

authority A is to be determined

from time to time by political decisions of the Congress
and the Presideni ·

Id.

-~~~
~~~...&-.(_

~rh~
~.

6.

/)uJ1[

/

~ D<fot

the least remarkabl

of the Court's

criticism of Nation

of Cities ~-1

" /"'' i.JA~

opinion is
it

~

"""

"inevitably invites an unelect d federal

make decisions

about which

which ones it dislikes".

state

it favors and

-

Ante, at

It does not seem
elected" majority of

to accur to the Court that it five

Justices

today

judiciary to

rejects

200

years

of

the

understanding of the constitutional st tus of federalism.
I

will

return

~

later

to

-1.

~~"-o

ederalism.

First,

following the Court's order of discuss on, I
· d;a.- ~~ b.-1 ~ ~~ot1"JJCC~~v
~A r;eaceRs €e r QHQUWA"J I..;eague of Cities ., ~
sons not previously a vanced in the several
rationale of that case.

* * *
Annmarie:
language

and

you

Take a careful look at the foregoing
might

have

Lynda

don't want to seem strident or
decision.

also

look

to overstate

at

it.

I

the Court's

On the other hand, I think it important at the

outset to make explicitly clear the far reaching effect of
the Court's decision - a decision without precedent.

FIN

02('~~ -1-c ~~~7~
~~~~~.

.-
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GARM SALLY-POW
MEMORANDUM

TO:

Annmarie

DATE:

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

November 13, 1984

Garcia
I comment on the outline of our opinion.

It is

thorough and identifies the principal points very well.
On further reflection, I am not sure that it is
best to put the federalism argument as Part I.

It

certainly will be the most important part of our opinion.
Yet, it seems more logical to follow generally the order
of discussion in HAB's opinion.

After the introductory

portions (that I have dictated as Part I and want you to
feel free to revise and edit), we would have a Part II
that responds to HAB's rejection of League of Cities.

'

..
•.

Our

2.

purpose is to demonstrate that the Court reads it far too
narrowly, either to justify its attack on federalism or
simply because of a misconception of the League of Cities'
basic approach.
The "traditional governmental functions" test
cannot fairly be read as narrowly as the Court does today.
The test actually contemplates a balancing or weighing of
the respective interests of the two components of our
federal system - the states and the federal government.
HAB himself viewed the League of Cities test in precisely
this light in his concurring opinion in that case.

Our

dissent could identify the weaknesses in HAB's denigration
of League of Cities, and conclude this part of our dissent
with a summary exposition of the proper balancing test.

3.

It is important, Annmarie, to keep this portion
of our dissent reasonably concise, ignorning or relegating
to summary footnotes some of our possible criticisms.

For

example, I would dispose of HAB's tax case analogies in a
brief footnote.
The second major part of the dissent, Part III,
of course, would be the discussion of federalism - the
most distinctive feature of our dual system of government.
Again, there will be a temptation perhaps to overwrite as
there is a great deal that can be said.

So long as it is

written well, this will not concern me.

The Court opinion

is 29 pages, and we are free to equal it.
L.F.P., Jr.
ss

.., ..

~'

)

GARl SALLY-POW

lfp/ss 11/14/84

82-1913 and 82-1951 Garcia
JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting.
The Court today,

in its 5-4 decision overrules

National League of Cities v. Usery, 426

u.s.

833 (1976), a

case in which we held that Congress could lacked authority
torequirements of

the

Fair

Labor Standards Act on state

and local governments.
I

There

are,

of

course,

numerous

examples

over

the

history of this Court in which prior decisions have been
reconsidered

and

overruled.

I

can

recall,

however,

no

case in which the principle of stare decisis was ingored
as flagrantly as we now witness. 1
Court

in

applied

National
there,

have

past eight years.
been

cited

and

League

of

The reasoning of the

Cities,

been repeatedly
National

quoted,

and

the

reiterated over

League of Cities

since

its

principle

decision

the

itself has
in

1974,

in

1 National League of Cities following some
changes in the composition of the Court, had overruled
Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 ( 1968) •
Unlike National
League of Cities, Wirtz had not been repeatedly accepted
by subsequent decisions.
(Annmarie: check this).

2.

opinions
Hodel v.
264,

joined

by

every

member

Virginia Sur face Mining

287-293

(1981);

Island R. Co.,

of
&

the

present

Court.

Reel. Ass' n, 452 u.S.

United Transportation Union v.

455 u.s.

678,

684-686

Long

(1982); and Federal

Energy Regulatory Commission v. Mississippi, 456 u.s. 742,
764-767 (1982).
R.

Co.,

a

Less than three years ago, in Long Island

unanimous

Court

reaffirmed

the

principles

of

National League of Cities but found them inapplicable to
the regulation of a railroad heavily engaged in interstate
commerce.

The Court stated:

"The key prong of the National League of Cities
test applicable to this case is the third one
[repeated and reformulated in Hodel], which
examines whether 'the states' compliance with
the federal law would directly impair their
ability to structure integral operations in
areas of traditional governmental functions. '"
Id., at 684.
The Court

in that case recognized

times be a difficult one",
considered

in

that

id.,

unanimous

that the test "may at

but

its application was

decision

as

settled

constitutional doctrine.
Justice Blackmun, the author of today's reversal
of

National

League

of Cities,

wrote

the

opinion of

the

Court in FERC v. Mississippi, supra, decided June 1, 1982.
It is of interest that the four Justices who join Justice

3.

Blackmun today were the four who joined his opinion in its
entirety in FERC v. Mississippi.

In that case, the Court

then said:
"In National League of Cities v. Usery, supra,
for example, the Court made clear that the
State's regulation of its relationship with its
employees is an 'undoubted attribute of state
sovereignty.'
!d., at 845.
Yet, by holding
'unimpaired' California v. Taylor, 353 u.s. 553
{1957}, which upheld a federal labor regulation
as applied to state railroad employees, 426
u.s., at 854. n. 18, National League of Cities
acknowledged that not all aspects of a State's
sovereign authority are immune from federal
control." Id., n. 28, p. 764.
The footnote in FERC quoted above did say that even where
the requirements of the National League of Cities standard
are met,
federal
state

"there are situations in which the nature of the
interest advanced may be such that

submission".

The

joint

regulation in FERC was such a

it

federal/state

justifies
system

of

"situation", but there was

no hint in Justice Blackmun's opinion that National League
of Cities - or its basic standard that he reiterated - was
subject to the infirmities discovered today.
It
does

not

is

true

that

apply

with

the

the doctrine of stare decisis
same

force

in a

constitutional

case as it does where the meaning of the Constitution is
not at issue [Annmarie, cite authority].

..•

This distinction

4.

usually has been recognized where a new Justice comes to
the Court,

bound by his oath

faithfully

to construe

the

Constitution, and views a constitutional issue differently
from

one

or

more

predecessors.

In

the

present

case,

however, the five Justices who compose the majority today
participated

in

National

reaffirming it. 2

League

of Cities and

the cases

The stability of judicial decision, and

with it respect for

the authority of this Court, are not

served by the abrupt overruling of precedents we witness
in

this

case.

[Annmarie,

perhaps

you

can

find

some

authority for supporting stare decisis and its importance
that could be included in a footnote].
Whatever effect the Court's decision may have in
weakening the application of stare decisis, this is likely
to be less important than what the Court has done to the
Constitution

itself.

States

its

federal

and

implicit

is

Constitution
itself.

Despite

2 Justice

some

The

unique

feature

system
in

the

genuflecting

of

the

guaranteed
name
in

of

our

language

United

by

the

country
to

the

O'Connor succeeded Justice Stewart
in September 1981, and participated in Long Island RR. and
FERC.

,,

5.

concept of federalism,

today's decision can be viewed as

reading the Tenth Amendment out of the Constitution.
holding

is

that

the

Fair

Labor

Standards

Act

The
(FLSA)

"contravened no affirmative limit on Congress' power under
the Commerce Clause" to determe the wage rates and hours
of employment of all state and local employees.
27.

In

rejecting

the

traditional

view

of

Ante, at

our

federal

system, the Court states:
"Apart from the limitation on federal authority
inherent in the delegated nature of Congress'
Article I powers, the principal means chosen by
the Framers to ensure the role of the states in
the federal system lies in the structure of the
federal government government." Ante, at 21, 22
(emphasis added).
---The "structure" relied upon is the fact that the
states have "a role in the selection of both the Executive
and Legislative Branches of the federal government".
No

mention

"means"

are

is

made · of

identified

the
as

Tenth

Amendment,

"ensur [ing]"

the

no

role

Id.

other
of

the

states, and no authority is cited for the holding that the
role of states in the federal system is not rooted in the
Constitution
states

may

itself.
exercise

Rather,
their

the

extent

authority

to

now

which
is

to

the
be

determined from time to time by political decisions of the

6.

Congress and the President decisions the Court says will
not be subject to judicial review.
least

remarkable

critic ism

of

aspect

National

of

the

Id.

Indeed, not the

Court's

League

of

opinion

Cities

is

its

because

it

"inevitably invites an unelected federal judiciary to make
decisions about which state policies it favors and which
ones
accur
five

it dislikes".

Ante,

to the Court that
Justices

today

at

17.

it -

It

does

not

seem

to

an "unelected" majority of

rejects

almost

200

years

of

the

understanding of the constitutional status of federalism.
I

will return later

federalism.

First,

discussion,

I

will

to what the Court does

following
address

the

Court's

its critic ism of

order

to
of

the general

standard of League of Cities.

* * *
Annmarie:
language

and

you

Take a careful look at the foregoing

might

have

Lynda

don't want to seem strident or
decision.

also

look

at

it.

I

to overstate the Court's

On the other hand, I think it important at the

outset to make explicitly clear the far reaching effect of
the Court's decision- a decision without precedent.

Feel

free, of course, to edit and suggest substantive changes.

<
'<

'·

4.

After a paragraph along the foregoing lines
(written

~gantly

by you), the dissent could then

J\

move - as your outline proposes - to address the doctrine
of federalism.

This could follow after an opening

sentence or two to the effect that although the Court's
opinion repeatedly pays lip service to state sovereignty,
it nowhere defines it or cites the case that have
repeatedly emphasized its basic part of the structure of
our government.

Nor does the opinion of the Court

identify what is left of a separate constitutional role of
the states •
.As a general observation, Annmarie, your outline
of 11/9 is comprehensive.

Indeed, it may - if followed

too literally - obscure what we gree should be the central
emphasis of the dissent:

'

'

That the Court's opinion is

''

''
'

5.

unprecedented and far reaching because it authorizes a
fundamental change in the federal system prescribed by the
Constitution and intended by the Framers.
I therefore think we should devote a minimum of
space to some of the marginal issues and arguments:

e.g.,

HAB's reliance on the tax analogy, the fact that many of
his citations do not support his conclusions, and the
like.

* * *
Your suggested outline, after the introductory
portions, would have three main parts:
II.

Majority's approach.

In this you would address HAB's attack on the
"traditional governmental functions" analysis.

6.

III.

Defining Traditional Governmental

Functions.
Here you would make the important argument that
the "traditional

~overnmental

functions" test - as stated

in League of Cities - is misconceived by the Court's
opinion as HAB himself viewed it, in joining League of
Cities, the test actually contemplates a balancing or
weighing of the respective interests of the two components
of our federal system - the states and the federal
government.

An alternative outline or structure for our
dissent could involve only two major parts after the
introductory portions.

We could start, as HAB does with

the League of Cities standard and demonstrate that the

~--~

t

7.

~

Court reads it far too narrowly, either to justify its
attack on federalism ~~al f or simply because o ~ ~
miconception of the League of Cities basis approach.

HAB

recognizes this himself in his concurring opinion.
Part II then would contain our federalism
argument.

After all, this should be the heart of our

opinion and possibly it would be more effective to address
Harry's highly vulnerable federalsim arguments after a
Part I in which we show that the proper understanding of
the traditional governmental functions language used in
prior decisions is viewed far too narrowly by the Court's
opinion.
This alternative outline of our dissent would
follow more closely HAB's Court opinion.

This would not

weigh heavily with me if a different outline seemed more

8.

logical.

If Lynda is familiar enough with the came, I

would be interested in your joint thinking as to how to
organize our dissent.

We have all of the material and

some wonderfully strong arguments.

The structure of the

opinion, however, is important and also it is essential
not to make it unduly long.

lfp/ss 09/29/84

SAN SALLY-POW
MEMORANDUM

TO:

Annmarie

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

DATE:

Sept. 29, 1984

82-1913 and 82-1951 San Antonio Transit Authority Case
The brief amicus filed on behalf of 25 states,
and

apparently

Massachusetts,

written

by

the

is particularly

Attorney

General

interesting.

of

It strongly

supports reaffirmance of the basic principle

(federalism)

of National League of Cities, and urges us to affirm the
DC's

decision.

analytical
whether

But

the

approach.

the

brief

It

function

at

argues

rejects
issue

is

for

a

analysis

different
based

"traditional",

upon

and

is

particularly critical of the "rigid and myopic historical
approach"
whether

urged

by

the

the municipal

SG

-

an

approach

function was a

that

looks

to

traditional one at

the time the FLSA was adopted.
The states' brief argues for a "balancing test"
one

that

would

review to weigh

require

a

court

exercising

the strength of the federal

judicial

interest in

regulating the states as states against the seriousness of
the

intrusion

congressional

on
action

state
(here

sovereignty".
the

FLSA)

The

should

specific

be analyzed

::

•..

..

~-

'.....

.

..,
'

2.

"in light of

the

functions

constitutional scheme".
One factor

served

by

the

states

in the

P. 42.

to be assessed is "the proximity of

the federal action to the core concerns of the Commerce
Clause".

The

integrated
absence

Founding

Fathers

national economy"

of

state-imposed

wished

to

assure

that can exist only

barriers.

The

impact

"an

in the
of

the

state activity on interstate commerce must be assessed to
determine

whether

regulation.

the

state

must

submit

to

federal

This "does not focus on whether the state is

engaged in commercial activity, but instead inquires into
the degree which that activity affects the core concerns
of the Commerce Clause".
whether

the

regulation

The question, therefore, is not
of

wages

and

hours

of

transit

workers is within the scope of the Commerce Clause •
rather,
i.e.

the

how

created

relevant

much
by

of

a

exempting

inquiry

is an assessment of degree

burder

on

publicly

interstate
employed

commerce

transit

is

workers

from the FLSA?" P. 42-45.
The states' brief goes on to say that:
"Once the strength of the federal interest and
the impact of the state activity have been
ascertained, they may be balanced against the
injury to state sovereignty posed the federal
regulation."

3.

states,

Finally,

as

there must

be

I

understand

recognition

the

that

brief

the

by

the

Constitution

established "a frame of government within which democratic
choice

is guaranteed.

sovereignty

should

For

not

this

be

reason,

assessed

injury to state

in

terms

of

the

substantive merit of a particular state policy, but rather
in terms of the effect upon self government." P. 51- 52.
The brief concludes, not surprisingly, that the
"balance
mass

tips"

against

transit.

These

the

extension

transit

systems

rather than national concerns".
been

regulated

remained

by

the

subject

to

processes" and regulation.
Finally,

the

FLSA

to public

relate

to

"local

Moreover, they have never

federal

"local

of

government,

political

but

have

decision-making

P. 61, 62.

point

is

made

that

the

"assured

provision of public transportation is an essential feature
of

the

daily

children,

lives

of

many

the elderly, etc."

people

-

commuters,

school

The point also is made that

the "intrusion of the national government into this local
political process
range

of

choice,

[and local service]
but

demonstrates

not only limits the
to

state

and

citizens that the local government is not theirs".

local
P. 64.

4.

Brief

of

American

Public

Transit

Association

(Bill

Coleman)
This wordy supplemental brief on behalf of this
party

(one of the appellees) argues that the "principles"

of League of Cities are sound and should be reaffirmed.
It is emphasized that four subsequent cases

(Hodel,

Island

(opinion

Railroad,

FERC

v.

Mississippi

Long
by

Blackmun), and EEOC v. Wyoming) have reaffirmed League of
Cities and its "principles".

P. 7-15.

I should have said that on p.
the

two

"constraints

on

Congress'

2 of this brief,

exercise

of

Commerce

Clause power in direct regulation of the states and their
political subdivisions, are "the principles of federalism"
and the Tenth Amendment.
Commencing
that

"the

subsequent

three

at

p.

part

cases,

is

32 of

test
a

in

fully

the

brief,

Hodel,

and

workable

it

is

applied

doctrine

said
in
that

insures thorough consideration of all legitimate state and
constitutional
scrutiny
each

is

interests.

in

sovereign's

Court's

tests

effect a

The

result

of

such

balancing of

the

importance of

interests
and

-

a

precedents

understandable criteria".

P. 33.

balancing
provide

for

judicial

which

objective

the
and

5.

I note that this "balancing test" is similar to
that which is the centerpiece in the brief on behalf of 25
states that I discuss above.

Reply Briefs on Behalf of Appellants
The SG 1 s
the

SG 1 s

reply brief is weak and adds little to

original

flawed

arguments by the SG 1 s

effort.

off ice

Indeed,

for

me

the

in this case are about the

weakest I have ever seen emerge from that quality group of
lawyers.

For my comments on the SG 1 s brief, see my memo

of September 7.
The

reply

brief

appellant

of

Garcia

is

scholarly, well written - and will be well argued by Larry
Gold prior

but it reiterates the extreme position advanced in
briefs.

Federalist

Following

elaborate

exercised

directly as a

with

and

regulation.
observation:

.

it is supreme over state law

respect

to

private

persons

or

regulation or restriction on the action of

state and local governments.

'

The

the brief presents an absolutist

view of the Commerce Clause:

"goods

from

(that could be matched easily with quotations

emphasizing federalism),

whether

quotations

services"
The

brief

Under

would
supports

be

this view,
subject

all local

to

this view by the

federal
facile

6.

"The fact that, as to any given good or service,
some entities [private corporations] that are
not sovereign provide the service while some
entities [cities] that are sovereign do not,
demonstrates that such -aC:tivity is not an
essential attribute of state sovereignty".
This
and

it also

upon whether

observation

identifies
a

service

undercuts

the

SG' s

argument,

the logical weakness of reliance
is

"traditional",

"essential" or

"core".
These observations implicitly suggest the merit
of the "balancing test" urged by the brief on behalf of 25
states.

The

Garcia

brief,

as

an

alternative

to

its

"basic position", agrees with the "Secretary of Labor (the
SG)

that if the states are to retain the current form of

commerce power

immunity,

the immunity should be confined

to the functions the states have historically performed "
P. 14.

* * *
In light of my examination of these and other
briefs, and in view of problems identified in the analysis
of League of Cities, I am inclined to agree generally with
a balancing test

in which a

reviewing court would weigh

7.
/

.

the factors

identified in the states' brief.

to discuss with Annrnarie who has

I will want

thought about

the case

more intensively than I have recently.

L.F.P., Jr.

ss

,.
·'

.,
'
'f·

lfp/ss

10/18/84
MEMORANDUM

TO:

Annmarie

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

DATE:

October 18, 1984

82-1913 Garcia
I have now had an opportunity to read your first
draft

of

a

dissent

undertaking
opinion.
adhere

this

in

in

advance

Necessarily,
essentially

circulated

this

we

to

case.
of

have

the

our

I

appreciate
seeing

assumed

reasoning

that

of

Court

HAB

the

There certainly will

last Term.

the

your

will

draft

he

be changes,

perhaps substantial ones. 1
I now record random thoughts in this memorandum
both for

you and me as

reminders to myself.

possible points to be made in our opinion.
in

no

particular

priority.

order,

and

suggest

I

identify

I state them
no

particular

In the end, some may merit including in a draft

and others perhaps not.
1.
opinion

in

1I

We should be careful not to undercut WHR • s
National

League

am dictating
HAB's draft of last Term •

.,~trt~;.~ .: i'r:·.t:'

... .

of

this

Cities.

without

I

recognize,

having

reread

2.

Annmarie,

that

previously

I

am

retreating

expressed

redefining

the

that

basic

we

somewhat

should

felicitous way of acomplishing this.
been

reiterated

repeatedly

FERC), we should not
standard
court

is a

must

(Hodel,

and

weigh

interests that are at issue.

Court's

federalism.
Harris,
use -

will,

opinion

u.s.

401

is

37

an

standard

In

under

from

Long

some

long

Island

federal

more

R.,

and

emphasize

accepted

excellent

and
The

state

the

principles

of

in

v.

quote
44-45)

that

Younger

that we should

to demonstrate the ongoing

See Pennhurst last Term.

balancing

Island

of

but in applying it a

course,

explaining

the

terms

Your draft does this.

with other authorities -

3.

find

Long

the

(I believe at

vitality of federalism.

quote

of

rejects

There

in

view

join HAB now in condemning it.

address

We

the

As the standard has

sound generalization,

2.

speak

Lets

standard.

from

R.R.

the

application

approach,
at

we

page

can

686-as

of

the

use

the

to

the

application of the standard, and the fact that it is not a
static one.
4.

'

It may be helpful to demonstrate by examples

that the test is not static.

HAB's opinion last Term did

this

reason.

but

for

a

different

For

decades

the

.
,-

3.

providing

of public schools was not a traditional state

function in the sense that it had ancient roots.

Indeed,

we could argue that local transportation - purely in terms
of

tradition

other

-

fits

functions

collection,
streets.

more

such as

etc.

neatly

into the

schools,

standard

public health,

Transportation

depends

on

than

garbage

roads

and

State and local governments always have provided

these essentials of "transit":

e.,

i.

to facilitate the

movement of people so essential to any form of civilized
life.

Roads

and

They

services.

streets

have

been

are

still

improved,

state
and

the

and

local

means

of

transportation have changed from horse-drawn carriages to
streetcars,

buses and now subways.

To be sure, most of

these early methods of moving people about were privately
operated, but this could be left in private hands only so
long as they were economically viable.
providing

an

essential

public

The function was

service,

and

one

long

regulated only by the states.
Annemar ie,

I don't want to carry the foregoing

too far or to overemphasize it.

It may be worth only a

footnote, but I'd like your thinking as to its merit.
5.

The

AFL-CIO's

brief

argues,

as

its

first

point, that the providing of all "goods and services" may

4.

be subjected to federal regulation regardless of whether
the goods and services are viewed as traditional or not.
HAB' s

opinion goes

beyond

this

and would hold

that

the

only limit on the Commerce Cause is the "structure" of the
federal system.
6.

You have commented on federal funding simply

in a sentence.

After we see HAB's new opinion, it should

be

-

pointed

out

perhaps

in

a

footnote

-

that

federal

funding has now become pervasive - and perhaps necessarily
so in view of the extent to which state and local revenues
have

been

excise

drained

taxes.

federal

If

off

primarily

"funding"

constitutional

by

federal

income

and

the

scope

of

states

could

be

criticism

of

determined

authority

the

abolished.

* * *
This
draft.
well

I

think

written.

rewritten -

memorandum

implies

no

the essence of your
No

doubt

the

draft

draft
will

your

is sound and
have

to

be

and probably expanded - when HAB's opinion is

circulated.

L.F.P., Jr.
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AN SALLY-POW
82-1913 Garcia

Comments on HAB's Opinion of Last Term:
Since

1913

Texas

has

regulate "carriage for hire".
provided

for

and other
hire.

franchising,

authorized

localities

to

Since 1915 San Antonio has

insurance,

safety requirements

regulations of passenger vehicles operated for

P. 2, 3.
Not until 1961 did Congress extend the FLSA to

employees of private mass transit systems.
In
extended

1966,

to

state

for
and

the
local

first

P. 4.

time,

government

the

Act

was

employees.

The

application of the Act to public schools and hospitals was
sustained

in Maryland v.

Wirtz overruled

Wirtz,

392 U.S 183

( 1968) ,

but

P.

5.

in National League of Cities.

4,

Not until 1974 was the Act made fully applicable with

respect

employees.

P.

to overtime
5.

limitations

-

to mass

even

transit

This history makes clear that Congress

was half-a-century behind Texas in regulating any aspect
of local transit systems.
The

DC

in

this

history of local regulation.

case

relied

P. 7.

heavily

on

this

' 2.

HAB

recognized

the

distinction

between

the

authority of Congress to regulate private activity and its
authority

to

impose

governmental entity.
some reason -

federal

regulation

of

HAB makes the point -

a

state

perhaps with

that if mass transit is exempt it must be

because it is owned and operated by the city rather than
because the operations are "local".

P. 8.

HAB devotes almost a full page of "string cites"
he says illustrates the difficulty of determining what is

a

"traditional

governmental

function".

9,

P.

10.

Annmarie can distinguish a good many of these cases.
Perhaps the centerpiece of HAB' s
Term was

the

principle"
the

in

"identifying an organizing

that places cases on one side of the line or
He

other.

headway

"difficulty"

argument last

says

in defining

that
the

"this

Court

has

made

scope of governmental

protected under National League of Cities".

little

functions

P. 10.

On the same page that HAB finds no "organizing
principle",

he

speaks of

the Court's difficulty in Long

Island in developing a "workable standard for traditional
governmental functions".
HAB
standards

.

'

does

involve

recognize

that

many

"constitutional

'undoubted gray areas'", citing Fry v •

' 3.

u.s.

United States, 421

542, 558, and that we decide on a

"case-by- case" basis the applicability of the particular
constitutional provision.

P. 11.

As Annmarie has noted, HAB devotes several pages
to the argument that the Court's difficulty "in the field
of tax immunity"
in

the

is illustrative of the problem involved

application

of

the

League

of

Cities

Annmarie meets this argument very well.

standard.

We may think it

desirable to expand her response after we see Harry's new
opinion.
HAB states that in Long Island we "rejected the
possibility of making immunity

[from federal regulation]

turn on a purely historical standard of 'tradition'"·
15.

He

then

goes

on

to

say

that

the

defect

in

P.
the

historical approach is that:
It prevents courts from accommodating changes in
the historic function of states, changes that
have resulted in a number of once private
functions like education being assumed by the
states
and
their
subdivisions."
[see
also
footnote 9]
P. 15.
HAB concludes

that

"reliance on history as an

organizing principle results in line drawing of the most
arbitrary sort".

P. 15.

,.

..

',.

..

4.

Then,

HAB rejects "non-historical standards" as

being "just as unworkable as a historical standard".

P.

16.

HAB

finds

"a

more

fundamental

applying the League of Cities standard -

problem"

in

the same problem

"that explains why the Court was never able to develop a
basis for the governmental/proprietary distinction in the
inter-governmental tax immunity cases.

P.

16 ,

17•

This

fundamental problem is that:
"Neither
the
governmental/proprietary
distinction nor any other that purports to
separate important governmental functions from
other ones can be faithful to the role of
federalism in a democratic society". P. 17
But

HAB's

explanation

unfaithfulness to the
follow.

of

role of federalism

his

theory

is not easy to

Indeed, he devotes less than a page to an opaque

explanation of

this

"more fundamental problem" before he

comes to his conclusion on p. 18:
"We therefore reject, as unsound in principle
and unworkable in practice, a rule of state
immunity from federal regulation that turns on a
judicial appraisal of whether
a particular
governmental
function
is
'integral'
or
'traditional'"· P. 18

•'·"

.. · ,.,.

of

' 5.

After

finding

a

"more fundamental problem"

for

rejecting the League of Cities standard (p. 16), HAB moves
forward a few pages to another "more fundamental reason"
for

this

rejection,

namely:

"the

sovereignty

states is limited by the Constittuion itself".
It

is

recognized

significant

that

measure

of

the

states

sovereign

of

the

P. 19, 20.

"retain

a

authority"

(citing

my

dissent in Wyoming) , but HAB says they do so "only to the
extent

that

the

Constitution

has

not

divested

them

of

their original powers and transferred those powers to the
federal government".

P. 20.

He goes on to say the Court has "no license to
employ free standing conceptions of state sovereignty when
measuring

congressional

Clause".

P.

permits

the

sovereignty
This

21.

view

In

federal
except

simply

authority

other

words,

government
where

reads

to

explicity
the

Tenth

under
the

the

Commerce

Commerce Clause

eliminate
granted
Amendment

all

state

the

states.

out

of

the

Constitution.
Having disposed of the Tenth Amendment, HAB then
moves to his novel thesis that the Framers perceived that
state sovereignty would be protected by "the structure of
the federal government itself".

P. 22.

He finds that the

' 6.

states

are

protected

because

the

states were

over

the

House

of

from

"overreaching

"vested with

by

Congress"

indirect

influence

Representatives and

the Presidency by

their control of electoral qualifications and their role
in

presidential

elections",

and

direct influence in the Senate".

As
government
which

is

federal

illustrative
the

states,

funds

of

how

they

"given

more

P. 22. 1

protective

HAB cites

are made

were

the

available

the

federal

lavishness with
to

the

states -

including the funding of "such services as police and fire
protection, education, public health and hospitals, parks
and

recreation,

lavishness
benefit

and

sanitation".

23,

P.

24.

This

is more accurately explained by the political

seen

by

members

of

Congress

in

making

money

available to their home districts or states.
HAB cites
exempt
OSHA,

states
the

and

a

number

their

Sherman Act

and

of

statutes

subdivisions,

that expressly
including

several others.

P.

24.

NLRA,
HAB

1 r note that HAB cites articles by Professor
Wechsler and Professor Choper as supporting his views.
Annmarie should take a look at these.

•!,

}

.

>,

,·

' 7.

cites

these

Congress

as

any

evidence
time

of

could

generosity.

make

all

of

Under

his

view

these

statutes

applicable to the states just as it has done with FLSA.
HAB
example

of

says

"the

something

constitutional

scheme

fundamental
being

limitation

'fundamental']

[another
that

the

imposes on the Commerce Clause

to

protect the states as states is one of process rather than
one of result."

P. 25.

Finally,
restraint"

on

HAB

federal

identifies
authority

the
is

"a

"only

substantive

requirement

that

Congress not attempt to single out the states for special
burdens or otherwise discriminate against them".

P.

25.

HAB cites no case authority for this expansive view of the
Constitution.
retains

It will be

interesting to see whether he

this extreme view when he writes for

the Court.

He does cite M'Cullough v. Maryland, as resting in part on
concerns about discrimination.

* * *
My rereading of HAB' s opinion again shocks me.
He

rejects,

sovereignty
explicitly

in

effect,

protected
stated.

by

the
the

existence
Constitution

He construes

of

any

state

except

where

the Commerce Clause as

preempting the Tenth Amendment even though several states

.~.

' 8.

would

not

have

ratified

adoption of that Amendment.

the

Constitution

[Annmarie:

without

the

Ask the library -

perhaps Penny - to give us the record evidence of why the
lOth Amendment was added.]
As I now read HAB's opinion,

it goes beyond the

AFL-CIO brief's view that "all goods and servies" provided
by the states are subject to complete regulation by the
federal government.
L.F.P., Jr.
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October 30, 1984
GAR GINA-POW
To:

Annmarie

From:

LFP, JR.

Re:

82-1913 and 82-1951 - Garcia v. San Antonio
Over the weekend I read HAB's opinion of October

23 with some care.
opinion

of

last

present

opinion

I

did not have with me at home his

June.
is

As

I

simply

significant additions.

recall,

a

large

incorporated,

but

part

the

there

are

You mentioned the omission of his

"discrimination" point.
In
myself,

any
I

event,

perhaps

note points

as

a

memory

refresher

that we may consider -

for

some quite

general and others specific.
1.

A major

curiosity

of

his

proports to support "federalism".

opinion

is

that

it

For example, he states

that League of Cities is "inconsistent with principles of
federalism"

p.

2.

Again,

no

"distinction"

that

"proports to separate our important governmental functions
can be faithful to the role of federalism in a democratic
society."

du~

. .'

p. 17.

Federalism

-

federal

and

if

it means

state

anything

system

of

-

our

refers

to

country.

the
It

2.

necessarily recognizes that the state's have a major role
that

cannot

concedes

be

that

the state

voided

by

the

federal

government.

"some sovereign authority

(p.

19), but never

is

HAB

retained" by

identifies it.

P.

20.

At

another point, HAB states that the "states unquestionably
do

'retain

a

significant

measure

(quoting my dissent in Wyoming) .

of
P.

state
20.

authority'"

But he limits

that in the next few sentences of his opinion
[Annmarie:
It is important for us to
address what federalism means.
Some of the
decisions of this Court will be quite helpful.
[Secondary authority also should be examined.]
2.

HAB concedes that a "case by case" approach might

"develop a workable standard".
pages

of

his

"traditional

opinion

function"

are

P.

11.

devoted

standard

of

But the first 18
to

rejecting

National Cities.

then concludes that no

other standard is workable.

is

"balancing"

no

mention

of

a

the

analysis

that

He

There
is

familiar in constitional cases.
L.M-

[Did
not
HAB
mention
balancing .1\ his
concurring opinion in League of Cities? Do you
know of any decisions of this Court that apply a
balancing analysis in a Commerce Clause case?
We might ask Lynda or the Library for help on
this.]

so

3.

3.

You have a good answer to HAB's reliance on the

"governmental/proprietary"
taxation.

function

distinction

in

Were the earlier cases ever expressly overruled

or merely reinterpreted?

4.
interest

10,

In

n.

in

being

meaningless

15,

p.
free

HAB

from

genuflecting

as

refers

federal
he

to

the

"state

regulations"

subordinates

the

a
state

interest to the Commerce Clause.
5.

After

rejecting

HAB

considers

standard,
historial";

"uniquely

"traditional

functions"

as

and

"history";

"non-

function";

and

rejects

govermental

"necessary governmental services",
HAB

does

not

mention

(P. 15-16).

"balancing"

But again

weighing

or

a

the

respective interests of governments in the federal system.

6.
problems"
standard

Harry has again identified two "more fundamental
with
can

federalism".

League

be

of Cities.

found

that

P. 16-17.

is

The

first

"faithful

to

is
the

that

no

role of

On page 17, after this statement,

the opinion curiously seems to wonder off and talk about
the

opportunity

non-elected
interfere

'.

..
~

lt;

states

federal
with

representatives".

:j.*~ ~

of

to

judiciary
action

of

"experiment .. ,
not

being

"elected

and

about

competent

a
to

legislative

P. 16, 17.

~';

4.

Annmarie, we may take a jab at HAB for this
sort of talk.
He is not concerned about the
competency of an unelected federal judiciary to
read
the
Tenth
Amendment
out
of
the
Constitution.
Nor
is
it
self-evident
how
conveying
virtually
unlimited power
on the
federal government enhances the ability of the
various states to "experiment".
HAB's "logic"
simply eludes me.
7.
finds,

Repeating

the

argument

he

made

last

as a second "more fundamental reason"

Term,
for

HAB

holding

that Congress has power to regulate wages and hours of all
state

and

local

employees

is

that

"state sovereignty is

limited by the Constitution itself".
After

conceding

that

"some

P. 19.

sovereign

authority

is

retained", he does not identify it except the provision of
the

Constitution

integrity".
8.
P.

20.

protects

"state

territorial

P. 21.

The opinion relies on a quote from Justice Field.
The quotation,

purpose

and

G<

subs tan ~

Field, dissenting
368,

that

401,

said

though quite general, supports the
of

the

Tenth

in B&O Railroad Co.
that

the

Amendment.
v.

Constitution

Justice

Baugh, 149

u.s.

"recognizes

and

perserves the autonomy and independence of the states ... ",
and that federal "supervision over either the legislative
or judicial action of the states is in no case permissible

.

'·

5.

except

as

to

matters

by

the

Constitution

specifically

authorized or delegated to the United States."
nothing

in

authorizes

the

Commerce

Congress

state employees.

to

Clause

regulate

that

the

There is

"specifically"

wages

and

hours

of

The Commerce Clause is no more specific

than the Tenth Amendment in the language used.
9.

In purporting to illustrate the "effectiveness of

political

power"

(P.

23,

24),

HAB

emphasizes

federal

grants to state and local services such as police, fire,
schools,

santitation,

etc.

In

commenting

on

this,

we

could note that by virtue of the "spending power" Congress
has

exercised

substantial

affairs, but I
that

the

mere

control

over

state

and

local

know of no decision that holds or implies
granting

of

federal

funds

without

a

positive reservation of regulating authority - establishes
a Commerce Clause
benefit

from

the

right
grants.

to control
See

the

activities

Pennhurst

I

that

that

may

be

relevant.
10.

HAB cites a number of federal statutes that have

not been extended to cover state employees or activities:
NLRB,

LMRA,

OSHA,

Power Act. - P. 24.

ERISA,

the

Sherman

Act,

the

Federal

6.

Rather

than

supporting

HAB's

argument

that

the

structure protects the states, the rationale and decision
of the Court in this case make perfectly clear that the
"protection"
"grace",

that

exists

present

is

a

matter

that can be withdrawn at any time.

must mean more than this.
system

at

if

authority

the
only

state
as

a

of

Federalism

Can there be a genuine federal

components
matter

of

of

the

grace

by

system
the

have

federal

component?
11.

Of

Congress -

course,

HAB' s

argument

is we can

trust

the

and perhaps to a less extent the President -

not to denigrate the role of the states because the people
of all of the states elect the legislative branch and the
head of the executive branch.

As we have discus sed, HAB

cites no authority for this and we know of none with the
possible

exception

of

some

secondary

writing.

HAB's

opinion reflects a unrealistic - if not singularly naive view

of

how

the

political

system

works

in our

country

today.
In the early years of our country, Congress met only
briefly in the course of a year.

Its members were drawn,

in large part, from citizens of some prominence in various
careers -

citizens who spent most of each year in their

7.

home districts or

states.

Now,

professional politicians who by

law

against

branch of

the

holding

responsibilities.
relatively

new

employment.

government.

Moreover,
phenomena

"special intersts group".
of these:

I believe - are restricted

private

national

Congress is composed of

as

in

we

They
have

national

They

have

are

no

state

discussed,

politics

a

is

the
the

For years there have been some

e.g., veterans groups

to join), and organized labor.

(but I was never willing

Today, the range of groups

and PACs that lobby regularly is legion.
12.
that

A major

his

flaw

reliance

in HAB' s

on

"structure"

"democracy"

federal government itself.

reasoning

focuses

only

on

is
the

His opinion overlooks the fact

that the most effective democracy is at the lcoal level
where the people are close to the local problems, and know
and

have

access

to

the

people

who

are

councils and county board of supervisors.
these

levels

also

have

family

members

elected

to city

The people at
who

are

in

various services performed by the local goverments.
state
are

legislatures,

drawn

within

the

from

the

state.

none of which meet the year
various

professions

and

the
The

around,

employments

A state legislature therefore

is far

more responsive to the state electrate than the Congress

'.

8.

is to any particular state interest.
deal of writing
effect

that

processes
influential

- perhaps in some of our cases -

the

is
at

There must be a good

public

participation

greater,

better

the

and

state

in

democratic

informed,

local

levels

to the

and
than

more
in

the

Congress or the federal bureaucy.
13.

If HAB mentions the Tenth Amendment,

my reading of his opinion.
us

with

Amendment

some
and

history
its

of

purpose.

it escaped

I hope that Penny has provided
the

adoption

This

written about it a number of times.
LFP, Jr.

Court

of
also

the
must

Tenth
have

The case of Garcia vs. San Antonio tions to vagutf and sweeping proMetropolitan Transit Authority, de- nouncements about the nature of the
cided by the Supreme Court Tuesday, whole American process. Justice
rated front-page headlines for good .Lewis Powell, writing for the minorreason. First-and taxpayers be- ity, was unimpressed with his colware-it restores sweeping powers Jeag}le's intellectual feat.
that Congress had before 1976 to imJustice Powell · first maintained
pose costs on state and local governthat ·the particular decisions required
ments. Second, the justices split of the courts by the Us~ry ruling were
sharply over whether courts must con- ·no more difficult than the balancing
stantly define the separate prerogaacts they had to perform in countless
tives of federal and state govern- other policy areas. More central, he
ments. The court majority, in effect,
thought it scandalous to maintain cawashed its hands of this constitutional
valierly that the rights of the states in
responsibility and told the politicians the American regime will be proto fight it out.
tected automatically. It is dangerous,
· Garcia is a sharp and untoward rehe asserted, to say that the all-imporv.ersal of court policy. In 1976, in Natant principle of governments close to
tional League of Cities vS. Usery, the _ the people does not require the proteccourt ruled that even the wide-ranging tion of explicit Jaws and rules and
Commerce Clause of the Constitution court opinions.
does not empower Congress to impose
When you finish reading this worminimum-wage and overtime requireried
criticism of the majority opinion,
ments on state governments performit is hard to escape the thought that
ing certain of their "traditional" functions. Since then, the courts have been Justice Blackmun's cheery description of a self-regulating federalism is
applying this principle to other cases.
In the process they have complained more than a trifle glib. It is particuabout the difficulty of figuring out larly so at a time of so much public
concern over the enormous accretion
what constitutes a "traditional" local
government function and what does of power in Congress, with public esriot. Garcia solved these difficulties by teem for that body at such a low
ebb.
overruling Usery completely.
It is indeed true that Usery was
Justice Harry Blackmun, writing
difficult to put into practice. After a
for the five-man liberal majority, explained why it was necessary and safe long period of centralization, many
ideas about what naturally constituted
to give up trying to hem in the federal
a local or state function had been
government. First, he noted, the
courts have found no coherent way to eroded or altogether lost. Liberal justices had made the Commerce Clause
separate the local functions they want
an eight-lane highway for federal lawto defend against federal intrusion
makers seeking new areas of regulafrom those they do not. They are not
tion and controL But the difficulty
likely to find the magic principle in
represented scant cause for abdicathe future, either, he thought.
tion.
More important, he argued, making fixed lists of federal functions vs.
In ·fact, the Blackmun decision is
local functions is no way to run a not really abdication, but a distinct
changing democracy. Our founders
and affirmative award of power to the
recognized this, for they chose to pro- · federal government. It ignores, along
teet the states not by putting the variwith all the other arguments for deous levels of government into rigid
centralized power, the truth that comboxes but by giving the states power petition among the states in the delivwithin the national government itery of wanted public services at low
self-organizing the Senate on state
rates to the taxpayers is a vital conlines, for instance, or making the
trol over government excess. Constates the basic units for choosing a gress faces far Jess restraint and is
president.
correspondingly more guilty of such
This argument is a wonderfully excess. We hope Justice William
clever way to shift the federalism de- Rehnquist is correct in saying that it
bate away from arguments about con- is only a matter of tim·e before the
stitutionally allotted government func- Blackmun decision is itself reversed.
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and others who laid the leaillatlon wu
needed to atve public employeet!i the
same
protections as the private 1ector,
which Is covered under the Fair Labor
have traclitionallY held authority.
They also noted that the decision ran Standards Act and the Federal Gov· ·
coun~er to President R-.an•s philoao- emment. , '
phy. The Administration, which . bad
··
However, the decision was unusual in
opposed the broad •cope of the decl• that
the court, in ruling . that public
sion, bas held that- the ~tea should be transit workers had to be brought
given more authority in various areas under Federal standards, al8o overin return for having their Federal tunds ruled its own ·decision of 1976 holdlng
reduced. Mr. Reaaan's 1986 budpt that the ConStitution did not permft
callB for deep cuts in aid to states, dties Congress to "directly replace the
THEY S~£ LOSS OF POWERS and
other local kovernments 'and the states' freedom to structure integral
governors said they were now '1n a poel- operations in areas,of U,ditt~ JOV·
tion of possibly having to give up both emment fw\ctions.
.
funds and authority.. '
Blackmun Seel State Strenatb
Governors and Mayors Expect the
· The moat Immediate effect of the ·
decision, according to state an.d local Associate Justice Hap-y .A. Black- 1
Crowding by Congress in
otfidala, was that it would cost their mun, writing the ~lnion, laid efforts
governments many millions of dollars by Federal courts to Impose Umita on ·
Areas Other Than Pay
in overtime pay for pollee officers, tire- ~e power of COngress ~er the lOth
fiahtera, transit workers and others Amendment bad proven ~practlca- ,
who work split or unusual lhifts and ble and doctrinally barren and the
By .JOHN HERBERS
that the paperwork involved would add states ~re now in a position to defend
11pec1a1 til n. New Yen na burden. . ·
themselves , agai~U!! Congress 1n the
Paying the minimum wage as re- "political process.
WASHINGTON, Feb. 20 - A furor
,8nlptecl today among governors, qulred under Federal ltandarda was s. Kenneth Howard, executiVe direcmayors and other local otfidals over not considered a factor because an but tor of the Advisory Commtasion on Inthe Supreme Court ruling that 13 mil- the very smallest .Jurl8dictlons have tergovemmental ~elations, a nonpartlwage standards that equal or exceed san research organltation created by
.11011 state and local government employees are IUbject to Federal wage the Federal minimum, $3.35'&11 hour. Congress, said he did not understand
I,tandy Arndt, spokesman for the Na- how the Court came to that conclusion
and bour standards.
tional 1.eaaUe of Cities, aatd an adell- when the commission for some months 11
Some IIUd 7\lellday'a 5-to-4 dedslon tional factOr was that the aovemments has been conductin& a study on why the
;-would ra11e coaa and increase bureau-· involved were now in the middle of the states and their subordinate govern.crattc red tape. But beyond that, there fiscal year, with budpts already de- mentshdaolittlepowerlnCongress.
was a C008eDSUI that tbe ruling struck dded, "and now they are faced with "Where Is the political restraint?" he
at the heart of efforts by state and local deciding what they are going to do it said. "We don't see it tilat way."
. pvernmeats to win broader authority they don't have enouah money to pay Mr Howard said one of the prellmi·
naey>.findlngs of the 'study was that with
·throulh the courts to operate their policemen and firemen."
J jurildictions with lesa Interference
Impact on Pay b Murky
political parties weakene<1 in recent
. from Wasbiqton. ·
it was unclear, however, what the years Congress had·become an assem. "I always viewed the Supreme Court tlscal Impact would be. Congress, in bly of independent operators little inIn the role of referee, ltanding 011 tbe eaactini the 1874 legialation bringing nuenced by party otfidals or elected ·
field 1n a lt:J1ped ahirt, mediating the state and local employes under Fed8nil officials in respective states. "We see
contest between the state and Federal ·standards, wrote in 110me provisions pre-emptive legislation by.Congress u
aovemmeuts," laid Gov. Bruce Bab- for unusual shifts 10 ail :tQ,jreBtraln tbe a real threat to a balan~ Federal sys.
·
bitt of Arizona, a Democrat who Is a · costs. Much of the ~t)faetior would de- tem," he said.
pend on how the LabOr,Department~ Richard B. Geltman, general counsel ·
leading advocate of restoration of state
dded to enforce the regulations.,'~~-~ of.t heNationalGovemors' Aasodati~,
-powers. " .What this dedaion does is
The Supreme Court's decision ~u said: "This decision can only lead to a
1haw the referee leavtna the field and
welcomed by labor unions, wotk~~ - Fter exercise of Federal authority
1 beedtq for the lhower."
.!
'Aara err Totality' Worrlell Him .
He laid be was particularly con- , and unitary, centralized aovemment."
cemed about "the aura of totallty" of States and local governments, he said,
the dec:lstoo wblcb leaws tbe ,..,__. shorn of the constitutional protection
'
- - afforded the Federal legislative and
aDd the states COiltestina 011 politiCal judicial t>ranChes, are to be treated as ·
fttber than CODStitutional pounds.
f
.
Governor Babbitt .aDd other aover· i th~y were just "a few more 8pecial
nora u1d tb&t ~uae the Court bad ~~eh:~.f!OUPB coming to Washington
"taken w..Ik" there was fear that
<
Coopela would be _ ~ to 1 pre-empt
·Matthews. Coffey, executive of tbe
state power In areas far beyond waae. National . Association 9f Counties
aDd J1our ltaDdards, in educ:atioo, maintalning that "the Court bas tateri
crime control, coDaumer protection a Walk," said the burden wu now on
and otber fuoctiOiliiWbere the ltates state
and local governments to assume
1
a 'more dillJent watchcloa role" to
.make sure Congress no Ionaer paue8
legislation that asserted "a broad gen.
eral prindple" and then lett It up to tbe
cow:ts to dedde what harm it m1&ht clo
to the state &Jldl~ ~ent,s.

HIGH ·coURT RULING
SOURCE" OF DISMAY .
[ TO LOGAL-OFFIG.IALS
I
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Ia for despite the lOth Amendment, because
, .mel toea~ em~, ille <lcNrt . runntng a railroad was not a "tradition-
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JUSTICES ENHANCE ·.:· =~:.:::m;$. ==~~c=j=~
FED,E.R'AL POWER·S; ==:·~=u:;~~:; =t~f!w~
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. Constitutioll live~ the states special

.

interfere til state affairs.
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Rel)'lna on PoUtleal ProCea . .
With .. rare exceptions," ,Aaoc;iate
Justice· HatTY A •.,B\ackmun"wrote for
the majority today. the constitution
imposes no such limit.. Rather, he
said t,be states are protectecl ag'ainst
~ Fed~ral mtrusiCIDII into their saver-·
on1 · the---. that ..._,
·
eignty , y to
""'&"..,.. " .....,~can
_, use tbe "political process ' to protect

UPSET O'WN '76 PRECED,ENT.

Federal qe disA Severely Frayed DoetrlDe

the National League of Cities doctrine

::;re:T=ln:~~o:

thel97tldecision,thatSanAntonlowas
immune from being required to pay its
mass transit workers accol'dinR to Federa! wage and hour BCales. Soth the !
transit workers and the Federal Gov0 ~ .
ernment appealed to the Supreme
It
r
Court, arguing that mass transit was
not a traditional state function and that
the lOth Amendment analysis should
themset~.
·
,
not apply.
It is "~ s~re of the Federal
The Court argued ·· the case last
Government itself" that protects the March and, after failing to reach a
·
states, Ju8tice Blackm~ continued, decision by the end df the term, ordered
By LINDA GREENHOUSE
and not any "judicially created Umita- a new argument for last October with
Spec:laJtoTbeNew.Y~.nmes
• •
tioos 011 Federal JXJWI!Ir/' He said ef- an added issue: "whether or not the
WASHINGTON, Feb. 19- Taking fortS by tbe Supreme \~uri and the principles of the lOth Amendment as
the rare step ' of ovemlling one of its · 1
-~· ....e to •.t..pose Other limits on setforf:binNational LeagueofCitiesv. /
ower""""'"" ....
Usery should be reconsidered"
own recent precedents, the Supreme . the power of 'Congress bad · proven
It was clear then that the .:esmt toCourt today signiflcantly . enban~ the
"both impracticable ~ doctrinal'y day was a posslbnitf, although few peopower of the Federal Government to, barren." Citing ~ p~ of state . pie expected the sweeping terms with ·
regulate state activititlS that bad been
which the Court reached the result. Soconsidered immune from Federal con- delegatiOilS in Congiess and the states' licitor General Rex E. Lee, arguing for
1 trol:
• role in the ~ CoUep, Justice . the Federal Government, bad urged
. The decision, one of the Court's most Blaclanun laid: "The political process the Court to upbold National League of
important ruli~ on the subject ~Of . lDsures that laws .t hat unduly burden
the states will not be promulgated."
Excerpts from opf,Uons, page Al2.
Justice Blackmun appeared to be Implying that once the states have lost a
, federalism, created a new framework battle in Congress, the judiciary should
I for analyzing the constitutional bal- interfere only with ~me reluc, ance ~tween Federal and state au. tance, if at all.
·
In a bitter dissenting oPinion, AsSoci1 thority.
ate Justice Lewis F. Powell Jr. ac:..
j The Court ruled, 5 to 4, that Federal cused the majority of abandoning the
minimum wage and hour standards Court's age-old principle of judiclalr&l cover -employees of pUblicly owned view and of establ.isbing in its place the
\ mass transit systems. In immediate doctrine lbat Federal political offi~
practical-terms, the decision lslik~ "are the sole judges of the Omits of
l~d to higher wages for transit
- their own power." ·
ers. While nearly aU these employees
· "The states' rote in our system of
: receive more than the minimum wage, Government ts a matter of constltuthey typically work split shifts, with tional law, not of legislative grace,"
long breaks between the morning and Justice Powell said.
' evening rosh hours and would receive · The decision, Garda v. ,San .Antonio
:-~ft ..... overti ' """
.
Metropolitan Transit A~ty, No. tzu""~
me a-Y·
. .
11113, was the latest episode bi an anEffect on Other State Employees
usual'chapter of constitutional history.
i - ·
.
.
al
Two otber dlsseoters, Associate Jus, By extensiOn, the dectsion so re- tices William H. Relmquist and Sandra
I stores most other state employees to . Day O'Cormor, each suggested in tbe1r
protected status under the Fai~ Labor own dissenting opinions that the chapStandards Act. The 1976 decision, ter may not be closed, and that today's
which the Court ovemlled today, held decision itself may soon be a target for
that the Constitution did not permit overniling.
Congress to extend wage and hour · Chief Justice Warren E. Burger a1ao
coverage to state employees ~use to · dissented. Justice Blackmun's ma- ·
do so would "directly displace the
states' freedom to stnicture integral
operations in areas of traditional goven,unental fyn_Etions." ,

ImpOSI't'IOn f US Standard··
for Translt· Wor"'ers pay ..Sets New Framework :·
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jority opinion was Joined by As80daRte CitieS as a "fundamental constitutiOnal ~
lustfces William J. Brennan, Byron · Insight." Be said today that be was 'I"
White, 'I'burgood Marshall and John "surprised and grieving" over the~ · t:
Paul Stevens.
· come.
Reactioa to·RuJlD&
Blaclmuin'a Plvotal Role
The key role was that of Justice
The National League of Cities ~ued .. r
Blackmun. ' He had been a reluctant a statement saying the Court bad
member of the 5-to-4 majority in the "clearly upset ·any semblance of bal· •1
1978 -declsion, which was written by ance between the interests of ;Federal
t Justice Rehnquist. That declsioo, Na- policy and our once-proud traditions of
ltional League of Citiesv.-Usery, stnack local self-government."
i·down Congress's extension of the Fair Gerald w. McEntee, president of the
Labor Standards Act to stat~ employ- American Federation of State, County 1:.•
ees by resurrecting one of the most ob- and Municipal Employees, said the ~ ...
scure provisions of the Bill of Rights, decision ended a period of "second- n •
the lOth Amendment.
class citizenship" for employees of ·n
The lOth Amendment provides }hat state and local government.
,c
powers not granted by the Constitution
Justice Blackinun's 28-page opinion v
to the Federal Government "are re- did not discuss the lOth Amendment. ·.~:
served to the states." The NatlonM Rather, he discussed the extent to o1
League of Cities decision found _in tha~ which the National League of Cities ap- 10
amendment an affirmative check on proach had proved "unsound in princlthe 'ability ,of Congress to exercise its pie and unworkable in practice."
nJ -.
power over interstate . commerce in
"We have no license to employ free. r.>
ways that affected the "states as standing conceptioos of state saver- nf ·
'states/' It was the first time in 40 yean : eignty when measuring Congressional l)
Umt the Court bad tnvalidated an ac.- authority under · the Commerce n
tion taken by Congress under the Com· ·Clause," . Justice Blackmun said. et-·
merce Clause power, and the decision ."State sovereign interests are more · at
appeared to herald a major shift in the properly protected by procedural safe- Je
Federal-state balance of power.
guards inherent in the structure of the 'l"
That ~mise did not materialize, Federal system than by judicially id however, as the Court seemed to pull createdlimttattonsonF~power." ·rr
back from the full implications of the
19
1976 decision. In 1972, for example, the
-- J)
~ Court ruled that employees of the stateREMEMBER THE NEEDIESTI
owned Long Island Ran Road had a
[ federally guaranteed right to strike,

I
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WASHINGTON; Feb. 19- Following are excerpts from opiniona by the Supreme Court today on the constitutional relationship between the Federal Government and the states. Associate Justice Harry A. Blackmun wrote the opinion, which was joined by Associate Justices William J. Brennan Jr., Byron R.
White, Thu~ood Marshall and John Paul Stevens. Aaaociate Justice Lewis F.
Powell Jr. filed a dfsaent joined by Chief Justice Warren E. Burger andAssoclate Justices William H. Rehnquist and Sandra Day O'CoMOr, who both alto
filed aeparate dissents.

F~om the

...

Opinion

'
By Justice Blackmun

•

I

We revisit lri these cases an tssue
gral operations in areas of traditional
raised in National League of Cities v.
governmental functions.' " Finally,
Usery (1976). In that litigation, this
the relation of state and Federal inCourt, by a sharply divided vote,
terests must not be such that "tl\e naruled that the Commerce Clause does
ture of the Federal ·interest justifies
not empower Congress to enforce the
state submission."
minimum-wage and overtime proviThe controversy has focused on the
sions of the Fair Labor Standards Act
third, that the challenged Federal
(F.L.S.A.) against the states "in
statute trench on "traditional governareas of traditional governmental
mental functions." Just bow troubleSUpreme Court lli8torical Society
functions."
some thE! task has been is revealed by
Associate
Justice
Harry A. BlacltAlthough National League of Cities
the results in other Federal cases.
mwt,
wbo
WJ'Ole
Court's
opinion.
supplied some examples of "tradiCourt Makes Uttle Headway
tional governmental functions," It did
Thus far, this Court Itself has made
not offer a aeneral explanation of how
little headway in defining the scope of Clause by its specific language does
a "traditional" function is to be disthe functions deemed protected wtder not provide any special limitation oi1
tinguished from a "nontraditonal"
Congress' actions with respect to the
National League of Cities.
one. Since then, Federal and state
~tates. It Is equally true, however,
We
believe,
however,
that
there
is
a
courts have struggled with the task
more fundamental problem at work . that the text of the Constitution prothus imposed, of Identifying a tradihere. Neither the governmental/pro- vides the beginning rather than the
tional function for purposes of state
prietary distinction nor any other that final answer to every inquiry into
immunity wtder the Commerce
purports to separate out Important questions of federalism. In order to
Clause.
governmental functions can be faith- be faithful to the underlying Federal
In the present cases, a Federal Disful to the role of federalism in a demo- premises of the Constitution, courts
trict Court concluded that municipal
cratic society. The essence of. our must look for the "postulates which
ownership and operation of a massFederal system is that within the limit and control."
transit system is a traditlonalaovernWe doubt that courts ultimately can
realm of authority left open to them
mental function and thus," wtder Naunder the Constitution, the states identify principled constitutional
tional Leasue of Cities, is exempt
must be equally free to engaae in any limitations on the scope of Congress'
from the obligations imposed by the
activity
that their clttzehs choose for Commerce Clause powers merely by
F.L.S.A. Faced with tbe identical
the common weal, no matter how relying on a priori definitions of state
question, three Federal Courts of Ap.
unorthodox or wtnecessary anyone sovereignty. In part, this is because
• peals and one state appellate court
else, including the judiciary, deems of the elusiveness of objective criteria
have reched the opposite conclusion.
for "fundamental" elements of state
state involvement to be.
Lack of Consllteney Seen
Any rule of state Immunity that sovereignty.
There is, however, a · more fundaOur examination of thil "function"
.looks to the "traditional," "integral,"
standard now persuades us that the
or "necessary" nature of aovernmen- mental reason: the sovereignty of the
attempt to draw the bowtdarles of . tal functions inevitably invites an States Is limited by the Constitution
state regulatory immunity in terms
wtelected Federal judiciary to make ItSelf. A variety of sovereign powers,
of "traditional governmental funcdecisions about which state policies it . for example, are withdrawn from the
states by Article I Section 10. Section
tion" Is not only wtworkable but Is infavors and which It dislikes.
consistent with established principles
We therefore now reject, as un- 8 of the same Article works an equally
of federalism and, indeed, with those
SOWld in prin.tclple and unworkable in sharp contraction of state soververy federalism principles on which
practice, a _rule of state Immunity eignty by authorizing Congress to exNational League of Cities purported
from Federal regulation that turns on • erclse a wide range of legislative
powers and (in conjwtctlon with the
to rest. That case, accordingly, Is
a judicial appraisal of whether a
overruled.
.
.
particular governmental function Is . Supremacy Clause of Article VI) to
The prerequisites for aovemmental
"integral" or "traditional." If there displace contrary state legislation.
By providing for final review of ,.
Immunity under National League of
are to be limits on Fedeial GovernCities were summarized by this Court
ment power to interfere with state questions of Federal law in this
in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining
functions, as wtdoubtedly tllere are, Court, Article III curtails the aovereign power of the'states' judiciaries to
(1981). Under that summary, four
we must look elsewhere to find them.
make authoritative determinations of
conditions must be satisfied. First, it
Special Position of Statel
law. Finally, the developed applicaIs said that the Federal statute at
The central theme of National · tion, through the Fourteenth AmendIssue must regulate ·"the states as
League .of Cities was that the states ment, of the greater part of the Bill of
states." Second, the statute must
occupy a special position in our con- Rights to the states limits the sover"address matters that are indusputastitutional system and that the scope eign authority that states otherwise
bly 'attributes of state sovereignty.' "
of Congress' authority under the would possess to leatslati with relbird, state compliance with the FedCommerce Clause must refiect that spect to their citizens and to conduct
eral obligation must "directly Impair
position. Of course, the Commerce their own affairs.
[the states'] ability 'to sttucture inte-

The states unquestionably do retain ·tiOns and their role in Presidential
a significant measure of sovereign elections. They were atven more di·
authority. They do so, however, only rect influence in the -senate, where
to the exent that the Constitution bas each state received equal repreaentanot divested them of their orlaJ,nal : tton and each senator was to be Hpowera and transferred those powers lected by the legislature of hla state.
to tbe Federal Government.
In short, the Jl'ramera Chose to rely
on a Federal system In which apeclal
When we look for the atates' "resld· restraints on Federal power over the
uary and Inviolable aov~tgnty," states inhered prtnctpally in the
(Tbe Federalist No. 39 J. Madison) In
of the national Government
the shape of the constitutional workings
Itself, rather than In discrete ltmlta·
scheme rather than In predetermined tions on the objects of Federal authornotions of sovereign power, a differ- ity.
ent measure of state sovereignty
The effectiveness of the Federal
. emerges. Apart from the Umltatlon political process in preserving the
. on Federal authority Inherent In the states' Interests Ia apparent In the
delegated nature of congress• Article
of Federal legislation.
• I powers, the principal means chosen course
We are- convinced that the fundaby the Framers to Insure the role of mental limitation that the constitu·
the states lie& tn the structure of the tional scheme imposes on the ComFederal Government itself.
merce Clause to protect the "states
It is no novelty to observe that the as states" is one of process i'ather
composition of the Federal Govern- than one of result. Any substantive re• ment was designed In large part to straint on the exercise of Commerce
protect the states from overreaching Clause powers must find its justiflca.
by Congress. The Framers thus gave tion In the procedural nature of thla
the states a role In the selection both baste limitation, and It must be taiof tbe executive and the legislative lored to compensate for possible fail·
branches of the Federal Government. tngs in the national political process
The states were vested with Indirect rather than to dictate a "sacred provinfluence oVer the House of R.epre. lnce of state autonomy."
•
sentatlves and tbe Presidency by
National League of Cities v. Usery
their control of electoral qualtftca- is overruled.

From Dissents
By Justice Powell
Because I belleve this decision subalters the Federal system
\ stantially
embodied in the Constitution, I dissent.
The stabillty of judicial decision,
and with It respect for the authority of
this Court, are not served by the ·
prectpltious overruling of multiple
precedents that we witness In this
case. A unique feature of the United
States is tbe Federal system of govemment guaranteed by the Constitu·
tion and implicit In the very name of
our country· Despite some genuflect·
lngln Court's opinion to the concept of
federalism, today'a decision effectively reduces the Tenth Amendment
to meaningless rhetoric when Congress acts pursuant to the Commerce
Clause.
To leave no doubt about its lntention, the Court renounces Its decision
In National League of Cities because
it "Inevitably Invites an unelected
Federal Judiciary to make decisions
about which state policies Its favors
and which ones It dislikes." In other
words, the extent to which the states
may exercise their authority, when
l Congress purports to act under the
Commnerce Clause, henceforth is to
be determined from time to time by
. political decisions made by members
of tbe Federal government, decisions
the Court says wUl not be subject to
' judicial review. I note that it does not
seem to have occUrred to the Court

I

1

the result of its holdlna,l.e., that Feel·
eral polltical offici.... lnvoldn& the
Commerce Clause, are the sole
Judges of the Umlta of their own
power. This result is 1nconalltent with
the fundamental principle~ of our
constitutional sy.tem. At least Iince
Marbury v. Madlson lt baa been the
settled province of the Federal Judtci- ·
ary "to aay what the law ll" with respect to the constitutionality of acts of
Congress. In reJecttna the role of the
Judiciary In Protectlna the atates
from Federal overreachlna, the
Court's opinion offers no explanation
for Ignoring the teachlna of the most
famous case In our blstory.
The question presented in thla case
Is whether the extension of the
. F.L.S.A. to the wages and hours of
. employees of a city-owned tranalt
system unconstitutionally lmptnaes
on fundamental state soveretanty.
The Court's
holdlna does
far more than atrJ:lp uswer this
question In the neptive. Today's
opinion apparently authorizes Fed·
eral control, under the auspices of the
Commerce Clause, over the terms
and conditions of employment of all
· state and local . emplOyeel. The
Court's action reflects a Hrloul milunderstanding, lf not an outrlaht rejection, of the.history of our country
and the Intention of the Framers of
the Constitutioo.

sw=

By Justice Rehnquiat
I Join both Jutlce Powell'• and Jus.tice O'Connor'• thouahtful dluenta. I'
do not think It Incumbent 011 tboH of
us In dissent to apell out further the
tine points of a principle that wlll, I
am confident, ln time qaln command the support of a majority of .t his

that it, an unelected majority of five
Justices, today rejects almost 200
·years of the understanding of the constitutional atatus of Federallsrrl.
Court. s
Defect' ln .Opinion Ia Seen
By Justice O'Connor
Today•s opinion does not explain
how the states' role tn the electoral
The Court today surveys the battle
process guarantees tAAt particular scene of federalism aDd sounds a reexercises of the Commerce Clause treat. Uke Justice Powell, I would
power Will not tnfrlnge on residual . prefer to bold the tleld aad, at the
state sovereignty. Members of Con- very least, render a Uttle aid to the
gress are elected from the various wo\Dlded.
•
·
states, but In office they are members
In my view, federallam cannot be
of the Federal Government.
reduced to the weak "euence" dllThe Court apparently thinks that · tilled by the majortty today.
·\ ·
the states' success of obtaining Fed·
Due to the ·e merpoce of an lnt6eral fwKls for various projects and srated and lndultrlallzed oatlooal
exemptions · from the obligations of ·economy, thla Court ~ been reo! ,
1 review a
some Federal statutes is tndlcative of quired to examine ,.ua
the "effectiveness of the Federal breathtaking expanaloo of the powers
political process In preserving the . of Congress. IndotnaaotheCourtcorstates' Interests." But such polltical rectly perceived that the Framers of
success is not relevant to the question our Constitution Intended Coqrels to
whether the polltical processes are have sufficient power to addrela nathe proper means of enforcing consftl· tional problems. They also envlaioned
tutional limitations. The fact that a republlc whose vitality was allured
Congress generally does not trans- by tbe diffusion of power DOt oaly
gress constitutional limits on Its among the branchel M the Fecleral
power to reach state activities does Government, but also between the
not make, Judicial review any less Federal Government and the atates.
In tbe 18th century theee intentions
necessary to rectify tbe cases In
.
did not conflict because tecbnology
which it does so.
The states' role •In our system of had not yet converted every local
government is a matter of constltu· problem Into a national ooe. ·A contional law, not of legislative grace.
fllct bas now erne~. and the Court
More troubling than the logical in- today retreats rather than recoDcile
ftrmlties In the Court's reasoning is ~ tlJil! Constitution'• dual cooc:ems, · .
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Overtime-Pay Ruling Burdens
State and Local Governments

"hn1nru.>·r "

percent of surveyed women
said they had bought a new
the past month. Their reasons:
43%
40%

By JOANN s. LUBLIN
Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

Had a coupon

HE FULL BLOW of the Supreme Court's Garcia decision
last February has just begun to hit state and local governments where it hurts-in their pocketbooks. Generally, the
ruling-which affects about half the nation's 14 million state
and local workers-bars the popular practice of granting compensatory time off for overtime work.
Instead, governments are required to pay overtime wages and
revamp their payroll systems. They say it will initially cost them $3
billion
or more,
although
everyonestarts
won'tenforcsuffer ~~~~~~~~~
the
same.
The Labor
Department
ing the ruling on Oct. 15; police and firefighter
groups seeking back pay already have sued
about 15 communities.
;;;;:==7 ~
For state and local governments, the high ~ ~
court's mandate "probably is the single biggest liii::!·~-~~
burden they will be facing this year and maybe IJ \IIJ1)11
Ill
next year," says Gregg Jackson, research diIJJ[IIIIIIIIIIIIII[[J
rector of the International City Management
Association. At Senate Labor Committee hearings this Thursday,
three governors, along with a host of other distressed municipal and
state officials, undoubtedly will warn of layoffs, reduced services
and higher taxes.

A good price

38%

Interested
in product

38%

T

1

OUR BILLS have been introduced in Congress to overturn
portions of the decision by amending the federal minimumwage and overtime-pay law. The chances for quick congressional action look slim, however, partly because the court's
action hurts certain states and localities more than others. A hardest-hit list would include: California, Florida and smaller, less-unionized communities, largely in the South and the West. Big Northeast
cities may be affected relatively less.
The impact is likely to be felt most among firefighters, who
consume a big chunk of local budgets. Firefighting also is expensive
for states with extensive fire-prone areas, such as California and
Florida. While the regular workweek for a majority of U.S. firefighters lasts 56 hours, Labor Department guidelines will require
state and local governments to give firefighters premium overtime
pay if they work more than 53 hours. One reason that heavily unionized big cities will be less affected is that many already have shorter
workweeks than the national norm.
In addition, some states and localities previously chose to comply with the federal Fair Labor Standards Act or have local statutes
that closely follow it. Among them: Maryland, Michigan and Massachusetts. "They don't see much need to get on the bandwagon"
clamoring for a congressional remedy, says James Valin, a top Labor Department official.

F

T ISN'T SURPRISING, then, that five of 21 cosponsors for one
House bill modifying the Garcia decision all hail from California-as does Sen. Pete Wilson, the author of a Senate measure.
The decision could cost the state and its local governments
more than $350 million.
By contrast, the Garcia ruling's economic effect on Massachusetts "is going to be nominal," says Michael Sloman, an assistant
attorney general. "That entered in our thinking" when state leaders
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For More Hikers
Only the Air
Remains Free
By DAVID SHRIBMAN
Staff Reporter of TnE WALL STREET JOURNAL

Turnstiles where New Hampshire's
Winneweta Falls Trail crosses the Ellis
River? A tollbooth on the switchbacks
along the Daniel Webster Trail on the
northeast slope of Mount Madison?
Not yet. But the hikers who are climbing into the Presidential and Franconia
Ranges this summer are talking about
more than the waterfall along the Ammonoosuc Ravine Trail and the steepness of
the Six Husbands Trail. They are also talking about user fees.
The term, once confined to the back
rooms of Capitol Hill, is increasingly being
heard in the back country of the White
Mountains. And though nobody is ready to
set up turnstiles or tollbooths, the notion is
creating a stir along the 350 miles of trails
within 50 miles of Pinkham Notch.
Many hikers, like Donna Polhamus of
Somerville, Mass., say that "there's something unappealing" about paying a fee to
walk the trails. But in the past dozen
years, New Hampshire officials, wilderness groups and others have mounted operations to rescue about 100 hikers from remote peaks and ravines-and there is
growing sentiment that the cost of such operations and the maintenance of public
trails and shelters ought to be underwritten by hikers themselves.

Hiker Obligations
"You get services just by taking a hike
in the woods," says Stephen Rice, director
of north country operations for the Appalachian Mountain Club, a major wilderness
group ~hat maintains eight huts and 17
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A Messa e From Garcia
This week a Senate subcommittee

wm begin hearings on the application

ot the Fair Labor Standards Act to
stitl:e and local governments, a subject
that usually glazes the eyes of all but
tne most devoted. This year, though,
it iS not just a matter of a million dollar~ here, a million there. Real money
is ~t stake. And state and local political leaders actually may be coming
forward to say so.
Early this year the Supreme Court,
in 1he Garcia decision, extended the
reach of the FLSA to cover state and
local government activities that were
once exempt. Among other changes,
local employees will not be permitted
to work overtime and take compensatory time off later on. From now on
the workers will have to be paid for
tMir overtime at time-and-a-half
ra es. Local government trainees,
from firefighting recruits to youth employment program workers, will also
fall uilder the time-and-a-half rule.
The price tag will vary by locality
and region. Big cities in the Northeast
will suffer least, since their labor
practices are already the most expensive and most favorable to public-employee unions. But even these cities
will pay more than their spokesmen
currently admit. And for the country
as a whole, the Garcia decision may
cost about $3 billion.
Lest you think this figure is a rightwing scare tactic, be advised that it
does not include the cost of renegotiating contracts, administering the
changes or going to court in disputes
over retroactive pay. Nothing in the
current Reagan budget will even approach this decision in added burden
tct local governments.
As the Journal's Joann S. Lublin
pointed out in a story yesterday, even
\~ IJcal government workers are not ec-

static about the Garcia decision. The
rule requiring time-and-a-half for
overtime will often mean no overtime
at all, and hence less total wages than
in the bad old days. Senior citizens
who now do government jobs at relatively low wages in order to stay below their Social Security ceilings may
well find the jobs eliminated. Paramedics who work in town and volunteer their after-hours services in their
rural home communities will not be
able to do so anymore. Though the
public-employee unions have an institutional interest in uniform national
labor standards, labor organizations
are divided on this issue.
Until very recently, local governments were urging the Reagan administration to press for corrective legislation but somehow not yelling quite
loud enough for their voices to reach
the general media or the Democrats
in the House of Representatives. With
state and local support slow in coming, the administration faced its own
dilemma: Should it step forward and
take the political heat alone, or should
it let the costs run up and start to entrench themselves until the localities
got up the gumption to join vigorously
in the debate?
In the past few days there have
been signs of more action. The hearings will give us the first public indication of how all the calculations have
come out. If a thundering silence
emerges from the hearing room, do
not assume that the Garcia problem is
trivial; what you hear will simply be
local leaders whose ties to an old ideology make them afraid to acknowledge the depth of the trouble. And if
you hear a bit of healthy yelling, you
will know that economic realities are
at last forcing some necessary recon·
siderations in American urban politics.

they must look to Congress, not the courts. The
principal means, Justice Blackmun wrote, by which
the role of the states in the federal system is to be
ensured "lies in the structure of the Federal
Government itself."
The states and localities, to be sure, will survive
the impact of Garcia's immediate holding, which
involves the application of the Fair Labor Standards
Act to a municipally owned mass-transit system.
The holding is bound to be both burdensome and
expensive, but most local governments will find
ways to adjust.
Far more is at stake, however, than bus drivers'
pay. Garcia raises fundamental questions about the
role of the Supreme Court as the balance wheel of
the federal system. History, principle, and an
understanding of the political process argue strongly
that the federal judiciary should undertake the very
function Garcia abdicates. For those who care about
the health of American constitutionalism, Garcia
should be an unsettling decision.
Although the ultimate reach of Garcia is
unclear, the decision adopts a variation on a theme
asking the Court to hold its hand when a litigant
claims that a federal action is beyond the authority
of the Federal Government in that the action
encroaches upon some protected right of the states.
Final resolution of such claims, this thesis runs,
should be left to the political branches of the
government.
Such a position reads an important part of the
founders' assumptions out of the constitutional
order. One may debate-though the point has long
since been academic-whether the founders intended the Supreme Court to have the power of
judicial review. But assuming the legitimacy of that
doctrine, it is hard to escape the conclusion that
the founders assumed that limiting national power
in order to protect the states would be a judicial
function.
James Madison, in Federalist No. 39, was
explicit: "there must be a tribunal empowered to
decide controversies relating to the boundaries
between the two jurisdictions." The nature of the
ratification contest--especially the Federalist's need
to reply to anti-Federalist charges-supports this
conclusion: the proponents of the Constitution saw
federalism as among the institutional arrangements
to be protected in the constitutional system.
The principle of the rule of law adds force to
what this history teaches. Anglo-American constitutionalism asserts that no branch of government
should be the ultimate judge of its own powers. The
principle that one cannot be a judge in one's own
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A E. Dick Howard
Editor's Note : Last year when Professor Howard delivered the
Richard Russell Lectures at the University of Georgia, he posed the
thesis that the Supreme Court has an important role to play in
deciding federalism issues. Since those lectures, the Supreme Court
has handed down its decision in Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authority. In that decision, a five-man
majority (there were four dissenters) ruled that where Federal actions
are attacked on the grounds that they invade rights reser~~ed to the
states under the Tenth Amendment, the states must look, for all
practical purposes, to Congress not the courts for protection. In so
ruling, the Court 011erruled one of its own modern decisions, its
1976 decision in National League of Cities v. Usery. The Garcia
decision is certainly the most important federalism decision in years
and it is being widely debated.

wo centuries ago, the framers who met at
Philadelphia labored to produce a Constitution crafted to the needs of a free people
living in a republic of extended territory. Drawing
on the lessons of history, they sought to give the
central government sufficient authority to deal with
such national concerns as commerce among the
states, while dispersing power in such a way as
to protect individual liberty and local self-government-two of the ends for which the war of
independence had been waged.
Federalism is a linchpin of that constitutional
order. The text of the Constitution-which refers
to the states at least fifty times-makes clear how
central the concept of federalism was to the
founders' thinking. Indeed, it was a concern about
the potential power of the new federal government
that led to the adoption of the Bill of Rights.
In the nineteenth century, that perceptive
French traveler, Tocqueville, lavished praise on
American federalism in his Democracy in America.
On the link between self-government and liberty,
he commented, "A nation may establish a free
government, but without municipal institutions it
cannot have the spirit of liberty."
As Americans prepare to celebrate the Constitution's bicentennial, the Supreme Court appears
to have forgotten both the framers' intent and the
teachings of the nation's history. In February the
Court decided Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority. Five justices joined in a majority
opinion concluding, in effect, that if the states
want protection within the constitutional system
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cause is of centuries' standing. This principle is
stated by Sir Edward Coke in Dr. Bonham's Case
(1610) and, · in our own time, has been reinforced
by United States v. Nixon (197 4). The principle is
especially important in a system which, in addition
to being federal, looks to checks and balances and
the separation of powers to restrain arbitrary
government.
Moreover, Garcia disregards the ways in which
the nation's political process actually works.
Essential to any argument that the Court should
abstain from adjudicating limits on national power
vis-a-vis the states is the notion that the states have
ample protection in the processes of politics.
This assumption has two dimensions. One is
institutional-that the states have a major part in
structuring the national government. The other is
political-that the ways in which the process
actually works (such as in the political parties and
in Congress) focus on the states. In fact, neither
branch of the argument reflects current realities.
There was a time when the states had considerable influence over the shape of federal
politics. Under the original Constitution, U.S.
senators were elected by state legislatures. 1he
Constitution did not set federal standards for
congressional elections; the states controlled the
franchise. And it was up to the state legislatures as
to how to draw the boundaries of congressional
districts.
All this has changed. The Seventeenth Amendment (adopted in 1913) brought direct election of
senators. Judicial decisions (such as that striking
down the poll tax) and acts of Congress (notably
the Voting Rights Act of 1965) have federalized
much of the law respecting the franchise. The 1965
statute, for example, requires preclearance (by the
Attorney General or the District Court for the
District of Columbia) of voting changes in areas
covered by the act. State power to apportion congressional seats has been circumscribed by decisions
such as the Supreme Court's 1964 opinion in
Wesberry v. Sanders, requiring that congressional
districts be based on population.
Accompanying these institutional changes
comes a palpable decline in the "political"
safeguards. Political parties, especially at the state
level, no longer are the force they once were.
Increased use of primaries and the impact of
"reforms" have encouraged the growth of alternative
institutions. Most striking has been the rise of
PACs, which now number in the thousands.
The "nationalization" of campaign finance
weakens the federal lawmakers' loyalties to
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constituents. Special interest politics tends to
replace consensus politics. Moreover, the explosive
growth of the Federal Government in modern times
has brought the emergence of the "iron triangle"
-the convergence of bureaucrats, interested
legislators (often powerful committee chairmen),
and lobbyists to determine the shape of federal"
programs.
In defense of having the Court abdicate Tenth
Amendment questions, as it did in Garcia, one
sometimes hears the argument that the Court
cannot resolve empirical questions. Thus, it is
argued, to "balance" competing state and federal
interests requires the Court to undertake a mode of
enquiry that more properly belongs to legislators.
Yet in other areas of constitutional litigation the
Court resolves empirical questions as a matter of
course. Every case involving claims that a state act
burdens commerce requires the resolution of
economic and other such data, but the Court does
not shirk this task.
Another objection to the Court's having a role
in Tenth Amendment cases is that the justices
cannot draw workable distinctions, such as deciding
what is and what is not a "traditional governmental
function" (the distinction that provided state
protection against federal intrusion before Garcia).
Such line-drawing is, of course, difficult. But its
being difficult does not mean that it should not be
undertaken, any more than the difficulty of deciding what constitutes "speech" or "religion"-the
thorniest of problems-are grounds for not deciding
First Amendment cases.
Whatever the tangles confronting the Court,
there are even graver reasons to question Congress'
competence or willingness to make considered judgments on constitutional questions-especially when
the question is that of the limits of Congress' own
power: The judicial process may have its flaws, but
it aspires to a degree of rationality, including
analytical reasoning, that one does not associate
with the legislative process. The limits of time, the
pressures of lobbyists, the temptations of
expediency, undue reliance on staff, and other
distractions often have more to do with the final
shape of legislation than any thinking about
constitutional issues. Martin Shapiro makes the
point well: "The nature of the legislative process,
combined with the nature of constitutional issues,
makes it virtually impossible for Congress to make
independent, unified, or responsible judgments on
the constitutionality of its own statutes."
Still another argument for the Court's leaving
the states and localities to the tender mercies of
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Congress is that the Court needs to husband its
scarce political capital. This argument raises the
spectre of a return to "dual federalism"-the ancien
regime, before 193 7, when the Supreme Court often
derailed federal, social and economic legislation in
the name of states' rights.
Such a risk is chimerical. For the Court to play
a role in protecting the states as states under the
Tenth Amendment, as the majority set out to do in
the Court's 1976 decision in National League of
Cities v. Usery (overruled in Garcia), raises no .
question about Congress' power over the private
sector.

I

the Constitution underway. Federalism is linked
with individual liberty and with the health of the
body politic.
By participating in government at the local
level, the citizen is educated in the value of civic
participation. A robust federalism encourages state
and local governments as schools for citizenship.
Moreover, federalism both reflects and encourages
pluralism, allowing individual idiosyncracies to
flourish. ·One often hears Justice Brandeis quoted on
the states' serving as "laboratories" for social and
economic experiments. The states are more than
mere laboratories; to the extent they encourage
pluralism the states are handmaidens of the open
society.
Ultimately, the case for federalism rests on the
right of choice-the essence of political freedom.
States and local governments have, of course, often
trampled this very right, as when they have denied
the vote because of race. The remedies for such
abuses lie in vigorous judicial enforcement of
constitutional guarantees and in Congress' power to
protect civil rights. But the need to guard against
trespasses by states or localities on individual
liberties does not undermine the conclusion that
federalism as such can operate as part of the very
matrix of protection for individual liberties.
In refusing to enforce the Tenth Amendment.:_
to play the role they regularly undertake in respect
to other provisions of the Bill of Rights-the Garcia
majority leaves an important constitutional sentry
post unmanned. What recourse have those who
care about the health of federalism?

Garcia betrays a glaring disregard of a
basic truth about American constitutionalism: that institutional rights are a
form of Individual rights.
As to keeping the Court out of unnecessary
controversies, most of the debate over "judicial
activism" in recent decades has involved such issues
as school prayer, criminal justice, and abortion. It is
individual rights decisions that, by and large, stir
passions. One doubts that the partisans of Garcia
would be content to see individual rights matters,
because they may be controversial, left likewise to
the political process.
Garcia betrays a glaring disregard of a basic truth
about American constitutionalism: that institutional
rights are a form of individual rights. Even such
basic guarantees as those in the Bill of Rights and
the Fourteenth Amendment do not secure absolute
personal rights. They protect against governmental
(that is, institutional) actions, not against
infringements by private parties. Thus, securing
individual rights requires assurances as to the
Constitution's institutional safeguards.
The individual American-as the heir to those
who brought the Constitution into being and agreed
to its adoption-has a fundamental entitlement to
living under the form of government spelled out in
the Constitution. The separation of powers is not
to be abandoned simply because it may be inconvenient. Likewise, one of the predicates of the
constitutional order is that the Supreme Court
adhere to the values of federalism as manifestly
implicit in the Constitution.
Federalism may be an elusive idea, but it is no
mere abstraction. And, while it was essential to the
adoption of the original Constitution, it is more
than simply a political compromise adopted to get

Early and outright reversal of Garcia
should not lightly be predicted, even
assuming new justices are appointed to
the Court. Reversals typically come only
after a precedent has been robbed of
vitality.
There are other opportunities for courts to
vindicate the underlying values. Federal statutes
may be interpreted in light of their impact on state
and local governments. For example, the Court's
1981 Pennhurst decision lays down the salutary rule
that federal grant conditions, to be binding on state
and local governments, must be clearly identified as
such when grant funds are accepted. Notions of
comity can come into play when reviewing lower
courts' use of their equity pOwers to reform state
institutions (such as prisons) or when deciding how
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far a federal coun may go in intervening in state
coun proceedings (as in the Coun's 1971 decision
in Y~ "· Hams).
Ultimately, one may hope for the undermining
or demise of Garcia. The majority decision stops
shon of saying that under no circumstances could
the constitutional structure impose affirmative ·limits
on federal actions affecting the states. A more
favorable fact situation than that in Garcia, one ·
entailing a more serious intrusion on the states and
a more marginal federal interest, might furnish the
occasion to begin the movement away from that
unfortunate decision.
Early and outright reversal of Garcia should not
lightly be predicted, even assuming riew justices are
appointed to the Court. Reversals typically come
only after a precedent has been robbed of vitality.
The Court decided Gideon"· Wainwright (1963),
requiring states to appoint counsel for felony
defendants ·unable to afford a lawyer, only after
twenty years of experience under Betts "· Brady
proved that an ad hoc approach would not do.
Likewise, it was easier for Justice Blackmun to
rationalize the result in Garcia by pointing to the
Court's difficulties in post~Nationall...eague of Cities
decisions such as EEOC "· Wyoming and FERC "·

•

Mississippi.
Still, one can hope that eventually a majority of
the justices will come to realize the mistake made in
Garcia. Because federalism is an intrinsic com~
ponent of the constitl,ltional system-indeed,
bolsters other constitutional values--safeguarding it
cannot be left to the unrestrained discretion of the
political branches. It may be that the authority
pronounced in National League of Cities (and
renounced in Garcia) ought to be sparingly used.
But it is salutary that the political branches lc.now
that the Coun has power to step in when the facts
point to intervention.
It is no less legitimate and proper for the
Supreme Coun to concern itself with assuring the
health of federalism as it is for the Court to uphold
individuallibenies as such. In neither case is
abdication of the Court's proper role consistent with
the principles inhering in the Constitution.
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A E. Dick Howard, White Burkett Miller Profeuur of Law and
Public Affairs, is an expert in corutinaional law, jvrUprudence and
rite Swprm~t Court. He is prtsmtJ, Counselor ro Govmwr Robb of
Virginia and Chairman of rite Virginia Commission on rite
Bicmtmnial of rite United St4te.S Corutitution.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNIT D STATES
Nos. 82-1913 AND 82-1951

t

82-1913
v.
SAN ANTONIO METROPO ITAN TRANSIT
AUTHORIT ET AL.
RAYMOND J. DONO AN, SECRETARY OF
LABO ,APPELLANT
82-1951
v.
SAN ANTON
METROPOLITAN TRANSIT
AUTHORITY ET AL.
ON APPEA

FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
OR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
[October - , 1984]

STICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court.
We revisit in these cases an issue raised in National
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U. S. 833 (1976). In that litigation, this Court, by a sharply divided vote, ruled that the
Commerce Clause does not empower Congress to enforce the /
minimumi\wage and overtime provisions of the Fair Labor V
Standards Act (FLSA) against the States "in areas of traditional governmental functions." I d., at 852. Although N ational League of Cities supplied some examples of "traditional governmental functions," it did not offer a general
explanation of how a "traditional" function is to be distinguished from a "nontraditional" one. Since then, federal and
state courts have struggled with the task, thus imposed, of
identifying a traditional function for purposes of state immunity under the Commerce Clause.
In the present cases, a Federal District Court concluded
that municipal ownership and operation of a mass-transit sys-
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tern is a traditional governmental function and thus, under
National League of Cities, is exempt from the obligations imposed by the FLSA. Faced with the identical question,
three Federal Courts of Appeals and one state appellate
court have reached the opposite conclusion. 1
Our examination of this "function" standard applied in
these and other cases over the last eight years now persuades
us that the attempt to draw the boundaries of state regulatory immunity in terms of "traditional governmental function" is not only unworkable but is inconsistent with established principles of federalism and, indeed, with those very
federalism principles on which National League of Cities purported to rest. That case, accordingly, is overruled.
I
The history of public transportation in San Antonio, Tex.,
is characteristic of the history of local mass transit in the
United States generally. Passenger transportation for hire
within San Antonio originally was provided on a private basis
by a local transportation company. In 1913, the Texas Legislature authorized the State's municipalities to regulate vehicles providing carriage for hire. 1913 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch.
147, § 4, ~ 12, now codified, as amended, as Tex. Rev. Civ.
Stat. Ann., Art. 1175, §§ 20 and 21 (Vernon 1963). Two
years later, San Antonio enacted an ordinance setting forth
franchising, insurance, and safety requirements for passenger vehicles operated for hire. The city continued to rely on
such publicly regulated private mass transit until1959, when
it purchased the privately owned San Antonio Transit Company and replaced it with a public authority known as the San
Antonio Trans~t System (SATS). SATS operated until1978,
See Dove v. Chattanooga Area Regional Transportation Authority,
701 F . 2d 50 (CA6 1983); Alewine v. City Council, 699 F . 2d 1060 (CAll
1983), cert. pending, Nos. 82-1974 and 83-257; Kramer v. New Castle Area
Transit Authority , 677 F . 2d 308 (CA3 1982), cert. denied , 459 U. S. 1146
(1983); Francis v. City of Tallahassee, 424 So. 2d 61 (Fla. App. 1982).
1
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when the city transferred its facilities and equipment to appellee San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority
(SAMTA), a public mass-transit authority organized on a
countywide basis. See generally Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann.,
Art. 1118x (Vernon Supp. 1984). SAMTA currently is the
major provider of transportation in the San Antonio metropolitan area; between 1978 and 1980 alone, its vehicles traveled over 26 million route miles and carried over 63 million
passengers.
As did other localities, San Antonio reached the point
where it came to look to the Federal Government for financial
assistance in maintaining its public mass transit. SATS
managed to meet its operating expenses and bond obligations
for the first decade of its existence without federal or local
financial aid. By 1970, however, its financial position had
deteriorated to the point where federal subsidies were vital
for its continued operation. SATS' general manager that
year testified before Congress that "if we do not receive substantial help from the Federal Government, San Antonio may
. .. join the growing ranks of cities that have inferior [public]
transportation or may end up with no [public] transportation
at all." 2
The principal federal program to which SATS and other
mass-transit systems looked for relief was the Urban Mass
Transportation Act of 1964 (UMTA), Pub. L. 88-365, 78 Stat.
302, as amended, 49 U. S. C. App. §§ 1601 et seq., which provides substantial federal assistance to urban mass-transit
programs. See generally Jackson Transit Authority v.
Transit Union, 457 U. S. 15 (1982). UMTA now authorizes
the Department of Transportation to fund 75 percent of the
capital outlays and up to 50 percent of the operating expenses
of qualifying mass-transit programs. §§ 4(a), 5(d) and (e), 49
U. S. C. App. §§ 1603(a), 1604(d) and (e). SATS received its
2

Urban Mass Transportation: Hearings on H. R. 6663 et al. before the
Subcommittee on Housing of the House Committee on Banking and Currency, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., p. 419 (1970) (statement of F. Norman Hill).
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first UMTA subsidy, a $4.1 million capital grant, in December 1970. From then until February 1980, SATS and
SAMTA received over $51 million in UMTA grants-more
than $31 million in capital grants, over $20 million in operating assistance, and a minor amount in technical assistance.
During SAMTA's first two fiscal years, it received $12.5 million in UMTA operating grants, $26.8 million from sales
taxes, and only $10.1 million from fares. Federal subsidies
and local sales taxes currently account for about 75 percent of
SAMTA's operating expenses.
The present controversy concerns the extent to which
SAMTA may be subjected to the minimum-wage and overtime requirements of the FLSA. When the FLSA was enacted in 1938, its wage and overtime provisions did not apply
to local mass-transit employees or, indeed, to employees of
state and local governments. §§ 3(d), 13(a)(9), 52 Stat. 1060,
1067. In 1961, Congress extended minimum-wage coverage
to employees of any private mass-transit carrier whose annual gross revenue was not less than $1 million. Fair Labor
Standards Amendments of 1961, §§ 2(c), 9, 75 Stat. 65, 71.
Five years later, Congress extended FLSA coverage to state
and local-government employees for the first time by withdrawing the minimum-wage and overtime exemptions from
public hospitals, schools, and mass-transit carriers whose
rates and services were subject to state regulation. Fair
Labor Standards Amendments of 1966, §§ 102(a) and (b), 80
Stat. 831. At the same time, Congress eliminated the overtime exemption for all mass-transit employees other than
drivers, operators, and conductors. § 206(c), 80 Stat. 836.
The application of the FLSA to public schools and hospitals
was ruled to be within Congress' power under the Commerce
Clause. Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U. S. 183 (1968).
The FLSA obligations of public mass-transit systems like
SATS were expanded in 1974 when Congress provided for
the progressive repeal of the surviving overtime exemption
for mass-transit employees. Fair Labor Standards Amend-

'.
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ments of 1974, § 21(b), 88 Stat. 68. Congress simultaneously
brought the States and their subdivisions further within the
ambit of the FLSA by extending FLSA coverage to virtually
all state and local-government employees. §§ 6(a)(1) and (6),
88 Stat. 58, 60, 29 U. S. C. §§ 203(d) and (x). SATS complied with the FLSA's overtime requirements until 1976,
when this Court, in National League of Cities, supra, overruled Maryland v. Wirtz, and held that the FLSA could not
be applied constitutionally to the "traditional governmental
functions" of state and local governments. Four months
after National League of Cities was handed down, SATS informed its employees that the decision relieved SATS of its
overtime obligations under the FLSA. 3
Matters rested there until September 17, 1979, when the
Wage and Hour Administration of the Department of Labor
issued an opinion that SAMTA's operations "are not constitutionally immune from the application of the Fair Labor
Standards Act" under National League of Cities. Opinion .
WH-499, 6 LRR 91:1138. On November 21 of that year,
SAMTA filed this action against the Secretary of Labor in
the United States District Court for the Western District of
Texas. It sought a declaratory judgment that, contrary to
the Wage and Hour Administration's determination, National League of Cities precluded the application of the
FLSA's overtime requirements to SAMTA's operations.
The Secretary counterclaimed under 29 U.S. C. §217 for enforcement of the overtime and record-keeping requirements
of the FLSA. On the same day that SAMTA filed its action,
appellant Garcia and several other SAMTA employees
brought suit against SAMTA in the same District Court for
overtime pay under the FLSA. Garcia v. SAMTA, Civil
Neither SATS nor SAMTA appears to have attempted to avoid the
FLSA's minimum-wage provisions. We are informed that basic wage levels in the mass-transit industry traditionally have been well in excess of the
minimum wages prescribed by the FLSA. See Brief for National League
of Cities et al. as Amici Curiae 7-8.
3
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Action No. SA 79 CA 458. The District Court has stayed
that action pending the outcome of these cases, but it allowed
Garcia to intervene in the present litigation as a defendant in
support of the Secretary. One month after SAMTA brought
suit, the Department of Labor formally amended its FLSA
interpretive regulations to provide that publicly owned local
mass-transit systems are ·not entitled to immunity under N ational League of Cities. 44 Fed. Reg. 75,630 (1979), codified
as 29 CFR § 775.3(b)(3) (1983).
On November 17, 1981, the District Court granted
SAMTA's motion for summary judgment and denied the Secretary's and Garcia's cross-motion for partial summary judgment. Without further explanation, the District Court ruled
that "local public mass transit systems (including [SAMTA])
constitute integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions" under National League of Cities. Juris.
Statement in No. 82-1913, p. 24a. The Secretary and Garcia
both appealed directly to this Court pursuant to 28 U. S. C.
§ 1252. During the pendency of those appeals, Transportation Union v. Long Island R . Co., 455 U. S. 678 (1982), was
decided. In that case, the Court ruled that commuter rail
service provided by the state-owned Long Island Rail Road
did not constitute a "traditional governmental function" and
hence did not enjoy constitutional immunity, under National
League of Cities, from the requirements of the Railway
Labor Act. Thereafter, it vacated the District Court's judgment in the present cases and remanded them for further
consideration in the light of Long Island. 457 U. S. 1102
(1982).
On remand, the District Court adhered to its original view
and again entered judgment for SAMTA. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority v. Donovan, 557 F. Supp. 445
(1983). The court looked first to what it regarded as the
"historical reality" of state involvement in mass transit. It
recognized that States not always had owned and operated
mass-transit systems, but concluded that they had engaged
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in a longstanding pattern of public regulation, and that this
regulatory tradition gave rise to an "inference of sovereignty." !d., at 447-448. The court next looked to the
record of federal involvement in the field and concluded that
constitutional immunity would not result in an erosion of federal authority with respect to state-owned mass-transit systems, because many federal s~.~tmut~e:s themselves contain exemptions for States and thus ~he withdrawal of federal
regulatory power over public mass-transit systems a supervening federal policy. !d., at 448-450. Although the Federal Government's authority over employee wages under the
FLSA obviously would be eroded, Congress had not asserted
any interest in the wages of public mass-transit employees
until 1966 and hence had not established a longstanding federal interest in the field, in contrast to the century-old federal
regulatory presence in the railroad industry found significant
for the decision in Long Island. Finally, the court compared
mass transit to the list of functions identified as constitutionally immune in National League of Cities and concluded that
it did not differ from those functions in any material respect.
The court stated: "If transit is to be distinguished from the
exempt [National League of Cities] functions it will have to
be by identifying- at raditional state function in the same way
pornography is sometimes identified: someone knows it when
they see it, but they can't describe it." 557 F. Supp., at
453. 4
The Secretary and Garcia again took direct appeals from
the District Court's judgment. We noted probable jurisdiction. - - U. S. - - (1983). After initial argument, the
'The District Court also analyzed the status of mass transit under the
four-part test devised by the Sixth Circuit in Amersbach v. City of Cleveland, 598 F . 2d 1033 (1979). In that case, the Court of Appeals looked to
(1) whether the function benefits the community as a whole and is made
available at little or no expense; (2) whether it is undertaken for public
service or pecuniary gain; (3) whether government is its principal provider;
and (4) whether government is particularly suited to perform it because of
a community-wide need. !d., at 1037.

V
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cases were restored to our calendar for reargument, and the
!' parties were requested to brief and argue the following additional question:
"Whether or not the principles of the Tenth Amendment as set forth in National League of Cities v. Usery,
426 U. S. 833 (1976), should be reconsidered?"
- - U. S. - - (1984).

Reargument followed in due course.

II
Appellees have not argued that SAMTA is immune from
regulation under the FLSA on the ground that it is a local
transit system engaged in intrastate commercial activity. In
a practical sense, SAMTA's operations might well be characterized as "local." Nonetheless, it long has been settled that
Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause extends to
intrastate economic activities that affect interstate commerce. See, e. g., Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining &
Reel. Assn., 452 U. S. 264, 276-277 (1981); Heart of Atlanta
Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U. S. 241, 258 (1964);
· Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U. S. 111, 125 (1942); United States
v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100 (1941). Were SAMTA a privately
owned and operated enterprise, it could not credibly argue
that Congress exceeded the bounds of its Commerce Clause
powers in prescribing minimum wages and overtime rates for
SAMTA's employees. Any constitutional exemption from
the requirements of the FLSA therefore must rest on
SAMTA's status as a governmental entity rather than on the
"local" nature of its operations.
The prerequisites for governmental immunity under N ational League of Cities were summarized by this Court in
Hodel, supra. Under that summary, four conditions must
be satisfied before a state activity may be deemed immune
from a particular federal regulation under the Commerce
Clause. First, it is said that the federal statute at issue
must regulate "the 'States as States.'" Second, the statute
must "address matters that are indisputably 'attribute[s] of
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state sovereignty."' Third, state compliance with the federal obligation must "directly impair [the States'] ability 'to
structure integral operatiQns in areas of traditional governmental functions.'" Finally, the relation of state and federal
interests must not be such that "the nature of the federal interest . . . justifies state submission." 452 U. S., at
287-288, and n. 29, quoting National League of Cities, 426
U. S., at 845, 852, 854.
The controversy in the present cases has focused on the
third Hodel requirement-that the challenged federal statute
trench on "traditional governmental functions." The District Court voiced a common concern: "Despite the abundance
of adjectives, identifying which particular state functions are
immune remains difficult." 557 F. Supp., at 447. Just how
troublesome the task has been is revealed by the results
reached in other federal cases. Thus, courts have held that
regulating ambulance services, Gold Cross Ambulance v.
City of Kansas City, 538 F. Supp. 956, 967-969 (WD Mo.
1982), aff'd on other grounds, 705 F. 2d 1005 (CA8 1983),
cert. pending, No. 83-183; licensing automobile drivers,
United States v. Best, 573 F. 2d 1095, 1102-1103 (CA9 1978);
operating a municipal airport, Amersbach v. City of Cleveland, 598 F. 2d 1033, 1037-1038 (CA6 1979); performing solid
waste disposal, Hybud Equipment Corp. v. City of Akron,
654 F. 2d 1187, 1196 (CA6 1981); and operating a highway authority, Malina-Estrada v. Puerto Rico Highway Authority,
680 F. 2d 841, 845-846 (CAl 1982), are functions protected
under National League of Cities. At the same time, courts
have held that issuance of industrial development bonds,
Woods v. Homes and Structures of Pittsburgh, Kansas, Inc.,
489 F. Supp. 1270, 1296-1297 (Kan. 1980); regulation of intrastate natural gas sales, Oklahoma ex rel. Derryberry v.
FERC, 494 F. Supp. 636, 657 (WD Okla. 1980), aff'd, 661 F.
2d 832 (CAlO 1981), cert. denied sub nom. Texas v. FERC,
457 U. S. 1105 (1982); regulation of traffic on public roads,
Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 552 F. 2d 25, 38 (CA2), cert.
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denied, 434 U. S. 902 (1977); regulation of air transportation,
Hughes Air Corp. v. Public Utilities Commission, 644 F. 2d
1334, 1340-1341 (CA9 1981); operation of a telephone system,
Puerto Rico Tel. Co. v. FCC, 553 F. 2d 694, 700-701 (CAl
1977); leasing and sale of natural gas, Public Service Co. v.
FERC, 587 F. 2d 716, 721 (CA5), cert. denied sub nom. Louisiana v. FERC, 444 U. S. 879 (1979); operation of a mental
health facility, Williams v. Eastside Mental Health Center,
Inc., 669 F. 2d 671, 680-681 (CAll), cert. denied, 459 U. S.
976 (1982); and provision of in-house domestic services for the
aged and handicapped, Bonnette v. California Health and
Welfare Agency, 704 F. 2d 1465, 1472 (CA9 1983), are not entitled to immunity. We find it difficult, if not impossible, to
identify an organizing principle that places each of the cases
in the first group on one side of a line and each of the cases in
the second group on the other side. The constitutional distinction between licensing drivers and regulating traffic, for
example, or between operating a highway authority and operating a mental health facility, is elusive at best.
Thus far, this Court itself has made little headway in defining the scope of the governmental functions deemed protected under National League of Cities. In that case the
Court set forth examples of protected and unprotected functions, see 426 U. S., at 851, 854, n. 18, but provided no explanation of how those examples were identified. The only
other case in which the Court has had occasion to address the
problem is Long Island. 5 We there observed: "The determination of whether a federal law impairs a state's authority
with respect to 'areas of traditional [state] functions' may at
times be a difficult one." 455 U. S., at 684, quoting National League of Cities, 426 U. S., at 852. The accuracy of
5
See also, however, Jefferson County Pharmaceutical Assn. v. Abbott
Laboratories, 460 U. S. 150, 154, n. 6 (1983); FERC v. Mississippi, 456
U. S. 742, 781, and n. 7 (1982) (opinion concurring in the judgment in part
and dissenting in part); Fry v. Un'ited States, 421 U. S. 542, 558, and n. 2
(1975) (dissenting opinion).

'
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that statement is demonstrated by this Court's own difficulties in Long Island in developing a workable standard for
"traditional governmental functions." We relied in large
part there on "the historical reality that the operation of railroads is not among the functions traditionally performed by
state and local governments," but we simultaneously disavowed "a static historical view of state functions generally
immune from federal regulation." 455 U. S., at 686 (first
emphasis added; second emphasis in original). We held that
the inquiry into a particular function's "traditional" nature
was merely a means of determining whether the federal statute at issue unduly handicaps "basic state prerogatives," id.,
at 686-687, but we did not offer an explanation of what makes
one state function a "basic prerogative" and another function
not basic. Finally, having disclaimed a rigid reliance on the
historical pedigree of state involvement in a particular area,
we nonetheless found it appropriate to emphasize the extended historical record of federal involvement in the field of
rail transportation. I d., at 687-689.
Many constitutional standards involve "undoubte[d] ...
gray areas," Fry v. United States, 421 U. S. 542, 558 (1975)
(dissenting opinion), and, despite the difficulties that this
Court and other courts have encountered so far, it normally
might be fair to venture the assumption that case-by-case
development would lead to a workable standard for determining whether a particular governmental function should be immune from federal regulation under the Commerce Clause.
A further cautionary note is sounded, however, by the
Court's experience in the related field of state immunity from
federal taxation. In South Carolina v. United States, 199
U. S. 437 (1905), the Court held for the first time that the
state tax immunity recognized in Collector v. Day, 11 Wall.
113 (1870), extended only to the "ordinary" and "strictly governmental" instrumentalities of state governments and not to
instrumentalities "used by the State in the carrying on of an
ordinary private business." 199 U. S., at 451, 461. While
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the Court applied the distinction outlined in South Carolina
for the following 40 years, at no time during that period did
the Court develop a consistent formulation of the kinds of
governmental functions that were entitled to immunity.
The Court identified the protected functions at various times
as "essential," "usual," "traditional," or "strictly governmental." 6 While "these differences in phraseology . . . must
not be too literally contradistinguished," Brush v. Commissioner, 300 U. S. 352, 362 (1937), they reflect an inability to
specify precisely what aspects of a governmental function
made it necessary to the "unimpaired existence" of the
States. Collector v. Day, 11 Wall., at 127. Indeed, the
Court ultimately chose "not, by an attempt to formulate any
ge,neral test, [to] risk embarrassing the decision of cases [concerning] activities of a different kind which may arise in the
future." Brush v. Commissioner, 300 U. 8., at 365.
If these tax immunity cases had any common thread, it was
in the attempt to distinguish between "governmental" and
"proprietary" functions. 7 • To say that the distinction be6
See Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U. S. 107, 172 (1911) ("essential");
Helvering v. Therrell , 303 U. S. 218, 225 (1938) (same); Helvering v. Powers, 293 U. S. 214, 225 (1934) ("usual"); United States v. California, 297
U. S. 175, 185 (1936) ("activities in which the states have traditionally engaged"); South Carolina v. United States, 199 U. S. 437, 461 (1905)
("strictly governmental").
7
In South Carolina, the Court relied on the concept of "strictly governmental" functions to uphold the application of a federal liquor license tax to
a state-owned liquor-distribution monopoly. In Flint, the Court stated:
"The true distinctio?\s between ... those operations of the States essential to the execution of its [si<i!)governmental functions, and which the
State can only do itself, and those activities which are of a private character"; under this standard, "[i]t is no part of the essential governmental
functions of a State to provide means of transportation, supply artificial
light, water and the like." 220 U. S., at 172. In Ohio v. Helvering, 292
U. S. 360 (1934), another case involving a state liquor-distribution monopoly, the Court stated that "the business of buying and selling commodities
. .. is not the performance of a governmental function ," and that "[w]hen a
state enters the market place seeking customers it divests itself of its quasi
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tween "governmental" and "proprietary" proved to be stable,
however, would be something of an overstatement. In 1911,
for example, the Court declared that the provision of a
municipal water supply "is no part of the essential governmental functions of a State." Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220
U. S. 107, 172. Twenty-six years later, without any intervening change in the applicable legal standards, the Court
simply rejected its earlier position and decided that the provision of a municipal water supply was immune from federal
taxation as an essential governmental function, even though
municipal water works long had been operated for profit by
private industry. Brush v. Commissioner, 300 U. 8., at
370-373. At the same time that the ·court was holding a
municipal water supply to be immune from federal taxes, it
had held that a state-run commuter rail system was not immune. Helvering v. Powers, 293 U. S. 214 (1934). Justice
Black, in Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U. S. 405, 427 (1938),
was moved to observe: "An implied constitutional distinction
which taxes income of an officer of a state-operated transportation system and exempts income of the manager of a municipal water. works system manifests the uncertainty created
by the 'essential' and 'non-essential' test" (concurring opinion). It was this uncertainty and instability that led the
Court shortly thereafter, in New York v. United States, 326
U. S. 572 (1946), unanimously to conclude that the distinction
between "governmental" and "proprietary" functions was
sovereignty pro tanto, and takes on the character of a trader, so far, at
least, as the taxing power of the federal government is concerned." I d., at
369. In Powers, the Court upheld the application of the federal income tax
to the income of trustees of a state-operated commuter railroad; the Court
reiterated that "the State cannot withdraw sources of revenue from the
federal taxing power by engaging in businesses which constitute a departure from the usual governmental functions and to which, by reason of
their nature, the federal taxing power would normally extend," regardless
of the fact that the proprietary enterprises "are undertaken for what the
State conceives to be the public benefit." 293 U. S., at 225. Accord, Allen v. Regents, 304 U. S. 439, 451-453 (1938).
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"untenable" and must be abandoned. See id., at 583 (opinion
of Frankfurter, J., joined by Rutledge, J.); id., at 586 (Stone,
C. J., concurring, joined by Reed, Murphy, and Burton, JJ.);
id., at 590-596 (Douglas, J., dissenting, joined by Black, J.).
See also Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U. S. 444, 457,
and n. 14 (1978) (plurality opinion); Case v. Bowles, 327 U. S.
92, 101 (1946).

Even during the heyday of the governmental/proprietary
distinction in intergovernmental tax-immunity doctrine the
Court never explained the constitutional basis for that distinction. In South Carolina, it expressed its concern that
unlimited state immunity from federal taxation would allow
the States to undermine the Federal Government's tax base
by expanding into previously private sectors of the economy.
See 199 U. S., at 454-455. 8 Although the need to reconcile
state and federal interests obviously demanded that state immunity have some limiting principle, the Court did not try to
justify the particular result it reached; it simply concluded
that a "line [must] be drawn," id., at 456, and proceeded to
draw that line. The Court's elaborations in later cases, such
as the assertion in Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U. S. 360, 369
(1934), that "[w]hen a state enters the market place seeking
customers it divests itself of its quasi sovereignty pro tanto,"
sound more of ipse dixit than reasoned explanation. This inability to give principled content to the distinction between
"governmental" and "proprietary," no less significantly than
its unworkability, led the Court to abandon the distinction in
New York v. United States.
The distinction the Court discarded as unworkable in the
field of tax immunity has proved no more fruitful in the field
of regulatory immunity under the Commerce Clause. Neither do any of the alternative standards that might be em8
That concern was especially weighty in South Carolina because liquor
taxes, the object of the dispute in that case, then accounted for over onefourth of the Federal Government's revenues. See New York v. United
States, 326 U. S. 572, 598, n. 4 (1946) (dissenting opinion).

82-1913 & 82-1951-0PINION
GARCIA v. SAN ANTONIO METRO. TRANSIT AUTH.

15

ployed to distinguish between protected and unprotected
governmental functions appear manageable. We rejected
the possibility of making immunity turn on a purely historical
standard of "tradition" in Long Island, and properly so. The
most obvious defect of a historical approach to state immunity is that it prevents a court from accommodating changes
in the historical functions of States, changes that have resulted in a number of once-private functions like education
being assumed by the States and their subdivisions. 9 At the
same time, the only apparent virtue of a rigorous historical
standard, namely, its promise of a reasonably objective measure for state immunity, is illusory. Reliance on history as an
organizing principle results in linedrawing of the most arbitrary sort; the genesis of state governmental functions
stretches over a historical continuum from before the Revolution to the present, and courts would have to decide by fiat
precisely how longstanding a pattern of state involvement
had to be for federal regulatory authority to be defeated. 10
9
Indeed, the "traditional" nature of a particular governmental function
can be a matter of historical nearsightedness; today's self-evidently "traditional" function is often yesterday's suspect innovation. Thus, National
League of Cities offered the provision of public parks and recreation as an
example of a traditional governmental function. 426 U. S., at 851. A
scant 80 years earlier, however, in Shoemaker v. United States, 147 U. S.
282 (1893), the Court pointed out that city commons originally had been
provided not for recreation but for grazing domestic animals "in common,"
and that "[i]n the memory of men now living, a proposition to take private
property [by eminent domain] for a public park ... would have been regarded as a novel exercise of legislative power." !d., at 297.
1
°For much the same reasons, the existence vel non of a tradition of federal involvement in a particular area does not provide an adequate standard for state immunity. Most of the Federal Government's current regulatory activity originated less than 50 years ago with the New Deal; and a
good portion of it has developed within the past two decades. The recent
vintage of this regulatory activity does not diminish the strength of the federal interest in applying regulatory standards to state activities, nor does it
affect the strength of the States' interest in being free from federal supervision. Although the Court's intergovernmental tax immunity decisions
ostensibly have subjected particular state activities to federal taxation be-

.
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A nonhistorical standard for selecting immune governmental functions is likely to be just as unworkable as is a historical standard. The goal of identifying "uniquely" governmental functions, for example, has been rejected by the
Court in the field of government tort liability in part because
the notion of a "uniquely" governmental function is unmanageable. See Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U. S.
61, 64-68 (1955); see also Lafayette v. Louisiana Power &
Light Co., 435 U. S. 389, 433 (1978) (dissenting opinion).
Another possibility would be to confine immunity to "necessary'' governmental services, that is, services that would be
provided inadequately or not at all unless the government
provided them. Cf. Flint v. Stone Tracy Co ., 220 U. S., at
172. The set of services that fits into this category, however, may well be negligible. The fact that an unregulated
market produces less of some service than a State deems desirable does not mean that the State itself must provide the
service; in most if not all cases, the State can "contract out"
by hiring private firms to provide the service ·or simply by
providing subsidies to existing suppliers. It also is open to
question how well equipped courts are to make this kind of
determination about the workings of economic markets.
We believe, however, that there is a more fundamental
problem at work here, a problem that explains why the Court
was never able to provide a basis for the
governmentaVproprietary distinction in the intergovernmencause those activities "ha[ve] been traditionally within [federal taxing]
power from the beginning," N ew York v. United States, 326 U. S. , at 588
(Stone, C. J., concurring, joined by Reed, Murphy, and Burton, JJ.), the
Court has not in fact required federal taxes to have long historical records
in order to be effective. The income tax at issue in Powers, supra, took
effect less than a decade before the tax years for which it was challenged,
while the federal tax whose application was upheld in New York v. United
States took effect in 1932 and was rescinded less than two years later. See
Helvering v. Powers , 293 U. S., at 222; Rakestraw, The Reciprocal Rule of
Governmental Tax Immunity-A Legal Myth, 11 Fed. Bar J. 3, 34, n. 116
(1950).
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tal tax immunity cases and why an attempt to draw similar
distinctions with respect to federal regulatory authority
under National League of Cities is unlikely to succeed regardless of how the distinctions are phrased. The problem is
that neither the governmental/proprietary distinction nor
any other that purports to separate out important governmental functions can be faithful to the role of federalism in a
democratic society. The essence of our federal system is
that within the realm of authority left open to them under the
Constitution, the States must be equally free to engage in
any activity that their citizens choose for the common weal,
no matter how unorthodox or unnecessary anyone else-including the judiciary-deems state involvement to be. Any
rule of state immunity that looks to the "traditional," "integral," or "necessary': nature of governmental functions inevitably invites an unelected federal judiciary to make decisions
about which state policies it favors and which ones it dislikes.
"The science of government . . . is the science of experiment," Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204, 226 (1821), and the
States cannot serve as laboratories for social and economic
experiment, see New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U. S.
262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), if they must pay an
added price when they meet the changing needs of their citizenry by taking up functions that an earlier day and a different society left in private hands. In the words of Justice
Black:
"There is not, and there cannot be, any unchanging
line of demarcation between essential and non-essential
governmental functions. Many governmental functions
of today have at some time in the past been non-governmental. The genius of our government provides that,
within the sphere of constitutional action, the peopleacting not through the courts but through their elected
legislative representatives-have the power to determine as conditions demand, what services and functions
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the public welfare requires." Helvering v. Gerhardt,
304 U. S., at 427 (concurring opinion).
We therefore now reject, as unsound in principle and unworkable in practice, a rule of state immunity from federal
regulation that turns on a judicial appraisal of whether a particular governmental function is "integ:r:_al" or "traditional."
Any such rule leads to inconsistent results at the same time
that it disserves principles of democratic self-governance,
and it breeds inconsistency precisely because it is divorced
from those principles. If there are to be limits on the Federal Government's power to interfere with state functionsas undoubtedly there are-we must look elsewhere to find
them. We accordingly return to the underlying issue that
confronted this Court inNational League of Cities-the manner in which the Constitution insulates States from the reach
of Congress' power under the Commerce Clause.

III
The central theme of National League of Cities was that
the States occupy a special position in our constitutional system and that the scope of Congress' authority under the
Commerce Clause must reflect that position. Of course, the
Commerce Clause by its specific language does not provide
any special limitation on Congress' actions with respect to the
States. See EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U. S. 226, 248 (1983)
(concurring opinion). It is equally true, however, that the
text of the Constitution provides the beginning rather than
the final answer to every inquiry into questions of federalism,
for "[b]ehind the words of the constitutional provisions are
postulates which limit and control." Monaco v. Mississippi,
292 U. S. 313, 322 (1934). National League of Cities reflected the general conviction that the Constitution preclude
"the National Government [from] devour[ing] the essentials
of state sovereignty." Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U. S., at 205
(dissenting opinion). In order to be faithful to the underly-

/
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ing federal premises of the Constitution, courts must look for
the "postulates which limit and control."
What has proved problematic is not the perception that the
Constitution's federal structure imposes limitations on the·
Commerce Clause, but rather the nature and content of those
limitations. One approach to defining the limits on Congress' authority to regulate the States under the Commerce
Clause is to identify certain underlying elements of political
sovereignty that are deemed essential to the States' "separate and independent existence." Lane County v. Oregon, 7
Wall. 71, 76 (1869). This approach obviously underlay the
Court's use of the "traditional governmental function" concept inNational League of Cities. It also has led to the separate requirement that the challenged federal statute "address matters that are indisputably 'attribute[s] of state
sovereignty."' Hodel, 452 U. S., at 288, quoting National
League of Cities, 426 U. S., at 845. In National League of
Cities itself, for example, the Court concluded that decisions
by a State concerning the wages and hours of its employees
are an "undoubted attribute of state sovereignty." 426
U. S., at 845. The opinion did not explain what aspects of
such decisions made them such an "undoubted attribute," and
the Court since then has remarked on the uncertain scope of
the concept. See EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U. S., at 238,
n. 11. The point of the inquiry, however, has remained to
single out particular features of a State's internal governance
that are deemed to be intrinsic parts of state sovereignty.
We doubt that courts ultimately can identify principled
constitutional limitations on the scope of Congress' Commerce Clause powers over the States merely by relying on a
priori definitions of state sovereignty. In part, this ~s because of the elusiveness of objective criteria for "fundamental" elements of state sovereignty, a problem we have
witnessed in the search for "traditional governmental functions." There is, however, a more fundamental reason: the
sovereignty of the States is limited by the Constitution itself.
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A variety of sovereign powers, for example, are withdrawn
from the States by Article I, § 10. Section 8 of the same Article works an equally sharp contraction of state sovereignty
by authorizing Congress to exercise a wide range of legislative powers and (in conjunction with the Supremacy Clause
of Article VI) to displace contrary state legislation. See
Hodel, 452 U. S., at 290-292. By providing for final review
of questions of federal law in this Court, Article III curtails
the sovereign power of the States' judiciaries to make authoritative determinations of law. See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304 (1816). Finally, the developed application,
through the Fourteenth Amendment, of the greater part of
the Bill of Rights to the States limits the sovereign authority
that States otherwise would possess to legislate with respect
to their citizens and to conduct their own affairs.
The States unquestionably do "retai[n] a significant measure of sovereign authority." EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U. S.,
at 269 (POWELL,. J., dissenting). They do so, however, only
to the extent that the Constitution has not divested them of
their original powers and transferred those powers to the
Federal Government. In the words of James Madison to the
Members of the First Congress: "Interference with the
power of the States was no constitutional criterion of the
power of Congress. If the power was not given, Congress
could not exercise it; if given, they might exercise it, although it should interfere with the laws, or even the Constitution of the States." 2 Annals of Cong. 1897 (1791).
Justice Field made the same point in the course of his defense
of state autonomy in his dissenting opinion in Baltimore &
Ohio R. Co. v. Baugh, 149 U. S. 368, 401 (1893), a defense
quoted with approval in Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S.
64, 78-79 (1938):

.

"[T]he Constitution of the United States ... recognizes and preserves the autonomy and independence of
the States-independence in their legislative and independence in their judicial departments. [Federal] [s]u-
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pervision over either the legislative or the judicial action
of the States is in no case permissible except as to matters by the Constitution specifically authorized or delegated to the United States. Any interference with
either, except as thus permitted, is an invasion of the authority of the State and, to that extent, a denial of its
independence."
As a result, to say that the Constitution assumes the continued role of the States is to say little about the nature of
that role. Only recently, this Court recognized that the purpose of the constitutional immunity recognized in National
League of Cities is not to preserve "a sacred province of state
autonomy." EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U. S., at 236. With
rare exceptions, like the guarantee, in Article IV, § 3, of
state territorial integrity, the Constitution does not carve out
express elements of state sovereignty that Congress may not
employ its delegated powers to displace. James Wilson reminded the Pennsylvania ratifying convention in 1787: "It is
true, indeed, sir, although it presupposes the existence of
state governments, yet this Constitution does not suppose
them to be the sole power to be respected." 2 Debates in the
Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal
Constitution 439 (J. Elliot 2d ed. 1876) (Elliot). The power
of the Federal Government is a "power to be respected" as
well, and the fact that the States remain sovereign as to all
powers not vested in Congress or denied them by the Constitution offers no guidance about where the frontier between
state and federal power lies. In short, we have no license to
employ freestanding conceptions of state sovereignty when
measuring congressional authority under the Commerce
Clause .
. When we look for the States' "residuary and inviolable sovereignty," The Federalist No. 39, p. 285 (B. Wright ed. 1961)
(J. Madison), in the shape of the constitutional scheme rather
than in predetermined notions of sovereign power, a different
measure of state sovereignty emerges. Apart from the limi-
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tation on federal authority inherent in the delegated nature
of Congress' Article I powers, the principal means chosen by
the Framers to ensure the role of the States in the federal
system lies in the structure of the Federal Government itself.
It is no novelty to observe that the composition of the Federal Government was designed in large part to protect the
States from overreaching by Congress. 11 The Framers thus
gave the States a role in the selection both of the Executive
and the Legislative Branches of the Federal Government.
The States were vested with indirect influence over the
House of Representatives and the Presidency by their control of electoral qualifications and their role in presidential
elections. U. S. Const., Art. I, §2, and Art. II,§ 1. They
were given more direct influence in the Senate, where each
State received equal representation and each Senator was to
be selected by the legislature of his State. Art. I, § 3. The
significance attached to the States' equal representation in
the Senate is underscored by the prohibition of any constitutional amendment divesting a State of equal representation
without the State's consent. Art. V.
The extent to which the structure of the Federal Government itself was relied on to insulate the interests of the
States is evident in the views of the Framers. James Madison explained that the Federal Government "will partake sufficiently of the spirit [of the States], to be disinclined to invade the rights of the individual States, or the prerogatives
of their governments." The Federalist No. 46, p. 332 (B.
Wright ed. 1961). Similarly, James Wilson observed that "it
was a favorite object in the Convention" to provide for the
security of the States against federal encroachment and that
n See, e. g., J. Choper, Judicial Review and the National Political Process 175-184 (1980); Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The
Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 543 (1954); La Pierre, The Political Safeguards of
Federalism Redux: Intergovernmental Immunity and the States as Agents
of the Nation, 60 Wash. U. L. Q. 779 (1982) .

. ·.

J

I

82-1913 & 82-1951-0PINION
GARCIA v. SAN ANTONIO METRO. TRANSIT AUTH.

23

the structure of the Federal Government itself served that
end. 2 Elliot, at 438-439. Madison placed particular reliance on the equal representation of the States in the .Senate,
which he saw as "at once a constitutional recognition of the
portion of sovereignty remaining in the individual States, and
an instrument for preserving that residuary sovereignty."
The Federalist No. 62, p. 408 (B. Wright ed. 1961). He further noted that "the residuary sovereignty of the States [is]
implied and secured by that principle of representation in one
branch of the [federal] legislature" (emphasis added). The
Federalist No. 43, p. 315 (B. Wright ed. 1961). See also
M'Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 435 (1819). In short,
the Framers chose to rely on a federal system in which special restraints on federal power over the States inhered principally in the workings of the National Government itself,
rather than in discrete limitations on the objects of federal
authority. State sovereign interests, then, are more properly protected by procedural safeguards inherent in the
structure of the federal system than by judicially created
limitations on federal power.
The effectiveness of the federal political process in preserving the States' interests is apparent even today in the course
of federal legislation. On the one hand, the States have been
able to direct a substantial proportion of federal revenues
into their own treasuries in the form of general and programspecific grants in aid. The federal role in assisting state and
local governments is a longstanding one; Congress provided
federal land grants to finance state governments from the beginning of the Republic, and direct cash grants were awarded
as early as 1887 under the Hatch Act. 12 In the past quartercentury alone, federal grants to States and localities ·have
12
See, e. g., A. Howitt, Managing Federalism: Studies in Intergovernmental Relations 3-18 (1984); Break, Fiscal Federalism in the United
States: The First 200 Years, Evolution and Outlook, in The Future of Federalism in the 1980s, pp. 39-54 (July 1981).
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grown from $7 billion to $96 billion. 13 As a result, federal
grants now account for about one-fifth of state and local government expenditures. 14 The States have obtained federal
funding for such services as police and fire protection, education, public health .and hospitals, parks and recreation, and
sanitation. 15 Moreover, at the same time that the States
have exercised their influence to obtain federal support, they
have been able to exempt themselves from a wide variety of
obligations imposed by Congress under the Commerce
Clause. For example, the Federal Power Act, the National
Labor Relations Act, the Labor-Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act, the Occupational Safety and Health Act, the
Employee Retirement Insurance Security Act, and the Sherman Act all contain express or implied exemptions for States
and their subdivisions. 1 The fact that some federal statutes
13
A. Howitt, supra, at 8; Bureau of the Census, U. S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Federal. Expenditures by State for Fiscal
Year 1983, p. 2 (1984) (Census, Federal Expenditures); Division of Government Accounts and Reports, Fiscal Service-Bureau of Government Financial Operations, Dept. of the Treasury, Federal Aid to States: Fiscal
Year 1982, p. 1 (1983 rev. ed.).
14
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Significant
Features of Fiscal Federalism 120, 122 (1984).
15
See, e. g., the Federal Fire Prevention and Control Act of 1974, 88
Stat. 1535, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 2201 et seq.; the Urban Park and
Recreation Recovery Act of 1978, 92 Stat. 3538, 16 U. S. C. § 2501 et seq.;
the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 27, as
amended, 20 U. S. C. § 2701 et seq.; the Water Pollution Control Act, 62
Stat. 1155, as amended, 33 U. S. C. § 1251 et seq.; the Public Health Service Act, 58 Stat. 682, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 201 et seq.; the Safe Drinking Water Act, 88 Stat. 1660, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 300f et seq.; the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 197, as
amended, 42 U. S. C.§ 3701 et seq.; the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, 88 Stat. 633, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 5301 et seq.; and
the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974, 88 Stat.
1109, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 5601 et seq. See also Census, Federal Expenditures, at 2-15.
6
' See 16 U. S. C. § 824(f); 29 U. S. C. § 152(2); 29 U. S. C. § 402(e); 29
U. S. C. § 652(5); 29 U. S. C. §§ 1003(b)(1), 1002(32); and Parker v. Brown,
317 u. s. 341 (1943).
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such as the FLSA extend general obligations to the States
cannot obscure the extent to which the political position of
the States in the federal system has served to minimize the
burdens that the States bear under the Commerce Clause. 17
We realize that changes in the structure of the Federal
Government have taken place since 1789, not the least of
which has been the substitution of popular election of Senators by the adoption of the Seventeenth Amendment in 1913,
and that these changes may work to alter the influence of the
States in the federal political process. 18 Nonetheless,
against this background, we are convinced that the fundamental limitation that the constitutional scheme imposes on
the Commerce Clause to protect the "States as States" is one
of process rather than one of result. Any substantive restraint on the exercise of Commerce Clause powers must find
its justification in the procedural nature of this basic limitation, and it must be tailored to compensate for possible
. failings in the national political process rather than to dictate
a "sacred province of state autonomy." EEOC v. Wyoming,
460 U. S., at 236.
Insofar as the present cases are concerned, then, we need
go no further than to state that we perceive nothing in the
overtime and minimum-wage requirements of the FLSA, as
applied to SAMTA, that is destructive of state sovereignty or
violative of any constitutional provision. SAMTA faces
nothing more than the same minimum-wage and overtime obEven as regards the FLSA, Congress incorporated special provisions
concerning overtime pay for law enforcement and firefighting personnel
when it amended the FLSA in 1974 in order to take account of the special
concerns of States and localities with respect tq these positions. See 29
U. S. C. § 207(k). Congress also declined to impose any obligations on
state and local governments with respect to policymaking personnel who
are not subject to civil service laws. See 29 U. S. C. § 203(e)(2)(C)(i) and
(ii).
18
See, e. g., Choper, supra, at 177-178; Kaden, Politics, Money, and
State Sovereignty: The Judicial Role, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 847, 860-868
(1979) .
17
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ligations that hundreds of thousands of other employers, public as well as private, have to meet.
In these cases, the status of public mass transit simply underscores the extent to which the structural protections of
the Constitution insulate the States from federally imposed
burdens. When Congress first subjected state mass-transit
systems to FLSA obligations in 1966, and when it expanded
those obligations in 1974, it simultaneously provided extensive funding for state and local mass transit through UMTA.
In the two decades since its enactment, UMTA has provided
over $22 billion in mass transit aid to States and localities. 19
In 1983 alone, UMTA funding amounted to $3.7 billion. 20 As
noted above, SAMTA and its immediate predecessor have received a substantial amount of UMTA funding, including over
$12 million during SAMTA's first two fiscal years alone. In
short, Congress has not simply placed a financial burden on
the should~rs of States and localities that operate mass-transit systems, but has provided substantial countervailing financial assistance as well, assistance that may leave individual mass transit systems better off than they would have
been had Congress never intervened at all in the area. Congress' treatment of public mass transit reinforces our conviction that the national political process systematically protects
States from the risk of having their functions in that area
pandicapped by Commerce Clause regulation. 21
See Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1983: Hearings before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on
Appropriations, 97th Con g., 2d Sess., p. 808 (1982) (fiscal years
1965-1982); Census, Federal Expenditures 15 (fiscal year 1983).
20
Census, Federal Expenditures 15.
21
Our references to UMTA are not meant to imply that regulation under
the Commerce Clause must be accompanied by countervailing financial
benefits under the Spending Clause. The application of the FLSA to
SAMTA would be constitutional even had Congress not provided federal
funding under UMTA.
19
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IV
This analysis makes clear that Congress' action in affording
SAMTA employees the protections of the wage and hour provisions of the FLSA contravened no affirmative limit on Congress' power under the Commerce Clause. The judgment of
the District Court therefore must be reversed.
Of course, we continue to recognize that the States occupy
a special and specific position in our constitutional system and
that the scope of Congress' authority under the Commerce
Clause must reflect that position. But the principal and
basic limit on the federal commerce power is that inherent in
all congressional action-the built-in restraints that our system provides through state participation in federal governmental action. The political process ensures that laws that
unduly burden the States will not be promulgated. In the
factual setting of these cases the internal safeguards of the
political process have performed as intended.
These cases do not require us to identify or define what. affirmative limits the constitutional structure might impose on
federal action affecting the States under the Commerce
Clause. See Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U. S. 559 (1911). We
note and accept Justice Frankfurter's observation in New
York v. United States, 326 U. S. 572, 583 (1946):
"The process of Constitutional adjudication does not
thrive on conjuring up horrible possibilities that never
happen in the real world and devising doctrines sufficiently comprehensive in detail to cover the remotest
contingency. Nor need we go beyond what is required
for a reasoned disposition of the kind of controversy now
before the Court."
Though the separate concurrence providing the fifth vote
in National League of Cities was "not untroubled by certain
possible implications" of the decision, 426 U. S., at 856, the
Court in that case attempted to articulate affirmative limits

·,
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on the Commerce Clause power in terms of core governmental functions and fundamental attributes of state sovereignty. But the model of democratic decisionmaking the
Court there identified underestimated, in our view, the solicitude of the national political process for the continued vitality
of the States. Attempts by other courts since then to draw
guidance from this model have proved it both impracticable
and doctrinally barren. In sum, in National League of Cities the Court tried to repair what did not need repair.
We do not lightly overrule recent precedent. 22 We have
not hesitated, however, when it has become apparent that a
prior decision has departed from a proper understanding of
congressional power under the Commerce Clause. See
United States v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100, 116-117 (1941). Due
respect for the reach of congressional power within the federal system mandates that we do so now.
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U. S. 833 (1976), is
overruled. The judgment of the District Court is reversed,
and these cases are remanded to that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.

22

But see United States v. Scott, 437 U. S. 83, 86-87 (1978).
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JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court.
In National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U. S. 833
(1976), this Court held that the Commerce Clause does not
empower Congress to enforce the minimum wage and overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)
against States "in areas of traditional governmental ftmctions." I d., at 852. Although National League of Cities
provided examples of "traditional governmental functions," it
did not offer a more general explanation of how "traditional"
functions were to be distinguished from "nontraditional"
ones. Since then, federal and state courts have devoted considerable effort to the task of identifying traditional functions
for purposes of state immunity under the Commerce Clause.
In this case, a Federal District Court concluded that municipal ownership and operation of a mass-transit system is a traditional governmental function and hence is exempt from the
obligations of the FLSA under National League of Cities.
Faced with the identical question, three Federal Courts of

82-1913 & 82-1951-0PINION
GARCIA v. SAN ANTONIO TRANSIT AUTHORITY

2

Appeals and one state appellate court have reached a contrary conclusion. 1
A review of the operation of the "traditional governmental
function" standard in this and other cases now persuades us
that the attempt to draw the boundaries of state regulatory
immunity in terms of "traditional governmental functions" is
both unworkable and inconsistent with the principles of federalism on which National League of Cities rests. For the
reasons given below, we conclude instead that the prerequisite for state immunity from Commerce Clause regulation
must be a federal statutory scheme that singles out the
States for unequal regulatory burdens. Because the FLSA
imposes minimum-wage and overtime obligations evenhandedly on private as well as public employers, we hold today
that its application to municipal mass-transit systems like
that operated by appellee San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authority (SAMTA) is within the power delegated to Congress by the Commerce Clause.
I
SAMTA provides public transportation for the metropolitan area of San Antonio, Tex. The history of public transportation in San Antonio is characteristic of the history of
local mass transit in the United States generally. Passenger
transportation for hire within San Antonio originally was provided on a private basis by local transportation companies.
In 1913, the Texas Legislature authorized the State's municipalities to regulate vehicles providing carriage for hire.
1913 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 147, § 4, ~ 12, codified as amended
at Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann., Art. 1175, §§ 20 and 21 (Vernon
1963). Two years later, San Antonio enacted an ordinance
Dove v. Chattanooga Area Regional Transportation Authority, 701 F.
2d 50 (CA6 1983); Alewine v. City Council, 699 F. 2d 1060 (CAll 1983),
cert. pending, Nos. 82-1974 and 83-257; Kramer v. New Castle Area Transit Authority, 677 F. 2d 308 (CA3 1982), cert. denied, 459 U. S. 1146
(1983); Francis v. City of Tallahassee, 424 So. 2d 61 (Fla. App. 1982).
1
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setting forth franchising, insurance, and safety requirements
for passenger vehicles operated for hire. The city relied on
publicly regulated private mass transit until 1959, when it
purchased the privately owned San Antonio Transit Company and transformed it into a public authority called the San
Antonio Transit System (SATS). SATS continued in operation until 1978, when San Antonio transferred its facilities
and equipment to SAMTA, a public mass-transit authority
organized on a countywide basis. See generally Tex. Rev.
Civ. Stat. Ann., Art. 1118x (Vernon Supp. 1984). SAMTA
currently is a major source of transportation in the San Antonio metropolitan area; between 1978 and 1980 alone, its vehicles covered over 26 million route miles and carried over 63
million passengers.
Like other cities, San Antonio has come to look to the Federal Government for financial assistance in maintaining public
mass transit. SATS managed to meet its operating expenses and bond obligations without federal or local financial
aid for the first decade of its existence. By 1970, however,
its financial position had deteriorated to the point where
federal subsidies became vital to its continued operation.
SATS' general manager testified before Congress that year
that "if we do not receive substantial help from the Federal
Government, San Antonio may ... join the growing ranks of
cities that have inferior [public] transportation or may end up
with no [public] transportation at all." 2
The principal federal program to which SATS and other
mass transit systems looked for relief was the Urban Mass
Transportation Act of 1964 (UMTA), 78 Stat. 302, as
amended, 49 U. S. C. §§ 1601 et seq., which provides substantial federal assistance to urban mass-transit programs.
See generally Jackson Transit Authority v. Transit Union,
457 U. S. 15 (1982). As amended, UMTA authorizes the DeUrban Mass Transportation: Hearings on H. R. 6663 et al. Before the
Subcommittee on Housing of the House Committee on Banking and Currency, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., p. 419 (1970) (statement of F. Norman Hill) .
2

.. .
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partment of Transportation to fund 75 percent of the capital
outlays and up to 50 percent of the operating expenses of
qualifying mass-transit programs. §§ 4(a), 5(d) and (e), 49
U. S. C. §§ 1603(a), 1604(d) and (e). SATS received its first
UMTA subsidy, a $4.1 million capital grant, in December
1970. Between December 1970 and February 1980, SATS
and SAMTA received over $51 million in UMTA grantsmore than $31 million in capital grants, over $20 million in operating assistance, and a minor amount in technical assistance. During SAMTA's first two fiscal years, it received
$12.5 million in UMTA operating grants, $26.8 million from
sales taxes, and only $10.1 million in fares. Federal subsidies and local sales taxes currently account for roughly 75
percent of SAMTA's operating expenses.
The present controversy concerns the extent to which
SAMTA may be subjected to the minimum-wage and overtime requirements of the FLSA. When the FLSA was enacted in 1938, its wage and overtime provisions did not cover
either local mass-transit employees or employees of state and
local governments. Pub. L. No. 75-718, §§ 3(d), 13(a)(9), 52
Stat. 1060, 1067 (1938). In 1961, Congress extended minimum-wage coverage to employees of all private mass-transit
carriers whose annual gross revenues were not less than
$1,000,000. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1961,
Pub. L. No. 87-30, §§2(c), 9, 75 Stat. 66,72-73. Five years
later, Congress extended FLSA coverage to state and local
government employees for the first time by withdrawing the
minimum-wage and overtime exemptions from public hospitals, schools, and mass-transit carriers whose rates and services were subject to state regulation. Fair Labor Standards
Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-601, §§ 102(a) and (b),
80 Stat. 831. At the same time, Congress eliminated the
overtime exemption for all mass-transit employees other
than drivers, operators, and conductors. § 206(c), 80 Stat.
836. The application of the FLSA to public schools and hos-
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pitals was held to be within Congress' power under the Commerce Clause. Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U. S. 183 (1968).
The FLSA obligations of public mass-transit systems like
SATS were expanded in 1974 when Congress provided for
the progressive repeal of the surviving overtime exemption
for mass-transit employees. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 21(b), 88 Stat. 68. Congress simultaneously brought the States and their subdivisions farther within the ambit of the FLSA by extending
FLSA coverage to virtually all state and local government
employees. §§ 6(a)(1) and (a)(6), 88 Stat. 58, 60, 29 U. S. C.
§§ 203(d) and (x). SATS complied with the FLSA's overtime
requirements until 1976, when this Court overruled Maryland v. Wirtz in National League of Cities and held that the
FLSA could not be applied constitutionally to the "traditional
governmental functions" of state and local governments.
Four months after National League of Cities was handed
down, SATS informed its employees that the decision relieved SATS of its overtime obligations under the FLSA. 3
Matters rested there until1979, when the Wage and Hour
Administration of the Department of Labor issued an opinion
that SAMTA's operations "are not constitutionally immune
from the application of the Fair Labor Standards Act" under
National League of Cities. Opinion WH-499, 6 Labor Rel.
Rep. (BNA) 91:1138 (Sept. 17, 1979). On November 21,
1979, SAMTA filed this action against the Secretary of Labor
in the United States District Court for the Western District
of Texas. SAMTA sought a declaratory judgment that, contrary to the Wage and Hour Administration's determination,
National League of Cities precluded the application of the
FLSA's overtime requirements to SAMTA's operations.
3
Evidently, neither SATS nor SAMTA has attempted to avoid the
FLSA's minimum-wage provisions. We are informed that basic wage levels in the mass-transit industry traditionally have been well in excess of the
minimum wages set by the FLSA. See Brief for National League of Cities
et al. as Amici Curiae 7-8.
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The Secretary counterclaimed under 29 U. S. C. §217 for enforcement of the overtime and record-keeping requirements
of the FLSA. On the same day that SAMTA filed its action,
Joseph Garcia and several other SAMTA employees brought
suit against SAMTA in the District Court for overtime pay
under the FLSA. Garcia v. SAMTA, Civil Action No. SA
79 CA 458. The District Court stayed that action pending
the outcome of this suit but allowed Garcia to intervene in the
present litigation as a defendant in support of the Secretary.
One month after SAMTA brought suit, the Department of
Labor formally amended its FLSA interpretive regulations
to provide that publicly owned local mass-transit systems are
not entitled to immunity under National League of Cities.
44 Fed. Reg. 75,630 (1979), codified at 29 CFR § 775.3(b)(3)
(1983).
On November 17, 1981, the District Court granted a motion for summary judgment by SAMTA and denied a crossmotion for partial summary judgment by the Secretary and
Garcia. Without further explanation, the District Court
held that "local mass transit systems (including [SAMTA])
constitute integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions" under National League of Cities. Juris.
Statement in No. 82-1913, p. 24a. The Secretary and Garcia
appealed to this Court pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1252. During the pendency of those appeals, we held in Transportation
Union v. Long IslandR. Co., 455 U.S. 678 (1982), that commuter rail service provided by the state-owned Long Island
Rail Road did not constitute a "traditional governmental
function" and hence did not enjoy constitutional immunity,
under National League of Cities, from the requirements of
the Railway Labor Act. We accordingly vacated the District Court's judgment in the present cases and remanded for
further consideration in light of Long Island. 457 U. S. 1102
(1982).
On remand, the District Court adhered to its original view
and again entered judgment for SAMTA. San Antonio Met-
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ropolitan Transit Authority v. Donovan, 557 F. Supp. 445
(1983). The court looked first to the "historical reality" of
state involvement in mass transit. It recognized that States
historically had not owned and operated mass-transit systems, but concluded that they had engaged in a longstanding
pattern of public regulation and that this regulatory tradition
gave rise to an "inference of sovereignty." !d., at 447-448.
The court next looked to the record of federal involvement in
the field and concluded that constitutional immunity would
not result in an erosion of federal authority with respect
to state-owned mass-transit systems, because many federal
statutes themselves contain exemptions for States and thus
made the withdrawal of federal regulatory power over public
mass-transit systems a supervening federal policy. Id., at
448-450. Although the Federal Government's authority
over employee wages under the FLSA obviously would be
eroded, Congress had not asserted any interest in the wages
of public mass-transit employees until1966 and hence had not
established a longstanding federal interest in the field, in contrast to the century-old federal regulatory presence in the
railroad industry found significant in Long Island. Finally,
the court compared mass transit to the list of functions identified as constitutionally immune in National League of Cities
and concluded that it did not differ from those functions in
any material respect. The court stated: "If transit is to be
distinguished from the exempt [National League of Cities]
functions it will have to be by identifying a traditional state
function in the same way pornography is sometimes identified: someone knows it when they see it, but they can't describe it." 557 F. Supp., at 453. 4
• The District Court also analyzed the status of mass transit under the
four-part test devised by the Sixth Circuit in Amersbach v. City of Cleveland, 598 F. 2d 1033 (1979). In that case, the Court of Appeals looked to:
(1) whether the function benefits the community as a whole and is made
available at little or no expense; (2) whether it is undertaken for public
service or pecuniary gain; (3) whether government is particularly well

"·
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The Secretary and Garcia again appealed from the District
Court's judgment. We noted probable jurisdiction,
U. S. - - (1983), and we now reverse.
II
Appellees have not argued that SAMTA is immune from
regulation under the FLSA merely because it is a local transit system engaged in intrastate commercial activity.
SAMTA's operations may well be characterized as "local" in a
practical sense. Nonetheless, it long has been settled that
Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause extends to
all intrastate economic activities that affect interstate commerce. See, e. g., Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining &
Reel. Assn., 452 U. S. 264, 276-277 (1981); Heart of Atlanta
Motel v. United States, 379 U. S. 241, 258 (1964); Wickard v.
Filburn, 317 U. S. 111, 125 (1942); United States v. Darby,
312 U. S. 100 (1941). Were SAMTA a privately owned and
operated enterprise, it could not credibly argue that Congress exceeded the bounds of its Commerce Clause powers in
setting minimum wages and overtime rates for SAMTA's employees. Any constitutional exemption from the requirements of the FLSA therefore must rest on SAMTA's status
as a governmental entity rather than on the "local" nature of
its operations.
The prerequisites for the governmental immunity recognized in National League of Cities were summarized by the
Court in Hodel, supra. Under the test there set forth, four
conditions must obtain before a state activity may be deemed
immune from a particular federal regulation under the Commerce Clause. First, the federal statute at issue must regulate "the 'States as States.'" Second, the statute must "address matters that are indisputably 'attribute[s] of state
sovereignty."' Third, state compliance with the federal obligation must "directly impair [the State's] ability 'to strucsuited to perfonn it because of a community-wide need; and (4) whether
government is its principal provider. !d., at 1037.
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ture integral operations in areas of traditional governmental
functions.' " Finally, the relation of state and federal interests must not be such that "the nature of the federal interest
... justifies state submission." 452 U. S., at 287-288 and
n. 29, quoting National League of Cities, 426 U. S., at 845,
852, 854.
The controversy in these cases has focused on the third
Hodel requirement-that the challenged federal statute
trench on "traditional governmental functions." The District Court voiced a common concern when it stated that
"identifying which particular state functions are immune
[under this standard] remains difficult." 557 F. Supp., at
44 7. Just how difficult the task has been is reflected in the
efforts of other federal courts. Thus, courts have held that
regulating ambulance services, Gold Cross Ambulance v.
City of Kansas City, 538 F. Supp. 956, 967-969 (WD Mo.
1982), aff'd on other grounds, 705 F. 2d 1005 (CA8 1983),
cert. pending, No. 83-183; licensing automobile drivers,
United States v. Best, 573 F. 2d 1095, 1102-1103 (CA9 1978);
operating a municipal airport, Amersbach v. City of Cleveland, 598 F. 2d 1033, 1037-1038 (CA6 1979); performing solid
waste disposal, Hybud Equipment Corp. v. City of Akron,
654 F. 2d 1187, 1196 (CA6 1981); and operating a highway authority, Malina-Estrada v. Puerto Rico Highway Authority,
680 F. 2d 841, 845-846 (CAl 1982), are protected functions
under National League of Cities. At the same time, courts
have held that issuance of industrial development bonds,
Woods v. Homes and Structures of Pittsburgh, Kansas, Inc.,
489 F. Supp. 1270, 1296-1297 (Kan. 1980); regulation of intrastate natural gas sales, Oklahoma ex rel. Derryberry v.
FERC, 494 F. Supp. 636, 657 (WD Okla. 1980), aff'd, 661 F.
2d 832 (CAlO 1981), cert. denied sub nom. Texas v. FERC,
457 U. S. 1105 (1982); regulation of traffic on public roads,
Friends ofthe Earth v. Carey, 552 F. 2d 25, 38 (CA2), cert.
denied, 434 U. S. 902 (1977); regulation of air transportation,
Hughes Air Corp. v. Public Utilities Commission, 644 F. 2d
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1334, 1340-1341 (CA9 1981); operation of a telephone system,
Puerto Rico Tel. Co. v. FCC, 553 F. 2d 694, 700-701 (CAl
1977); leasing and sale of natural gas, Public Service Co. v.
FERC, 587 F. 2d 716, 721 (CA5), cert. denied sub nom. Louisiana v. FERC, 444 U. S. 879 (1979); operation of a mental
health facility, Williams v. Eastside Mental Health Center,
Inc., 669 F. 2d 671, 680-681 (CAll), cert. denied, 459 U. S.
976 (1982); and provision of in-house domestic services for the
aged and handicapped, Bonnette v. California Health and
Welfare Agency, 704 F. 2d 1465, 1472 (CA91983), are not entitled to immunity. It is difficult to identify an organizing
principle that places each of the cases in the first group on
one side of a line and each of the cases in the second group on
the other side; the constitutional distinction between licensing drivers and regulating traffic, for example, or between
operating a highway authority and operating a mental health
facility, is elusive at best.
Thus far, this Court itself has made little headway in defining the scope of the governmental functions protected under
National League of Cities. In that case the Court set forth
examples of protected and unprotected functions, see 426
U. S., at 851, 854, n. 18, but provided no explanation of how
those examples were identified. The only other case in
which the Court has had occasion to address the problem is
Long Island. 5 We recognized there that "[t]he determination of whether a federal law impairs a state's authority with
respect to 'areas of traditional [state] functions' may at times
be a difficult one." 455 U. S., at 684, quoting National
League of Cities, 426 U. S., at 852. The accuracy of that
statement is demonstrated by this Court's own difficulties in
Long Island in developing a workable standard for "tradi5
See also, however, Jefferson County Pharmaceutical Assn. v. Abbott
Laboratories, 460 U. S. - , - , n. 6 (1983) (slip op. 3, n. 6); FERC v.
Mississippi, 456 U. S. 742, 781 and n. 7 (1982) (O'CONNOR, J., concurring
in the judgment in part and dissenting in part); Fry v. United States, 421
U. S. 542, 558 and n. 2 (1975) (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting).

I •
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tiona! governmental functions." We relied in large part
there on "the historical reality that the operation of railroads
is not among the functions traditionally performed by state
and local governments," but we simultaneously disavowed "a
static historical view of state functions generally immune
from federal regulation." 455 U. S., at 686 (first emphasis
added; second emphasis in original). We held that the inquiry into a particular function's "traditional" nature was
merely a means of determining whether the federal statute at
issue unduly handicaps "basic state prerogatives," id., at
686-687, but we did not offer an explanation of what makes
one state function a "basic prerogative" and another function
not. Finally, having disclaimed a rigid reliance on the historical pedigree of state involvement in a particular area, we
nonetheless found it appropriate to emphasize the extended
historical record of federal involvement in the field of rail
transportation. I d., at 687-689.
Many constitutional standards involve "undoubte[d] ...
gray areas," Fry v. United States, 421 U. S. 542, 558 (1975)
(REHNQUIST, J., dissenting), and, despite the difficulties that
this Court and other courts have encountered so far, it normally might be fair to venture the assumption that case-bycase development by this Court would lead to a workable
standard for determining whether a particular governmental
function should be immune from federal regulation under the
Commerce Clause. A further cautionary note is sounded,
however, by the Court's experience in the related field of
state immunity from federal taxation. In South Carolina v.
United States, 199 U. S. 437 (1905), the Court held for the
first time that the state tax immunity recognized in Collector
v. Day, 11 Wall. 113 (1870), extended only to the "ordinary"
and "strictly governmental" instrumentalities of state governments and not to instrumentalities "used by the State in
the carrying on of an ordinary private business." 199 U. S.,
at 451, 461. While the Court applied the distinction outlined
in South Carolina for the next succeeding 40 years, at no
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time during that period did the Court develop a consistent
formulation of the kinds of governmental functions that were
entitled to immunity. The Court identified the protected
functions at various times as "essential," "usual," "traditional," or "strictly governmental" ones. 6 While "these differences in phraseology . . . must not be too literally contradistinguished," Brush v. Commissioner, 300 U. S. 352, 362
(1937), they reflect an inability to specify precisely what aspects of a governmental function made it necessary to the
"unimpaired existence" of the the States. Collector v. Day,
11 Wall., at 127. Indeed, the Court ultimately chose "not,
by an attempt to formulate any general test, [to] risk embarrassing the decision in cases [concerning] activities of a different kind which may arise in the future." Brush, 300 U. S.,
at 365.
If these tax immunity cases did have a common thread, it
was an attempt to distinguish between "governmental" and
"proprietary" functions. 7 To say that the distinction bea See Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U. S. 107, 172 (1911) ("essential");
Helvering v. Therrell , 303 U. S. 218, 225 (1938) (same); Helvering v. Powers, 293 U. S. 214, 225 (1934) ("usual"); United States v. California, 297
U. S. 175, 185 (1936) ("activities in which the states have traditionally
engaged"); South Carolina v. United States , 199 U. S. 437, 461 (1905)
("strictly governmental").
7
In South Carolina, the Court relied on the concept of "strictly governmental" functions to uphold the application of a federal liquor license tax to
a state-owned liquor distribution monopoly. In Flint, the Court stated:
"The true distinction is between . . . those operations of the States essential to the execution of its [sic] governmental functions, and which the
State can only do itself, and those activities which are of a private character"; under this standard, "[i]t is no part of the essential governmental
functions of a State to provide means of transportation, supply artificial
light, water and the like." 220 U. S., at 172. In Ohio v. Helvering, 292
U. S. 360 (1934), another case involving a state liquor-distribution monopoly, the Court stated that "the business of buying and selling commodities
.. . is not the performance of a governmental function," and that "[w]hen a
state enters the market place seeking customers it divests itself of its quasi
sovereignty pro tanto, and takes on the character of a trader, so far, at
least, as the taxing power of the federal government is concerned. " I d., at
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tween "governmental" and "proprietary'' functions proved to
be unstable, however, would be something of an understatement. In 1911, for example, the Court declared that the
provision of municipal water supplies "is no part of the essential governmental functions of a state." Flint v. Stone Tracy
Co., 220 U. S. 107, 172. Twenty-six years later, without
any intervening change in the applicable legal standards, the
Court simply rejected its earlier position and decided that the
provision of municipal water supplies was immune from federal taxation as an essential governmental function, even
though municipal water works long had been operated for a
profit by private industry. Brush, 300 U. S., at 370-373.
At the same time that the Court was holding municipal water
supplies to be immune from federal taxes, it had, in turn,
held that a state-run commuter rail system was not immune.
Helvering v. Powers, 293 U. S. 214 (1934). As Justice Black
was moved to observe in H elvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U. S.
405 (1938), "[a]n implied constitutional distinction which
taxes income of an officer of a state-operated transportation
system and exempts income of the manager of a municipal
water works system manifests the uncertainty created by the
'essential' and 'non-essential' test." Id., at 427 (concurring
opinion). It was this uncertainty and instability that led the
Court shortly thereafter, in New York v. United States, 326
U. S. 572 (1946), to conclude unanimously that the distinction
between "governmental" and "proprietary" functions was
"untenable" and must be abandoned. See id., at 583 (Frankfurter, J., joined by Rutledge, J.); id., at 586 (Stone, C. J.,
369. In Helvering v. Powers, supra, the Court upheld the application of
the federal income tax to the income of trustees of a state-operated commuter railroad; the Court reiterated that "the State cannot withdraw
sources of revenue from the federal taxing power by engaging in businesses which constitute a departure from the usual governmental functions
and to which, by reason of their nature, the federal taxing power normally
would extend," regardless of the fact that the proprietary enterprises "are
undertaken for what the State conceives to be the public benefit." 293
U. S., at 225. Accord, Allen v. Regents, 304 U. S. 439, 451-453 (1938).
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joined by Reed, Murphy, and Burton, JJ., concurring); id., at
590-596 (Douglas, J., joined by Black, J., dissenting). See
also Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U. S. 444, 457, and
n. 14 (1978) (plurality opinion); Case v. Bowles, 327 U. S. 92,
101 (1946).

Even during the heyday of the governmental/proprietary
distinction in intergovernmental tax-immunity doctrine,
moreover, the Court never explained the constitutional basis
for the distinction. The Court expressed its concern in
South Carolina that unlimited state immunity from federal
taxation would allow the States to undermine the Federal
Government's tax base by expanding into previously private
sectors of the economy. See 199 U. S., at 454-455. 8 The
need to reconcile state and federal interests obviously demanded that state immunity have some limiting principle,
but the Court did not try to justify the particular principle
that it chose; it simply concluded that a "line [must] be
drawn," 199 U. S., at 456, and proceeded to draw one. The
Court's elaborations in subsequent cases, like the assertion in
Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U. S. 360, 369 (1934), that "[w]hen a
state enters the market place seeking customers it divests itself of its quasi sovereignty pro tanto," sound more of ipse
dixit than reasoned explanation. This inability to give principled content to the distinction between "governmental" and
"proprietary" functions, no less significantly than the unworkability of the distinction, led the Court to abandon the
distinction with such alacrity in New York v. United States.
We see no reason to believe that a distinction which the
Court discarded as unworkable in the field of tax immunity
can prove fruitful in the field of regulatory immunity under
the Commerce Clause. Neither do any of the alternative
standards that might be employed to distinguish between
That concern was especially vivid in South Carolina because liquor
taxes, the object of the dispute in that case, then accounted for over onefourth of the Federal Government's revenues. See New York v. United
States, 326 U. S. 572, 598, n. 4 (1946) (dissenting opinion).
8
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protected and unprotected governmental functions appear
manageable. We rejected the possibility of making immunity turn on a purely historical standard of "tradition" in
Long Island, and properly so. The most obvious defect of a
historical approach to state immunity is that it prevents
courts from accommodating changes in the historical functions of States, changes that have resulted in a number of
once-private functions like education being assumed by the
States and their subdivisions. 9 At the same time, the only
apparent virtue of a rigorous historical standard, its promise
of a reasonably objective measure for state immunity, is illusory. Reliance on history as an organizing principle results
in linedrawing of the most arbitrary sort; the genesis of state
governmental functions stretches over a historical continuum
from before the Revolution to the present, and courts would
have to decide by fiat precisely how longstanding a pattern of
state involvement had to be for federal regulatory authority
to lapse. 10
Indeed, the ''traditional" nature of a particular governmental function
can be a matter of historical nearsightedness; today's self-evidently "traditional" function is often yesterday's suspect innovation. Thus, National
League of Cities offered the provision of public parks and recreation as an
example of a traditional governmental function. 426 U. S., at 851. A
scant 80 years earlier, however, in Shoemaker v. United States, 147 U. S.
282 (1892), the Court pointed out that city commons originally had been
provided for grazing domestic animals rather than for recreation and that
"[i]n the memory of men now living, a proposition to take private property
[by eminent domain] for a public park ... would have been regarded as a
novel exercise of legislative power." !d., at 297.
1
°For much the same reasons, the existence vel non of a tradition of federal involvement in a particular area does not provide an adequate standard for state immunity. Most of the Federal Government's current regulatory activity originated less than 50 years ago with the New Deal, and a
good portion of it has developed within the past two decades. The recent
vintage of this regulatory activity does not diminish the strength of the federal interest in applying regulatory standards to state activities, nor does it
affect the strength of the States' interest in being free from federal supervision. Although the Court's intergovernmental tax immunity decisions
ostensibly have subjected particular state activities to federal taxation
9
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Nonhistorical standards for selecting immune governmental functions are likely to be just as unworkable as a historical standard is. The goal of identifying "uniquely" governmental functions, for example, has been rejected by the
Court in the field of government tort liability in part because
the notion of a "uniquely" governmental function is unmanageable. See Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U. S.
61, 64-68 (1955); see also Lafayette v. Louisiana Power &
Light Co., 435 U. S. 389, 433 (1978) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
Another possibility would be to confine immunity to "necessary'' governmental services-that is, services that would be
provided inadequately or not at all unless the government
provided them. Cf. Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U. S., at
172. The set of services that fit into this category, however,
may well be negligible. The fact that an unregulated market
produces less of some service than a State deems desirable
does not mean that the State itself must provide the service;
in most if not all cases, the State can "contract out" by hiring
private firms to provide the service or simply by providing
subsidies to existing suppliers. It also is open to question
how well equipped courts are to make this kind of determination about the workings of economic markets.
We believe, however, that there is a more fundamental
problem at work here, a problem that explains why the
Court was never able to provide a basis for the governmental/proprietary distinction in the intergovernmental tax
immunity cases and why an attempt to draw similar distincbecause those activities "ha[ve] been traditionally within [federal taxing]
power from the beginning," New York v. United States, 326 U. S., at 588
(Stone, C. J., concurring in the judgment), the Court has not in fact required federal taxes to have long historical records in order to be effective.
The income tax at issue in Powers took effect less than a decade before the
tax years for which it was challenged, while the federal tax whose application was upheld in New York v. United States took effect in 1932 and was
rescinded less than two years later. See Helvering v. Powers , 293 U. S.,
at 222; Rakestraw, The Reciprocal Rule of Governmental Tax ImmunityA Legal Myth, 11 Fed. Bar J . 3, 34, n. 116 (1950).
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tions with respect to federal regulatory authority under N ational League of Cities is unlikely to succeed regardless of
how the distinctions are couched. The problem is that neither the governmental/proprietary distinction nor any other
that purports to separate important governmental functions
from other ones can be faithful to the role of federalism in a
democratic society. The essence of our federal system is
that within the realm of authority left open to them under the
Constitution, the States must be equally free to engage in
any activity that their citizens choose for the common weal,
no matter how unorthodox or unnecessary anyone else--including the judiciary-deems state involvement to be. Any
rule of state immunity that looks to the "traditional," "integral," or "necessary" nature of governmental functions inevitably invites an unelected federal judiciary to make decisions
about which state policies it favors and which ones it dislikes.
"The science of government . . . is the science of experiment," Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204, 226 (1821), and the
States cannot serve as laboratories for social and economic
experiment, see New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U. S.
262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), if they must pay an
added price when they meet the changing needs of their citizenry by taking up functions that an earlier day and a different society left in private hands. In the words of Justice
Black:
"There is not, and there cannot be, any unchanging
line of demarcation between essential and non-essential
governmental functions. Many governmental functions
of today have at some time in the past been non-governmental. The genius of our government provides that,
within the sphere of constitutional action, the people-acting not through the courts but through their elected
legislative representatives-have the power to determine as conditions demand, what services and functions
the public welfare requires." H elvering v. Gerhardt,
304 U. S., at 427 (concurring opinion).
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We therefore reject, as unsound in principle and unworkable in practice, a rule of state immunity from federal regulation that turns on a judicial appraisal of whether a particular
governmental function is "integral" or "traditional." Any
such rule leads to inconsistent results at the same time that
it disserves principles of democratic self-governance, and it
breeds inconsistency precisely because it is divorced from
those principles. If there are to be limits on the immunity of
state governments from federal regulation under the Commerce Clause, and limits there must be, we must look elsewhere to find them. We accordingly return to the underlying issue that confronted this Court in National League
of Cities-the manner in which the Constitution insulates
States from the reach of Congress' power under the Commerce Clause.
III
The central principle of National League of Cities is that
the States occupy a special position in our constitutional system and that the scope of Congress' authority under the
Commerce Clause must reflect that position. It is true that
the Commerce Clause by its terms does not provide any special limitation on Congress' actions with respect to the
States. See EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U. S. - , - (1983)
(STEVENS, J., concurring) (slip op. 5). It is equally true,
however, that the text of the Constitution can be no more
than the beginning of an inquiry into questions of federalism,
for "[b]ehind the words of the constitutional provisions are
postulates which limit and control." Monaco v. Mississippi,
292 U. S. 313, 322 (1934). National League of Cities reflects
the general conviction that in order to be faithful to the underlying federal premises of the Constitution, courts must
look for the "postulates which limit and control."
What has proved problematic is not the idea that the Constitution's federal structure imposes limitations on the Commerce Clause, but rather the nature and content of those
limitations. One approach to defining the limits on Con-

.
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gress' authority to regulate the States under the Commerce
Clause is to identify certain underlying elements of political
sovereignty that are deemed essential to the States' "separate and independent existence." Lane County v. Oregon, 7
Wall. 71, 76 (1869). This approach underlies the Court's use
of the "traditional governmental function" concept in N ational League of Cities. It also has led to the separate requirement that the challenged federal statute "address matters that are indisputably 'attribute[s] of state sovereignty.'"
Hodel, 452 U. S., at 288, quoting National League of Cities,
426 U. S., at 845. In National League of Cities itself, for
example, the Court concluded that decisions by a State concerning the wages and hours of its employees are an "undoubted attribute of state sovereignty." 426 U. S., at 845.
The opinion did not explain what aspects of such decisions
made them an "undoubted attribute of state sovereignty,"
and the Court since has remarked on the uncertain scope
of the concept, see EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U. · S., at--,
n. 11 (slip op. 10, n. 11), but the point of the inquiry has remained to single out particular features of a State's internal
governance that are deemed to be intrinsic parts of state
sovereignty.
We have come to doubt, however, that courts ultimately
can identify principled constitutional limitations on the scope
of Congress' Commerce Clause powers ov~r the States by relying on a priori definitions of state sovereignty. In part,
this is because of the elusiveness of objective criteria for
"fundamental" elements of state sovereignty, a problem that
we have witnessed in the search for "traditional governmental functions." There is, however, a more fundamental
reason: the sovereignty of the States is limited by the Constitution itself. A variety of sovereign powers, for example,
are withdrawn from the States by Article I, § 10. Section 8
of the same Article works an equally sharp contraction of
state sovereignty, quite apart from whatever authority it
may confer on Congress to regulate the "States as States,"
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by authorizing Congress to exercise a wide range of legislative powers and (in conjunction with the Supremacy Clause
of Article VI) to displace contrary state legislation. See
Hodel, 452 U. S., at 290-292. By providing for final review
of questions of federal law in this Court, Article III curtails
the sovereign power of the state judiciaries to make authoritative determinations of law. See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304 (1816). Finally, the developed application
of the greater part of the Bill of Rights to the States through
the Fourteenth Amendment limits the sovereign authority
that States otherwise would possess to legislate with respect
to their citizens and conduct their own affairs.
The States unquestionably "retai[n] ... a significant measure of sovereign authority." EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U. S.,
at - - (POWELL, J., dissenting) (slip op. 5). They do so,
however, only to the extent that the Constitution has not divested them of their original powers and transferred those
powers to the Federal Government. In the words of James
Madison to the members of the first Congress: "Interference
with the power of the States was no constitutional criterion of
the power of Congress. If the power was not given, Congress could not exercise it; if given, they might exercise it,
although it should interfere with the laws, or even the Constitution of the States." 2 Annals of Cong. 1897 (1791).
Justice Field made the same point in the course of his defense
of state autonomy in Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Baugh, 149
U. S. 368 (1893), a defense quoted with approval in Erie R.
Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, 78-79 (1938):
"[T]he Constitution of the United States ... recognizes and preserves the autonomy and independence of
the States-independence in their legislative and independence in their judicial departments. [Federal] [s]upervision over either the legislative or the judicial action
of the States is in no case permissible except as to matters by the Constitution specifically authorized or delegated to the United States. Any interference with
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either, except as thus permitted, is an invasion of the authority of the State and, to that extent, a denial of its
independence." 149 U. S., at 401 (dissenting opinion)
(emphasis added).
As a result, to say that the Constitution assumes the continued role of the States is to say little about the nature of
that role. Only last Term, this Court recognized that the
purpose of the constitutional immunity recognized in N ational League of Cities is not to preserve "a sacred province
of state autonomy." EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U. S., at-(slip op. 9). With rare exceptions, like the guarantee of
state territorial integrity in Article IV, § 3, the Constitution
does not carve out express elements of state sovereignty that
Congress may not employ its delegated powers to displace.
As James Wilson reminded the Pennsylvania ratifying convention in 1787, "although it presupposes the existence of
state governments, yet this Constitution does not suppose
them to be the sole power to be respected." 2 Debates in the
Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal
Constitution 439 (J. Elliot 2d ed. 1876) (Elliot). The power
of the Federal Government is a "power to be respected" as
well, cf. National League of Cities, 426 U. S., at 856 (concurring opinion), and the fact that the States remain sovereign
with respect to all powers not vested in Congress or denied
them by the Constitution offers no guidance about where the
frontier between state and federal power is to be drawn. In
short, we have no license to employ freestanding conceptions
of state sovereignty when measuring congressional authority
under the Commerce Clause.
When we look for the States' "residuary and inviolable sovereignty," The Federalist No. 39, p. 285 (B. Wright ed. 1961)
(J. Madison), in the shape of the constitutional scheme rather
than in predetermined notions of sovereign power, a different
measure of state sovereignty emerges. Apart from the limitation on federal authority inherent in the delegated nature
of Congress' Article I powers, the principal means chosen by
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the Framers to ensure the role of the "States as States" in
the federal system lies in the structure of the Federal Government itself. It is no novelty to observe that the composition of the Federal Government was designed in large part
to protect the States from overreaching by Congress. 11 The
Framers thus gave the States a role in the selection both of
the Executive and the Legislative Branches of the Federal
Government. The States were vested with indirect influence over the House of Representatives and the Presidency
by their control of electoral qualifications and their role in
presidential elections. U. S. Const., Art. I, § 2, and Art. II,
§ 1. They were given more direct influence in the Senate,
where each State received equal representation and each
Senator was to be selected by the legislators of his State.
Art. I, § 3. The significance attached to the States' equal
representation in the Senate is underscored by the prohibition on any constitutional amendment divesting a State of
equal representation without the State's consent. Art. V.
The extent to which the structure of the Federal Government itself was relied on to insulate the interests of the
States is evident in the views of the Framers. James Madison explained that the Federal Government "will partake sufficiently of the spirit [of the States], to be disinclined to invade the rights of the individual States, or the prerogatives
of their governments." The Federalist No. 46, p. 332 (B.
Wright ed. 1961). Similarly, James Wilson argued that "it
was a favorite object in the Convention" to provide for the
security of the States against federal encroachment and that
the structure of the Federal Government itself served that
end. 2 Elliot 438-439. Madison placed particular reliance
"See, e. g., J. Choper, Judicial Review and the National Political Process 175-184 (1980); Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The
Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 543 (1954); La Pierre, The Political Safeguards of
Federalism Redux: Intergovernmental Immunity and the States as Agents
of the Nation, 60 Wash. U. L. Q. 779 (1982).
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on the equal representation of the States in the Senate, which
he saw as "at once a constitutional recognition of the portion
of sovereignty remaining in the individual States, and an instrument for preserving that residuary sovereignty." The
Federalist No. 62, p. 408 (B. Wright ed. 1961). Accord, id.,
No. 43, p. 315 ("[T]he residuary sovereignty of the States [is]
implied and secured by that principle of representation in one
branch of the [federal] legislature") (emphasis added). See
also M'Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 435 (1819). In
short, the Framers chose to rely on a federal system in which
special restraints on federal power over the "States as
States" inhered principally in the workings of the National
Government itself, rather than in discrete limitations on the
objects of federal authority.
The effectiveness of the federal political process in preserving the States' interests is apparent even today in the course
of federal legislation. On the one hand, the States have been
able to direct a substantial proportion of federal revenues
into their own treasuries in the form of general and programspecific grants in aid. The federal role in assisting state and
local governments is a longstanding one; Congress provided
federal land grants to finance state governments from the beginning of the Republic, and direct cash grants were awarded
as early as 1887 under the Hatch Act. 12 In the past quartercentury alone, federal grants to States and localities have
grown from $7 billion to $96 billion. 13 As a result, federal
grants now account for roughly one-fifth of state and local
12
See, e. g., A. Howitt, Managing Federalism: Studies in Intergovernmental Relations 3-18 (1984); Break, Fiscal Federalism in the United
States: The First 200 Years, Evolution and Outlook, in The Future of Federalism in the 1980s, pp. 39-54 (July 1981).
13
A. Howitt, supra, at 8; Bureau of the Census, U. S. Dept. of Commerce, Federal Expenditures by State for Fiscal Year 1983, p. 2 (1984)
(Census, Federal Expenditures); Division of Government Accounts and
Reports, Fiscal Service-Bureau of Government Financial Operations,
Dept. of the Treasury, Federal Aid to States: Fiscal Year 1982, p. 1 (1983
rev. ed.).
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government expenditures. 14 The States have obtained federal funding for such services as police and fire protection,
education, public health and hospitals, parks and recreation,
and sanitation. 15 At the same time that the States have exercised their influence to obtain federal support, moreover,
they have been able to exempt themselves from a wide variety of obligations imposed by Congress under the Commerce
Clause. For example, the Federal Power Act, the National
Labor Relations Act, the Labor-Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act, the Occupational Safety and Health Act, the
Employee Retirement Insurance Security Act, and the Sherman Act all contain express or implied exemptions for States
and their subdivisions. 16 The fact that some federal statutes
like the FLSA do extend general obligations to the States
cannot obscure the extent to which the political position of
the States in the federal system has served to minimize the
burdens that the States have had to bear under the Commerce Clause.
We realize that changes in the structure of the Federal
Government have taken place since 1789, not the least of
which has been the substitution of popular election of Senators by the adoption of the Seventeenth Amendment in 1913,
and that these changes may work to alter the influence of the
"Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Significant
Features of Fiscal Federalism 120, 122 (1984).
16
See, e. g., the Federal Fire Prevention and Control Act of 1974, 15
U. S. C. §§2201 et seq. ; the Urban Park and Recreation Recovery Act of
1978, 16 U. S. C. §§ 2501 et seq. ; the Elementary and Secondary Education
Act of 1965, 20 U. S. C. §§ 2701 et seq.; the Water Pollution Control Act, 33
U. S. C. §§ 1251 et seq.; the Public Health Service Act, 42 U. S. C. §§ 201
et seq. ; the Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U. S. C. §§ 300f et seq.; the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 42 U. S. C. §§ 3701 et seq.;
the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, 42 U. S. C. §§ 5301
et seq.; and the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974,
42 U. S. C. §§ 5601 et seq. See also Census, Federal Expenditures 2-15.
16
See 16 U. S. C. § 824(f); 29 U. S. C. § 152(2); 29 U. S. C. § 402(e); 29
U. S. C. § 652(5); 29 U. S. C. §§ 1002(32), 1003(b)(1); and Parker v. Brown,
317 u. s. 341 (1943).
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States in the federal political process. 17 Nonetheless,
against this background, we remain convinced that the fundamental limitation that the constitutional scheme imposes on
the Commerce Clause to protect the "States as States" is one
of process rather than one of result. Any additional substantive restraints on the exercise of Commerce Clause powers
must find their justification in the procedural nature of this
basic limitation, and they must be tailored to compensate for
possible failings in the national political process rather to dictate a "sacred province of state autonomy," EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S., a t - (slip op. 9).
The only substantive restraint that satisfies these criteria,
in our judgment, is a requirement that Congress not attempt
to single out the States for special burdens or otherwise discriminate against them. The constitutional mechanisms for
safeguarding the role of the States are unlikely to be at risk
when Congress proceeds by uniform legislation that places
burdens evenhandedly on States and private parties alike, for
the outcome will reflect not only the States' own interests but
the interests of all those who are similarly situated. In those
circumstances, the structural features of the Constitution designed to protect the States can be trusted to have served
their purpose. The federal political process is unlikely to
produce regulatory schemes that frustrate or obstruct state
functions as long as those functions are shared by private
parties as well and as long as Congress does not single out
the States for regulatory burdens. We therefore hold that
the implicit substantive limitations on congressional regulation of the States under the Commerce Clause demand no
more than that the statute at issue be a nondiscriminatory
one. In allowing States to be subjected to nondiscriminatory
federal legislation, it must be noted, we are not treating the
constitutionality of such legislation as a nonjusticiable quesSee, e. g., J. Choper, supra, at 177-178; Kaden, Politics, Money, and
State Sovereignty: The Judicial Role, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 847, 860-868
(1979).
17
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tion to be remitted to other branches of government. 18 Instead, we are holding that such legislation is constitutionalthat the restrictions on Commerce Clause power that inhere
in the structure of the Constitution are not transgressed by
statutes that accord equal treatment to States and similarly
situated private parties. 19
The idea that concerns about discrimination should form
the linchpin of intergovernmental immunity doctrine is not,
of course, a new one in this Court. The Court's first intergovernmental-immunity decision, M'Cullogh v. Maryland,
supra, rested in large part on concerns about discrimination.
In striking down as unconstitutional a Maryland tax on unlicensed banks that singled out the Bank of the United States,
Chief Justice Marshall was careful to add that the prohibition
on state taxation of federal instrumentalities "does not extend to a tax paid by the real property of the bank, in common with the other real property within the State, nor to a tax
imposed on the interest which the citizens of Maryland may
hold in this institution, in common with other property of the
same description throughout the State." 4 Wheat., at 436
(emphasis added). The Court subsequently has observed
that M'Cullogh "'could and perhaps should'" be read "'simply for the principle that the Constitution prohibits a State
from taxing discriminatorily a federally established instrumentality."' United States v. New Mexico, 455 U. S. 720,
733 (1982), quoting First Agricultural Bank v. State Tax
Comm'n, 392 U. S. 339, 350 (1968) (dissenting opinion).
Cf. National League of Cities, 426 U.S., at 841-842, n. 12; New York
v. United States , 326 U. S. 572, 581-582 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., joined by
Rutledge, J.); J. Choper, supra, at 220-222; Matsumoto, National League
of Cities-From Footnote to Holding-State Immunity from Commerce
Clause Regulation, 1977 Ariz. State L. J . 35, 40-42.
19
There thus is no inconsistency between the substantive rule of constitutional immunity that we announce today and the intent of the Framers
that this Court resolve "controversies relating to the boundary between
the [state and federal] jurisdictions." The Federalist No. 39, p. 285 (B.
Wright ed. 1961) (J. Madison).
18
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Justices Frankfurter and Rutledge advocated a discrimination-based standard for state immunity from federal taxation
in New York v. United States, supra; they would have found
"no restriction upon Congress to include the States in levying
a tax exacted equally from private persons upon the same
subject matter." 326 U. S., at 584.
We recognize that a majority of the Court rejected Justice
Frankfurter's approach to tax immunity doctrine in New
York v. United States. See id., at 587-588 (Stone, C. J.,
joined by Reed, Murphy, and Burton, JJ., concurring in the
judgment); id., at 592 (Douglas, J., joined by Black, J., dissenting). More important for present purposes, we recognize that the Court rejected the same standard with respect
to regulatory immunity in National League of Cities. See
426 U. S., at 843. While we adhere to National League of
Cities' premise that the Commerce Clause is subject to special limitations when Congress seeks to regulate the "States
as States," we cannot accept its specific formulation of the
rule of state immunity to the extent that it is inconsistent
with the principles we announce today. Federal regulation
that is otherwise within Congress' power under the Commerce Clause may extend to state functions as long as it applies uniformly to private as well as public activities and does
not discriminate against the States and their subdivisions. 20
When these principles are applied here, the outcome is
clear. Nothing in the statutory scheme of the FLSA discriminates against SAMTA or any other municipally oper20
We should not be understood to suggest that every statute that does
single out the States for special obligations is unconstitutional ipso facto.
For example, Congress' undisputed authority to pre-empt state regulation
of private activities entails the additional authority to forgo pre-emption
and to require instead that States consider specified federal interests in
regulating the same conduct, see FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U. S. 742,
763-768, and nn. 29-30 (1982), even though the exercise of the latter authority requires Congress to address its commands to the States alone.
We have no occasion now to consider under what other circumstances nonuniform federal legislation might be constitutionally permissible.
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ated mass-transit system. Instead, SAMTA faces the same
minimum-wage and overtime obligations that hundreds of
thousands of other employers, private as well as public, must
meet. Indeed, as the Court noted inNational League of Cities, 426 U. S., at 839, Congress incorporated special provisions concerning overtime pay for police and firefighting personnel when it amended the FLSA in 1974 in order to take
account of the special concerns of States and localities with
respect to these positions. See 29 U. S. C. § 207(k). Congress also declined to impose any obligations on state and
local governments with respect to policymaking personnel
who are not subject to civil service laws. See 29 U. S. C.
§ 203(e)(2)(C)(i) and (ii). 21
In this case, the status of public mass transit simply underscores the extent to which the structural protections of the
Constitution insulate the States from federally imposed burdens. While Congress first subjected state mass-transit systems to FLSA obligations in 1966 and expanded those obliga21
The only respect in which the FLSA might discriminate against public
employers involves the statute's overtime requirements for employees covered by collective-bargaining agreements. Under 29 U. S. C. §§ 207(b)(l)
and (2), an employee may be required to work more than 40 hours in a particular week without accruing overtime compensation if his total number of
working hours over a 26-week or 52-week period fall within specified limits
"in pursuance of an agreement ... made as a result of collective bargaining
by representatives of employees certified as bona fide by the National
Labor Relations Board." Because the National Labor Relations Act does
not provide coverage for state and local government employees, see 29
U. S. C. § 152(2), the National Labor Relations Board might not have jurisdiction to provide the necessary certification with respect to a public
employer who otherwise qualified under§§ 207(b)(l) or (2). At most, however, the discrimination-based standard on which we rely today would prohibit the application of the National Labor Relation Board certification
requirement to public employers; the general overtime provisions of the
National Labor Relations Act, which apply equally to public and private
employers, would not be affected. If SAMTA could avail itself of the collective-bargaining provisions of§ 207 but for the lack of National Labor Relations Board certification, a matter that the record before us does not disclose, SAMTA is free to pursue the issue on remand.
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tions in 1974, it simultaneously provided extensive funding
for state and local mass transit through UMTA. In the two
decades since its enactment, UMTA has provided over $22
billion in mass transit aid to States and localities. 22 In 1983
alone, UMTA funding amounted to $3.7 billion. 23 As noted
above, SAMTA and its predecessor have received a substantial amount of UMTA funding, including over $12 million during SAMTA's first two fiscal years alone. In short, Congress has not simply placed a financial burden on the
shoulders of States and localities that operate mass-transit
systems, but has provided substantial countervailing financial assistance as well-assistance that may leave individual
mass transit systems better off than they would have been
had Congress never intervened at all in the area. Congress'
treatment of public mass transit reinforces our conviction
that the national political process will systematically protect
States from the risk of having their functions handicapped by
Commerce Clause regulation. 24
IV
Today we reaffirm the fundamental premise of National
League of Cities that Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause must accommodate the special role of the
States in the federal system. We hold, however, that the
necessary accommodation between federal power and state
autonomy is realized when Congress places no burden on the
States that it has not placed on private parties as well. For
22
See Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1983: Hearings Before the Subcommittee of the House Committee
on Appropriations, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 808 (1982) (fiscal years
1965-1982); Census, Federal Expenditures 15 (fiscal year 1983).
23
Census, Federal Expenditures 15.
24
Our references to UMTA are not meant to imply that nondiscriminatory regulation under the Commerce Clause must be accompanied by countervailing financial benefits under the Spending Clause. The application
of the FLSA to SAMTA would be constitutional even had Congress not
provided federal funding under UMTA.
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that reason, the judgment of the District Court is reversed
and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
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JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court.
In National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U. S. 833
(1976) , this Court held that the Commerce Clause does not
empower Congress to enforce the minimum-wage and overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)
against States "in areas of traditional governmental functions." I d., at 852. Although National League of Cities
P~~~
provided examples of "traditional governmental functions," it
~ lt~~'- did not offer a more general explanation of how "traditional"
functions were to be distinguished from "nontraditional"
~
~~ ones. Since then, federal and state courts have devoted considerable effort to the task of identifying traditional functions
for purposes of state immunity under the Commerce Clause.
In this case, a Federal District Court concluded that municipal ownership and operation of a mass-transit system is a traditional governmental function and hence is exempt from the
obligations of the FLSA under National League of Cities.
Faced with the identical question, three Federal Courts of

o/
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Appeals and one state appellate court have reached a contrary conclusion. 1
A review of the operation of the "traditional governmental
function" standard in this and other cases now persuades us
that the attempt to draw the boundaries of state regulatory
immunity in terms of "traditional governmental functions" is
both1Unworkable t\and 'tnconsistent with the principles of federalism "~m which National League of Cities rests. For the
reasons given below, we conclude instead that the prerequisite for state immunity from Commerce Clause regulation
must be a federal statutory scheme that singles out the
States for unequal regulatory burdens. Because the FLSA
imposes miiiilliUrn-wage and overtime obligations evenhandedly on private as well as public employers, we hold today
that its application to municipal mass-transit systems like
that operated by appellee San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authority (SAMTA) is within the power delegated to Congress by the Commerce Clause.
I
SAMTA provides public transportation for the metropolitan area of San Antonio, Tex. The history of public transportation in San Antonio is characteristic of the history of
local mass transit in the United States generally. Passenger
transportation for hire within San Antonio originally was proVl~den a private basis by local transportation companies.
I 91 the Texas Legislature authorized the State's municipa 1 1es to reguia.te vehicles J?roviding carriag_e jor hire.
19~en. Laws, ch. 147, § 4, ~ 12, codified as amended
at Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann., Art. 1175, §§ 20 and 21 (Vernon
1963). Two years later, n Ant
enacted an ordinance
Dove v. Chattanooga Area Regional Transportation Authority, 701 F.
2d 50 (CA6 1983); Alewine v. City Council , 699 F. 2d 1060 (CAll 1983),
cert. pending, Nos. 82- 1974 and 83-257; Kramerv. New Castle Area Transit A uthority, 677 F . 2d 308 (CA3 1982), cert. denied, 459 U. S. 1146
(1983); Francis v. City of Tallahassee, 424 So. 2d 61 (Fla. App. 1982).
1
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setting forth franchising, insurance, and safety requirements
for pas·senger vehicles operated for hire. The city relied on
publicly regulated private mass transit until 1959, when it
purchased the privately owned San Antonio Transit Company and transformed it into a public authority called the San
Antonio Transit System (SATS). SATS continued in operation until 1978, when San Antonio transferred its facilities
and equipment to SAMTA, a public mass-transit authority
organized on a countywide basis. See generally Tex. Rev.
Civ. Stat. Ann., Art. 1118x (Vernon Supp. 1984). SAMTA
currently is a major source of transportation in the San Antonio metropolitan area; between 1978 and 1980 alone, its vehicles covered over 26 million route miles and carried over 63
million passengers.
Like other cities, San Antonio has come to look to the Federal Government for financial assistance in maintaining public
mass transit. SATS managed to meet its operating expenses and bond obligations without federal or local financial
aid for the first decade of its existence. By 1970, however,
its financial position had deteriorated to the point where
federal subsidies became vital to its continued operation.
SATS' general manager testified before Congress that year
that "if we do not receive substantial help from the Federal
Government, San Antonio may ... join the growing ranks of
cities that have inferior [public] transportation or may end up
with no [public] transportation at all." 2
The principal federal program to which SATS and other
mass transit systems looked for relief was the Urban Mass
Transportation Act of 1964 (UMTA), 78 Stat. 302, as
amended, 49 U. S. C. §§ 1601 et seq., which provides substantial federal assistance to urban mass-transit programs.
See generally Jackson Transit Authority v. Transit Union,
457 U. S. 15 (1982). As amended, UMTA authorizes the De' Urban Mass Transportation: Hearings on H. R. 6663 et al. Before the
Subcommittee on Housing of the House Committee on Banking and Currency, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., p. 419 (1970) (statement of F. Norman Hill).
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partment of Transportation to fund 75 percent of the capital
outlays and up to 50 percent of the operating expenses of
qualifying mass-transit programs. §§ 4(a), 5(d) and (e), 49
U. S. C. §§ 1603(a), 1604(d) and (e). SATS received its first
UMTA subsidy, a $4.1 million capital grant, in December
1970. Between December 1970 and February 1980, SATS
and SAMTA received over $51 million in UMTA grantsmore than $31 million in capital grants, over $20 million in operating assistance, and a minor amount in technical assistance. During SAMTA's first two fiscal years, it received
$12.5 million in UMTA operating grants, $26.8 million from
sales taxes, and only $10.1 million in fares. Federal subsidies and local sales taxes currently account for roughly 75
percent of SAMTA's operating expenses.
The present controversy concerns the extent to which
SAMTA may be subjected to the minimum-wage and overtime requirements of the FLSA. When the FLSA was enacted in 1938, its wage and overtime provisions dianht cover
eitner local mass-transit employees or employees of state and
local governments. Pub. L. No. 75-718, §§ 3(d), 13(a)(9), 52
Stat. 1060, 1067 (1938). In 1961, Congress extended minimum-wage coverage to employees of all ~ mass-transit
carriers whose annual gross revenues were not less than
$1,000,000. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1961,
Pub. L. No. 87-30, §§2(c), 9, 75 Stat. 66, 72-73. Five years
later, Congress extended FLSA coverage to state and local
government employees for the first time by withdrawing the
minimum-wage and overtime exemptions from public hospitals, schools, and mass-transit carriers whose rates and services were subjec
ate regulation. Fair Labor Standards
Amendments f 1966 ub. L. No. 89-601, §§ 102(a) and (b),
80 Stat. 831.
the same time, Congress eliminated the
overtime exemption for all mass-transit employees other
than drivers, operators, and conductors. § 206(c), 80 Stat.
836. The application of the FLSA to public schools and hos-

..
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pitals was held to be within Congress' power under the Commerce Clause. Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U. S. 183 (1968).
The FLSA obligations of public mass-transit systems like
SATS were expanded in 1974 when Congress provided for
the progressive repeal of the surviving overtime exemption
for mass-transit employees. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 21(b), 88 Stat. 68. Congress simultaneously brought the States and their subdivisions farther within the a 1t o e LSA b extending
FLSKCoverage to virtually all state an 1 cal government
employees. § 6 a)(l) an a) , 88 Stat. 58, 60, 29 . . C.
§§ 203(d) and (x). SATS complied with the FLSA's overtime
requirements until 1976, when this Court overruled Maryland v. Wirtz in National League~that the
FLSA could not be applied constitutionally to the "traditional
governmental functions" of state and local governments.
Four months after National League of Cities was handed
down, SATS informed its employees that the decision relieved SATS of its overtime obligations under the FLSA. 3
Matters rested there until1979, when the Wage and Hour
Administration of the Department of Labor issued an opinion
that SAMTA's operations "are not constitutionally immune
from the application of the Fair Labor Standards Act" under
National League of Cities. Opinion WH-499, 6 Labor Rel.
Rep. (BNA) 91:1138 (Sept. 17, 1979). On November 21,
1979, SAMTA filed this action against the Secretary of Labor
in the United States District Court for the Western District
of Texas. SAMTA sought a declaratory judgment that, contrary to the Wage and Hour Administration's determination,
National League of Cities precluded the application of the
FLSA's overtime requirements to SAMTA's operations.
'--"~

8
Evidently, neither SATS nor SAMTA has attempted to avoid the
FLSA's minimum-wage provisions. We are informed that basic wage levels in the mass-transit industry traditionally have been well in excess of the
minimum wages set by the FLSA. See Brief for National League of Cities
et al. as Amici Curiae 7-8.
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The Secretary counterclaimed under 29 U. S. C. §217 for enforcement of the overtime and record-keeping requirements
of the FLSA. On the same day that SAMTA filed its action,
Joseph Garcia and several other SAMTA employees brought
suit against SAMTA in the District Court for overtime pay
under the FLSA. Garcia v. SAMTA, Civil Action No. SA
79 CA 458. The District Court stayed that action pending
the outcome of this suit but allowed Garcia to intervene in the
present litigation as a defendant in support of the Secretary.
One month after SAMTA brought suit, the Department of
Labor formally amended its FLSA interpretive regulations
to provide that publicly owned local mass-transit systems are
not entitled to immunity under National League of Cities.
44 Fed. Reg. 75,630 (1979), codified at 29 CFR § 775.3(b)(3)
(1983).
On November 17, 1981, the District Court granted a motion for summary judgment by SAMTA and denied a crossmotion for partial summary judgment by the Secretary and
Garcia. Without further explanation, the District Court
held that "local mass transit systems (including [SAMTA])
constitute integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions" under National League of Cities. Juris.
Statement in No. 82-1913, p. 24a. The Secretary and Garcia
appealed to this Court pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1252. During the pendency of those appeals, we held in Transportation
Union v. Long Island R. Co., 455 U. S. 678 (1982), that commuter rail service provided by the state-owned Long Island
Rail Road did not constitute a "traditional governmental
function" and hence did not enjoy constitutional immunity,
under National League of Cities, from the requirements of
the Railway Labor Act. We accordingly vacated the District Court's judgment in the present cases and remanded for
further consideration in light of Long Island. 457 U. S. 1102
(1982).
On remand, the District Court adhered to its original view
and again entered judgment for SAMTA. San Antonio Met-
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ropolitan Transit Authority v. Donovan, 557 F. Supp. 445
(1983). The court looked first to the "historical reality" of
state involvement in mass transit. It ~zed that States
historically had not owned and operated ~systElli!§, u concluded that the ad engaged in a lon standing
pa~ and tha this regulatory tradition
gave rise to an "Inference of sovereignty." I d., at 447-448.
The court next looked to the record of federal involvement in
the field and concluded that constitutional immunity would
not result in an erosion of federal authority with respect
to state-owned mass-transit systems, because many federal
statutes themselves contain exemptions for States and thus
make the withdrawal of federal regulatory power over public
mass-transit systems a supervening federal policy. Id., at
448-450. Although the Federal Government's authority
over employee wages under the FLSA obviously would be
eroded, Congress had not asserted any interest in the wages
of public mass-transit employees until1966 and hence had not
established a longstanding federal interest in the field, in contrast to the century-old federal regulatory presence in the
railroad industry found significant in Long Island. Finally,
the court compared mass transit to the list of functions identified as constitutionally immune in National League of Cities
and concluded that it did not differ from those functions in
any material respect. The court stated: "If transit is to be
distinguished from the exempt [National League of Cities]
functions it will have to be by identifying a traditional state
function in the same way pornography is sometimes identified: someone knows it when they see it, but they can't describe it." 557 F. Supp., at 453. 4
• The District Court also analyzed the status of mass transit under the
four-part test devised by the Sixth Circuit in Amersbach v. City of Cleveland, 598 F. 2d 1033 (1979). In that case, the Court of Appeals looked to:
(1) whether the function benefits the community as a whole and is made
available at little or no expense; (2) whether it is undertaken for public
service or pecuniary gain; (3) whether government is particularly well
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The Secretary and Garcia again appealed from the District
Court's judgment. We noted probable jurisdiction,
U. S. - - (1983), and we now reverse.
II
Appellees have not argued that SAMTA is immune from
regulation under the FLSA merely because it is a local transit system engaged in intrastate commercial activity.
SAMTA's operations may well be characterized as "local" in a
practical sense. Nonetheless, it long has been settled that
Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause extends to
all intrastate economic activities that affect interstate commerce. See, e. g., Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining &
Reel. Assn., 452 U. S. 264, 276-277 (1981); Heart of Atlanta
Motel v. United States, 379 U. S. 241, 258 (1964); Wickard v.
Filburn, 317 U. S. 111, 125 (1942); United States v. Darby,
312 U. S. 100 (1941). Were SAMTA a privately owned and
operated enterprise, it could not credibly argue that Congress exceeded the bounds of its Commerce Clause powers in
setting minimum wages and overtime rates for SAMTA's employees. Any constitutional exemption from the requirements of the FLSA therefore must rest on SAMTA's status
as a governmental entity rather than on the "local" nature of
its operations.
The prerequisites for the governmental immunity recognized in National League of Cities were summarized by the
Court in Hodel, supra. Under the test there set forth, four
conditions must obtain before a state activity may be deemed
immune from a particular federal regulation under the Commerce Clause. First, the federal statute at issue must regulate "the 'States as States.'" Second, the statute must "address matters that are indisputably 'attribute[s] of state
sovereignty."' Third, state compliance with the federal obligation must "directly impair [the State's] ability 'to strucsuited to perform it because of a community-wide need; and (4) whether
government is its principal provider. ld., at 1037.
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ture integral operations in areas of traditional governmental
functions."' Finally, the relation of state and federal interests must not be such that "the nature of the federal interest
... justifies state submission." 452 U. S., at 287-288 and
n. 29, quoting National League of Cities, 426 U. S., at 845,
852, 854.
The controversy in these cases has focused on the third
Hodel requirement-that the challenged federal statute
trench on "traditiona
Ye mental functions." The District Court voiced a common concern when it stated that
"identifying which particular state functions are immune
[under this standard] remains difficult." 557 F. Supp., at
447. Just how difficult the task has been is reflected in the
efforts of other federal courts. Thus, courts have held that
regulating ambulance services, Gold Cross Ambulance v.
City of Kansas City, 538 F. Supp. 956, 967-969 (WD Mo.
1982), aff'd on other grounds, 705 F. 2d 1005 (CAS 1983),
cert. pending, No. 83-183; licensing automobile drivers,
United States v. Best, 573 F. 2d 1095, 1102-1103 (CA9 1978);
operating a municipal airport, Amersbach v. City of Cleveland, 598 F. 2d 1033, 1037-1038 (CA6 1979); performing solid
waste disposal, Hybud Equipment Corp. v. City of Akron,
654 F. 2d 1187, 1196 (CA6 1981); and operating a highway authority, Malina-Estrada v. Puerto Rico Highway Authority,
680 F. 2d 841, 845-846 (CAl 1982), are protected functions
under National League of Cities. At the same time, courts
have held that issuance of industrial development bonds,
Woods v. Homes and Structures of Pittsburgh, Kansas, Inc.,
489 F. Supp. 1270, 1296-1297 (Kan. 1980); regulation of intrastate natural gas sales, Oklahoma ex rel. Derryberry v.
FERC, 494 F. Supp. 636, 657 (WD Okla. 1980), aff'd, 661 F.
2d 832 (CAlO 1981), cert. denied sub nom. Texas v. FERC,
457 U. S. 1105 (1982); regulation of traffic on public roads,
Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 552 F. 2d 25, 38 (CA2), cert.
denied, 434 U. S. 902 (1977); regulation of air transportation,
Hughes Air Corp. v. Public Utilities Commission, 644 F. 2d
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1334, 1340-1341 (CA9 1981); operation of a telephone system,
Puerto Rico Tel. Co. v. FCC, 553 F. 2d 694, 700-701 (CAl
1977); leasing and sale of natural gas, Public Service Co. v.
FERC, 587 F. 2d 716, 721 (CA5), cert. denied sub nom. Louisiana v. FERC, 444 U. S. 879 (1979); operation of a mental
health facility, Williams v. Eastside Mental Health Center,
Inc., 669 F. 2d 671, 680-681 (CAll), cert. denied, 459 U. S.
976 (1982); and provision of in-house domestic services for the
aged and handicapped, Bonnette v. California Health and
Welfare Agency, 704 F. 2d 1465, 1472 (CA9 1983), are not entitled to immunity. It is difficult to identify an organizing
principle that places eacli of the cases in the first group on
one side of a line and each of the cases in the second group on
the other side; the constitutional distinction between licensing drivers and regulating traffic, for example, or between
operating a highway authority and operating a mental health
facility, is elusive at best.
Thus far, this Court itself has made little headway in defining the scope of the governmental functions protected under
National League of Cities. In that case the Court set forth
examples of protected and unprotected functions, see 426
U. S., at 851, 854, n. 18, but provided no explanation of how
those examples were identified. The only other case in
which the Court has had occasion to address the problem is
Long Island. 5 We recognized there that "[t]he determination of whether a federal law impairs a state's authority with
respect to 'areas of traditional [state] functions' may at times
be a difficult one." 455 U. S., at 684, quoting National
League of Cities, 426 U. S., at 852. The accuracy of that
statement is demonstrated by this Court's own difficulties in
Long Island in developing a workable standard for "tradi~

5

See also, however, Jefferson County Pharmaceutical Assn. v. Abbott
Laboratories, 460 U. S. - , - , n. 6 (1983) (slip op. 3, n. 6); FERC v.
Mississippi, 456 U. S. 742, 781 and n. 7 (1982) (O'CONNOR, J., concurring
in the judgment in part and dissenting in part); Fry v. United States, 421
U. S. 542, 558 and n. 2 (1975) (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting).
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tional governmental functions." We relied in large part
there on "the historical reality that the operation of railroads
is not among the functions traditionally performed by state
and local governments," but we simultaneously disavowed "a
static historical view of state functions generally immune
from federal regulation." 455 U. S., at 686 (first emphasis
added; second emphasis in original). We held that the inquiry into a particular function's "traditional" nature was
merely a means of determining whether the federal statute at
issue unduly handicaps "basic state prerogatives," id., at
686-687, but we did not offer an explanation of what makes
one state function a "basic prerogative" and another function
not. Finally, having disclaimed a rigid reliance on the historical pedigree of state involvement in a particular area, we
nonetheless found it appropriate to emphasize the extended
historical record of federal involvement in the field of rail
transportation. I d., at 687-689.
Many constitutional standards involve "undoubte[d] ...
gt:ay areas," Fry v. United States, 421 U. S. S42, 558' (1975)
(R~HNQUIST, J., dissenting), and, despite the difficulties that
this Court and other courts have encountered so far, it normally might be fair to venture the assumption that case-bycase development by this Court would lead to a workable
Stahcrnrd for determining whether a particular governmental
function should be immune from federal regulation under the
Commerce Clause. A further cautionary note is sounded,
however, by the Court's experience in the related field of
state immunity from federal taxation. In South Carolina v.
United States, 199 U. S. 437 (1905), the Court held for the
first time that the state tax immunity recognized in Collector
v. Day, 11 Wall. 113 (1870), extended only to the "ordinary"
and "strictly governmental" instrumentalities of state governments and not to instrumentalities "used by the State in
the carrying on of an ordinary private business." 199 U. S.,
at 451, 461. While the Court applied the distinction outlined
in South Carolina for the next succeeding 40 years, at no
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time during that period did the Court develop a consistent
formulation of the kinds of governmental functions that were
entitled to immunity. The Court identified the protected
functions at various times as "essential," "usual," "traditional," or "strictly governmental" ones. 6 While "these differences in phraseology . . . must not be too literally contradistinguished," Brush v. Commissioner, 300 U. S. 352, 362
(1937), they reflect an inability to specify precisely what aspects of a governmental function made it necessary to the
"unimpaired existence" of the the States. Collector v. Day,
11 Wall., at 127. Indeed, the Court ultimately chose "not,
by an attempt to formulate any general test, [to] risk embarrassing the decision in cases [concerning] activities of a different kind which may arise in the future." Brush, 300 U. S.,
at 365.
If these tax immunity cases did have a common thread, it
was an attempt to di.stingt!ish between "governmental" and
"proprietary" functions. 7 To say that t~ dihinction be6See Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 172 (1911) ("essential");
Helvering v. Therrell, 303 U. S. 218, 225 (1938) (same); Helvering v. PCYWers, 293 U. S. 214, 225 (1934) ("usual"); United States v. California, 297
U. S. 175, 185 (1936) ("activities in which the states have traditionally
engaged"); South Carolina v. United States, 199 U. S. 437, 461 (1905)
("strictly governmental").
7
In South Carolina, the Court relied on the concept of "strictly governmental" functions to uphold the application of a federal liquor license tax to
a state-owned liquor-distribution monopoly. In Flint, the Court stated:
"The true distinction is between ... those operations of the States essential to the execution of its [sic] governmental functions, and which the
State can only do itself, and those activities which are of a private character"; under this standard, "[i]t is no part of the essential governmental
functions of a State to provide means of transportation, supply artificial
light, water and the like." 220 U. S., at 172. In Ohio v. Helvering, 292
U. S. 360 (1934), another case involving a state liquor-distribution monopoly, the Court stated that "the business of buying and selling commodities
. . . is not the performance of a governmental function," and that "[w]hen a
state enters the market place seeking customers it divests itself of its quasi
sovereignty pro tanto, and takes on the character of a trader, so far, at
least, as the taxing power of the federal government is concerned." I d., at
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tween "governmental" and "proprietary'' functions proved to
be unstable, however, would be something of an understatement. In 1911, for example, the Court declared that the
provision of municipal water supplies "is no part of the essential governmental functions of a state." Flint v. Stone Tracy
Co., 220 U. S. 107, 172. Twenty-six years later, without
any intervening change in the applicable legal standards, the
Court simply rejected its earlier position and decided that the
provision of municipal water supplies was immune from federal taxation as an essential governmental function, even
though municipal water works long had been operated for a
profit by private industry. Brush, 300 U. S., at 370-373.
At the same time that the Court was holding municipal water
supplies to be immune from federal taxes, it had, in turn,
held that a state-run commuter rail system was not immune.
Helvering v. Powers, 293 U. S. 214 (1934). As Justice Black
was moved to observe in H elvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U. S.
405 (1938), "[a]n implied constitutional distinction which
taxes income of an officer of a state-operated transportation
system and exempts income of the manager of a municipal
water works system manifests the uncertainty created by the
'essential' and 'non-essential' test." Id., at 427 (concurring
opinion). It was this uncertainty and instability that led the
Court shortly thereafter, in New York v. United States, 326
U. S. 572 (1946), to conclude unanimously that the distinction
between "governmental" and "proprietary" functions was
"untenable" and must be abandoned. See id., at 583 (Frankfurter, J., joined by Rutledge, J.); id., at 586 (Stone, C. J.,
369. In Helvering v. Powers, supra, the Court upheld the application of
the federal income tax to the income of trustees of a state-operated commuter railroad; the Court reiterated that "the State cannot withdraw
sources of revenue from the federal taxing power by engaging in businesses which constitute a departure from the usual governmental functions
and to which, by reason of their nature, the federal taxing power normally
would extend," regardless of the fact that the proprietary enterprises "are
undertaken for what the State conceives to be the public benefit." 293
U. S., at 225. Accord, Allen v. Regents, 304 U. S. 439, 451-453 (1938).
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joined by Reed, Murphy, and Burton, JJ., concurring); id., at
590-596 (Douglas, J., joined by Black, J., dissenting). See
also Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U. S. 444, 457 and
n. 14 (1978) (plurality opinion); Case v. Bowles, 327 U. S. 92,
101 (1946).

Even during the heyday of the governmental/proprietary
distinction in intergovernmental tax-immunity doctrine,
moreover, the Court n
explained the constitutional basis
for the distinction. The Co
expresse 1 s c cern in
Soutn CaroT:i:na that unlimited state immunity from federal
taxation would allow the States to undermine the Federal
Government's tax base by expanding into previously private
sectors of the economy. See 199 U. S., at 454-455. 8 The
need to reconcile state and federal interests obviously demanded that state immunity have some limiting principle,
but the Court did not try to justify the particular principle
that it chose; it simply concluded that a "line [must] be
drawn," 199 U. S., at 456, and proceeded to draw one. The
Court's elaborations in subsequent cases, like the assertion in
Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U. S. 360, 369 (1934), that "[w]hen a
state enters the market place seeking customers it divests itself of its quasi sovereignty pro tanto," sound more of ipse
dixit than reasoned explanation. This inability to give principled content to the distinction between "governmental" and
"proprietary" functions, no less significantly than the unworkability of the distinction, led the Court to abandon the
distinction with such alacrity in New York v. United States.
We see no reason to believe that a distinction which the
Court discarded as unworkable in the field of tax immunity
can prove fruitful in the field of regulatory immunity under
the Commerce Clause. Neither do any of the alternative
standards that might be employed to distinguish between
8
That concern was especially vivid in South Carolina because liquor
taxes, the object of the dispute in that case, then accounted for over onefourth of the Federal Government's revenues. See New York v. United
States, 326 U. S. 572, 598, n. 4 (1946) (dissenting opinion).
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protected and unprotected governmental functions appear
manageable. We rejected the possibility of making immunity turn on a purely historical standard of "tradition" in
Long Island, and properly so. The most obvious defect of a
historical approach to state immunity is that it prevents
courts from accommodating changes in the historical functions of States, changes that have resulted in a number of
once-private functions like education being assumed by the
States and their subdivisions. 9 At the same time, the only
apparent virtue of a rigorous historical standard, its promise
of a reasonably objective measure for state immunity, is illusory. Reliance on history as an organizing principle results
in linedrawing of the most arbitrary sort; the genesis of state
governmental functions stretches over a historical continuum
from before the Revolution to the present, and courts would
have to decide by fiat precisely how longstanding a pattern of
state involvement had to be for federal regulatory authority
to lapse. 10
Indeed, the "traditional" nature of a particular governmental function
can be a matter of historical nearsightedness; today's self-evidently "traditional" function is often yesterday's suspect innovation. Thus, National
League of Cities offered the provision of public parks and recreation as an
example of a traditional governmental function. 426 U. S., at 851. A
scant 80 years earlier, however, in Shoemaker v. United States, 147 U. S.
282 (1892), the Court pointed out that city commons originally had been
provided for grazing domestic animals rather than for recreation and that
"[i]n the memory of men now living, a proposition to take private property
[by eminent domain] for a public park . . . would have been regarded as a
novel exercise of legislative power." I d., at 297.
1
°For much the same reasons, the existence vel non of a tradition of federal involvement in a particular area does not provide an adequate standard for state immunity. Most of the Fe~ Government's current regulatory activit originated less than 50 ears a o with ffie "New I>eiir,and a
good ort10n of it as eve ope within the past two decades. The recent
vintage of this regu atory actiVIty does no Imims
e s rength of the federal interest in applying regulatory standards to state activities, nor does it
affect the strength of the States' interest in being free from federal supervision. Although the Court's intergovernmental tax immunity decisions
ostensibly have subjected particular state activities to federal taxation
9

~
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N onhistorical standards for selecting immune govern-

mental functionsare li:Kely to be just as unworkable as a historical standard is. The goal of identifying "uni uely" governmental functions, for example, nas been rejecte by the
Co~f government tort liability in part because
the notion of a "uniquely" governmental function is unmanageable. See Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U. S.
61, 64-68 (1955); see also Lafayette v. Louisiana Power &
Light Co., 435 U. S. 389, 433 (1978) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
Another possibility would be to confine immunity to "necessary" governmental services-that is, services that would be
provided inadequately or not at all unless the government
provided them. Cf. Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U. S., at
172. The set of services that fit into this category, however,
may well be negligible. The fact that an unregulated market
produces less of some service than a State deems desirable
does not mean that the State itself must provide the service;
in most if not all cases, the State can "contract out" by hiring
private firms to provide the service or simply by providing
subsidies to existing suppliers. It also is open to question
how well equipped courts are to make this kind of determination about the workings of economic markets.
We believe, however, that there is a more fundamental
pr9bl~m at work here, a problem that explams wliy the
Cou:ft was never able to provide a basis for the governmental/proprietary distinction in the intergovernmental tax
because those activities "ha[ve] been traditionally within [federal taxing]
power from the beginning," New York v. United States, 326 U. S., at 588
(Stone, C. J., joined by Reed, Murphy, and Burton, JJ., concurring in the
judgment), the Court has not in fact required federal taxes to have long
historical records in order to be effective. The income tax at issue in Powers took effect less than a decade before the tax years for which it was challenged, while the federal tax whose application was upheld in New Y ark v.
United States took effect in 1932 and was rescinded less than two years
later. See Helvering v. Powers, 293 U. S., at 222; Rakestraw, The Reciprocal Rule of Governmental Tax Immunity-A Legal Myth, 11 Fed. Bar J.
3, 34, n. 116 (1950).
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immunity cases and why an attempt to draw similar distinctions with respect to 1ederarregtllatory authori1y_unaer N ationa£ League oj ~is unli:Kely to succeed regardless of
hoWThe 1 m
s are couc e .
e problem is that neither the governmental/proprietary distinction nor any other
that purports o separa e 1m ortant overnmental fu ctions
from o er es can e ruthful to the role of federalism in a
e essence o our e era sys em is
democra 1c soc1e .
tha~e realm of authority left open to them under the
Constitution, the States must be equally free to engage in
any activity that their citizens choose for the common weal,
no matter how unorthodox or unnecessary anyone else-including the judiciary-deems state involvement to be. Any
rule of state immunity that looks to the "traditional," "integral," or "necessary" nature of governmental functions inevitably invites an unelected federal judiciary to make decisions
about which state policies it favors and which ones it dislikes.
is the science of experi"The science of government
ment," Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204, 226 (1821), and the
States cannot serve as laboratories for social and economic
experiment, see New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U. S.
262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), if they must pay an
added price when they meet the changing needs of their citizenry by taking up functions that an earlier day and a different society left in private hands. In the words of Justice
Black:
0

0

•

•

"There is not, and there cannot be, any unchanging
line of demarcation between essential and non-essential
governmental functions. Many governmental functions
of today have at some time in the past been non-governmental. The genius of our government provides that,
within the sphere of constitutional action, the peopleacting not through the courts but through their elected
legislative representatives-have the power to determine as conditions demand, what services and functions

l
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the public welfare requires." H elvering v. Gerhardt,
304 U. S., at 427 (concurring opinion).
We therefore reject, as unsound in principle and unworkable in praCtice, a nile of state immunity from federal regulation that turns on aluCiiciaf armraisal of wh.ether_ a particular
governmentaliUnctfon is "integral" or "traditional." Any
sucli ru e ea s o mcons1s ent results at the same time that
it disserves principles of democratic self-governance, and it
breeds inconsistency precisely because it is divorced from
those principles. If there are to be limits on the immunity of
state governments from ederal re lation un er t e ommerce ause, and limi s t ere must be, we must look elsewhere to find them. We accoraingly return to the un<fei.lying Issue t a confronted this Court in National League
of Cities-the manner in which the Constitution insulates
States from the reach of Congress' power under the Commerce Clause.
III
The central principle of National League of Cities is that
the States occupy a special position in our constitutional system and that the scope of Congress' authority under the
Commerce Clause must reflect that position. It is true that
the Commerce Clause by its terms does not provide any special limitation on Congress' actions with respect to the
States. See EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U. S. - , - (1983)
(STEVENS, J., concurring) (slip op. 5). It is equally true,
however, that the text of the Constitution provides the beginning rather than the final answer to every inquiry into
questions of federalism, for "[b]ehind the words of the constitutional provisions are postulates which limit and control."
Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U. S. 313, 322 (1934). National
League of Cities reflects the general conviction that the Constitution precludes "the National Government [from] devour[ing] the essentials of state sovereignty." Maryland v.
Wirtz, 392 U. S., at 205 (Douglas, J., dissenting). In order
to be faithful to the underlying federal premises of the Con-

•
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stitution, courts must look for the "postulates which limit and
control."
What has proved problematic is not the idea that the Constitution's federal structure imposes limitations on the Commerce Clause, but rather the nature and content of those
limitations. One approach to defining the limits on Congress' authority to regulate the States under the Commerce
Clause is to identify certain underlying elements of political
sovereignty that are deemed essential to the States' "separate and independent existence." Lane County v. Oregon, 7
Wall. 71, 76 (1869). This approach underlies the Court's use
of the "traditional governmental function" concept in N ational League of Cities. It also has led to the separate requirement that the challenged federal statute "address matters that are indisputably 'attribute[s] of state sovereignty.'"
Hodel, 452 U. S., at 288, quoting National League of Cities,
426 U. S., at 845. In National League of Cities itself, for
example, the Court concluded that decisions by a State concerning the wages and hours of its employees are an "undoubted attribute of state sovereignty." 426 U. S., at 845.
The opinion did not explain what aspects of such decisions
made them an "undoubted attribute of state sovereignty,"
and the Court since has remarked on the uncertain scope
of the concept, see EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S., at--,
n. 11 (slip op. 10, n. 11), but the point of the inquiry has remained to single out particular features of a State's internal
governance that are deemed to be intrinsic parts of state
sovereignty.
We have come to doubt, however, that courts ultimately
can identifY principled constitutiona mitations on the scope
of Congress' Commercecfause powers over the States Oy-rewns o s a e sovereignty. In part,
lymg on a prtort
this is because of the elusiveness of objective criteria for
"fundamental" elements o s ate sovereignty, a prob em that
we have witnessed in the search for "traditional governmental functions." There is, however, a more fundamental

I
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reason: the sovereignty of the States is limited by the Constitution itself":'--A'Variety or sovereign powerS', for example,
are withdrawn from the States by Article I, § 10. Section 8
of the same Article works an equally sharp contraction of
state sovereignty, quite apart from whatever authority it
may confer on Congress to regulate the "States as States,"
by authorizing Congress to exercise a wide range of legislative powers and (in conjunction with the Supremacy Clause
of Article VI) to displace contrary state legislation. See
Hodel, 452 U. S., at 290-292. By providing for final review
of questions of federal law in this Court, Article III curtails
the sovereign power of the state judiciaries to make authoritative determinations of law. See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304 (1816). Finally, the developed application
of the greater part of the Bill of Rights to the States through
the Fourteenth Amendment limits the sovereign authority
that States otherwise would possess to legislate with respect
to their citizens and conduct their own affairs.
The States unquestionably "retai[n] . . . a significant measure of sovereign authority." EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U. S.,
at - - (POWELL, J., dissenting) (slip op. 5). They do so,
however, only to the extent that the Constitution has not divested them of their original powers and transferred those
powers to the Federal Government. In the words of James
Madison to the members of the first Congress: "Interference
with the power of the States was no constitutional criterion of
the power of Congress. If the power was not given, Congress could not exercise it; if given, they might exercise it,
although it should interfere with the laws, or even the Constitution of the States." 2 Annals of Cong. 1897 (1791).
Justice Field made the same point in the course of his defense
of state autonomy in Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Baugh, 149
U. S. 368 (1893), a defense quoted with approval in Erie R.
Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, 78-79 (1938):
"[T]he Constitution of the United States . . . recognizes and preserves the autonomy and independence of
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the States-independence in their legislative and independence in their judicial departments. [Federal] [s]upervision over either the legislative or the judicial action
of the States is in no case permissible except as to matters by the Constitution specifically authorized or delegated to the United States. Any interference with
either, except as thus permitted, is an invasion of the authority of the State and, to that extent, a denial of its
independence." 149 U. S., at 401 (dissenting opinion)
(emphasis added).
As a result, to say that the Constitution assumes the continued role of the States is to say little about the nature of
that role. Only last Term, this Court recognized that the
purpose of the constitutional immunity recognized in N ational League of Cities is not to preserve "a sacred province
of state autonomy." EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U. S., at-(slip op. 9). With rare exceptions, like the guarantee of
state territorial integrity in Article IV, § 3, the Constitution
does not carve out express elements of state sovereignty that
Congress may not employ its delegated powers to displace.
As James Wilson reminded the Pennsylvania ratifying convention in 1787, "although it presupposes the existence of
state governments, yet this Constitution does not suppose
them to be the sole power to be respected." 2 Debates in the
Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal
Constitution 439 (J. Elliot 2d ed. 1876) (Elliot). The power
of the Federal Government is a "power to be respected" as
well, cf. National League of Cities, 426 U. S., at 856 (concurring opinion), and the fact that the States remain sovereign
with respect to all powers not vested in Congress or denied
them by the Constitution offers no guidance about where the
frontier between state and federal power is to be drawn. In
short, we have no license to employ freestanding conceptions
of state sovereignty when measuring congressional authority
under the Commerce Clause.

'·
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When we look for the States' "residuary and inviolable sovereignty," The Federalist No. 39, p. 285 (B. Wright ed. 1961)
(J. Madison), in the shape of the constitutional scheme rather
than in predetermined notions of sovereign power, a different
measure of state sovereignty emerges. Apart from the limitation on federal authority inherent in the delegated nature
of Congress' Article I powers, the principal means chosen by
the Framers to ensure the role of the "States as States" in
the federal system lies in the structure of the Federal Govez:!?.ment itself. It is no novelty o observ
e composition of the Federal Government was designed in large part
to protect the States from overreaching by Congress. 11 The
Framers thus gave the States a role in the selection both of
the Executive and the Legislative Branches of the Federal
Government. The States were vested with indirect influence over the House of Representatives and the Presidency
by their control of electoral qualifications and their role in
presidential elections. U. S. Const., Art. I, § 2, and Art. II,
§ 1. They were given more direct influence in the Senate,
where each State received equal representation and each
Senator was to be selected by the legislators of his State.
Art. I, § 3. The significance attached to the States' equal
representation in the Senate is underscored by the prohibition on any constitutional amendment divesting a State of
equal representation without the State's consent. Art. V.
The extent to which the structure of the Federal Government itself was relied on to insulate the interests of the
States is evident in the views of the Framers. James Madison explained that the Federal Government "will partake sufficiently of the spirit [of the States], to be disinclined to inSee, e. g., J. Choper, Judicial Review and the National Political Process 175-184 (1980); Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The
Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 543 (1954); La Pierre, The Political Safeguards of
Federalism Redux: Intergovernmental Immunity and the States as Agents
of the Nation, 60 Wash. U. L. Q. 779 (1982).
11
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vade the rights of the individual States, or the prerogatives
of their governments." The Federalist No. 46, p. 332 (B.
Wright ed. 1961). Similarly, James Wilson argued that "it
was a favorite object in the Convention" to provide for the
security of the States against federal encroachment and that
the structure of the Federal Government itself served that
end. 2 Elliot 438-439. Madison placed particular reliance
on the equal representation of the States in the Senate, which
he saw as "at once a constitutional recognition of the portion
of sovereignty remaining in the individual States, and an instrument for preserving that residuary sovereignty." The
Federalist No. 62, p. 408 (B. Wright ed. 1961). Accord, id.,
No. 43, p. 315 ("[T]he residuary sovereignty of the States [is]
implied and secured by that principle of representation in one
branch of the [federal] legislature") (emphasis added). See
also M'Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 435 (1819). In
short, the Framers chose to rely on a federal system in which
special restraints on federal power over the "States as
States" inhered principally in the workings of the National
Government itself, rather than in discrete limitations on the
objects of federal authority.
The effectiveness of the federal political process in preserving the States' interests is apparent even today in the course
of federal legislation. On the one hand, the States have been
able to direct a substantial proportion of federal revenues
into their own treasuries in the form of general and programspecific grants in aid. The federal role in assisting state and
local governments is a longstanding one; Congress provided
federal land grants to finance state governments from the beginning of the Republic, and direct cash grants were awarded
as early as 1887 under the Hatch Act. 12 In the past quartercentury alone, federal grants to States and localities have
12

See, e. g., A. Howitt, Managing Federalism: Studies in Intergovernmental Relations 3-18 (1984); Break, Fiscal Federalism in the United
States: The First 200 Years, Evolution and Outlook, in The Future of Federalism in the 1980s, pp. 39-54 (July 1981).
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grown from $7 billion to $96 billion. 13 As a result, federal
grants now account for roughly one-fifth of state and local
government expenditures. 14 The States have obtained federal funding for such services as police and fire protection,
education, public health and hospitals, parks and recreation,
and sanitation. 15 At the same time that the States have exercised their influence to obtain federal support, moreover,
they have been able to exempt themselves from a wide variety of obligations imposed by Congress under the Commerce
Clause. For example, the Federal Power Act, the National
Labor Relations Act, the Labor-Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act, the Occupational Safety and Health Act, the
Employee Retirement Insurance Security Act, and the Sherman Act all contain express or implied exemptions for States
and their subdivisions. 16 The fact that some federal statutes
like the FLSA do extend general obligations to the States
cannot obscure the extent to which the political position of
the States in the federal system has served to minimize the
13
A. Howitt, supra, at 8; Bureau of the Census, U. S. Dept. of Commerce, Federal Expenditures by State for Fiscal Year 1983, p. 2 (1984)
(Census, Federal Expenditures); Division of Government Accounts and
Reports, Fiscal Service-Bureau of Government Financial Operations,
Dept. of the Treasury, Federal Aid to States: Fiscal Year 1982, p. 1 (1983
rev. ed.).
14
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Significant
Features of Fiscal Federalism 120, 122 (1984).
15
See, e. g., the Federal Fire Prevention and Control Act of 1974, 15
U. S. C. §§ 2201 et seq.; the Urban Park and Recreation Recovery Act of
1978, 16 U. S. C. §§ 2501 et seq.; the Elementary and Secondary Education
Act of 1965, 20 U. S. C. §§ 2701 et seq.; the Water Pollution Control Act, 33
U. S. C. §§ 1251 et seq.; the Public Health Service Act, 42 U. S. C. §§ 201
et seq.; the Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U. S. C. §§ 300f et seq.; the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 42 U. S. C. §§ 3701 et seq.;
the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, 42 U. S. C.§§ 5301
et seq.; and the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974,
42 U. S. C. §§ 5601 et seq. See also Census, Federal Expenditures 2-15.
6
' See 16 U. S. C. § 824(f); 29 U. S. C. § 152(2); 29 U. S. C. § 402(e); 29
U. S. C. § 652(5); 29 U. S. C. §§ 1002(32), 1003(b)(1); and Parker v. Brown,
317 u. s. 341 (1943).
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burdens that the States have had to bear under the Commerce Clause.
We realize that changes in the structure of the Federal
Government have taken place since 1789, not the least of
which has been the substitution of popular election of Senators by the adoption of the Seventeenth Amendment in 1913,
and that these changes may work to alter the influence of the
States in the federal political process. 17 Nonetheless,
against this background, we remain convinced that the fundamental limitation that the constitutional scheme im oses on
the ommerce ause o ro ec
of process ra er
tive res raints on e exe c1se of Commerce Clause powers
must find their justification in the procedural nature of this
basic limitation, and they must be tailored to compensate for
possible failings in the national political process rather to dictate a "sacred province of state autonomy," EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U. S., at-- (slip op. 9).
The only substantive restraint that satisfies these criteria,
in our judgment, is a requirement that Congress not attempt
to single out the States for special burdens or otherwise discriminate against them. The constitutional mechanisms for
safeguarding the role of the States are unlikely to be at risk
when Congress proceeds by uniform legislation that places
burdens evenhandedly on States and private parties alike, for
the outcome will reflect not only the States' own interests but
the interests of all those who are similarly situated. In those
circumstances, the structural features of the Constitution designed to protect the States can be trusted to have served
their purpose. The federal political process is unlikely to
produce regulatory schemes that frustrate or obstruct state
functions as long as those functions are shared by private
parties as well and as long as Congress does not single out
17
See, e. g., J . Choper, supra, at 177-178; Kaden, Politics, Money, and
State Sovereignty: The Judicial Role, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 847, 860-868
(1979).
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the States for regulatory burdens. We therefore hold that
the implicit substantive limitations on congressional regulation of the States under the Commerce Clause demand no
more than that the statute at issue be a nondiscriminatory
one. In allowing States to be subjected to nondiscriminatory
federal legislation, it must be noted, we are not treating the
constitutionality of such legislation as a nonjusticiable question to be remitted to other branches of government. 18 Instead, we are holding that such legislation is constitutionalthat the restrictions on Commerce Clause power that inhere
in the structure of the Constitution are not transgressed by
statutes that accord equal treatment to States and similarly
situated private parties. 19
The idea that concerns about discrimination should form
the linchpin of intergovernmental immunity doctrine is not,
of course, a new one in this Court. The Court's first intergovernmental-immunity decision, M'Cullogh v. Maryland,
supra, rested in large part on concerns about discrimination.
In striking down as unconstitutional a Maryland tax on unlicensed banks that singled out the Bank of the United States,
Chief Justice Marshall was careful to add that the prohibition
on state taxation of federal instrumentalities "does not extend to a tax paid by the real property of the bank, in common with the other real property within the State, nor to a tax
imposed on the interest which the citizens of Maryland may
hold in this institution, in common with other property of the
same description throughout the State." 4 Wheat., at 436
18

Cf. National League of Cities, 426 U. S., at 841-842, n. 12; New York
v. United States, 326 U. S. 572, 581-582 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., joined by
Rutledge, J. ); J . Choper, supra, at 220-222; Matsumoto, National League
of Cities-From Footnote to Holding-State Immunity from Commerce
Clause Regulation, 1977 Ariz. State L. J . 35, 40-42.
19
There thus is no inconsistency between the substantive rule of constitutional immunity that we announce today and the intent of the Framers
that this Court resolve "controversies relating to the boundary between
the [state and federal] jurisdictions." The Federalist No. 39, p. 285 (B.
Wright ed. 1961) (J. Madison).
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(emphasis added). The Court subsequently has observed
that M'Cullogh "'could and perhaps should'" be read "'simply for the principle that the Constitution prohibits a State
from taxing discriminatorily a federally established instrumentality."' United States v. New Mexico, 455 U. S. 720,
733 (1982), quoting First Agricultural Bank v. State Tax
Comm'n, 392 U. S. 339, 350 (1968) (dissenting opinion).
Justices Frankfurter and Rutledge advocated a discrimination-based standard for state immunity from federal taxation
in New York v. United States, supra; they would have found
"no restriction upon Congress to include the States in levying
a tax exacted equally from private persons upon the same
subject matter." 326 U. S., at 584.
We recognize that a majority of the Court rejected Justice
Frankfurter's approach to tax immunity doctrine in New
York v. United States. See id., at 587-588 (Stone, C. J.,
joined by Reed, Murphy, and Burton, JJ., concurring in the
judgment); id., at 592 (Douglas, J., joined by Black, J., dissenting). More important for present purposes, we recognize that the Court rejected the same standard with respect
to regulatory immunity in National League of Cities. See
426 U. S., at 843. While we adhere to National League of
Cities' premise that the Commerce Clause is subject to special limitations when Congress seeks to regulate the "States
as States," we cannot accept its specific formulation of the
rule of state immunity to the extent that it is inconsistent
with the principles we announce today. Federal regulation
that is otherwise within Congress' power under the Commerce Clause may extend to state functions as long as it applies uniformly to private as well as public activities and does
not discriminate against the States and their subdivisions. 20
00
We should not be understood to suggest that every statute that does
single out the States for special obligations is unconstitutional ipso facto.
For example, Congress' undisputed authority to pre-empt state regulation
of private activities entails the additional authority to forgo pre-emption
and to require instead that States consider specified federal interests in

,.

~
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When these principles are applied here, the outcome is
clear. Nothing in the statutory scheme of the FLSA discriminates against SAMTA or any other municipally operated mass-transit system. Instead, SAMTA faces the same
minimum-wage and overtime obligations that hundreds of
thousands of other employers, private as well as public, must
meet. Indeed, as the Court noted inNational League of Cities, 426 U. S., at 839, Congress incorporated special provisions concerning overtime pay for police and firefighting personnel when it amended the FLSA in 1974 in order to take
account of the special concerns of States and localities with
respect to these positions. See 29 U. S. C. § 207(k). Congress also declined to impose any obligations on state and
local governments with respect to policymaking personnel
who are not subject to civil service laws. See 29 U. S. C.
§ 203(e)(2)(C)(i) and (ii). 21
regulating the same conduct, see FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U. S. 742,
763-768 and nn. 29-30 (1982), even though the exercise of the latter authority requires Congress to address its commands to the States alone. We
have no occasion now to consider under what other circumstances nonuniform federal legislation might be constitutionally permissible.
21
The only respect in which the FLSA might discriminate against public
employers involves the statute's overtime requirements for employees covered by collective-bargaining agreements. Under 29 U. S. C. §§ 207(b)(1)
and (2), an employee may be required to work more than 40 hours in a particular week without accruing overtime compensation if his total number of
working hours over a 26-week or 52-week period fall within specified limits
"in pursuance of an agreement ... made as a result of collective bargaining
by representatives of employees certified as bona fide by the National
Labor Relations Board." Because the National Labor Relations Act does
not provide coverage for state and local government employees, see 29
U. S. C. § 152(2), the National Labor Relations Board might not have jurisdiction to provide the necessary certification with respect to a public
employer who otherwise qualified under §§ 207(b)(l) or (2). At most, however, the discrimination-based standard on which we rely today would prohibit the application of the National Labor Relation Board certification
requirement to public employers; the general overtime provisions of the
National Labor Relations Act, which apply equally to public and private
employers, would not be affected. If SAMTA could avail itself of the col-
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In this case, the status of public mass transit simply underscores the extent to which the structural protections of the
Constitution insulate the States from federally imposed burdens. While Congress first subjected state mass-transit systems to FLSA obligations in 1966 and expanded those obligations in 1974, it simultaneously provided extensive funding
for state and local mass transit through UMTA. In the two
decades since its enactment, UMTA has provided over $22
billion in mass transit aid to States and localities. 22 In 1983
alone, UMTA funding amounted to $3.7 billion. 23 As noted
above, SAMTA and its predecessor have received a substantial amount of UMTA funding, including over $12 million during SAMTA's first two fiscal years alone. In short, Congress has not simply placed a financial burden on the
shoulders of States and localities that operate mass-transit
systems, but has provided substantial countervailing financial assistance as well-assistance that may leave individual
mass transit systems better off than they would have been
had Congress never intervened at all in the area. Congress'
treatment of public mass transit reinforces our conviction
that the national political process will systematically protect
States from the risk of having their functions handicapped by
Commerce Clause regulation. 24
lective-bargaining provisions of§ 207 but for the lack of National Labor Relations Board certification, a matter that the record before us does not disclose, SAMTA is free to pursue the issue on remand.
22
See Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1983: Hearings Before the Subcommittee of the House Committee
on Appropriations, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 808 (1982) (fiscal years
1965-1982); Census, Federal Expenditures 15 (fiscal year 1983).
23
Census, Federal Expenditures 15.
24
Our references to UMTA are not meant to imply that nondiscriminatory regulation under the Commerce Clause must be accompanied by countervailing financial benefits under the Spending Clause. The application
of the FLSA to SAMTA would be constitutional even had Congress not
provided federal funding under UMTA.
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IV

Today we reaffirm the fundamental premise of National
League of Cities that Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause must accommodate the special role of the
States in the federal system. We hold, however, that the
necessary accommodation between federal power and state
autonomy is realized when Congress places no burden on the
States that it has not placed on private parties as well. For
that reason, the judgment of the District Court is reversed
and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
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JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court.
We revisit in these cases an issue raised in National
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U. S. 833 (1976). In that litigation, this Court, by a sharply divided vote, ruled that the
Commerce Clause does not empower Congress to enforce the
minimum-wage and overtime provisions of the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA) against the States "in areas of traditional governmental functions." !d., at 852. Although National League of Cities supplied some examples of "traditional governmental functions," it did not offer a general
explanation of how a "traditional" function is to be distinguished from a "nontraditional" one. Since then, federal and
state courts have struggled with the task, thus imposed, of
identifying a traditional function for purposes of state immunity under the Commerce Clause.
In the present cases, a Federal District Court concluded
that municipal ownership and operation of a mass-transit sys-
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tern is a traditional governmental function and thus, under
National League of Cities, is exempt from the obligations imposed by the FLSA. Faced with the identical question,
three Federal Courts of Appeals and one state appellate
court have reached the opposite conclusion. 1
Our examination of this "function" standard applied in
these and other cases over the last eight years now persuades
us that the attempt to draw the boundaries of state regulatory immunity in terms of "traditional governmental function" is not only unworkable but is inconsistent with ~sta,b
lished principles of federalism and, indeed, with those very
@er~l~~~ciE_les on whic h N ationoJ1.eague2J'Qi§ p urported to rest. That case, accordingly, is overruled.
I
The history of public transportation in San Antonio, Tex.,
is characteristic of the history of local mass transit in the
United States generally. Passenger transportation for hire
within San Antonio originally was provided on a private basis
by a local transportation company. In 1913, the Texas Legislature authorized the State's municipalities to regulate vehicles providing carriage for hire. 1913 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch.
147, § 4, ~ 12, now codified, as amended, as Tex. Rev. Civ.
Stat. Ann., Art. 1175, §§ 20 and 21 (Vernon 1963). Two
years later, San Antonio enacted an ordinance setting forth
franchising, insurance, and safety requirements for passenger vehicles operated for hire. The city continued to rely on
such publici re lated private mass transit until 1959, when
it pure ased the privately owned San Antonio T~ansll Company and replaced it with a public authority known as the San
Antonio Transit System (SATS). SATS operated until1978,
See Dove v. Chattanooga Area Regional Transportation Authority,
701 F. 2d 50 (CA6 1983); Alewine v. City Council, 699 F. 2d 1060 (CAll
1983), cert. pending, Nos. 82-1974 and 83-257; Kramer v. New Castle Area
Transit Authority, 677 F. 2d 308 (CA3 1982), cert. denied, 459 U. S. 1146
(1983); Francis v. City of Tallahassee, 424 So. 2d 61 (Fla. App. 1982).
1

J 'TSf
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when the city transferred its facilities and equipment to appellee San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority
(SAMTA), a public mass-transit authority organized on a
countywide basis. See generally Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann.,
Art. 1118x (Vernon Supp. 1984). SAMTA currently is the
major provider of transportation in the San Antonio metropolitan area; between 1978 and 1980 alone, its vehicles traveled over 26 million route miles and carried over 63 million
passengers.
As did other localities, San Antonio reached the point
where it came to look to the Federal Government for financial
assistance in maintaining its public mass transit. BATs
managoo to meet its operating expenses and bond obligations
for the first decade of its existence without federal or local
financial aid. By 1970, however, its financial position had
deteriorated to the point where federal subsidies were vital
for its continued operation. SATS' general manager that
year testified before Congress that "if we do not receive substantial help from the Federal Government, San Antonio may
... join the growing ranks of cities that have inferior [public]
transportation or may end up with no [public] transportation
at all." 2
The principal federal program to which SATS and other
mass-transit systems looked for relief was the 'Qrban Mass
Tr~4 (UMTA), Pub. L. 88-365, 78 Stat.
302, as amended, 49 U. S. C. App. §§ 1601 et seq., which provides substantial federal assistance to urban mass-transit
programs. See generally Jackson Transit Authority v.
Transit Union, 457 U. S. 15 (1982). UMTA now authorizes
the Departm~nt of Transportation to fund 75 percent of the
'< ca ital outla ' s and u to 50 ercent of the o~enses
of qualifying mass-transit programs. §§ 4(a), 5(d) and (e), 49
U. S. C. App. §§ 1603(a), 1604(d) and (e). SATS received its
•.Urban Mass Transportation: Hearings on H. R. 6663 et al. before the
Subcommittee on Housing of the House Committee on Banking and Currency, 91st Cong. , 2d Sess., p. 419 (1970) (statement of F. Norman Hill).
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first UMTA subsidy, a $4.1 million capital grant, in December 1970. From then until February 1980, SATS and
SAMTA received over $51 million in UMTA grants-more
than $31 million in capital grants, over~ $20- million in operating assistance, and a minor amount in technical assistance.
During SAMTA's first two fiscal years, it received $12.5 million in UMTA operating grants, $26.8 million from sales
taxes, and only $10.1 million from fares. Federal subsidies
{ and lo~s currently account for abotif75 percent of
~ SAMTA's operatmg expenses.
The present controversy concerns the extent to which
SAMTA may be subjected to the minimum-wage and overtime requirements of the FLSA. When the FLSA was enacted in 1938, its wage and overtime provisions did not apply
to local mass-transit employees or, indeed, to employees of
state and local governments. §§ 3(d), 13(a)(9), 52 Stat. 1060,
1067. In 1961, Congress extended minimum-wage coverage
to employees of any private mass-transit carrier whose annual gross revenue was not less than $1 million. Fair Labor
Standards Amendments of 1961, §§ 2(c), 9, 75 Stat. 65, 71.
Five years later, Congress extended FLSA coverage to state
and local-government employees for the first time by withdrawing the minimum-wage and overtime exemptions from
public hospitals, schools, and mass-transit carriers whose
rates and services were subject to state regulation. Fair
Labor Standards Amendments of 1966, §§ 102(a) and (b), 80
Stat. 831. At the same time, Congress eliminated the overtime exemption for all mass-transit employees other than
drivers, operators, and conductors. § 206(c), 80 Stat. 836.
The application of the FLSA to public schools and hospitals/
was ruled to be within Congress' power under the Commerce
Clause. Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U. S. 183 (1968).
The FLSA obligations of public mass-transit systems like
SATS were expanded in ~4 when CoEgr,ess provided for
the progressive repeal of e rv"vi o ertime ex_emytion
for mass-transit employees. Fair Labor Standar s amend1 "'..._.

~
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ments of 1974, § 21(b), 88 Stat. 68. Congress simultaneously
brought the States and their subdivisions further within the
ambit of the FLSA by extending FLSA coverage to virtually
all state and local-government employees. §§ 6(a)(1) and (6),
88 Stat. 58, 60, 29 U. S. C. §§ 203(d) and (x). SATS complied with the FLSA's overtime requirements until 1976,
when this Court, in National League of Cities, supra, overruled Maryland v. Wirtz, and held that the FLSA could not
be applied constitutionally to the "traditional governmental
functions" of state and local governments. Four months
after National League of Cities was handed down, SATS informed its employees that the decision relieved SATS of its
overtime obligations under the FLSA. 3
Matters rested there until September 17, 1979, when the
Wage and Hour Administration of the Department of Labor
issued an opinion that SAMTA's operations "are not constitutionally immune from the application of the Fair Labor
Standards Act" under National League of Cities. Opinion
WH-499, 6 LRR 91:1138. On November 21 of that year,
SAMTA filed this action against the Secretary of Labor in
the United States District Court for the Western District of
Texas. It sought a declaratory judgment that, contrary to
the Wage and Hour Administration's determination, National League of Cities precluded the application of the
FLSA's overtime requirements to SAMTA's operations.
The Secretary counterclaimed under 29 U. S. C. § 217 for enforcement of the overtime and record-keeping requirements
of the FLSA. On the same day that SAMTA filed its action,
appellant Garcia and several other SAMTA employees
brought suit against SAMTA in the same District Court for
overtime pay under the FLSA. Garcia v. SAMTA, Civil
Neither SATS nor SAMTA appears to have attempted to avoid the
FLSA's minimum-wage provisions. We are informed that basic wage levels in the mass-transit industry traditionally have been well in excess of the
minimum wages prescribed by the FLSA. See Brief for National League
of Cities et a!. as Amici Curiae 7-8.
3
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Action No. SA 79 CA 458. The District Court has stayed
that action pending the outcome of these cases, but it allowed
Garcia to intervene in the present litigation as a defendant in
support of the Secretary. One month after SAMTA brought
suit, the Department of Labor formally amended its FLSA
interpretive regulations to provide that publicly owned local
mass-transit systems are not entitled to immunity under N ational League of Cities. 44 Fed. Reg. 75,630 (1979), codified
as 29 CFR § 775.3(b)(3) (1983).
On November 17, 1981, the District Court granted
SAMTA's motion for summary judgment and denied the Secretary's and Garcia's cross-motion for partial summary judgment. Without further explanation, the District Court ruled
that "local public mass transit systems (including [SAMTA])
constitute integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions" under National League of Cities. Juris.
Statement in No. 82-1913, p. 24a. The Secretary and Garcia
both appealed directly to this Court pursuant to 28 U. S. C.
§ 1252. During the pendency of those appeals, Transportation Union v. Long Island R. Co., 455 U. S. 678 (1982), was
decided. In that case, the Court ruled that commuter rail
service provided by the state-owned Long Island Rail Road
did not constitute a "traditional governmental function" and
hence did not enjoy constitutional immunity, under National
League of Cities, from the requirements of the Railway
Labor Act. Thereafter, it vacated the District Court's judgment in the present cases and remanded them for further
consideration in the light of Long Island. 457 U. S. 1102
(1982).
On remand, the District Court adhered to its original view
and again entered judgment for SAMTA. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority v. Donovan, 557 F. Supp. 445
(1983). The court looked first to what it regarded as the
"historical reality" of state involvement in mass transit. It
recognized that States not always had owned and operated
mass-transit systems, but concluded that they had engaged
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in a longstanding pattern of public regulation, and that this
regulatory tradition gave rise to an "inference of sovereignty." Id., at 447-448. The court next looked to the
record of federal involvement in the field and concluded that
constitutional immunity would not result in an erosion of federal authority with respect to state-owned mass-transit systems, because many federal statutes themselves contain exemptions for States and thus make the withdrawal of federal
regulatory power over public mass-transit systems a supervening federal policy. Id., at 448-450. Although the Federal Government's authority over employee wages under the
FLSA obviously would be eroded, Congress had not asserted
any interest in the wages of public mass-tr ns1t employees
u:rltiri9 a
e ce a no es a 1s e a ongstan ilig federa mterest in the field, in contrast to the century-old federal
regulatory presence in the railroad industry found significant
for the decision in Long Island. Finally, the court compared
mass transit to the list of functions identified as constitutionally immune in N atwna Le ue o Cities an cone u e that
it 1 no 1 er om t ose nctions 1 any material respect.
The court stated: "If transit is to be distinguished from the
exempt [National League of Cities] functions it will have to
be by identifying a traditional state function in the same way
pornography is sometimes identified: someone knows it when
they see it, but they can't describe it." 557 F. Supp., at
453. 4

The Secretary and Garcia again took direct appeals from
the District Court's judgment. We noted probable jurisdiction. - - U. S. - - (1983). After initial argument, the
'The District Court also analyzed the status of mass transit under the
four-part test devised by the Sixth Circuit in Amersbach v. City of Cleveland, 598 F. 2d 1033 (1979). In that case, the Court of Appeals looked to
(1) whether the function benefits the community as a whole and is made
available at little or no expense; (2) whether it is undertaken for public
service or pecuniary gain; (3) whether government is its principal provider;
and (4) whether government is particularly suited to perform it because of
a community-wide need. ld., at 1037.
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cases were restored to our calendar for reargument, and the

'parties were requested to brief and argue the following addiItional question:
"Whether or not the rinci les of the Tenth Amendment as set forth in National League of Cities v. Usery,
"426U. S. 833 (1976), should be reconsidered?"
- - U. S. - - (1984).

Reargument followed in due course.

II
Appellees have not argued that SAMTA is immune from
regulation under the FLSA on the ground that it is a local
transit system engaged in intrastate commercial activity. In
a practical sense, SAMTA's operations might well be characterized as "local." Nonetheless, it long has been settled that
Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause extends to
intrastate economic activities that affect interstate commerce. See, e. g., Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining &
Reel. Assn., 452 U. S. 264, 276-277 (1981); Heart of Atlanta
Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U. S. 241, 258 (1964);
· Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U. S. 111, 125 (1942); United States
v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941). Were SAMTA a rivatel
~
owned and operated enterprise, it cou not credibly argue
thatCongress exceeded the bounds of its Commerce Clause
powers in prescribing minimum wages and overtime rates for
SAMTA's employees. Any constitutional exemption from
the requirements of the FLSA therefore must rest on
SAMTA's status as a governmental entity rather than on the
"local" nature of its operations.
The prerequisites for governmental immunity under N ational League of Cities were summarized by this Court in
!lgjjel, supra. Under that summary, four conditions must
be satisfied before a state activity may be deemed immune
from a particular federal regulation under the Commerce
Clause. First, it is said that the federal statute at issue
must regulate "the 'States as States."' Second, the statute j~
must "address ma~disputably 'attribute[s] of
~

..

~
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state sovereignty."' Third, state compliance with the federal obligation must "d~air [the States'] ability 'to
structure inte al o erations in areas of traditional governmen a nctions. '
ina y, t e relation of state an federal
intereStSiniist not be such that "the nature of the federal interest . . . justifies state submission." 452 U. S., at
287-288, and n. 29, quoting National League of Cities, 426
U. S., at 845, 852, 854.
The controversy in the present cases has focused on the
t ird Hodel re uirement-that th chal n ed federal statute
trenc on raditiona governmental functions ' The District Court vo1c
co
on conce : espite the abundance
of adjectives, identifying which particular state functions are
immune remains difficult." 557 F. Supp., at 447. Just how
troublesome the task has been is revealed by the results
reached in other federal cases. Thus, courts have held that
regulating ambulance services, Gold Cross Ambulance v.
City of Kansas City, 538 F. Supp. 956, 967-969 (WD Mo.
1982), aff'd on other grounds, 705 F. 2d 1005 (CAS 1983),
cert. pending, No. 83-183; licensing automobile drivers,
United States v. Best, 573 F. 2d 1095, 1102-1103 (CA9 1978);
operating a municipal airport, Amersbach v. City of Cleveland, 598 F. 2d 1033, 1037-1038 (CA6 1979); performing solid
waste disposal, Hybud Equipment Corp. v. City of Akron,
654 F. 2d 1187, 1196 (CA61981); and operating a highway authority, Malina-Estrada v. Puerto Rico Highway Authority,
680 F. 2d 841, 845-846 (CAl 1982), are functions protected
under National League of Cities. At the same time, courts
have held that issuance of industrial development bonds,
Woods v. Homes and Structures of Pittsburgh, Kansas, Inc.,
489 F. Supp. 1270, 1296-1297 (Kan. 1980); regulation of intrastate natural gas sales, Oklahoma ex rel. Derryberry v.
FERC, 494 F. Supp. 636, 657 (WD Okla. 1980), aff'd, 661 F.
2d 832 (CAlO 1981), cert. denied sub nom. Texas v. FERC,
457 U. S. 1105 (1982); regulation of traffic on public roads,
Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 552 F. 2d 25, 38 (CA2), cert.

'I
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denied, 434 U. S. 902 (1977); regulation of air transportation,
Hughes Air Corp. v. Public Utilities Commission, 644 F. 2d
1334, 1340-1341 (CA9 1981); operation of a telephone system,
Puerto Rico Tel. Co. v. FCC, 553 F. 2d 694, 700-701 (CAl
1977); leasing and sale of natural gas, Public Service Co. v.
FERC, 587 F. 2d 716, 721 (CA5), cert. denied sub nom. Louisiana v. FERC, 444 U. S. 879 (1979); operation of a mental
health facility, Williams v. Eastside Mental Health Center,
Inc., 669 F. 2d 671, 680-681 (CAll), cert. denied, 459 U. S.
976 (1982); and provision of in-house domestic services for the
aged and handicapped, Bonnette v. California Health and
Welfare Agency, 704 F. 2d 1465, 1472 (CA91983), are not entitled to immunity. We find it difficult, if not impossible, to
identify an organizing principle that places each of the cases
in the first group on one side of a line and each of the cases in
the second group on the other side. The constitutional distinction between licensing drivers and regulating traffic, for
example, or between operating a highway authority and operating a mental health facility, is elusive at best.
Thus far, this Court itself has made little headway in defining the sco e o
e governmenta
nctions deemed protee e un er atwna League of Ct tes. In that case the
Court set forth examples of protected and unprotected functions, see 426 U. S., at 851, 854, n. 18, but provided no explanation of how those examples were identified. The only
other case in which the Court has had occasion to addre s ffie
p~s Long Is an .
e there o serve : "The determination of wnether a federal law impairs a state's authority
with respect to 'areas of traditional [state] functions' may at
times be a difficult one." 455 U. S., at 684, quoting N ational League of Cities, 426 U. S., at 852. The accuracy of
5

Pha~/eutical

See also, however,v:;;fferson County
Assn. v. Abbott
Laboratories, 460 U. S. 150, 154, n. 6 (1983), FERC v. Mississippi, 456
U. S. 742, 781, and n. 7 (1982) (opinion concurring in the judgment in part
and dissenting in part); Fry v. United States, 421 U. S. 542, 558, and n. 2
(1975) (dissenting opinion).
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that statement is demonstrated by this Court's own difficulties in Long Island in developing a workable standard for
"traditional governmental functions." We relied in large
part there on "the historical reality that the operation of railroads is not among the functions traditionally performed by
state and local governments," but we simultaneously disavowed "a static historical view of state functions generally
immune from federal regulation." 455 U. S., at 686 (first
emphasis added; second emphasis in original). We held that
\....../
the inquiry into a particular function's "traditional" nature
was merely a means of determining whether the federal statute at issue unduly handicaps "basic state prerogatives," id.,
at 686-687, but we did not offer an explanation of what makes
one state function a "basic prerogative" and another function
not basic. Finally, having disclaimed a rigid reliance on the
historical pedigree of state involvement in a particular area,
we nonetheless found it appropriate to emphasize the extended historical record of federal involvement in the field of
rail transportation. Id., at 687-689.
Many constitutional standards involve "undoubte[d] . . . ~ ~
gray areas, ry v. nite States, 421 U. S. 542,' 558 (1975) I
'
(dissenlJng opinion), and, despite the difficulties that this
Court and other courts have encountered so far, it normally
might be fair to venture the assum ion that c~e .c._..~~ ~
develo ment would lead to a workable standard for e ermm- _ , .. ~- -L _ / ; .
ing whe Rer a particular governmen a nction should be im~~
mune from federal regulation under the Commerce Clause. /1-..,~ ·
A further cautionary note is sounded, however b the
1...
Court's experience in the related field of tate immunitY! from
1 •
fed~. In South Carolina v. nt e
a es:--I99
~
U~5), the Court held for the first time that the
state tax immunity recognized in Collector v. Day, 11 Wall.
113 (1870), extended only to the "ordinary" and "strictly governmental" instrumentalities of state governments and not to
instrumentalities "used by the State in the carrying on of an
ordinary private business." 199 U. S., at 451, 461. While

J5
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the Court applied the distinction outlined in South Carolina
for the following 40 years, at no time during that period did
the Court develop a consistent formulation of the kinds of
governmental functions that were entitled to immunity.
The Court identified the protected functions at various times
as "essential," "usual," "traditional," or "strictly governmental." 6 While "these differences in phraseology . . . must
not be too literally contradistinguished," Brush v. Commissioner, 300 U. S. 352, 362 (1937), they reflect an inability to
specify precisely what aspects of a governmental function
made it necessary to the "unimpaired existence" of the
States. Collector v. Day, 11 Wall., at 127. Indeed, the
Court ultimately chose "not, by an attempt to formulate any
ge,neral test, [to] risk embarrassing the decision of cases [concerning] activities of a different kind which may arise in the
future." Brush v. Commissioner, 300 U. S., at 365.
If these tax immunity cases had any common thread, it was
in the attempt to distinguish between "governmental" and
"proprietary" functions. 7 To say that the distinction be6
See Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U. S. 107, 172 (1911) ("essential");
Helvering v. Therrell, 303 U. S. 218, 225 (1938) (same); Helvering v. Powers, 293 U. S. 214, 225 (1934) ("usual"); United States v. California, 297
U. S. 175, 185 (1936) ("activities in which the states have traditionally engaged"); South Carolina v. United States, 199 U. S. 437, 461 (1905)
("strictly governmental").
7
In South Carolina, the Court relied on the concept of "strictly governmental" functions to uphold the application of a federal liquor license tax to
a state-owned liquor-distribution monopoly. In Flint, the Court stated:
"The true distinction is between ... those operations of the States essential to the execution of its [sic] governmental functions, and which the
State can only do itself, and those activities which are of a private character"; under this standard, "[i]t is no part of the essential governmental
functions of a State to provide means of transportation, supply artificial
light, water and the like." 220 U. S., at 172. In Ohio v. Helvering, 292
U. S. 360 (1934), another case involving a state liquor-distribution monopoly, the Court stated that "the business of buying and selling commodities
... is not the performance of a governmental function," and that "[w]hen a
state enters the market place seeking customers it divests itself of its quasi
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tween "governmental" and "proprietary" proved to be stable,
however, would be something of an overstatement. In 1911,
for example, the Court declared that the provision of a
municipal water supply "is no part of the essential governmental functions of a State." Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220
U.S. 107, 172. Twenty-six years later, without any inter- ~
vening change in t~l standards, the Court ~
sim2ly rej ~ted. its earlier osition and decided that t'lleProvision of a mumcipal wa er supp y was Immune from federal
taxation as an essential governmental function, even though
municipal water works long had been operated for profit by
private industry. Brush v. Commissioner, 300 U. S., at
370-373. At the same time that the Court was holding a
municipal water supply to be immune from federal taxes, it
had held that a state-run commuter rail system was not immune. Helvering v. Powers, 293 U. S. 214 (1934). Justice
Black, in Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U. S. 405, 427 (1938),
was moved to observe: "An implied constitutional distinction
which taxes income of an officer of a state-operated transportation system and exempts income of the manager of a munici al w
s stem manifests the uncertainty created
by the 'essential' and' n-essential' test" (concurring opinion).
It was this uncertainty and instability that led the Court
shortly thereafter, in New York v. United §.tates, 326 U. S.
572 (~6), unanimo~s!_y~n~~e that the distinction between "gove~ ano ''J)ropRm~was "unsovereignty pro tanto, and takes on the character of a trader, so far, at
least, as the taxing power of the federal government is concerned." I d., at
369. In Powers, the Court upheld the application of the federal income tax
to the income of trustees of a state-operated commuter railroad; the Court
reiterated that "the State cannot withdraw sources of revenue from the
federal taxing power by engaging in businesses which constitute a departure from the usual governmental functions and to which, by reason of
their nature, the federal taxing power would normally extend," regardless
of the fact that the proprietary enterprises "are undertaken for what the
State conceives to be the public benefit." 293 U. S. , at 225. Accord, Allen v. Regents, 304 U. S. 439, 451-453 (1938).
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tenable" and must be abandoned. See id., at 583 (opinion of
Frankfurter, J., joined by Rutledge, J.); id., at 586 (Stone,
C. J., concurring, joined by Reed, Murphy, and Burton, JJ.);
id., at 590-596 (Douglas, J., dissenting, joined by Black, J.).
See also Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U. S. 444, 457,
and n. 14 (1978) (plurality opinion); Case v. Bowles, 327 U. S.
92, 101 (1946).

Even during the heyday of the governmental/proprietary
distinction in intergovernmental tax-immunity doctrine the
Court never ex lai
constitutional basis for that distinction. In South Carolina, 1 expresse 1 s concern that
unlimited state immunity from federal taxation would allow
the States to undermine the Federal Government's tax base
by expanding into previously private sectors of the economy.
See 199 U. S., at 454-455. 8 Although the need to reconcile
state and federal interests obviously demanded that state immunity have some limiting principle, the Court did not try to
justify the particular result it reached; it simply concluded
that a "line [must] be drawn," id., at 456, and proceeded to
draw that line. The Court's elaborations in later cases, such
as the assertion in Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U. S. 360, 369
(1934), that "[w]hen a state enters the market place seeking
customers it divests itself of its quasi sovereignty pro tanto,"
sound more of ipse dixit than reasoned explanation. This inability to give principled content to the distinction between
- "governmental" and "proprietary," no less significantly than
its unworkability, led the Court to abandon the distinction
with alacrity in New York v. United States.
The distinction the Court discarded as unworkable in the
field of tax immunity has proved no more fruitful in the field
of regulatory immunity under the Commerce Clause. Neither do any of the alternative standards that might be em8
That concern was especially weighty in South Carolina because liquor
taxes, the object of the dispute in that case, then accounted for over onefourth of the Federal Government's revenues. See New York v. United
States, 326 U. S. 572, 598, n. 4 (1946) (dissenting opinion).
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ployed to distinguish between protected and unprotected
governmental functions appear manageable. We rejec! ed
the possibility of making immunity turn on a purelx_ hist2._r1cal
sta~" in Long Island, and properly so. The
most obvious defect of a h~ch to state immunity is that it prevents a court from accommodating changes
in the historical functions of States, changes that h~ve resulted in a number of once-private functions like education
being assumed by the States and their subdivisions. 9 At the
same time, the only apparent virtue of a rigorous historical
standard, namely, its promise of a reasonably objective measure for state immunity, is illusory. Reliance on history as an
organizing principle results in linedra~bi
tr~
e IS
s a e governmental
nc ions
stretches over a historical continuum from before the Revolution to the present, and courts would have to decide by fiat
pi:_eciself how longstanding a pa e o s a e
o
ent
had to oe for federal regulatory authority to be defeated. 10
Indeed, the "traditional" nature of a particular governmental function
can be a matter of historical nearsightedness; today's self-evidently "traditional" function is often yesterday's suspect innovation. Thus, National
League of Cities offered the provision of public parks and recreation as an
example of a traditional governmental function. 426 U. S. , at 851. A
scant 80 years earlier, however, in Shoemaker v. United States, 147 U. S.
282 (1893), the Court pointed out that city commons originally had been
provided not for recreation but for grazing domestic animals "in common,"
and that "[i]n the memory of men now living, a proposition to take private
property [by eminent domain] for a public park . . . would have been regarded as a novel exercise of legislative power." ld., at 297.
1
°For much the same reasons, the existence vel non of a tradition of federal involvement in a particular area does not provide an adequate standard for state immunity. Most of the Federal Government's current regulatory activ_ity~nated less than 0 years ago with the New ea , and a
good portion of 1t has develOpea witliin the past two decades. The recent
vintage of this regulatory activity does not diminish the strength of the federal interest in applying regulatory standards to state activities, nor does it ~
affect the stren
of the States' interest in being free from federa su er- )
vis1on.
!though the o s intergovernmental tax 1mmumfy dec18lons
ostensibly have subjected particular state activities to federal taxation be9
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{j) A

onhistorica standard for selecting immune governmenta fun
s 1s 1 ely to 11& just as unworkable as is a historical standard. The goal ~denti ng umque y_' govern-G J
mental functions, for example, has been r cte by the
Court in the field of government tort liability in part because
the notion of a "uniquely" governmental function is unmanageable. See Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U. S.
61, 64-68 (1955); see also Lafayette v. Louisiana Power &
Light Co., 435 U. S. 389, 433 (1978) (dissenting opinion).
· · ity would be to confine immunity toCnfa~- (j)
he
sa " overnmenta serv1
that is, services that wou
e
prov1 e ma equa e o not at all unless the government
provided them. Cf. Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U. S., at
172. The set of servjces that fits into this category, however, may well be negligible. The fact that an unregulated
market produces less of some service than a State deems desirable does not mean that the State itself must provide the
service; in most if not all cases, the State can "contract out"
by hiring private firms to provide the service or simply by
providing subsidies to existing suppliers. It also is open to
question how well equipped courts are to make this kind of
determination about the workings of economic markets.
We believe, however, that there is a more fundamental
problem at work here, a problem that explains w}lyt:lie"Cou rt
was never able to provide a basis for the
governmental/proprietary distinction in the intergovernmencause those activities "ha[ve] been traditionally within [federal taxing]
~J7~~
power from the beginning," New York v. United States, 326 U. S. , at 588 /)
_J _
....,
(Stone, C. J. , concurring, joined by Reed, Murphy, and Burton, JJ.), the /-,--v-~
Court has not in fact required federal taxes to have long historical records
in order to be effective. The income tax at issue in Powers, supra, took
effect less than a decade before the tax years for which it was challenged,
while the federal tax whose application was upheld in New York v. United
States took effect in 1932 and was rescinded less than two years later. See
Helvering v. Powers, 293 U. S., at 222; Rakestraw, The Reciprocal Rule of
Governmental Tax Immunity-A Legal Myth, 11 Fed. Bar J. 3, 34, n. 116
(1950).

:='".J
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tal tax immunity cases and why an attempt to draw similar
distinctions with respect to federal regulatory authority
under National League of Cities is unlikely to succeed regardless of how the distinctions are phrased. The ,2!0blem_is Th-e.- ~
that neither the governmental/proprietary distinCtion nor
J..- 7-L-tJ)
any other that purports to separate out important governmental functions can be faithful to the role of federalism in a ~ ~ ~
democratic society. The essence of our feder~ is ~ ~
thatwitliliithe realm of authority left open to them under the ~ 4
Constitution, the States must be equally free to engage in 1 ,
any activity that their citizens choose for the common weal, ~ ~
no matter how unorthodox or unnecessary anyone else-in- ~/~ ~ /J. ~
"\)
eluding the judiciary-deems state involvement to be. Any tf -~ ~
rule of state immunity that looks to the "traditional," "i~
g!!ll," or "necessary" nature of governmental functions inevitably invites an unelec d federal judiciary to make decisions
about w~olicies it avors an w ic ones it 1slikes.
___,
"The science of government . . . is the science of experiment," Anderson v. Dun
04, 226 (1821), and the
..L dJ. 112
States cannot serve as boratories !' social and economic 4 f3 JAJ- h ·' 1 '_;J
ex~ see New S
ce
v. Liebmann, 2'8~ U. S. ..) ~ ~
262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), if they must pay an ~ 1
added price when they meet the changing needs of their citi·
zenry by taking up functions that an earlier day and a differ.:::;
ent society left in private hands. In the words of Justice
Black:
"There is not, and there cannot be, any unchanging
line of demarcation between essential and non-essential
governmental functions. Many governmental functions
of today have at some time in the past been non-governmental. The genius of our government provides that,
within the sphere of constitutional action, the peopleacting not through the courts but through their elected
le 'slative representatives-have the power to determine as con 1tions emand, what services and functions
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the public welfare requires." Helvering v. Gerhardt,
304 U. S., at 427 (concurring opinion).
We therefore now reject, as unsound in principle and unworkable in practice;a-ruled?f. state ~unj,ty from federal
regulation that turns on a~ Ic~:~~sal of whether a particular governmental funC1on Yslllfegi?al" or "traditional."
Any such rule leads to inconsistent results at the same time
that it 'disserves principles of democratic self- overnance
and it breeds1nconsistency precise y ecause it is divorced
from those principles. If there are to be limits on the Federal Government's power to interfere with state functionsas undoubtedly there are-we must look elsewhere to find
them. We accordingly return to the underlying issue that
confronted this Court inNational League of Cities-the manner in which the Constitution insulates States from the reach
of Congress' power under the Commerce Clause.

III
The central theme of National League of Cities was that
the States occupy a special position in our constitutional system and that the scope of Congress' authority under the
Commerce Clause must reflect that position. Of course, the
Commerce Cl use b · s s e · c langua e does not provide
any special limitation on Congress' ac Ions wit respect to the
States. See "EEOc v. Wyoming, 460 U. S. 226, 248 (1983)
(concurring opinion). It is equally true, however, that the
text of the Constitution provides the beginning rather than
the final answer to every inquiry into questions of federalism,
for "[b ]ehind the words of the constitutional provisions are
postulates which limit and control." Monaco v. Mississippi,
292 U. S. 313, 322 (1934). National League of Cities reflected the general conviction that the Constitution precludes
"the National Government [from] devour[ing] the essentials
of state sovereignty." Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U. S., at 205
(dissenting opinion). In order to be faithful to the underly-
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ing federal premises of the Constitution, courts must look for
the "postulates which limit and control."
What has proved problematic is not the perception that the
Constitution's federal structure imposes limitations on the
Commerce Clause, but rather the nature and content of those
limitations. One approach to defining the limits on Congress' authority to regulate the States under the Commerce
·Clause is to identify certain underlying elements of political
sovereignty that are deemed essential to the States' "separate and independent existence." Lane County v. Oregon, 7
Wall. 71, 76 (1869). This approach obviously underlay the
Court's use of the "traditional governmental function" concept in National League of Cities. It also has led to the separate requirement that the challenged federal statute "address matters that are indisputably 'attribute[s] of state
sovereignty."' Hodel, 452 U. S., at 288, quoting National
League of Cities, 426 U. S., at 845. In National League of
Cities itself, for example, the Court concluded that decisions •'
by a State concerning the wages an ours f its emplo ees ~~ 0
are an un ou e a ribu~ e sovereignty." 426 ~ ~ ~
U~, at 845. The opinion did not explain ·what aspects of
such decisions made them such an "undoubted attribute," and ~J!...L-t...
the Court since then has remarked on the uncertain scope of
the concept. See EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U. S., at 238,
n. 11. The point of the inquiry, however, has remained to
single out particular features of a State's internal governance
that are deemed to be intrinsic parts of state sovereignty.
We doubt that courts ultimately can identify principled
constitutional limitations on the scope of Congress' Commerce Clause powers over the States merely by relying on a
priori definitions of state sovereignty. In part, this is because of the elusiveness of objective criteria for "fundamental" elements of state sovereignty, a problem we have
witnessed in the search for "tra · ·
ental functions." There is, however, mor
ndamental reaso :the
sovereignty of the States is limited by the Constitution Itself.
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A variety of sovereign powers, for example, are withdrawn
from the States by Article I, § 10. Section 8 of the same Article works an equally sharp contraction of state sovereignty
by authorizing Congress to exercise a wide range of legislative powers and (in conjunction with the Supremacy Clause
of Article VI) to displace contrary state legislation. "'See
Hodel, 452 U. S., at 290-292. By providing for final review
of questions of federal law in this Court, Article III curtails
the sovereign power of the States' judiciaries to make authoritative determinations of h:fw. See Mailfn v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304 (1816). Finally, the developed application,
l?v; ~/L::
through the Fourteenth Amendment, of the greater part of
~r~
the Bill of Rights to tile mires"11mits the sovereign authority
that States otherwise would possess to legislate with respect
~
to their citizens and to conduct their own affairs.
The States unquestionably do "retai[n] a significant meas- ~
ure of soverei authority." boc v. Wyoming, 460 U. S.,
at 269 (
ELL, , dissenting). They do so, however, only .,~
to the exten t at the Constitution has not divested them of ~
their original powers and transferred those powers to the
Federal Government. In the words of James Madison to the
l--t-~~~
Members of the First Congress: "Interference with the
power of the States was no constitutional criterion of the
- 2D
power of Congress. If ~w~l" wa~ no~ given, Congress
could not exercise it;- ii given~xercise 1t, althougl1ifsliOuidTriterfere with the laws, or even the Constitution of the States." 2 Annals of Cong. 1897 (1791).
Justice Field made the same point in the course of his defense
of state autonomy in his dissenting opinion in Baltimore &
Ohio R. Co. v. Baugh, 149 U. S. 368, 401 (1893), a defense
quoted with approval in Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S.

f-

~~ ·

f

64, 78-79 (1938):

"[T]he Constitution of the United States ... recognizes and preserves the autonomy and independence of
tlie a es-m ependence in their legislative and independence in their judicial departments. [Federal] [s]u-
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pervision over either the legislative or t judicial action
of the States is in no case permissibl except as to matters by the Constitutio s ec1 call uthorized or delegated to the United States. A ny interference with
either, except as thus permitted, is an invasion of the authority of the State and, to that extent, a denial of its
independence."
As a result, to say that the Constitution assumes the continued role of the States is to say little about the nature of
that role. Only recently, this Court recognized that the purpose of the constitutional immunity recognized in National
League of Cities is not to preserve "a sacred province of state
autonomy." EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U. S., at 236. With
rare exce tions like the guarantee, in Article IV, § ~
s ate territorial integrit the Constit~oes not carve_g.u t
ex ress e emen s o s ate soverei t
on ess rna not
em loy its el ate powers to dis lace. James Wilson reminde the Pennsylvania ratifying convention in 1787: "It is
true, indeed, sir, although it presupposes the existence of
state governments, yet this Constitution does not suppose
them to be the sole power to be respected." 2 Debates in the
Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal
Constitution 439 (J. Elliot 2d ed. 1876) (Elliot). The power
of the Federal Government is a "power to be respected" as
well, and the fact that the States remain sovereign as to all
powers not vested in Congress or denied them by the Constitution offers no guidance about where the frontier between
state and federal power lies. In short, we have no license to
employ freestanding conceptions of state sovereignty when
measuring congressional authority under the Commerce
Clause.
When we look for the States' "residuary and inviolable sov~ty," The Federalist No. 39, p.
. Wnght e . 1961)
(J. Madison), in the shape of the constitutional scheme rather
than in predetermined notions of sovereign power, a different
measure of state sovereignty emerges. Apart from the limi-

J

I~
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~AAA~~--~ ~~
VY,.__- · t ation -on federal authority inherent in the dele ated nature
/'\ of Con ess Article I ower , e prmcipal means chosen oy ~
the Framers to ensure the role of the States in the federal ~
system lies in the tructure of the Federal Government itself.
-v'v-~
It is no novelty t o se e that the composition of the Federal Government was designed in large part to protect the L'k-L+v-b-- ,.._
States from overreaching by Congress. 11 The Framers thus
cO-( /2~
gave the States a role in the selection both of the Executive
C~~
and the egis atlve ranches o the Fooeral Government.
The States were vested with indirect influence over the
lA-/1-HJ~I:!]
House of Representatives and the Presidency by their control of electoral qualifications and their role in presidential ~~~~~
elections. U. S. Const., Art. I, § 2, and Art. II, § 1. They
were given more direct influence in the Senate, where each
State received equal representation and each Senator was to
be selected by the legislature of his State. Art. I, § 3. The
significance attached to the States' equal representation in
the Senate is underscored by the prohibition of any constitutional amendment divesting a State of equal representation
without the State's consent. Art. V.
The extent to which the structure of the Federal Government itself was relied on to insulate the interests of the
States is evident in the views of the Framers. James Madison explained that the Federal Government "will partake sufficiently of the spirit [of the States], to be disinclined to in~
vade the rights of the individual States, or the prerogatives ~
of their governments." The Federalist No. 46, p. 332 (B. ~
Wright ed. 1961). Similarly, James Wilson observed that "it ~ ~
was a favorite object in the Convention" to provide for the
~-. · _- ~ J
security of the States against federal encroachment and that ~ ~~

?

See, e. g., J. Choper, Judicial Review and the National Political Process 175-184 (1980); Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The
Role of the States in the Composition and Selectwlr orthe N a'tiumrl. Government, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 543 (1954); La Pierre, The Political Safeguards of
Federalism Redux: Intergovernmental Immunity and the States as Agents
of the Nation, 60 Wash. U. L. Q. 779 (1982).
11

~~
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the structure of the Federal Government itself served that
end. 2 Elliot, at 438-439. Madison placed particular reliance on the equal representation of the States in the Senate,
which he saw as "at once a constitutional recognition of the
portion of sovereignty remaining in the individual States, and
an instrument for preserving that residuary sovereignty."
The Federalist No. 62, p. 408 (B. Wright ed. 1961). He further note~esiduary sovereignty of the States [is]
implied and secured by that principle of representation in one
branch of the [federal] legislature" (emphasis added). The
Federalis~ p. 315 (B. Wright ed. 1961).
See also
M'Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 435 (1819). In short,
the Framers chose to rely on a federal system in which special restraints on federal power over the States inhered principally in the workings of the National Government itself,
rather than in discrete limitations on the objects of federal
authority. State sovereign interests, then, are more properly protected by procedural safeguards inherent in the
structure of the federal system than by judicially created
limitations on federal power.
.
The effec_!jveness of the federal political process in preserv- ~
~
ing the States' interests is apparent even today in the course
of federal legislation. On the one hand, the States have been
~
able to direct a substantial proportion of federal revenues
~--- ~ . _
into their own treasuries in the form of general and program/~' --~
specific grants in aid. The federal role in assisting state and
"-1:.....-local govern!!lents is a longstandfngo ne; Congress provided
~La _,. .....
#--..
federal land grants to finance state governments from the ber-r---r~
ginning of the Republic, and direct cash grants were awarded
as early as 1887 under the Hatch Act. 12 In the past quartercentury alone, federal grants to States and localities have

7

A

12
See, e. g., A. Howitt, Managing Federalism: Studies in Intergovernmental Relations 3-18 (1984); Break, Fiscal Federalism in the United
States: The First 200 Years, Evolution and Outlook, in The Future of Federalism in the 1980s, pp. 39-54 (July 1981).

.•
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grown from $7 billion to $96 billion. 13 As a result, federal
grants now account for about one-fifth of state and local government expenditures. 14 The States have obtained federal
funding for such services as police and fire protection, education, public health and hosl![tals, parks and recreation,alld
sanitation. r~oreover, at the same time that the Stat~s
have exercised their influence to obtain federal support, they
have been able to exempt themselves from a wide variet of
obligations Impose
y
s under the Commerce
ause.
or examp e, t e Federal Power Act, the National
Labor Relations Act, the Labor-Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act, the Occupational Safety and Health Act, the
Employee Retirement Insurance Security Act, and the Sherman Act all contain express or implied exemptions for States
and their subdivisions. 16 The fact that some federal statutes
13

A. Howitt, supra, at 8; Bureau of the Census, U. S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Federal Expenditures by State for Fiscal
Year 1983, p. 2 (1984) (Census, Federal Expenditures); Division of Government Accounts and Reports, Fiscal Service-Bureau of Government Financial Operations, Dept. of the Treasury, Federal Aid to States: Fiscal
Year 1982, p. 1 (1983 rev. ed.).
14
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Significant
Features of Fiscal Federalism 120, 122 (1984).
15
See, e. g., the Federal Fire Prevention and Control Act of 1974, 88
Stat. 1535, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 2201 et seq.; the Urban Park and
Recreation Recovery Act of 1978, 92 Stat. 3538, 16 U. S. C. § 2501 et seq.;
the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 27, as
amended, 20 U. S. C. § 2701 et seq.; the Water Pollution Control Act, 62
Stat. 1155, as amended, 33 U. S. C. § 1251 et seq.; the Public Health Service Act, 58 Stat. 682, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 201 et seq.; the Safe Drinking Water Act, 88 Stat. 1660, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 300f et seq.; the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 197, as
amended, 42 U. S. C.§ 3701 et seq.; the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, 88 Stat. 633, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 5301 et seq.; and
the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974, 88 Stat.
1109, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 5601 et seq. See also Census, Federal Expenditures, at 2-15.
16
See 16 U. S. C. § 824(f); 29 U. S. C. § 152(2); 29 U. S. C. § 402(e); 29
U. S. C. § 652(5); 29 U. S. C. §§ 1003(b)(l), 1002(32); and Parker v. Brown,
317 u. s. 341 (1943).

.....
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such as the FLSA extend general obligations to the States
cannot obscure the extent to which the political position of
the States in the federal system has served to minimize the
burdens that the States bear under the Commerce Clause. 17
We realize that changes in the structure of the Federal
Government have taken place since 1789, not the least of
which has been the substitution of popular election of Senators by the adoption of the Seventeenth Amendment in 1913,
and that these changes may work to alter the influence of the
States in the federal political process. 18 Nonetheless, }
against this background, we are convinced that the fundamental limitation that the constitutional scheme imposes- on
the Commerce Clause to protect the "States as States" is one
of process rather than one of result. Any substantiverestraint on the exercise of Commerce Clause powers must find
its justification in the procedural nature of this basic limitation, and it must be tailored to compensate for possible
failings in the national political process rather than to dictate
a "sacred province of state autonomy." EEOC v. Wyoming,
460 U. S., at 236.
Insofar as the present cases are concerned, then, we need
go no further than to state that we erceive nothin 1 the
overtime and minimum-wa e re. uiremen s of th
LSA, as
apphe o AMTA, a is destructive of state sover i ty or
violative of any constltu 10na provision. SAMTA faces
nothing more than the same minimum-wage and overtime ob~----~,__-

Even as regards the FLSA, Congress incorporated special provisions
concerning overtime pay for law enforcement and firefighting personnel
when it amended the FLSA in 1974 in order to take account of the special
concerns of States and localities with respect to these positions. See 29
U. S. C. § 207(k). Congress also declined to impose any obligations on
state and local governments with respect to policymaking personnel who
are not subject to civil service laws. See 29 U. S. C. § 203(e)(2)(C)(i) and
(ii).
18
See, e. g., Choper, supra, at 177-178; Kaden, Politics, Money, and
State Sovereignty: The Judicial Role, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 847, 860-868
(1979).
17
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ligations that hundreds of thousands of other employers, public as well as private, have to meet.
In these cases, the status of public mass transit simply underscores the extent to which the structural protections of
the Constitution insulate the States from federally imposed
burdens. When Congress first subjected state mass-transit
systems to FLSA obligations in 1966, and when it expanded
those obligations in 1974, it simultaneously provided extensive funding for state and local mass transit through UMTA.
In the two decades since its enactment, UMTA has provided
over $22 billion in mass transit aid to States and localities. 19
In 1983 alone, UMTA funding amounted to $3.7 billion. 2Q As
noted above, SAMTA and its immediate predecessor have received a substantial amount of UMTA funding, including over
$12 million during SAMTA's first two fiscal years alone. In
short, Congress has not simply placed a financial burden on
the shoulders of States and localities that operate mass-transit systems, but has provided substantial countervailing financial assistance as well, assistance t at may leave individualmass transit systems better off than they would have
been had Congress never intervened at all in the area. Congress' treatment of public mass transit reinforces our conviction that the national political process systematically protects
States from the risk of having their functions in that area
handicapped by Commerce Clause regulation. 21
See Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1983: Hearings before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on
Appropriations, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 808 (1982) (fiscal years
1965-1982); Census, Federal Expenditures 15 (fiscal year 1983).
20
Census, Federal Expenditures 15.
21
Our references to UMTA are not meant to imply that regulation under
the Commerce Clause must be accompanied by countervailing financial
benefits under the Spending Clause. The application of the FLSA to
SAMTA would be constitutional even had Congress not provided federal
funding under UMTA.
19

..
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IV

•

This analysis makes clear that Congress' action in affording
SAMTA employees the protections of the wage and hour provisions of the FLSA contravened no affirmative limit on Congress' 2ower under the Commerce Clause. The judgment of
the District Court must therefore be reversed.
Of course, we continue to recognize that the States occupy
a special and specific position in our constitutional system and
tha~ess' authority under the Commerce
Clause must reflect that position. But the principal and
basic limit on the federal commerce ower is thatmherent in
all congressiOnal action-the built-in restraints that our system provides through state participation in federal governmental action. The political process ensures that laws that ~ ~/
unduly burden the St~s wilt- not -9e-promutgated:-1n the )
factu:tt-s"etting-of-i
ards of the
political process have performed as intended.
This case does not require us to identify or define what affirmative limits the constitutional structure might impose on
federal action affecting the States under the Commerce
Clause. See Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U. S. 559 (1911). We
note and accept Justice Frankfurter's observation in New
York -v. United States, 326 U. S. 572, 583 (1946):
"The process of Constitutional adjudication does not
thrive on conjuring up horrible possibilities that never
happen in the real world and devising doctrines sufficiently comprehensive in detail to cover the remotest
contingency. Nor need we go beyond what is required
for a reasoned disposition of the kind of controversy now
before the Court."
Though the separate concurrence providing the fifth vote
in National League of Cities was "not untroubled by certain
possible implications" of the decision, 426 U. S., at 856, the
Court in that case attempted to articulate affirmative limits
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on the Commerce Clause power in terms of core governmental functions and fundamental attributes of state sovereignty. But the model of democratic decisionmaking the
Court there identified underestimated, in our view, the solici- ~
tude of the national olitical rocess for the continued ~y
of t e Sfates. Attempts y ot er courts sm
en o draw
gulaance om this model have proved it both impracticable
and doctrinally barren. In sum, in National League of Cities the Court tried to repair what did not need repair.
We do not lightly overrule recent precedent. 22 We have
not hesitated, however, when it has become apparent that a
prior decision has departed from a proper understanding of
congressional power under the Commerce Clause. See
United States v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100, 116-117 (1941). Due
respect for the reach of congressional power within the federal system mandates that we do so now.
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U. S. 833 (1976), is
overruled. The judgment of the District Court is reversed,
and these cases are remanded to that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.

5

I

22

But see United States v. Scott, 437 U. S. 83, 86-87 (1978).
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JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting.
The Court today, in its 5-4 decision, overrules National
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U. S. 833 (1976), a case in
which we held that Congress lacked authority to impose the
requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act on state and
local governments. Because I believe this decision substantially alters the federal system embodied in the Constitution,
I dissent.
I
There are, of course, numerous examples over the history
of this Court in which prior decisions have been reconsidered
and overruled. There have been few cases, however, in
which the principle of stare decisis and the rationale of recent
decisions were ignored as abruptly as we now witness. 1 The
1
National League of Cities, following some changes in the composition
of the Court, had overruled Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U. S. 183 (1968). Un-

...
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reasoning of the Court in National League of Cities, and the
principle applied there, have been reiterated consistently
over the past eight years. Since its decision in 1976, National League of Cities has been cited and quoted in opinions
joined by every member of the present Court. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reel. Assn., 452 U. S. 264, 287-293
(1981); United Transportation Union v. Long Island R. R.,
455 U. S. 678, 684-686 (1982); FERC v. Mississippi, 456
U. S. 742, 764-767 (1982). Less than three years ago, in
Long Island R. R., supra, a unanimous Court reaffirmed the
principles of National League of Cities but found them inapplicable to the regulation of a railroad heavily engaged in interstate commerce. The Court stated:
"The key prong of the National League of Cities test
applicable to this case is the third one [repeated and
reformulated in Hodel], which examines whether 'the ·
states' compliance with the federal law would directly
impair their ability to structure integral operations in
areas of traditional governmental functions."
455 U. S., at 684. The Court in that case recognized that the
test "may at times be a difficult one," ibid., but it was considered in that unanimous decision as settled constitutional
doctrine.
As recently as June 1, 1982 the five Justices who constitute
the majority in this case also were the majority in FERC v.
Mississippi. In that case, the Court said:
"In National League of Cities, supra, for example, the
Court made clear that the State's regulation of its relationship with its employees is an 'undoubted attribute of
state sovereignty.' 426 U. S., at 845. Yet, by holding
'unimpaired' California v. Taylor, 353 U. S. 553 (1957),
which upheld a federal labor regulation as applied to
state railroad employees, 426 U. S., at 854. n. 18, N alike National League of Cities, the rationale of Wirtz had not been repeatedly accepted by our subsequent decisions.
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tional League of Cities acknowledged that not all aspects
of a State's sovereign authority are immune from federal
control."
426 U. S., at 764 n. 28.

The Court went on to say that even
where the requirements of the National League of Cities
standard are met, "'[t]here are situations in which the nature
of the federal interest advanced may be such that it justifies
state submission."' Ibid., quoting Hodel, supra, 452 U. S. ,
at 288 n. 29. The joint federaVstate system of regulation in
FERC was such a "situation," but there was no hint in the
Court's opinion that National League of Cities-or its basic
standard-was subject to the infirmities discovered today.
The doctrine of stare decisis is never entirely persuasive on
a constitutional question. City of Akron v. Akron Center for
Reproductive Health, 462 U. S. 416, - - (1983). Nevertheless, even in such a case, a "departure from the doctrine of
stare decisis demands special justification." Arizona v.
Rumsey , - - U. S.--, - - (1984). See also Oregon v.
Kennedy, 456 U. S. 667, 691-69;,n. 34 (1982) (STEVENS, J ..
concurring). In the present case, the five JUstices who compose the majority today participated in National League of
Cities and the cases reaffirming it. 2 The stability of judicial
decision, and with it respect for the authority of this Court,
are not served by the precipitous overruling of multiple precedents that we witness in this case. 3

1

2
JUSTICE O'CONNOR, the only new member ~e Court since our decision in National League of Cities , has joined the Court in reaffirming its
principles. See United Transportation Union v. Long Island R. Co., 455
U. S. 678 (1982) , and FERC v. Mississippi , 456 U. S. 742, 775 (1982)
(O'CONNOR, J., dissenting in part).
3
As we observed recently, "stare decisis is a doctrine that demands respect in a society governed by the rule of law." City of Akron v. Akron
Center for Reproductive Health , Inc.,- U. S . - (1983). In this respect, stare decisis represents "a natural evolution from the very nature of
our institutions." Lile, "Some Views on the Rule of Stare Decisis," 4 Va.
L. Rev. 955, 956 (1916).
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Whatever effect the Court's decision may have in weakening the application of stare decisis, it is likely to be less
important than what the Court has done to the Constitution
itself. A unique feature of the United States is the federal
system of government guaranteed by the Constitution and
implicit in the very name of our country. Despite some
genuflecting in Court's opinion to the concept of federalism,
today's decision effectively reduces the Tenth Amendment to
meaningless rhetoric when Congress acts pursuant to the
Commerce Clause. The Court holds that the Fair Labor
Standards Act ["FLSA"] "contravened no affirmative limit
on Congress' power under the Commerce Clause" to determine the. wage rates and hours of employment of all state and
local employees. Ante, at 27. In rejecting the traditional
view of our federal system, the Court states:
"Apart from the limitation on federal authority inherent
in the delegated nature of Congress' Article I powers,
the principal means chosen by the Framers to ensure the
role of the states in the federal system lies in the structure of the Federal Government itself."
Ante, at 21-22 (emphasis added).
To leave no doubt about its intention, the Court renounces
its decision in National League of Cities because it "inevitably invites an unelected federal judiciary to make decisions about which state policies its favors and which ones it
dislikes." Ante, at 17. In other words, the extent to which
the States may exercise their authority, when Congress purports to act under the Commerce Clause, henceforth is to be
detennined from time to time by political decisions made by
members of the federal government, decisions the Court says
will not be subject to judicial review. I note that it does· not
seem to have occurred to the Court that it-an unelected majority of five Justices-today rejects almost 200 years of the
understanding of the constitutional status of federalism. In
doing so, there is only a single passing reference to the Tenth
Amendment. Nor is so much as a dictum of any court cited

..

82-1913 & 82-1951-DISSENT
GARCIA v. SAN ANTONIO METRO. TRANSIT AUTH.

5

in support of the view that the role of the States in the fed-

eral system may depend upon the grace of elected federal officials, rather than on the Constitution as interpreted by this
Court.
In my opinion that follows, Part II addresses the Court's
criticisms of National League of Cities. Part III reviews
briefly the understanding of federalism that ensured the ratification of the Constitution and the extent to which this
Court, until today, has recognized that the States retain a
signficant measure of sovereignty in our federal system.
Part IV considers the applicability of the FLSA to the indisputably local service provided by an urban transit system.
II
The Court finds that the. test of State immunity approved
in National League of Cities and its progeny is unworkable
and unsound in principle. In finding the test to be unworkable, the Court begins by mischaracterizing National League
of Cities and subsequent cases. In concluding that efforts to
define state immunity are unsound in principle, the Court
radically departs from long settled constitutional values and
ignores the role of judicial review in our system of
government.
A
Much of the Court's opinion is devoted to arguing that it is
difficult to define a priori "traditional governmental functions." National League of Cities neither engaged in, nor
required, such a task. • The Court discusses and condemns
' In National League of Cities, we referred to the sphere of state sovereignty as including "traditional governmental functions," a realm which is,
of course, difficult to define with precision. But the luxury of precise 'definitions is one rarely enjoyed in interpreting and applying the general provisions of our Constitution. Not surprisingly, therefore, the Court's attempt to demonstrate the impossibility of definition is unhelpful. A
number of the cases it cites simply do not involve the problem of defining
governmental functions. E. g., Williams v. Eastside Mental Health Center, Inc., 669 F. 2d 671 (CAll), cert. denied, 459 U. S. 976 (1982); Friends
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as standards "traditional governmental function[s]," "purely
historical" functions, "'uniquely' governmental functions,"
and "'necessary' governmental services." Ante, at 10-11,
15, 16. But nowhere does it mention that National League
of Cities adopted a familiar type of balancing test for determining whether Commerce Clause enactments transgress
constitutional limitations imposed by the federal nature of
our system of government. This omission is noteworthy,
since the author of today's opinion joined National League of
Cities and concurred separately to point out that the Court's
opinion in that case "adopt[s] a balancing approach [that]
does not outlaw federal power in areas . . . where the federal
interest is demonstrably greater and where state ... compliance with imposed federal standards would be essential."
426 U. S., at 856 (BLACKMUN, J., concurring).
In reading National League of Cities to embrace a balancing approach, JUSTICE BLACKMUN quite correctly cited the
part of the opinion that reaffirmed Fry v. United States, 421
U. S. 542 (1975). The Court's analysis reaffirming Fry explicitly weighed the seriousness of the problem addressed by
the federal legislation at issue in that case, against the effects
of compliance on State sovereignty. 426 U. S., at 852-853.
Our subsequent decisions also adopted this approach of
of the Earth v. Carey , 552 F. 2d 25 (CA2), cert. denied, 434 U. S. 902
(1977). A number of others are not properly analyzed under the principles
of National League of Cities , notwithstanding some of the language of the
lower courts. E. g., United States v. Best, 573 F. 2d 1095 (CA91978~
Hybud Equipment Corp. v. City of Akron , 654 F. 2d 1187 (CA6 1981).
Moreover, rather than carefully analyzing the case law, the Court simply
lists various functions thought to be protected or unprotected by courts interpreting National League of Cities. Ante, at 9-10. In the cited cases,
however, the courts considered the issue of State immunity on the specific
facts at issue; they did not make blanket pronouncements that particular
things inherently qualified as traditional governmental functions or did not.
Having thus considered the cases out of context, it was not difficult for the
Court to conclude that there is no "organizing principle" among them. See
ante, at 10.

,
.}

82-1913 & 82-1951-DISSENT
GARCIA v. SAN ANTONIO METRO. TRANSIT AUTH.

7

weighing the respective interests of the States and federal
government. 5 In EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U. S. 226 (1983),
for example, the Court stated that "[t]he principle of immunity articulated in National League of Cities is a functional
doctrine ... whose ultimate purpose is not to create a sacred
province of state autonomy, but to ensure that the unique
benefits of a federal system . . . not be lost through undue
federal interference in certain core state functions." I d., at
236. See also Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U. S. 264 (1981). In overruling National League of Cities, the Court incorrectly characterizes
the mode of analysis established therein and developed in
subsequent cases. 6

•

In undertaking such balancing, we have considered , on the one hand,
the strength of the federal interest in the challenged legislation and the impact of exempting the States from its reach. Central to our inquiry into
the federal interest is how closely the challenged action implicate~ the central concerns of the Commerce Clause , viz., the promotion of a national
economy and free trade among the states. See EEOC v. Wyoming, 460
U. S. 226, 244 (STEVENS, J ., concurring). See also, for example, United
Transportation Union v. Long Island Rail Road Co., 455 U. S. 678, 688
(1982) ("Congress long ago concluded that federal regulation of railroad
labor services is necessary to prevent disruptions in vital rail service essential to the national economy."); FERC v. Mississippi , 456 U. S. 742, 757
(1982), ("it is difficult to conceive of a more basic element of interstate commerce than electric energy . ... "). Similarly, we have considered
whether exempting States from federal regulation would undermine the
goals of the federal program. S e Fr;J,qV~ Qnited States, 421 U. S. 542
(1975). See also Hodel 452 U. S~" 282}hatibhal surface mining standard
necessary to insure compet1tion amon tates does not un ermine States'
efforts to maintain adequate intrastate standards). On the other hand, we
have also assessed the injury done to the States if forced to comply with
federal Commerce Clause enactments. See National League of Cities·, 426
U. S., at 846-851.
'In addition, reliance on the Court's difficulties in the tax immunity
field is misplaced. Although the Court has abandoned the "governmental/proprietary" distinction in this field, see New York v. United
States, 326 U. S. 572 (1946), it has not taken the drastic approach of relying
solely on the structure of the federal government to protect the States' im6
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Moreover, the statute at issue in this case, the FLSA, is
the identical statute that was at issue in National League of
Cities. Although JUSTICE BLACKMUN's concurrence noted
that he was "not untroubled by certain possible implications
of the Court's opinion" in National League of Cities, it also
stated that "the result with respect to the statute under challenge here [the FLSA] is necessarily correct." 426 U. S., at
856 (emphasis added). His opinion for the Court today does
not discuss the statute, nor identify any changed circumstances that warrant the conclusion today that National
League of Cities is necessarily wrong.
B
Today's opinion does not explain how the States' role in the
electoral process guarantees that particular exercises of the
Commerce Clause power will not infringe on residual State
sovereignty. 7 Members of Congress are elected from the
various States, but once in office they are members of the
munity from taxation. See Massachusetts v. United States , 435 U. S. 444
(1978). Thus, faced with an equally difficult problem of defining constitutional boundaries of federal action directly affecting the States, we did not
adopt the view many would think naive, that the federal government itself
will protect whatever rights the States may have.
7
Late in its opinion, the Court suggests that after all there may be some
"affirmative limits the constitutional structure might impose on federal action affecting the States under the Commerce Clause." Ante , at 27. The
Court asserts that "(i]n the factual setting of these cases the internal safeguards of the political process have performed as intended." Ibid . The
Court does not explain the basis for this judgment. Nor does it identify
the circumstances in which the "political process" may fail and "affirmative
limits" are to be imposed. Presumably, such limits are to be determined
by the Judicial Branch even though it is "unelected." Today's opi~ion ,
however, has rejected the balancing standard and suggests no other standard that would enable a court to determine when there has been a malfunction of the "political process." The Court's failure to specify the "affirmative limits" on federal power, or when and how these limits are to be
determined , may well be explained by the transparent fact that any such
attempt would be subject to precisely the same objections on which it relies
to overrule National League of Cities.

"p
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federal government. 8 Although the States participate in the
Electoral College, this is hardly a reason to view the President as a representative of the States' interest against federal encroachment. We noted recently "the hydraulic pressure inherent within each of the separate Branches to exceed
the outer limits of its power . . . . " Immigration and
Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U. S. 919, - (1983). The Court offers no reason to think that this pressure will not operate when Congress seeks to invoke its powers under the Commerce Clause, notwithstanding the electoral role of the States. 9
One can hardly imagine this Court saying that because Congress is
composed of individuals, individual rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights
are amply p~tected by the political process. Yet, the position adopted
today is indistinguishable in principle. The Tenth Amendment also is an
essential part of the Bill of Rights. See infra, at - -.
9
At one time in our history, the view that the structure of the federal
government sufficed to protect, the States might have had a somewhat
more practical, although not a more logical, basis. Professor Wechsler,
whose seminal article in 1954 proposed the view adopted by the Court today, predicated his argument on assumptions that simply do not accord
with current reality. Professor Wechsler wrote: "National action has ...
always been regarded as exceptional in our polity, an instrusion to be justified by some necessity , the special rather than the ordinary case."
Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States
in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 Colum.
L. Rev. 543, 544 (1954). Not only is the premise of this view clearly at
odds with the proliferation of national legislation over the past 30 years,
but "a variety of structural and political changes in this century have combined to make Congress particularly insensitive to state and local values."
Advisory Comm'n on Intergovernmental Relations [ACIR], Regulatory
Federalism: Policy, Process, Impact and Reform 50 (1984). The adoption
of the Seventeenth Amendment (providing for direct election of senators),
the weakening of political parties on the local level, and the rise of national
media, among other things, have made Congress increasingly less representative of State and local interests, and more likely to be responsive to
the demands of various national constituencies. !d., at 50-51. As one
observer explained, "As Senators and members of the House develop independent constituencies among groups such as farmers, businessmen, laborers, environmentalists, and the poor, each of which generally supports
8
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The Court apparently thinks that the States' success at
obtaining federal funds for various projects and exemptions
from the obligations of some federal statutes is indicative of
the "effectiveness of the federal political process in preserving the States' interests .... " Ante, at 23-24. 10 But
such political success is not relevant to the question whether
the political processes are the proper means of enforcing constitutional limitations. 11 The fact that Congress generally
certain national initiatives, their tendency to identify with state interests
and the positions of state officials is reduced. " Kaden, "Federalism in the
Courts: Agenda for the 1980s," in ACIR, The Future of Federalism in the
'80s, at 97 (1981).
See also Kaden , Politics, Money, and State Sovereignty: The Judicial
Role, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 847 (1979) (changes in political practices and the
breadth of national initiatives mean that the political branches "may no
longer be as well suited as they once were to the task of safeguarding the
role of the states in the federal system and protecting the fundamental
value of federalism") and ACIR, Regulatory Federalism, supra , at 1-24
(detailing the "dramatic shift" in kind of federal regulation applicable to the
States over the past two decades). Thus, even if one were to ignore the
numerous problems with the Court's position in terms of constitutional
theory, there would remain· serious questions as to its factual premises.
10
The Court believes that the significant financial assistance afforded the
States and localities by the federal government is relevant to the constitutionality of extending Commerce Clause enactments to the States. See
ante, at 23-24, 26. This Court has never held, however, that the mere
disbursement of funds by the federal government establishes a right to
control activities that benefit from such funds. See Pennhurst State
School v. Halderman , 451 U. S. 1, 17-18 (1981): Regardless of the willingness of the federal government to provide federal aid , the constitutional
question remains the same: whether the federal statute violates the sovereign powers reserved to the States by the Tenth Amendment.
11
Apparently in an effort to reassure the States, the Court identifies
several major statutes that thus far have not been made applicable to State
governments: the Federal Power Act, 16 U. S. C. 824(f); the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U. S. C. § 152(2); the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 29 U. S. C. § 402(e); the Occupational Safety
and Health Act, 29 U. S. C. § 652(5); the Employee Retirement Insurance
Security Act, 29 U. S. C. §§ 1002(32), 1003(b)(1); and the Sherman Act, 15
U. S. C. § 1, et seq ee Parker v. Brown, 317 U. S. 341 (1943). Ante, at
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does not transgress constitutional limits on its power to reach
State activities does not make judicial review any less necessary to rectify the cases in which it does do so. 12 The States'
role in our system of government is a matter of constitutional
law, not of legislative grace. "The powers not delegated to
the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to
the States, are reserved to the States, respectively, or to the
people." U. S. Const., Amend. 10.
More troubling than the logical infirmities in the Court's
reasoning is the result of its holding, i. e., that federal political officials, invoking the Commerce Clause, are the sole
judges of the limits of their own power. This result is inconsistent with the fundamental principles of our constitutional
system. See, e. g., The Federalist No. 78 (Hamilton). At
least since Marbury v. Madison it has been the settled province of the federal judiciary "to say what the law is" with respect to the constitutionality of acts of Congress. 1 Cranch
137, 177 (1803). In rejecting the role of the judiciary in protecting the States from federal overreaching, the Court's
opinion offers no explanation for ignoring the teaching of the
24. The Court does not suggest that this restraint will continue after its
decision here. Indeed, it is unlikely that special interest groups will fail to
accept the Court's open invitation to urge Congress to extend these and
other statutes to apply to the States and their local subdivisions.
12
This Court has never before abdicated responsibility for assessing the
constitutionality of challenged action on the ground that affected parties
theoretically are able to look out for their own interests through the electoral process. As the Court noted in National League of Cities , a much
stronger argument as to inherent structural protections could have been
made in either Buckley v. Valeo , 424 U. S. 1 (1976) or Myers v. United
States, 272 U. S. 52 (1926), than can be made here. In these cases, the
President signed legislation that limited his authority with respect to certain appointments and thus arguably ''it was no concern of this Court that
the law violated the Constitution." 426 U. S., at 841-842 n. 12. The
Court nevertheless held the laws unconstitutional because they infringed
on presidential authority, the President's consent notwithstanding. The
Court does not address this point; nor does it cite any authority for its contrary view.
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most famous case in our history. 13

III
A
In our federal system, the States have a major role that
cannot be preempted by the national government. As contemporaneous writings and the debates at the ratifying conventions make clear, the States' ratification of the Constitution was predicated on this understanding of federalism.
Indeed, the Tenth Amendment was adopted specifically to
ensure that the important role promised the States by the
proponents of the Constitution was realized.
Much of the initial opposition to the Constitution was
rooted in the fear that the national government would be too
powerful and eventually would eliminate the States as viable
political entities. This concern was voiced repeatedly until
proponents of the Constitution made assurances that a bill of
rights, including a prqvision explicitly reserving powers in
the States, would be among the first business of.the new Congress. Samuel Adams argued, for example, that if the several States were to be joined in "one entire Nation, under one
Legislature, the Powers of which shall extend to every Subject of Legislation, and its Laws be supreme & controul the
whole, the Idea of Sovereignty in these States must be lost."
The Court states that the decision in National League of Cities "invite[s] an unelected federal judiciary to make decisions about which state
policies it favors and which ones its dislikes." Curiously, the Court then
suggests that under the application of the "traditional" governmental function analysis, "the states cannot serve as laboratories for social and economic experiment." Ante, at 17, citing Justice Brandeis's famous observation in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U. S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting). Apparently the Court believes that when "an unelected
federal judiciary" makes decisions as to whether a particular function is one
for the federal or state governments, the States no longer may engage in
"social and economic experiment." Ante, at 17. The Court does not explain how leaving the States virtually at the mercy of the federal government, without recourse to judicial review, will enhance their opportunities
to experiment and serve as "laboratories."
13
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Letter from Samuel Adams to Richard Henry Lee (Dec. 3,
1787), reprinted in Anti-Federalists versus Federalists 159
(J. Lewis ed. 1967). Likewise, George Mason feared that
"the general government being paramount to, and in every
respect more powerful than the state governments, the latter
must give way to the former." Address in the Ratifying
Convention of Virginia (June 4-12, 1788), reprinted in AntiFederalists versus Federalists, supra, at 208-209.
Antifederalists raised these concerns in almost every State
ratifying convention. 14 See generally 1-~ebates in the
Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal
Constitution (J. Elliot 2d. Ad. 1854). As a result, eight
States voted for the Constitution only after proposing amendments to be adopted after ratification. 15 All eight of these included among their recommendations some version of what
later became the Tenth Amendment. Ibid. So strong was
the concern that the proposed Constitution was seriously defective without a specific bill of rights, including a provision
reserving powers to the States, that in order to secure the
votes for ratification, the Federalists eventually conceded
that such provisions were necessary. See Schwartz, The
Bill of Rights: A Documentary History, 505 and passim
(1971). It was thus generally agreed that consideration of a
bill of rights would be among the first business of the new
Congress. See generally 1 Annals of Congress 432-437
(June 8, 1789) (remarks of James Madison). Accordingly,
the ten amendments that we know as the Bill of Rights were

- ~

"Opponents of the Constitution were particularly dubious of the Federalists' claim that the States retained powers not delegated to the United
States in the absence of an express provision so providing. For example,
James Winthrop wrote that "[i]t is a mere fallacy .. . that what rights are
not given are reserved." Letters of Agrippa, reprinted in Schwartz, The
Bill of Rights: A Documentary Historyj--!_~1~0,~5~1~1~(1~97.!..:1~)·'-:-;-;-;--:-::-----:-::------11
Indeed, the Virginia legislature came very close to withholding ratification of the Constitution until the adoption of a bill of rights that included, among other things, the substance of the Tenth Amendment. See
Schwartz, The Bill of Rights, supra, at 762-766 and passim.

:..
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proposed and adopted early in the first session of the First
Congress. Schwartz, The Bill of Rights , supra, 983-1167.
This history, which the Court simply ignores, documents
the integral role of the Tenth Amendment in our constitutional theory. It exposes as well, I believe, the fundamental
character of the Court's error today. Far from being "unsound in principle," ante, at 18, judicial enforcement of the
Tenth Amendment is essential to maintaining the federal system so carefully designed by the Framers and adopted in the
Constitution.
B
The Framers had definite ideas about the nature of the
Constitution's division of authority between the federal and
state governments. In The Federalist No. 39, for example,
Madison explained this division by drawing a series of contrasts between the attributes of a "national" government and
those of the government to be established by the Constitution. While a national form of government would possess an
"indefinite supremacy over all persons and things," the form
of government contemplated by the Constitution instead consisted of "local or municipal authorities [which] form distinct
and independent portions of the supremacy, no more subject
within their respective spheres to the general authority than
the general authority is subject to them, within its own
sphere." The Federalist No. 39, p. 256 (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
Under the Constitution, the sphere of the proposed government extended to jurisdiction of "certain enumerated objects,
only, ... leav[ing] to the several States a residuary and inviolable sovereignty over all other objects." ld.
Madison elaborated on the content of these separate
spheres of sovereignty in The Federalist No. 45:
"The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution
to the Federal Government are few and defined. Those
which are to remain in the State Governments are numerous and indefinite. The former will be exercised
principally on external objects, as war, peace, negotia-

.,
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tion, and foreign commerce; . . . . The powers reserved
to the several States will extend to all the objects,
which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the
lives, liberties and properties of the people; and the internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the State."

I d., at 313. Madison considered that the operations of the
federal government would be "most extensive and important
in times of war and danger; those of the State Governments
in times of peace and security." Ibid. As a result of this
division of powers, the State governments generally would
be more important than the federal government. Ibid.
The Framers believed that the separate sphere of sovereignty reserved to the States would ensure that the States
would serve as an effective "counterpoise" to the power of
the federal government. The States would serve this essential role because they would attract and retain the loyalty- of
their citizens. The roots of such loyalty, the Founders
thought, were .found in the objects peculiar to State government. For example, Hamilton argued that the States "regulat[e] all those personal interests and familiar concerns to
which the sensibility of individuals is more immediately
awake .... " The Federalist No. 17, supra, p. 107. Thus,
he maintained that the people would perceive the States as
"the immediate and most visible guardian of life and property," a fact which "contributes more than any other circumstance to impressing upon the minds of the people affection,
esteem and reverence towards the government." Ibid.
Madison took the same position, explaining that "the people
will be more familiarly and minutely conversant" with the
business of State governments, and "with the members of
these, will a greater proportion of the people have the ties of
personal acquaintance and friendship, and of family and party
attachments .... " The Federalist No. 46, p. 316. Like
Hamilton, Madison saw the States' involvement in the everyday concerns of the people as the source of their citizens' loyalty. Id. See also Nagel, Federalism as a Fundamental
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Value: National League of Cities in Perspective, 1981 Sup.
Ct. Rev. 81 (1981).
Thus, the harm to the States that results from federal
overreaching under the Commerce Clause is not simply a
matter of dollars and cents. National League of Cities, 426
U. S., at 846-851. Nor is it a matter of the wisdom or folly
of certain policy choices. Cf. ante, at 17. Rather, by usu~p
ing functions traditionally performed by the States, federal
overreaching under the Commerce Clause undermines the
constitutionally mandated balance of power between the
States and the federal government, a balance designed to
protect our fundamental liberties.

c
The emasculation of the powers of the States that can result from the Court's decision is predicated on the Commerce
Clause as a power "deleg3:ted to the United States" by ~he
Constitution. The relevant language states: "Congress shall
have power . . . to regulate commerce with foreign nations
and among the several states and with the Indian tribes."
Art. I, § 8. Section eight identifies a score of powers, listing
the authority to lay taxes, borrow money on the credit of the
United States, pay its debts, and provide for the common defense and the general welfare before its brief reference to
"Commerce." It is clear from the debates leading up to the
adoption of the Constitution that the commerce to be regulated was that which the states themselves lacked the practical capability to regulate. See, e. g., 1 M. Farrand, The
Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 (rev. ed. 1937);
The Federalist Nos. 7, 11, 22, 42, 45. See also EEOC v. -Wyoming, 460 U. S. 226, 265 (1983) (POWELL, J., dissenting).
Indeed, the language of the clause itself focuses on activities
that only a national government could regulate: commerce
with foreign nations and Indian tribes and "among" the several states.
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To be sure, this Court has construed the Commerce Clause
to accommodate unanticipated changes over the past two centuries. As these changes have occurred, the Court has had
to decide whether the federal government has exceeded its
authority by regulating activities beyond the capability of a
single state to regulate or beyond legitimate federal interests
that outweighed the authority and interests of the States.
In so doing, however, the Court properly has been mindful of
the essential role of the States in our federal system.
The opinion for the Court in National League of Cities was
faithful to history in its understanding of federalism. The
Court observed that "our federal system of government imposes definite limits upon the authority of Congress to regulate the activities of States as States by means of the commerce power." 426 U. S., at 842. The Tenth Amendment
was invoked to prevent Congress from exercising its "power
in a fashion that impairs the States' integrity or their ability
to .function effectively in a federal system." I d., at 842-843,
(~Fry v. United States, 421 U. S. 542, 547 n. 7 (1975)).
1"1 ~Court has recognized repeatedly that State sovereignty is a fundamental component of our system of government. More than a century ago, in Lane County v. Oregon,
7 Wall. 71 (1868), the Court stated that the Constitution recognized "the necessary existence of the States, and, within
their proper spheres, the independent authority of the
States." It concluded, as Madison did, that this authority
extended to "nearly the whole charge of interior regulation
... ; to [the States] and to the people all powers not expressly
delegated to the national government are reserved." I d., at
76. Recently, in Community Communications Co. v. City
of Boulder, 455 U. S. 40, 53 (1982), the Court recognized that
the state action exemption from the antitrust laws was based
on.$tate sovereignty. Similarly, in United Transportation
Union v. Long Island Railroad Co., 455 U. S. 678, 683
(1982), although finding the Railway Labor Act applicable to
a state-owned railroad, the unanimous Court was careful to

I
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say that the States possess constitutionally preserved sovereign powers.
Again, in Federal Regulatory Commission v. Mississippi,
456 U. S. 742, 752 (1982), in detennining the constitutionality
of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act, the Court explicitly considered whether the Act impinged on state sovereignty in violation of the Tenth Amendment. These represent only a few of the many cases in which the Court has
recognized not only the role, but the importance, of state
sovereignty. See also, e. g., United States v. Fry, supra;
Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U. S. 514 (1926); Coyle v.
Oklahoma, 221 U. S. 559 (1911). As Justice Frankfurter
noted, the States are not merely a factor in the "shifting economic arrangements" of our country, Kovacs v. Cooper, 336
U. S. 77, 95 (1949) (Justice Frankfurter, concurring), but
constitute a "coordinate element in the system established by
the Framers for governing our Federal Union." National
League of Cities, supra, at 849,.
D
In contrast, the Court today propounds a view of federalism that pays only lip service to the role of the States. Although it says that the States "unquestionably do 'retai[n] a
significant measure of sovereign authority,"' ante, at 20
(quoting EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U. S. 226, 269 (POWELL,
J., dissenting)), it fails to recognize the broad, yet specific
areas of sovereignty that the Framers intended the States to
retain. Indeed, the Court barely acknowledges that the
Tenth Amendment exists. 16 That Amendment states explicitly that "[t]he powers not delegated to the United States ...
are reserved to the States." U. S. Const., Amend. 10. The
Court recasts this language to say that the States retain their
sovereign powers "only to the extent that the Constitution
"The Court's opinion mentions the Tenth Amendment only once, when
it restates the question put to the parties for reargument in this case. See
ante, at 8.
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has not divested them of their original powers and transferred those powers to the Federal Government." Ante, at
20. This rephrasing is not a distinction without a difference;
rather, it reflects the Court's unprecedented view that Congress is free under the Commerce Clause to assume a State's
traditional sovereign power, and to do so without judicial review of its action. Indeed, the Court's view of federalism
appears to relegate the States to precisely the trivial role
that opponents of the Constitution feared they would
occupy. 17
In National League of Cities, we spoke of fire prevention,
police protection, sanitation, and public health as "typical of
[the services] performed by state and local governments in
discharging their dual functions of administering the public
law and furnishing public services." 426 U. S., at 851. Not
only are these activities remote from any normal concept of
interstate commerce, they are also activities that epitomize
the concerns of local, democratic self-government. See
supra n. 5. In emphasizing the need to protect traditional
governmental functions, we identified the kinds of activities
engaged in by state and local governments that affect the everyday lives of citizens. These are services that people are
in a position to understand and evaluate, and in a democracy,
have the right to oversee. 18 We recognized that "it is func17
As the amici argue, "the ability of the [S]tates to fulfill their role in the
constitutional scheme is dependent solely upon their effectiveness as instruments of self-government." Brief of Twenty-Four States as Amicus
Curiae 50. See also Brief of the National League of Cities et al as Amicus
Curiae (a brief on behalf of every major organization representing the concerns of State and local governments).
11
The Framers recognized that the most effective democracy occu,rs at
local levels of government, where people with first hand knowledge of local
problems have more ready access to public officials responsible for dealing
with them. E. g., The Federalist No. 17, at 107; No.45, at 316. This is as
true today as it was when the Constitution was adopted. "Participation is
likely to be more frequent, and exercised at more different stages of a governmental activity at the local level, or in regional organizations, than at
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tions such as these which governments are created to provide
. . ." and that the states and local governments are better
able than the national government to perform them. 426
U. S., at 851.
The Court maintains that the standard approved in N ational League of Cities "disserves principles of democratic
self government." Ante, at 18. In reaching this conclusion,
the Court looks myopically only to persons elected to positions in the federal government. It disregards entirely the
far more effective role of democratic self-government at the
state and local levels. One must compare realistically the
operation of the state and local governments with that of the
federal government. Federal legislation is drafted primarily
by the staffs of the congressional committees. In view of the
hundreds of bills introduced at each session of Congress and
the complexity of many of them, it is virtually impossible for
even the most conscientious legislators to be truly familiar
with many of the statutes enacted. Federal departments
and agencies customarily are authorized to write regulations.
Often these are more important than the text of the statutes.
As is true of the original legislation, these are drafted largely
by staff personnel. The administration and enforcement of
federal laws and regulations necessarily are largely in the
hands of staff and civil service employees. These employees
may have little or no knowledge of the States and localities

,

the state and federal levels. [Additionally,] the proportion of people actually involved from the total population tends to be greater, the lower the
level of government, and this, of course, better approximates the citizen
participation ideal." ACIR, Citizen Participation in the American Federal
System 95 (1979).
•
Moreover, we have witnessed in recent years the rise of numerous special interest groups that engage in sophisticated lobbying, and make. substantial campaign contributions to some members of Congress. These
groups are thought to have significant influence in the shaping and enactment of certain types of legislation. Contrary to the Court's view, a
''political process" that functions in this way is unlikely to safeguard the
sovereign rights of States and localities. See supra, n. 9.

,
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that will be affected by the statutes and regulations for which
they are responsible. In any case, they hardly are as accessible and responsive as those who occupy analogous positions
in State and local governments.
In drawing this contrast, I imply no criticism of these federal employees or the officials who are ultimately in charge.
The great majority are conscientious and faithful to their
duties. My point is simply that members of the immense
federal bureaucracy are not elected, know less about the
services traditionally rendered by states and localities, and
are inevitably less responsive to recipients of such services,
than are state legislatures, city councils, boards of supervisors, and state and local commissions, boards, and agencies.
It is at these state and local levels-not in Washington as the
Court so mistakenly thinks-that "democratic self-government" .is best exemplified.
IV
The question presented in this case is whether the extension of the FLSA to the wages and hours of employees of a
city-owned transit system unconstitutionally impinges on
fundamental state sovereignty. The Court's sweeping hold~ng does far more than simply answer this question in the
negative. In overruling National League of Cities, today's
opinion apparently authorizes federal control, under the auspices of the Commerce Clause, over the terms and conditions
of employment of all state and local employees. Thus, for
purposes of federal regulation, the Court rejects the distinction between public and private employers that had been
drawn carefully in National League of Cities. The Court's
action reflects a serious misunderstanding, if not an outright
rejection, of the history of our country and the intention of
the Framers of the Constitution. 19
The opinion of the Court in National League of Cities makes clear that
the very essence of a federal system of government is to impose "definite
limits upon the authority of Congress to regulate the activities of the
11
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I return now to the balancing test approved in National
League of Cities and accepted in Hodel, Long Island R. R.,
and FERC v. Mississippi. See supra n. 5 and ante, at--.
The Court does not find in this case that the "federal interest
is demonstrably greater." 426 U. S., at 856 (BLACKMUN, J.,
concurring). No such finding could have been made, for the
state interest is compelling. The financial impact on States
and localities of displacing their control over wages, hours,
overtime regulations, pensions, and labor relations with their
employees could have serious, as well as unanticipated, effects on State and local planning, budgeting, and the levying
of taxes. 20 As we said in National League of Cities , federal
control of the terms and conditions of employment of State
employees also inevitably "displaces state policies regarding
the manner in which [States] will structure delivery of those
governmental services that .citizens require." !d., at 847.
The Court emphasizes that municipal operation of an intracity mass transit system is relatively new in the life of our
country. It nevertheless is a classic example of the type of
service traditionally provided by local government. It is
local by definition. It is indistinguishable in principle from
the traditional services of providing and maintaining streets,
public lighting, traffic control, water, and sewerage systems. 21 Services of this kind are precisely those "with which
citizens are more 'familiarly and minutely conversant.'" The
Federalist, supra, No. 46, p. 316. State and local officials of
States as States by means of the commerce power." See also the Court's
opinion in Fry v. United States, 421 U. S. 542, 547 n. 7 (1975).
20
As Justice Douglas observed in his dissent in Maryland v. Wirtz, 392
U. S. 183, 201 (Douglas, J., dissenting),._.,Extension of the FLSA to the
States could "disrupt the fiscal policy of the states and threaten their autonomy in the regulation of health and education." Id., at 203.
21
In Long Island R. Co. the unanimous Court recognized that "[t]his
Court's emphasis on traditional governmental functions and traditional aspects of state sovereignty was not meant to impose a static historical view
of state functions generally immune from federal regulation." 455 U. S.,
at 686.

1f:-j
J/....;-

\!:.-

f

82-1913 & 82-1951-DISSENT
GARCIA v. SAN ANTONIO METRO. TRANSIT AUTH.

23

course must be intimately familiar with these services and
sensitive to their quality as well as cost. Such officials also
know that their constituents and the press respond to the adequacy, fair distribution, and cost of these services. It is
this kind of state and local control and accountability that the
Framers understood would insure the vitality and preservation of the federal system that the Constitution explicitly
requires. See National League of Cities, supra, at 847-852.

v
Although the Court's opinion purports to recognize that
the States retain some sovereign power, it does not identify
even a single aspect of state authority that would remain
when the Commerce Clause is invoked to justify federal
regulation. In Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U. S. 183 (1968),
overruled by National League of Cities and today reaffirmed,
the Court sustained an extension of the FLSA to certain hospitals, institutions, and schools. Although the Court's opinion in Wirtz was comparatively narrow, Justice Douglas, in
dissent, wrote presciently that the Court's reading of the
Commerce Clause would enable "the National Government
[to] devour the essentials of state sovereignty, though that
sovereignty is attested by the Tenth Amendment." I d., at
205. Today's decision makes Justice Douglas's fear once
again a realistic one.
As I view the Court's decision today as rejecting the basic
precepts of our federal system and limiting the constitutional
role of judicial review, I dissent.

To: The Chief Justice
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Justice White
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Justice Blackmun
Justice Rehnquist
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JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting.
The Court today, in its 5-4 decision, overrules National
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U. S. 833 (1976), a case in
which we held that Congress lacked authority to impose the
requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act on stat~ and
local governments. Because I believe this decision substantially alters the federal system embodied in the Constitution,
I dissent.
I
There are, of course, numerous examples over the history
of this Court in which prior decisions have been reconsidered
and overruled. I can recall, however, no case in which the
principle of stare decisis was ignored as flagrantly as we now
witness. 1 The reasoning of the Court in National League of
1
National League of Cities, following some changes in _the composition
of the Court, had overruled Maryland v. Wirtz , 392 U.S. 183 (1968). Un-
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Cities, and the principle applied there, have been reiterated
consistently over the past eight years. Since its decision in
1976, National League of Cities has been cited and quoted in
opinions joined by every member of the present Court.
Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reel. Assn., 452 U. S.
264, 287-293 (1981); United Transportation Union v. Long
Island R. R., 455 U. S. 678, 684-686 (1982); FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U. S. 742, 764-767 (1982). Less than three
years ago, in Long Island R. R., supra, a unanimous Court
reaffirmed the principles of National League of Cities but
found them inapplicable to the regulation of a railroad heavily
engaged in interstate commerce. The Court stated:
"The key prong of the National League of Cities test
applicable to this case is the third one [repeated and
reformulated in Hodel], which examines whether 'the
states' compliance with the federal law would directly
impair their ability to structure integral operations in
areas of traditional governmental functions."
455 U. S., at 684. The Court in that case recognized that the
test "may at times be a difficult one," ibid., but it was con-

sidered in that unanimous decision as settled constitutional
doctrine.
As recently as June 1, 1982 the five Justices who constitute
the majority in this case also were the majority in FERC v.
Mississippi. In that case, the Court said:
"In National League of Cities, supra, for example, the
Court made clear that the State's regulation of its relationship with its employees is an 'undoubted attribute of
state sovereignty.' 426 U. S., at 845. Yet, by holding
'unimpaired' California v. Taylor, 353 U. S. 553 (1957),
which upheld a federal labor regulation as applied to
state railroad employees, 426 U. S., at 854. n. 18, N ational League of Cities acknowledged that not all aspects
like National League of Cities, the holding of Wirtz had not been repeatedly accepted by our subsequent decisions .

.'
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of a State's sovereign authority are immune from federal
control."

426 U. S., at 764 n. 28. The Court went on to say that even
where the requirements of the National League of Cities
standard are met, "'[t]here are situations in which the nature
of the federal interest advanced may be such that it justifies
state submission.'" Ibid., quoting Hodel, supra, 452 U. S.,
at 288 n. 29. The joint federal/state system of regulation in
FERC was such a "situation," but there was no hint in the
Court's opinion that National League of Cities-or its basic
standard-was subject to the infirmities discovered today.
The doctrine of stare decisis is never entirely persuasive on
a constitutional question. City of Akron v. Akron Center for
Reproductive Health, 462 U. S. 416, - - (1983). Nevertheless, even in such a case, however, a "departure from the doctrine of stare decisis demands special justification." Arizona
v. Rumsey,-- U.S.--,-- (1984). See also Oregon v.
Kennedy, 456 U. S. 667, 691-692 n. 34 (1982) (JUSTICE STEVENS, concurring). In the present case, the five Justices
who compose the majority today participated in National
League of Cities and the cases reaffirming it. 2 The stability
of judicial decision, and with it respect for the authority of
this Court, are not served by the abrupt overruling of multiple precedents we witness in this case. 3
Whatever effect the Court's decision may have in weakening the application of stare decisis, it is likely to be less
important than what the Court has done to the Constitution
2
JUSTICE O'CONNOR succeeded Justice Stewart in September 1981, and
participated in United Transportation Union v. Long Island R. Co., 455
U. S. 678 (1982), and FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U. S. 742 (1982).
3
As we observed recently, "stare decisis is a doctrine that demands respect in a society governed by the rule of law." City of Akron v. Akron
Center for Reproductive Health, Inc.,- U. S . - (1983). In this respect, stare decisis represents "a natural evolution from the very nature of
our institutions." Lile, "Some Views on the Rule of Stare Decisis," 4 Va.
L. Rev. 955,956 (1916).
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itself. A unique feature of the United States is the federal
system guaranteed by ~he Constitution and implicit in the
very name of our country. Despite some genuflecting in
Court's opinion to the concept of federalism, today's decision
effectively reduces the Tenth Amendment to meaningless
rhetoric when Congress acts pursuant to the Commerce
Clause. The Court holds that the Fair Labor Standards Act
["FLSA"] "contravened no affirmative limit on Congress'
power under the Commerce Clause" to determine the wage
rates and hours of employment of all state and local employees. Ante, at 27. In rejecting the traditional view of
our federal system, the Court states:
"Apart from the limitation on federal authority inherent •
in the delegated nature of Congress' Article I powers,
the principal means chosen by the Framers to ensure the
role of the states in the federal system lies in the structure of the Federal Government itself."
Ante, at 21-22 (emphasis added).
To leave no doubt about its intention, the Court renounces
its decision in National League of Cities because it "inevitably invites an unelected federal judiciary to make decisions about which state policies its favors and which ones it
dislikes." Ante, at 17. In other words, the extent to which
the States may exercise their authority, when Congress purports to act under the Commerce Clause, henceforth is to be
determined from time to time by political decisions made by
members of the federal government, decisions the Court says
will not be subject to judicial review. I note that it does not
seem to have occurred to the Court that it-an unelected majority of five Justices-today rejects almost 200 years of the
understanding of the constitutional status of federalism. In
doing so, there is only a single passing reference to the Tenth
Amendment. Nor is so much as a dictum of any court cited
in support of the view that the role of the States in the federal system may depend upon the grace of elected federal of-
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ficials, rather than on the Constitution as interpreted by this
Court.
In my opinion that follows, Part II addresses the Court's
criticisms of National League of Cities. Part III reviews
briefly the understanding of federalism that ensured the ratification of the Constitution and the extent to which this
Court, until today, has recognized that the States retain a
signficant measure of sovereignty in our federal system.
Part IV considers the applicability of the FLSA to the indisputably local service provided by an urban transit system.
II
The Court finds that the test of State immunity approved
in National League of Cities and its progeny is unworkable
and unsound in principle. In finding the test to be unworkable, the Court begins by mischaracterizing National League·
of Cities and subsequent cases. In concluding that efforts to
define state immunity are unsound in principle, the Court
radically departs from long settled principles of constitutionalism and of the role of judicial review in our system of
government.
A
Much of the Court's opinion is devoted to arguing that it is
difficult to define a priori "traditional governmental ftmctions." National League of Cities neither engaged in, nor
required, such a task. 4 The Court discusses and condemns
• In National League of Cities, we referred to the sphere of state sovereignty as including "traditional governmental functions," a realm which is,
of course, difficult to define with precision. But the luxury of precise definitions is one rarely enjoyed in interpreting and applying the general provisions of our Constitution. Not surprisingly, therefore, the Court's attempt to demonstrate the impossibility of definition is unpersuasive. A
number of the cases it cites simply do not involve the problem of defining
governmental functions. E . g., Williams v. Eastside Mental Health Center, Inc., 669 F. 2d 671 (CAll), cert. denied, 459 U. S. 976 (1982); Friends
of the Earth v. Carey, 552 F. 2d 25 (CA2), cert. denied, 434 U. S. 902
(1977). A number of others are not properly analyzed under the principles
of National League of Cities, notwithstanding some of the language of the
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as standards "traditional governmental function[s]," "purely
historical" functions, '"uniquely' governmental functions,"
and "'necessary' governmental services." Ante, at 10-11,
15, 16. But nowhere does it mention that National League
of Cities adopted a familiar type of balancing test for determining whether Commerce Clause enactments transgress
constitutional limitations imposed by the federal nature of
our system of government. This omission is noteworthy,
since the author of today's opinion joined National League of
Cities and concurred. separately to point out that the Court's
opinion in that case "adopt[s] a balancing approach [that]
does not outlaw federal power in areas ... where the federal
interest is demonstrably greater and where state . . . compliance with imposed federal standards would be essential."
426 U. S., at 856 (JUSTICE BLACKMUN, concurring).
In reading National League of Cities to embrace a balancing approach, JusTICE BLA.CKMUN quite correctly cited the
part of the opinion that reaffirmed Fry v. United States, 421
U. S. 542 (1975). The Court's analysis reaffirming Fry explicitly weighed the seriousness of the problem addressed by
the federal legislation at issue in that case, against the effects
of compliance on State sovereignty. 426 U. S., at 852-853.
Our subsequent decisions also adopted this approach of
weighing the respective interests of the States and federal
government. 5 In EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U. S. 226 (1983),
lower courts. E. g., in United States v. Best, 573 F. 2d 1095 (CA9 1978)
and Hybud Equipment Corp. v. City of Akron, 654 F. 2d 1187 (CA61981).
Moreover, rather than carefully analyzing the case law, the Court simply
lists various functions thought to be protected or unprotected by courts interpreting National League of Cities. Ante, at 9-10. In the cited cases,
however, the courts considered the issue of State immunity on the specific
facts at issue; they did not make blanket pronouncements that particular
things inherently qualified as traditional governmental functions or did not.
Having thus considered the cases out of context, it was not difficult for the
Court to conclude that there is no "organizing principle" among them. See
ante, at 10.
6
In undertaking such balancing, we have considered, on the one hand,
the strength of the federal interest in the challenged legislation and the im-
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for example, the Court stated that "[t]he principle of immunity articulated in National League of Cities is a functional
doctrine . . . whose ultimate purpose is not to create a sacred
province of state autonomy, but to ensure that the unique
benefits of a federal system . . . not be lost through undue
federal interference in certain core state functions." I d., at
236. See also Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U. S. 264 (1981). In overruling National League of Cities, the Court incorrectly characterizes
the mode of analysis established therein and developed in
subsequent cases. 6
Moreover, the statute at issue in this case, the FLSA, is
the identical statute that was at issue in National League of
pact of exempting the States from its reach. Central to our inquiry into
the federal interest is how closely the challenged action implicates the central concerns of the Commerce Clause, viz., the promotion of a national
economy and free trade among the states. See EEOC v. Wyoming, 460
U. S. 226, 244 (JUSTICE STEVENS, concurring). E. g. United Transportation Union v. Long Island Rail Road Co., 455 U. S. 678, 688 (1982) ("Congress long ago concluded that federal regulation of railroad labor services is
necessary to prevent disruptions in vital rail service essential to the national economy."); FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U. S. 742, 757 (1982), ("it is
difficult to conceive of a more basic element of interstate commerce than
electric energy .. . ."). Similarly, we have considered whether exempting States from federal regulation would undermine the goals of the federal
program. See Fry v. United States, 421 U. S. 542 (1975). See also Hodel,
452 U. S. at 282 (national surface mining standards necessary to insure
competition among States does not undermine States' efforts to maintain
adequate intrastate standards). On the other hand, we have assessed the
injury done to the States if forced to comply with federal Commerce Clause
enactments. See National League of Cities, 426 U. S., at 846-851.
6
In addition, reliance on the Court's difficulties in the tax immunity
field is misplaced. Although the Court has abandoned the "governmental/proprietary" distinction in this field, see New York v. United
States , 326 U. S. 572 (1946) , it has not taken the drastic approach of relying
solely on the structure of the federal government to protect the States' immunity from taxation. See Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U. S. 444
(1978). Thus, faced with an equally difficult problem of defining constitutional boundaries of federal action directly affecting the States, we did not
adopt the view many would think naive, that the federal government itself
will protect whatever rights the States may have.
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Cities. Although JusTICE BLACKMUN's concurrence noted
that he was "not untroubled by certain possible implications
of the Court's opinion" in National League of Cities, it also
stated that "the result with respect to the statute under challenge here [the FLSA] is necessarily correct." 426 U. S., at
856 (emphasis added). His opinion for the Court today does
not discuss the statute, nor identify any changed circumstances that warrant a different holding.
B
Today's opinion does not explain how the States' role in the
electoral process guarantees that particular exercises of the
Commerce Clause power will not infringe on residual State
sovereignty. 7 Members of Congress are elected from the
various States, but once in office they are members of the
federal government. 8 Although the States participate in the
Electoral College, this is hardly a reason to view the President as a representative of the ·States' interest against fed7
Late in its opinion, the Court suggests that after all there may be some
"affirmative limits the constitutional structure might impose on federal action affecting the States under the Commerce Clause." Ante, at 27. The
Court asserts that "[i]n the factual setting of these cases the internal safeguards of the political process have performed as intended." Ibid . The
Court does not explain the basis for this judgment. Nor does it identify
the circumstances in which the "political process" may fail and "affirmative
limits" are to be imposed. Presumably, such limits are to be determined
by the Judicial Branch even though it is "unelected." Today's opinion,
however, has rejected the balancing standard and suggests no other standard that would enable a court to determine when there has been a malfunction of the "political process. " The Court's failure to specify the "affirmative limits" on federal power, or when and how these limits are to be
determined, may well be explained by the transparent fact that any such
attempt would be subject to precisely the same objections on which it relies
to overrule National League of Cities.
8
One can hardly imagine this Court saying that because Congress is
composed of individuals, individual rights are amply protected by the legislative process. Yet, the position adopted today is indistinguishable in
principle. The Tenth Amendment was adopted as an essential part of the
Bill of Rights and should be viewed as such. See infra, at - -.
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eral encroachment. We noted recently "the hydraulic pressure inherent within each of the separate Branches to exceed
the outer limits of its power . . . . " Immigration and
Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U. S. 919, - (1983). The Court offers no reason to think that this pressure will not operate when Congress seeks to invoke its powers under the Commerce Clause, notwithstanding the electoral role of the States. 9
At one time in our history, the view that the structure of the federal
government sufficed to protect the States might have had somewhat more
practical, although not more logical, basis. Professor Wechsler, whose
seminal article in 1954 proposed the view adopted by the Court today,
predicated his argument on assumptions that simply do not accord with
current reality. Professor Wechsler wrote: "National action has . . .
always been regarded as exceptional in our polity, an instrusion to be justified by some necessity, the special rather than the ordinary case."
Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States
in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 Colum.
L. Rev. 543, 544 (1954). Not only is the premise of this view clearly at
odds with the proliferation of national legislation over the past 30 years,
but "a variety of structural and political changes in this century have combined to make Congress particularly insensitive to state and local values."
Advisory Comm'n on Intergovernmental Relations [ACIR], Regulatory
Federalism: Policy, Process, Impact and Reform 50 (1984). The adoption
of the Seventeenth Amendment (providing for direct election of senators),
the weakening of political parties on the local level, and the rise of national
media, among other things, have made Congress increasingly less representative of State and local interests, and more likely to be responsive to
the demands of various national constituencies. Id., at 50-51. As one
observer explained, "As Senators and members of the House develop independent constituencies among groups such as farmers, businessmen, laborers, environmentalists, and the poor, each of which generally supports
certain national initiatives, their tendency to identify with state interests
and the positions of state officials is reduced." Kaden, "Federalism in the
Courts: Agenda for the 1980s," in ACIR, The Future of Federalism in the
'80s 97 (1981).
See also Kaden, Politics, Money, and State Sovereignty: The Judicial
Role, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 847 (1979) (changes in political practices and the
breadth of national initiatives mean that the political branches "may no
longer be as well suited as they once were to the task of safeguarding the
9
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The Court apparently thinks that the States' success at
obtaining federal funds for various projects and exemptions
from the obligations of some federal statutes is indicative of
the "effectiveness of the federal political process in preserving the States' interests.... " Ante, at 23-24. 10 But
political success is not relevant to the question whether the
political processes are the proper means of enforcing constitutional limitations. 11 The fact that Congress generally does
not transgress constitutional limits on its power to reach
State activities does not make judicial review any less necessary to rectify the infrequent cases in which it does do so. 12
role of the states in the federal system and protecting the fundamental
value of federalism.") and ACIR, Regulatory Federalism, supra, at 1-24
(detailing the "dramatic shift" in kind of federal regulation applicable to the
States over the past two decades). Thus, even if one were to ignore the
numerous problems with the Court's position in terms of constitutional
theory,. there would remain serious questions as to its factual premises.
10
The Court believes that the significant financial assistance afforded the
States and localities by the federal government is relevant to the constitutionality of extending Commerce Clause enactments to the States. See
ante, at 23-24, 26. This Court has never held, however, that the mere
disbursement of funds by the federal government establishes a right to
control activities that benefit from such funds. See Pennhurst State
School v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1, 17-18 (1981). Regardless of the willingness of the federal government to provide federal aid, the constitutional
question remains the same: whether the federal statute violates the sovereign powers reserved to the States by the Tenth Amendment.
11
Apparently in an effort to reassure the States, the Court identifies
several major statutes that thus far have not been made applicable to State
governments: the Federal Power Act, 16 U. S. C. 824(f); the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U. S. C. § 152(2); the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 29 U. S. C. § 402(e); the Occupational Safety
and Health Act, 29 U. S. C. § 652(5); the Employee Retirement Inslirance
Security Act, 29 U. S. C. §§ 1002(32), 1003(b)(1); and the Sherman Act,
Parker v. Brown, 317 U. S. 341 (1943). Ante, at 24. The Court does not
suggest that this restraint will continue after its decision is understood.
Indeed, it is unlikely that special interest groups will fail to accept the
Court's open invitation to urge Congress to extend these and other statutes to apply to the States and their local subdivisions.
12
This Court has never before abdicated responsibility for assessing the
constitutionality of challenged action on the ground that affected parties

,.
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The States' role in our system of government is a matter of
constitutional law, not of legislative grace. "The powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States, respectively, or to the people." U. S. Const., Amend. 10.
More troubling than the logical infirmities in the Court's
reasoning is the result of its holding, i. e., that federal political officials, invoking the Commerce Clause, are the sole
judges of the limits of their own power. This result is inconsistent with the fundamental principles of our constitutional
system. See, e. g., The Federalist No. 78 (Hamilton). At
least since Marbury v. Madison it has been the settled province of the federal judiciary "to say what the law is" with respect to the constitutionality of acts of Congress. In rejecting the role of the judiciary in protecting the States from
federal overreaching, the Court's opinion offers no explanation for ignoring the teaching of the most famous case in our
history.' 3
theoretically are able to look out for their own interests through the electoral process. As the Court noted in National League of Cities, a much
stronger argument as to inherent structural protections could have been
made in either Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (1976) or Myers v. United
States, 272 U. S. 52 (1926), than can be made here. In these cases, the
President signed legislation that limited his authority with respect to certain appointments and thus arguably "it was no concern of this Court that
the law violated the Constitution." 426 U. S., at 841-842 n. 12. The
Court nevertheless held the laws unconstitutional because they infringed
on presidential authority, the President's consent notwithstanding. The
Court does not address this point; nor does it cite any authority for its contrary view.
8
' The Court states that the decision in National League of Cities "invite[s] an unelected federal judiciary to make decisions about which state
policies it favors and which ones its dislikes." Curiously, the Court then
suggests that under the application of the "trad1tional" governmental function analysis, "the states cannot serve as laboratories for social and economic experiment." Ante, at 17, citing Justice Brandeis' famous observation in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U. S. 262, 311 (1932) (Justice
Brandeis, dissenting). Apparently the Court believes that when "an unelected federal judiciary" makes decisions as to whether a particular function is one for the federal or state governments, the States no longer may
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III
A
In our federal system, the States have a major role that
cannot be preempted by the national government. As contemporaneous writings and the debates at the ratifying conventions make clear, the States' ratification of the Constitution was predicated on this understanding of federalism.
Indeed, the Tenth Amendment was adopted specifically to
ensure that the important role promised the States by the
proponents of the Constitution was realized.
Much of the initial opposition to the Constitution was
rooted in the fear that the national government would be too
powerful and eventually would eliminate the States as viable*
political entities. This concern was voiced repeatedly until
proponents of the Constitution made assurances that a bill of
rights, including a provision explicitly reserving powers in
the States, would be among the first business of the new Congress. Samuel Adams argued, for example, that if the several States were to be joined in "one entire Nation, under one
Legislature, the Powers of which shall extend to every Subject of Legislation, and its Laws be supreme & controul the
whole, the Idea of Sovereignty in these States must be lost."
Letter from Samuel Adams to Richard Henry Lee (Dec. 3,
1787), reprinted in Anti-Federalists versus Federalists 159
(J. Lewis ed. 1967). Likewise, George Mason feared that
"the general government being paramount to, and in every
respect more powerful than the state governments, the latter
must give way to the former." Address in the Ratifying
Convention of Virginia (June 4-12 1788), reprinted in AntiFederalists versus Federalists, supra, at 208-209.
engage in "social and economic experiment." Ante, at 17. The Court's
decision putting federal Commerce Clause enactments beyond judicial review, however, surely does not enhance the States' opportunities to serve
as "laboratories."

82-1913 & 82-1951-DISSENT
GARCIA v. SAN ANTONIO METRO. TRANSIT AUTH.

13

Antifederalists raised these concerns in almost every State
ratifying convention. 14 See generally Elliot, Debates in the
Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal
Constitution (1854). As a result, eight States voted for the
Constitution only after proposing amendments to be adopted
after ratification. 15 All eight of these included among their
recommendations some version of what later became the
Tenth Amendment. Ibid. So strong was the concern that
the proposed Constitution was seriously defective without a
specific bill of rights, including a provision reserving powers
to the States, that in order to secure the votes for ratification, the Federalists eventually conceded that such provisions were necessary. See Schwartz, A Documentary History of the Bill of Rights, supra, at 505 and passim. It was
thus generally agreed that co.nsideration of a bill of rights
would be among the first business of the new Congress. See
generally 1 Annals of Congress 432-437 (June 8, 1789) (remarks of James Madison). Accordingly, the ten amendments that we know as the Bill of Rights were proposed and
adopted early in the first session of the First Congress.
Schwartz, A Documentary History of the Bill of Rights,
supra, 983-1167.
·
This history, which the Court simply ignores, documents
the integral role of the the Tenth Amendment in our constitutional theory. It exposes as well, I believe, the fundamental
character of the Court's error today. Far from being "unsound in principle," ante, at 18, judicial enforcement of the
Opponents of the Constitution were particularly dubious of the Federalist claim that the States retained powers not delegated to the United
States in the absence of an express provision so providing. For example,
James Winthrop wrote that "[i]t is a mere fallacy ... that what rights are
not given are reserved." Letters of Agrippa, reprinted in Schwartz, The
Bill of Rights, supra, at 510, 511.
16
Indeed, the Virginia legislature came very close to withholding ratification of the Constitution until the adoption of a bill of rights that included, among other things, the substance of the Tenth Amendment. See
Schwartz, The Bill of Rights, supra, at 762-766 and passim.
14
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Tenth Amendment is essential to maintaining the federal system so carefully designed by the Framers and adopted in the
Constitution.
B

The Framers had definite ideas about the nature of the
Constitution's division of authority between the federal and
state governments. In The Federalist No. 39, for example,
Madison explained this division by drawing a series of contrasts between the attributes of a "national" government and
those of the government to be established by the Constitution. While a national form of government would possess an
"indefinite supremacy over all persons and things," the form
of government contemplated by the Constitution instead consisted of "local or municipal authorities [which] form distinct
and independent portions of the supremacy, no more subject
within their respective spheres to the general authority than
the general authority is subject to them, within its own
sphere." The Federalist No. 39, p. 256 (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
Under the Constitution, the sphere of the proposed government extended to jurisdiction of "certain enumerated objects,
only, ... leav[ing] to the several States a residuary and inviolable sovereignty over all other objects." !d.
Madison elaborated on the content of these separate
spheres of sovereignty in The Federalist No. 45:
"The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution
to the Federal Government are few and defined. Those
which are to remain in the State Governments are numerous and indefinite. The former will be exercised
principally on external objects, as war, peace, negotiation, and foreign commerce; . . . . The powers reserved
to the several States will extend to all the objects,
which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the
lives, liberties and properties of the people; and the internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the State."
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Id., at 313. Madison considered that the operations of the
federal government would be "most extensive and important
in times of war and danger; those of the State Governments
in times of peace and security." Ibid. As a result of this
division of powers, the State governments generally would
be more important than the federal government. Ibid.
The Framers believed that the separate sphere of sovereignty reserved to the States would ensure that the States
would serve as an effective "counterpoise" to the power of
the federal government. The States would serve this essential role because they would attract and retain the loyalty of
their citizens. The roots of such loyalty, the Founders
thought, were found in the objects peculiar to State government. For example, Hamilton argued that the States "regulat[e] all those personal interests and familiar concerns to
which the sensibility of individuals is more immediately
awake .... " The Federalist No. 17, supra, p. 107. Thus,
he maintained that the people would perceive the States as
"the immediate and most visible guardian of life and property," a fact which "contributes more than any other circumstance to impressing upon the minds of the people affection,
esteem and reverence towards the government." Ibid.
Madison took the same position, explaining that "the people
will be more familiarly and minutely conversant" with the
business 9f State governments, and "with the members of
these, will a greater proportion of the people have the ties of
personal acquaintance and friendship, and of family and party
attachments .... " The Federalist No. 46, p. 316. Like
Hamilton, Madison saw the States' involvement in the everyday concerns of the people as the source of their citizens' loyalty. Id. See also Nagel, Federalism as a Fundamental
Value: National League of Cities in Perspective, 1981 Sup.
Ct. Rev. 81 (1981).
Thus, the harm to the States that results from federal
overreaching under the Commerce Clause is not simply a
matter of dollars and cents. National League of Cities, 426

..
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U. S., at 846-851. Nor is it a matter of the wisdom or folly
of certain policy choices. Cf. ante, at 17. Rather, by usurping functions traditionally performed by the States, federal
overreaching under the Commerce Clause undermines the
constitutionally mandated balance of power between the
States and the federal government, a balance designed to
protect our fundamental liberties.

c
The emasculation of the powers of the States that can result from the Court's decision is predicated on the Commerce
Clause as a power "delegated to the United States" by the
Constitution. The relevant language states: "Congress shall
have power . . . to regulate commerce with foreign nations
and among the several states and with the Indian tribes."
Art. I, § 8. Section eight identifies a score of powers, listing
. the authority to lay taxes, borrow money on the credit of the
United States, pay its debts, and provide for the common defense and the general welfare before its brief reference to
"Commerce." It is clear from the debates leading up to the
adoption of the Constitution that the commerce to be regulated was that which the states themselves were powerless to
regulate. See, e. g., 1M. Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 (rev. ed. 1937); The Federalist Nos.
7, 11, 22, 42, 45. See also EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U. S.
226, 265 (1983) (JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting). Indeed, the
language of the clause itself focuses on activities that only a
national government could regulate: commerce with foreign
nations and Indian tribes and "among" the several states.
To be sure, this Court has construed the Commerce Clause
to accommodate unanticipated changes over the past two centuries. As these changes have occurred, the Court has had
to decide whether the federal government has exceeded its
authority in regulating activities beyond the capability of a
single state to regulate or beyond legitimate federal interests
that outweighed the authority and interests of the States .

...
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In so doing, however, the Court properly has been mindful of
the essential role of the States in our federal system.
The opinion for the Court in National League of Cities was
faithful to history in its understanding of federalism. The
Court observed that "our federal system of government imposes definite limits upon the authority of Congress to regulate the activities of States as States by means of the commerce power." 426 U. S., at 842. The Tenth Amendment
was invoked to prevent Congress from exercising its "power
in a fashion that impairs the States' integrity or their ability
to function effectively in a federal system." I d., at 842-843,
quoting Fry v. United States, 421 U. S. 542, 547 n. 7 (1975)).
This Court has recognized repeatedly that State sovereignty is a fundamental component of our system of government. More than a century ago, in Lane County v. Oregon,
74 U. S. (7 Wall.) 71 (1868), the Court stated that the Constitution recognized "the necessary ~xistence of the States, .
and, within their proper spheres, the independent authority
of the States." It concluded, as Madison did, that this authority extended to "nearly the whole charge of interior regulation ... ; to [the States] and to the people all powers not
expressly delegated to the national government are reserved." Id., at 76. Recently, in Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U. S. 40, 53 (1982), the
Court recognized that the state action exemption from the
antitrust laws was based on State sovereignty. Similarly, in
United Transportation Union v. Long Island Railroad Co.,
455 U. S. 678, 683 (1982), although finding the Railway
Labor Act applicable to a state-owned railroad, the unanimous Court was careful to say that the States possess. constitutionally preserved sovereign powers.
Again, in Federal Regulatory Commission v. Mississippi,
456 U. S. 742, 752 (1982), in determining the constitutionality
of the Public Utility .Regulatory Policies Act, the Court explicitly considered whether the Act impinged on state sovereignty in violation of the Tenth Amendment. These repre-

"', '
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sent only a few of the many cases in which the Court has
recognized not only the role, but the importance, of state
sovereignty. See also, e. g., United States v. Fry, supra;
Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U. S. 514 (1926); Coyle v.
Oklahoma, 221 U. S. 559 (1911). As Justice Frankfurter
noted, the States are not merely a factor in the "shifting economic arrangements" of our country, Kovacs v. Cooper, 336
U. S. 77, 95 (1949) (Justice Frankfurter, concurring), but
constitute a "coordinate element in the system established by
the Framers for governing our Federal Union." National
League of Cities, supra, at 849.
D
In contrast, the Court today propounds a view of federalism that pays only lip service to the role of the States. Although it says that the States "unquestionably do 'retai[n] a
significant measure of sovereign authority,"' ante, at 20
(quoting EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U. S. 226, 269 (POWELL,
J., dissenting)), it fails to recognize the broad, yet specific
areas of sovereignty that the Framers intended the States to
retain. Indeed, the Court barely acknowledges that the
Tenth Amendment exists. 16 That Amendment states explicitly that "[t]he powers not delegated to the United States ...
are reserved to the States." U. S. Const., Amend. 10. The
Court recasts this language to say that the States retain their
sovereign powers "only to the extent that the Constitution
has not divested them of their original powers and transferred those powers to the Federal Government." Ante, at
20. This rephrasing is not a distinction without a difference;
rather, it reflects the Court's unprecedented view that Congress is free under the Commerce Clause to assume a State's
traditional sovereign power without judicial review of its
action. Indeed, the Court's view of federalism appears to
18

The Court's opinion mentions the Tenth Amendment only once, when
it restates the question put to the parties for reargument in this case. See
ante, at 8.
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relegate the States to precisely the trivial role that opponents of the Constitution feared they would occupy. 17
In National League of Cities, we spoke of fire prevention,
police protection, sanitation, and public health as "typical of
[the services] performed by state and local governments in
discharging their dual functions of administering the public
law and furnishing public services." 426 U. S., at 851. Not
only are these activities remote from any normal concept of
interstate commerce, they are also activities that epitomize
the concerns of local, democratic self-government. See
supra n. 5. In emphasizing the need to protect traditional
governmental functions, we identified the kinds of activities
engaged in by state and local governments that affect the everyday lives of people. These are services that people have
the ability to understand and evaluate as well as the right, in
a democracy, to oversee. 18 We recognized that "it is funcAs the amici argue, "the ability of the [S]tates to fulfill their role in the
constitutional scheme is dependent solely upon their effectiveness as instruments of self-government." Brief of Twenty-Four States as Amicus
Curiae 50. See also Brief of the National League of Cities et alas Amicus
Curiae (a brief on behalf of every major organization representing the concerns of State and local governments).
18
The · Framers recognized that the most effective democracy occurs at
local levels of government, where people with first hand knowledge of local
problems have more ready access to public officials responsible for dealing
with them. E. g., The Federalist No. 17, at 107; No.45, at 316. This is as
true today as it was when the Constitution was adopted. "Participation is
likely to be more frequent, and exercised at more different stages of a governmental activity at the local level, or in regional organizations, than at
the state and federal levels. [Additionally,] the proportion of people actually involved from the total population tends to be greater, the lower the
level of government, and this, of course, better approximates the citizen
participation ideal." ACIR, Citizen Participation in the American Federal
System 95 (1979).
Moreover, we have witnessed in recent years the rise of numerous special interest groups that engage in sophisticated lobbying, and make substantial campaign contributions to some members of Congress. These
groups are thought to have significant influence in the shaping and enactment of certain types of legislation. Contrary to the Court's view, a
17
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tions such as these which governments are created to provide
. . ." and that the states and local governments are better
able than the national government to perform them. 426
U. S., at 851.
The Court maintains that the standard approved in N ational League of Cities "disserves principles of democratic
self government." Ante, at 18. In reaching this conclusion,
the Court looks myopically only to persons elected to positions in the federal government. It disregards entirely the
far more effective role of democratic self-government at the
state and local levels. One must compare realistically the
operation of the state and local governments with that of the
federal government. Federal legislation is drafted primarily
by the staffs of the congressional committees. In view of the
hundreds of bills introduced at each session of Congress and
the complexity of many of them, it is virtually impossible for
even the most conscientious legislators to be truly familiar
with many of the statutes enacted. Federal departments
and agencies typically are authorized to write regulations.
Often these are more important than the text of the statutes.
Like the original legislation, these are drafted largely by
staff personnel. Thus, the administration and enforcement
of federal laws and regulations necessarily are largely in the
hands of staff and civil service employees. These employees
may have little or no knowledge of the States and localities
that will be affected by the statutes and regulations for which
they are responsible. In any case, they hardly are as accessible and responsive as those who occupy analogous positions
in State and local governments.
In drawing this contrast, I imply no criticism of these federal employees or the officials who are ultimately in charge.
The great majority are conscientious and faithful to their
duties. My point is simply that members of the immense
federal bureaucracy are not elected, know less about the
"political process" that functions in this way is unlikely to safeguard the
sovereign rights of States and localities.
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services traditionally rendered by states and localities, and
are inevitably less responsive to recipients of such services,
than are state legislatures, city councils, and boards of supervisors of local agencies. Thus, while I share the Court's concern with "principles of democratic self-government," I
think they are better served by National League of Cities
than the Court's position today.
IV
The question presented in this case is whether the extension of the FLSA to the wages and hours of employees of a
city-owned transit system unconstitutionally impinges on
fundamental state sovereignty. The Court's sweeping holding does far more than simply answer this question in the
negative. In overruling National League of Cities, today's
opinion apparently authorizes federal control, under the auspices of the Commerce Clause, over the terms and conditions
of employment of all state and local employees. Thus, for
purposes of federal regulation, the Court rejects the distinction between public and private employers that had been
drawn carefully in National League of Cities. The Court's
action reflects a serious misunderstanding, if not an outright
rejection, of the history of our country and the intention of
the Framers of the Constitution. 19
I return now to the balancing test approved in National
League of Cities and accepted in Hodel, Long Island R. R.,
and FERC v. Mississippi. Under this test, the Court
should consider whether the service or activity at issue is one
that "the states and their political subdivisions have traditionally afforded their citizens." National League of Cities,
supra, at 855. See ante, at - - . One cannot think of a
19
The opinion of the Court in National League of Cities makes clear that
the very essence of a federal system of government is to impose "definite
limits upon the authority of Congress to regulate the activities of the
States as States by means of the commerce power." See also the Court's
opinion in Fry, supra, at 547 n. 7.
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more fundamental and traditional activity of a State than
determination of the terms and conditions of employment of
its own employees. Moreover, the Court does not find in
this case that the "federal interest is demonstrably greater."
No such finding could have been made, for the state interest
is compelling. The financial impact on States and localities
of displacing their control over wages, hours, overtime regulations, pensions, and labor relations with their employees
could have serious, as well as unanticipated, effects on State
and local planning, budgeting, and the levying of taxes. 20 As
we said in National League of Cities, federal control also
inevitably "displaces state policies regarding the manner in
which [States] will structure delivery of those governmental
services that citizens require." !d., at 847.
The Court emphasizes that municipal operation of an intracity mass transit system is relatively new in the life of our
country. It nevertheless is a classic example of the type of
service traditionally provided by local government. It is
local by definition. It is indistinguishable in principle from
the traditional services of providing and maintaining streets,
public lighting, traffic control, water, and sewerage systems. 21 Services of this kind are precisely those "with which
citizens are more 'familiar[] and minutely conversant.'" The
Federalist, supra, No. 46, p. 316. State and local officials of
course must be intimately familiar with these services and
sensitive to their quality as well as cost. Such officials also
know that their constituents and the press respond to the adequacy, fair distribution, and cost of these services. It is
20
As Justice Douglas observed in his dissent in Maryland v. Wirtz,
supra, extention of the FLSA to the States could "disrupt the fiscal policy
of the states and threaten their autonomy in the regulation of health and
education." I d., at 302.
21
In Long Island R . Co. the unanimous Court recognized that "[t]his
Court's emphasis on traditional governmental functions and traditional aspects of state sovereignty was not meant to impose a static historical view
of state functions generally immune from federal regulation." 455 U. S.,
at 686.
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this kind of state and local control and accountability that the
Framers understood would insure the vitality and preservation of the federal system that the Constitution explicitly
requires. See National League of Cities, supra, at 847-852.

v
Although the Court's opinion purports to recognize that
the States retain some sovereign power, it does not identify
even a single aspect of state authority that would remain
when the Commerce Clause is invoked to justify federal
regulation. In Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U. S. 183 (1968),
overruled by National League of Cities and today reaffirmed,
the Court sustained an extension of the FLSA to certain hospitals, institutions, and schools. Although the Court's opin-.
ion in Wirtz was comparatively narrow, Justice Douglas, in
dissent, wrote presciently that the Court's reading of the
Commerce Clause would enable "the National Government
[to] devour the essentials of state sovereignty, though that
sovereignty is attested by the Tenth Amendment." I d., at
205. Today's decision makes Justice Douglas's fear once
again a realistic one.
As I view the Court' decision today as rejecting the basic
precepts of ourfederal system and limiting the constitutional
role of judicial review, I dissent.

To: The Chief Justice
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Justice White
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Justice Blackmun
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JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting.
The Court today, in its 5-4 decision, overrules National
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U. S. 833 (1976), a case in
which we held that Congress lacked authority to impose the
requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act on stat~ and
local governments. Because I believe this decision substantially alters the federal system embodied in the Constitution,
I dissent.
I
There are, of course, numerous examples over the history
of this Court in which prior decisions have been reconsidered
r----------~=
an~d~ov~e~rru
~l::::e::;.
d·:.-1\..:....:.,,.:.:::;~
in which the
principle of stare decisis
as we now
witness. 1 The reasoning of the Court in National League of
1
National League of Cities, following some changes in the composition
ofthe Court, had overruled Maryland v. Wirtz , 392 U.S. 183 (1968). Un-
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Cities, and the principle applied there, have been reiterated
consistently over the past eight years. Since its decision in
1976, National League of Cities has been cited and quoted in
opinions joined by every member of the present Court.
Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reel. Assn., 452 U. S.
264, 287-293 (1981); United Transportation Union v. Long
Island R. R., 455 U. S. 678, 684-686 (1982); FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U. S. 742, 764-767 (1982). Less than three
years ago, in Long Island R. R., supra, a unanimous Court
reaffirmed the principles of National League of Cities but
found them inapplicable to the regulation of a railroad heavily
engaged in interstate commerce. The Court stated:
"The key prong of the National League of Cities test
applicable to this case is the third one [repeated and
reformulated in Hodel], which examines whether 'the
states' compliance with the federal law would directly
impair their ability to structure integral operations in
areas of traditional governmental functions."
455 U. S., at 684. The Court in that case recognized that the

test "may at times be a difficult one," ibid., but it was considered in that unanimous decision as settled constitutional
doctrine.
As recently as June 1, 1982 the five Justices who constitute
the majority in this case also were the majority in FERC v.
Mississippi. In that case, the Court said:
"In National League of Cities, supra, for example, the
Court made clear that the State's regulation of its relationship with its employees is an 'undoubted attribute of
state sovereignty.' 426 U. S., at 845. Yet, by holding
'unimpaired' California v. Taylor, 353 U. S. 553 (1957),
which upheld a federal labor regulation as applied to
state railroad employees, 426 U. S., at 854. n. 18, National League of Cities acknowledged that not all aspects
like National League of Cities, the olding f Wirtz had not been repeatedly accepted by our subsequent dec sions.

82-1913 & 82-1951-DISSENT
GARCIA v. SAN ANTONIO METRO. TRANSIT AUTH.

3

of a State's sovereign authority are immune from federal
control."
426 U. S., at 764 n. 28. The Court went on to say that even
where the requirements of the National League of Cities
standard are met, "'[t]here are situations in which the nature
of the federal interest advanced may be such that it justifies
state submission."' Ibid., quoting Hodel, supra, 452 U. S.,
at 288 n. 29. The joint federal/state system of regulation in
FERC was such a "situation," but there was no hint in the
Court's opinion that National League of Cities-or its basic
standard-was subject to the infirmities discovered today.
The doctrine of stare decisis is never entirely persuasive on
a constitutional question. City of Akron v. Akron Center for
Reproductive Health, 462 U. S. 416, - - (1983). Nevertheless, even in such a case, hmv~ a "departure from the doctrine of stare decisis demands special justification." Arizona
v. Rumsey,-- U. S. - - , - - (1984). See also Oregon v.
Kennedy, 456 U. S. 667, 691-692 n. 34 (1982) (JUSTICE STEVENS, concurring). In the present case, the five Justices
who compose the majority today participated in National
League of Cities and the cases reaffirming it. 2 The stability
of judicial decision, and with it respect for the authority of
this Court, are not served by the ~ overruling of multiple precedents we witness in this case. 3
Whatever effect the Court's decision may have in weakening the application of stare decisis, it is likely to be less
important than what the Court has done to the Constitution
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2
JUSTICE O'CONNOR succeeded Justice Stewart in September 1981, and' \
participated in United Transportation Union v. Long Island R. Co., 45S J
U. S. 678 (1982), and FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U. S. 742 (1982).
~
3
As we observed recently, "stare decisis is a doctrine that demands respect in a society governed by the rule of law." City of Akron v. Akron
Center for Reproductive Health, Inc. , U. S . - (1983). In this respect, stare decisis represents "a natural evolution from the very nature of
our institutions." Lile, "Some Views on the Rule of Stare Decisis," 4 Va.
L. Rev. 955~ #
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itself. A unique feature of the United States is the federal
system guaranteed by the Constitution and implicit in the
very name of our country. Despite some genuflecting in
Court's opinion to the concept of federalism, today's decision
effectively reduces the Tenth Amendment to meaningless
rhetoric when Congress acts pursuant to the Commerce
Clause. The Court holds that the Fair Labor Standards Act
["FLSA"] "contravened no affirmative limit on Congress'
power under the Commerce Clause" to determine the wage
rates and hours of employment of all state and local employees. Ante, at 27. In rejecting the traditional view of
our federal system, the Court states:
"Apart from the limitation on federal authority inherent
in the delegated nature of Congress' Article I powers,
the principal means chosen by the Framers to ensure the
role of the states in the federal system lies in the structure of the Federal Government itself."
Ante, at 21-22 (emphasis added).
To leave no doubt about its intention, the Court renounces
its decision in National League of Cities because it "inevitably invites an unelected federal judiciary to make decisions about which state policies its favors and which ones it
dislikes." Ante, at 17. In other words, the extent to which
the States may exercise their authority, when Congress purports to act under the Commerce Clause, henceforth is to be
determined from time to time by political decisions made by
members of the federal government, decisions the Court says
will not be subject to judicial review. I note that it does not
seem to have occurred to the Court that it-an unelected majority of five Justices-today rejects almost 200 years of the
understanding of the constitutional status of federalism. In
doing so, there is only a single passing reference to the Tenth
Amendment. Nor is so much as a dictum of any court cited
in support of the view that the role of the States in the federal system may depend upon the grace of elected federal of-
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ficials, rather than on the Constitution as interpreted by this
Court.
In my opinion that follows, Part II addresses the Court's
criticisms of National League of Cities. Part III reviews
briefly the understanding of federalism that ensured the ratification of the Constitution and the extent to which this
Court, until today, has recognized that the States retain a
signficant measure of sovereignty in our federal system.
Part IV considers the applicability of the FLSA to the indisputably local service provided by an urban transit system.
II
The Court finds that the test of State immunity approved
in National League of Cities and its progeny is unworkable
and unsound in principle. In finding the test to be unworkable, the Court begins by mischaracterizing National League
of Cities and subsequent cases. In concluding that efforts to
define state immunity are unsound in principle, the Court
radically departs from long settled principles of constitutionalism and of the role of judicial review in our system of
government.
A

Much of the Court's opinion is devoted to arguing that it is
difficult to define a priori "traditional governmental functions." National League of Cities neither engaged in, nor
required, such a task. 4 The Court discusses and condemns
'InNational League of Cities, we referred to the sphere of state sovereignty as including "traditional governmental functions," a realm which is,
of course, difficult to define with precision. But the luxury of precise definitions is one rarely enjoyed in interpreting and applying the general provisions of our Constitution. Not surprisingly, therefore, the Court's attempt to demonstrate the impossibility of definition is ~· A
number of the cases it cites simply do not involve the problem of defining
governmental functions. E. g., Williams v. Eastside Mental Health Center, Inc., 669 F. 2d 671 (CAll), cert. denied, 459 U. S. 976 (1982); Friends
of the Earth v. Carey, 552 F. 2d 25 (CA2), cert. denied, 434 U. S. 902
(1977). A number of others are not properly analyzed under the principles
of National League of Cities, notwithstanding some of the language of the

•
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as standards "traditional governmental function[s]," "purely
historical" functions, "'uniquely' governmental functions,"
and " 'necessary' governmental services." Ante, at 10-11,
15, 16. But nowhere does it mention that National League
of Cities adopted a familiar type of balancing test for determining whether Commerce Clause enactments transgress
constitutional limitations imposed by the federal nature of
our system of government. This omission is noteworthy,
since the author of today's opinion joined National League of
Cities and concurred separately to point out that the Court's
opinion in that case "adopt[s] a balancing approach [that]
does not outlaw federal power in areas . . . where the federal
interest is demonstrably greater and where state . . . compliance with imposed federal standards would be essential."
426 U. S., at 856 (JUSTICE BLACKMUN, concurring).
In reading National League of Cities to embrace a balancing approach, JUSTICE BLACKMUN quite correctly cited the
part of the opinion that reaffirmed Fry v. United States, 421
U. S. 542 (1975). The Court's analysis reaffirming Fry explicitly weighed the seriousness of the problem addressed by
the federal legislation at issue in that case, against the effects
of compliance on State sovereignty. 426 U. S., at 852-853.
Our subsequent decisions also adopted this approach of
weighing the respective interests of the States and federal
government. 5 In EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U. S. 226 (1983),
lower courts. E. g., in United States v. Best, 573 F. 2d 1095 (CA9 1978)
and Hybud Equipment Corp. v. City of Akron, 654 F. 2d 1187 (CA61981).
Moreover, rather than carefully analyzing the case law, the Court simply
lists various functions thought to be protected or unprotected by courts interpreting National League of Cities. Ante, at 9-10. In the cited cases,
however, the courts considered the issue of State immunity on the specific
facts at issue; they did not make blanket pronouncements that particular
things inherently qualified as traditional governmental functions or did not.
Having thus considered the cases out of context, it was not difficult for the
Court to conclude that there is no "organizing principle" amortg them. See
ante, at 10.
5
In undertaking such balancing, we have considered, on the one hand,
the strength of the federal interest in the challenged legislation and the im-

. ,.
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for example, the Court stated that "[t]he principle of immunity articulated in National League of Cities is a functional
doctrine ... whose ultimate purpose is not to create a sacred
province of state autonomy, but to ensure that the unique
benefits of a federal system . . . not be lost through undue
federal interference in certain core state functions." I d., at
236. See also Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U. S. 264 (1981). In overruling National League of Cities, the Court incorrectly characterizes
the mode of analysis established therein and developed in
subsequent cases. 6
Moreover, the statute at issue in this case, the FLSA, is
the identical statute that was at issue in National League of

•

pact of exempting the States from its reach. Central to our inquiry into
the federal interest is how closely the challenged action implicates the central concerns of the Commerce Clause, viz., the promotion of a national
economy and free trade among the states. See EEOC v. Wyoming, 460
U. S. 226, 244 (JUSTICE STEVENS, concurring). E . g: United Transportation Union v. Long Island Rail Road Co., 455 U. S. 678, 688 (1982) ("Congress long ago concluded that federal regulation of railroad labor services is
necessary to prevent disruptions in vital rail service essential to the national economy."); FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U. S. 742, 757 (1982), ("it is
difficult to conceive of a more basic element of interstate commerce than
electric energy ... ."). Similarly, we have considered whether exempting States from federal regulation would undermine the goals of the federal
program. See Fry v. United States, 421 U. S. 542 (1975). See also Hodel,
452 U. S. at 282 (national surface mining standards necessary to insure
competition among States does not undermine States' efforts to main ·
adequate intrastate standards). On the other hand, we have assessed the
injury done to the States if forced to comply with feder
ommerce Clause
enactments. See National League of Cities , 426 U. S., at 846-851.
5
In addition, reliance on the Court's difficulties in the tax immunity
field is misplaced. Although the Court has abandoned the "governmental/proprietary" distinction in this field, see New York v. United
States, 326 U. S. 572 (1946), it has not taken the drastic approach of relying
solely on the structure of the federal government to protect the States' immunity from taxation. See Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U. S. 444
(1978). Thus, faced with an equally difficult problem of defining constitutional boundaries of federal action directly affecting the States, we did not
adopt the view many would think naive, that the federal government itself
will protect whatever rights the States may have .

.. ..
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Cities. Although JUSTICE BLACKMUN's concurrence noted
that he was "not untroubled by certain possible implications
of the Court's opinion" in National League of Cities, it also
stated that "the result with respect to the statute under challenge here [the FLSA] is necessarily correct." 426 U. S., at
856 (emphasis added). His opinion for the Court today does
not discuss the statute, nor identify any changed circumstances that warrant a-ffiffere~t aol:ffing.
B
~

Today's opinion does not explain how the States' role in the
electoral process g;w:~n~ that particular exercises of the
Commerce Clause power will not infringe on residual State
sovereignty. 7 Members of Congress are elected from the
various States, but once in office they are members of the
federal government. 8 Although the States participate in the
Electoral College, this is hardly a reason to view the President as a representative of the States' interest against fed-

7
Late in its opinion, the Court suggests that after all there may be some
"affinp.ative limits the constitutional structure might impose on federal action affecting the States under the Commerce Clause." Ante, at 27. The
Court asserts that "[i]n the factual setting of these cases the internal safeguards of the political process have performed as intended." Ibid. The
Court does not explain the basis for this judgment. Nor does it identify
the circumstances in which the "political process" may fail and "affirmative
limits" are to be imposed. Presumably, such limits are to be determined
by the Judicial Branch even though it is "unelected." Today's opinion,
however, has rejected the balancing standard and suggests no other standard that would enable a court to determine when there has been a malfunction of the "political process." The Court's failure to specify the "affirmative limits" on federal power, or when and how these limits are to be
determined, may well be explained by the transparent fact that any such
attempt would be subject to precisely the same objections on which it relies
to overrule National League of Cities.
8
One can hardly imagine this Court saying that because Congress is
composed of individuals, individual rights e amply protected by the~
~ process. Yet, the position adopt d today is indistinguishable in
principle. The Tenth Amendment
an essential part of the
Bill of Rights,
. See infra, at --.
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eral encroachment. We noted recently "the hydraulic pressure inherent within each of the separate Branches to exceed
the outer limits of its power . . . . " Immigration and
Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U. S. 919, - (1983). The Court offers no reason to think that this pressure will not operate when Congress seeks to invoke its powers under the Commerce Clause, notwithstanding the electoral role of the States. 9
'At one time in our history, the view that the structure of the federal
government sufficed to protect the States might have had somewhat more
practical, although not more logical, basis. Professor Wechsler, whose
seminal article in 1954 proposed the view adopted by the Court today,
predicated his argument on assumptions that simply do not accord with
current reality. Professor Wechsler wrote: "National action has . . .
always been regarded as exceptional in our polity, an instrusion to be justified by some necessity, the special rather than the ordinary c:ise."
Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States
in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 Colum.
L. Rev. 543, 544 (1954). Not only is the premise of this view clearly at
odds with the proliferation of national legislation over the past 30 years,
but "a variety of structural and political changes in this century have combined to make Congress particularly insensitive to state and local values."
Advisory Comm'n on Intergovernmental Relations [ACIR], Regulatory
Federalism: Policy, Process, Impact and Reform 50 (1984). The adoption
of the Seventeenth Amendment (providing for direct election of senators),
the weakening of political parties on the local level, and the rise of national
media, among other things, have made Congress increasingly less representative of State and local interests, and more likely to be responsive to
the demands of various national constituencies. I d., at 50-51. As one
observer explained, "As Senators and members of the House develop independent constituencies among groups such as farmers, businessmen, laborers, environmentalists, and the poor, each of which generally supports
certain national initiatives, their tendency to identify with state interests
and the positions of state officials is reduced." Kaden, "Federalism in the
Courts: Agenda for the 1980s," in ACIR, The Future of Federalism in the
'80s 97 (1981).
See also Kaden, Politics, Money, and State Sovereignty: The Judicial
Role, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 847 (1979) (changes in political practices and the
breadth of national initiatives mean that the political branches "may no
longer be as well suited as they once were to the task of safeguarding the
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The Court apparently thinks that the States' success at
obtaining federal funds for various projects and exemptions
from the obligations of some federal statutes is indicative of
the "effectiveness of the federal political process in preserving the States' interests.... " Ante, at 23-24. 10 But
political success is not relevant to the question whether the
political procesfes are the proper means of enforcing constitutional limitations. 11 The fact that Congress generally does
not transgress constitutional limits on its power to reach
State activities does not make judicial review any less necessary to rectify the iafl'~em cases in whic~ it does do so. 12
role of the states in the federal system and protecting the fundamental
value of federalism.") and ACIR, Regulatory Federalism, supra, at 1-24
(detailing the "dramatic shift" in kind of federal regulation applicable to the
States over the past two decades). Thus, even if one were to ignore· the
numerous problems with the Court's position in terms of constitutional
theory, there would remain serious. questions as to its factual premises.
10
The Court believes that the significant financial assistance afforded the
States and localities by the federal government is relevant to the constitutionality of extending Commerce Clause enactments to the States. See
ante, at 23-24, 26. This Court has never held, however, that the mere
disbursement of funds by the federal government establishes a right to
control activities that benefit from such funds. See Pennhurst State
School v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1, 17-18 (1981). Regardless of the willingness of the federal government to provide federal aid, the constitutional
question remains the same: whether the federal statute violates the sovereign powers reserved to the States by the Tenth Amendment.
11
Apparently in an effort to reassure the States, the Court identifies
several major statutes that thus far have not been made applicable to State
governments: the Federal Power Act, 16 U. S. C. 824(f); the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U. S. C. § 152(2); the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 29 U. S. C. § 402(e); the Occupational Safety
and Health Act, 29 U. S. C. § 652(5); the Employee Retirement Instirance
Security Act, 29 U. S. C. §§ 1002(32), 1003(b)(l); and the Sherman Act,
Parker v. Brown, 317 U. S. 341 (1943). Ante, at 24. The Court does not
suggest that this restraint will continue after its decision is understood.
Indeed, it is unlikely that special interest groups will fail to accept the
Court's open invitation to urge Congress to extend these and other statutes to apply to the States and their local subdivisions.
12
This Court has never before abdicated responsibility for assessing the
constitutionality of challenged action on the ground that affected parties
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The States' role in our system of government is a matter of
constitutional law, not of legislative grace. "The powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States, respectively, or to the people." U. S. Const., Amend. 10.
More troubling than the logical infirmities in the Court's
reasoning is the result of its holding, i. e., that federal political officials, invoking the Commerce Clause, are the sole
judges of the limits of their own power. This result is inconsistent with the fundamental principles of our constitutional
system. See, e. g., The Federalist No. 78 (Hamilton). At
least since Marbury v. Madison it has been the settled province of the federal judiciary "to say what the law is" with respect to the constitutionality of acts of Congress. In rejecting the role of the judiciary in protecting the States from
federal overreaching, the Court's opinion offers no explanation for ignoring the teaching of the most famous case in our
history. 13
theoretically are able to look out for their own interests through the electoral process. As the Court noted in National League of Cities, a much
stronger argument as to inherent structural protections could have been
made in either Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (1976) or Myers v. United
States, 272 U. S. 52 (1926), than can be made here. In these cases, the
President signed legislation that limited his authority with respect to certain appointments and thus arguably "it was no concern of this Court that
the law violated the Constitution." 426 U. S., at 841-842 n. 12. The
Court nevertheless held the laws unconstitutional because they infringed
on presidential authority, the President's consent notwithstanding. The
Court does not address this point; nor does it cite any authority for its contrary view.
.
18
The Court states that the decision in National League of Cities "invite[s] an unelected federal judiciary to make decisions about which· state
policies it favors and which ones its dislikes." Curiously, the Court then
suggests that under the application of the "traditional" governmental function analysis, "the states cannot serve as laboratories for social and economic experiment." Ante, at 17, citing Justice Brandeis' famous observation in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U. S. 262, 311 (1932) (Justice
Brandeis, dissenting). Apparently the Court believes that when "an unelected federal judiciary" makes decisions as to whether a particular function is one for the federal or state governments, the States no longer may
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III
A

In our federal system, the States have a major role that
cannot be preempted by the national government. As contemporaneous writings and the debates at the ratifying conventions make clear, the States' ratification of the Constitution was predicated on this understanding of federalism.
Indeed, the Tenth Amendment was adopted specifically to
ensure that the important role promised the States by the
proponents of the Constitution was realized.
Much of the initial opposition to the Constitution was
rooted in the fear that the national government would be too
powerful and eventually would eliminate the States as viable
political entities. This concern was voiced repeatedly until
proponents of the Constitution made assurances that a bill of
rights, including a provision explicitly reserving powers in
the States, would be among the first business of the new Congress. Samuel Adams argued, for example, that if the several States were to be joined in "one entire Nation, under one
Legislature, the Powers of which shall extend to every Subject of Legislation, and its Laws be supreme & controul the
whole, the Idea of Sovereignty in these States must be lost."
Letter from Samuel Adams to Richard Henry Lee (Dec. 3,
1787), reprinted in Anti-Federalists. versus Federalists 159
(J. Lewis ed. 1967). Likewise, George Mason feared that
"the general government being paramount to, and in every
respect more powerful than the state governments, the latter
must give way to the former." Address in the Ratifying
Convention of Virginia (June 4-12 1788), reprinted in AntiFederalists versus Federalist~,_§.U ra, at 208-209.
engage in "social and economic experiment." Ante, at 17. llle Cg~'~
.
dsgisign puttiBg ieaSF-al Cemmen:fi .Cl:mse enactmeats bey9JKLjyffic~ ~~
vi~\'• heweveP, l!ffi'ily. dees not enhance the~~pportunities to erve
~
as "laboratories."
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Antifederalists raised these concerns in almost every State
ratifying convention. 14 See generally Elliot, Debates in the
Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal
Constitution (1854). As a result, eight States voted for the
Constitution only after proposing amendments to be adopted
after ratification. 15 All eight of these included among their
recommendations some version of what later became the
Tenth Amendment. Ibid. So strong was the concern that
the proposed Constitution was seriously defective without a
specific bill of rights, including a provision reserving powers
to the States, that in order to secure the votes for ratification, the Federalists eventually conceded that such provisions were necessary. See Schwartz, A Documentary History of the Bill of Rights, supra, at 505 and passim. It was
thus generally agreed that consideration of a bill of rights
would be among the first business of the new Congress. See
generally 1 Annals of Congress 432-437 (June 8, 1789) (remarks of James Madison). Accordingly, the ten amendments that we know as the Bill of Rights were proposed and
adopted early in the first session of the First Congress.
Schwartz, A Documentary History of the Bill of Rights,
supra, 983-1167.

This history, which the Court simply ignores, documents
the integral role of the the Tenth Amendment in our constitutional theory. It exposes as well, I believe, the fundamental
character of the Court's error today. Far from being "unsound in principle," ante, at 18, judicial enforcement of the
14
Opponents of the Constitution were particularly dubious of the Federalist claim that the States retained powers not delegated to the United
States in the absence of an express provision so providing. For example,
James Winthrop wrote that "[i]t is a mere fallacy ... that what rights are
not given are reserved." Letters of Agrippa, reprinted in Schwartz, The
Bill of Rights, supra, at 510, 511.
15
Indeed, the Virginia legislature came very close to withholding ratification of the Constitution until the adoption of a bill of rights that included, among other things, the substance of the Tenth Amendment. See
Schwartz, The Bill of Rights, supra, at 762--766 and passim.
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Tenth Amendment is essential to maintaining the federal system so carefully designed by the Framers and adopted in the
Constitution.
B

The Framers had definite ideas about the nature of the
Constitution's division of authority between the federal and
state governments. In The Federalist No. 39, for example,
Madison explained this division by drawing a series of contrasts between the attributes of a "national" government and
those of the government to be established by the Constitution. While a national form of government would possess an
"indefinite supremacy over all persons and things," the form
of government contemplated by the Constitution instead consisted of "local or municipal authorities [which] form distinct
and independent portions of the supremacy, no more subject
within their respective spheres to the general authority than
the general authority is subject to them, within its own
sphere." The Federalist No. 39, p. 256 (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
Under the Constitution, the sphere of the proposed government extended to jurisdiction of "certain enumerated objects,
only, ... leav[ing] to the several States a residuary and inviolable sovereignty over all other objects." Id.
Madison elaborated on the content of these separate
spheres of sovereignty in The Federalist No. 45:
"The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution
to the Federal Government are few and defined. Those
which are to remain in the State Governments are numerous and indefinite. The former will be exercised
principally on external objects, as war, peace, negotiation, and foreign commerce; . . . . The powers reserved
to the several States will extend to all the objects,
which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the
lives, liberties and properties of the people.; and the internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the State."
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I d., at 313. Madison considered that the operations of the
federal government would be "most extensive and important
in times of war and danger; those of the State Governments
in times of peace and security." Ibid. As a result of this
division of powers, the State governments generally would
be more important than the federal government. Ibid.
The Framers believed that the separate sphere of sovereignty reserved to the States would ensure that the States
would serve as an effective "counterpoise" to the power of
the federal government. The States would serve this essential role because they would attract and retain the loyalty of
their citizens. The roots of such loyalty, the Founders
thought, were found in the objec~s peculiar to State government. For example, Hamilton argued that the States "regulat[e] all those personal interests and familiar concerns to
which the sensibility of individuals is more immediately
awake .... " The Federalist No. 17, supra, p. 107. Thus,
he maintained that the people would perceive the States as
"the immediate and most visible guardian of life and property," a fact which "contributes more than any other circumstance to impressing upon the minds of the people affection,
esteem and reverence towards the government." Ibid.
Madison took the same position, explaining that "the people
will be more familiarly and minutely conversant" with the
business of State governments, and "with the members of
these, will a greater proportion of the people have the ties of
personal acquaintance and friendship, and of family and party
attachments .... " The Federalist No. 46, p. 316. Like
Hamilton, Madison saw the States' involvement in the everyday concerns of the people as the source of their citizens' loyalty. Id. See also Nagel, Federalism as a Fundamental
Value: National League of Cities in Perspective, 1981 Sup.
Ct. Rev. 81 (1981).
Thus, the harm to the States that results from federal
overreaching under the Commerce Clause is not simply a
matter of dollars and cents. National League of Cities, 426

'•
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U. S., at 846-851. Nor is it a matter of the wisdom or folly
of certain policy choices. Cf. ante, at 17. Rather, by usurping functions traditionally performed by the States, federal
overreaching under the Commerce Clause undermines the
constitutionally mandated balance of power between the
States and the federal government, a balance designed to
protect our fundamental liberties.

c
The emasculation of the powers of the States that can result from the Court's decision is predicated on the Commerce
Clause as a power "delegated to the United States" by the
Constitution. The relevant language states: "Congress shall
have power . . . to regulate commerce with foreign nations
and among the several states and with the Indian tribes."
Art. I, § 8. Section eight identifies a score of powers, listing
the authority to lay taxes, borrow money on the credit of the
United States, pay its debts, and provide for the common defense and the general welfare before its brief reference to
"Co_mmerce." It is clear from the debates leading up to the
adoption of the Constitution that the commerce to be regulated was that which the states themselves were powerless o '
regulate. See, e. g., 1M. Farrand, The Recordsoftlle Federal Convention of 1787 (rev. ed. 1937); The Federalist Nos.
7, 11, 22, 42, 45. See also EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U. S.
226, 265 (1983) (JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting). Indeed, the
language of the clause itself focuses on activities that only a
national government could regulate: commerce with foreign
nations and Iridian tribes and "among" the several states.
To be sure, this Court has construed the Commerce Clause
to accommodate unanticipated changes over the past two centuries. As these changes have occurred, the Court has had
to decide whether the federal government has exceeded its
authority -ftr regulating activities beyond the capability of a
single state to regulate or beyond legitimate federal interests
that outweighed the authority and interests of the States.

I
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In so doing, however, the Court properly has been mindful of
the essential role of the States in our federal system.
The opinion for the Court in National League of Cities was
faithful to history in its understanding of federalism. The
Court observed that "our federal system of government imposes definite limits upon the authority of Congress to regulate the activities of States as States by means of the commerce power." 426 U. S., at 842. The Tenth Amendment
was invoked to prevent Congress from exercising its "power
in a fashion that impairs the States' integrity or their ability
to function effectively in a federal system." I d., at 842-843,
quoting Fry v. United States, 421 U. S. 542, 547 n. 7 (1975)).
This Court has recognized repeatedly that State sovereignty is a fundamental component of our system of government. More than a century ago, in Lane County v. Or~gon,
74 U. S. (7 Wall.) 71 (1868), the Court stated that the Con. stitution recognized "the necessary existence of the States,
and, within their proper spheres, the independent authority
of the States." It concluded, as Madison did, that this authority extended to "nearly the whole charge of interior regulation ... ; to [the States] and to the people all powers not
expressly delegated to the national government are reserved." Id., at 76. Recently, in Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U. S. 40, 53 (1982), the
Court recognized that the state action exemption from the
antitrust laws was based on State sovereignty. Similarly, in
United Transportation Union v. Long Island Railroad Co.,
455 U. S. 678, 683 (1982), although finding the Railway
Labor Act applicable to a state-owned railroad, the unanimous Court was careful to say that the States possess. constitutionally preserved sovereign powers.
Again, in Federal Regulatory Commission v. Mississippi,
456 U. S. 742, 752 (1982), in determining the constitutionality
of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act, the Court explicitly considered whether the Act impinged on state sovereignty in violation of the Tenth Amendment. These repre-
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sent only a few of the many cases in which the Court has
recognized not only the role, but the importance, of state
sovereignty. See also, e. g., United States v. Fry, supra;
Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U. S. 514 (1926); Coyle v.
Oklahoma, 221 U. S. 559 (1911). As Justice Frankfurter
noted, the States are not merely a factor in the "shifting economic arrangements" of our country, Kovacs v. Cooper, 336
U. S. 77, 95 (1949) (Justice Frankfurter, concurring), but
constitute a "coordinate element in the system established by
the Framers for governing our Federal Union." National
League of Cities, supra, at 849.

D
In contrast, the Court today propounds a view of federalism that pays only lip service to the role of the States. Although it says that the States "unquestionably do 'retai[n] a
significant measure of sovereign authority,'" ante, at 20
(quoting EE.OC v. Wyomirig, 460 U. S. 226, 269 (POWELL,
J., dissenting)), it fails to recognize the broad, yet specific
areas of sovereignty that the Framers intended the States to
retain. Indeed, the Court barely acknowledges that the
Tenth Amendment exists. 16 That Amendment states explicitly that "[t]he powers not delegated to the United States ...
are reserved to the States." U. S. Const., Amend. 10. The
Court recasts this language to say that the States retain their
sovereign powers "only to the extent that the Constitution
has not divested them of their original powers and transferred those powers to the Federal Government." Ante, at
20. This rephrasing is not a distinction without a difference;
rather, it reflects the Court's unprecedented view that Congress is free under the Commerce Clause to assume a State's
traditional sovereign power~thout judicial review of its
action. Indeed, the Court's view of federalism appears to
16
The Court's opinion mentions the Tenth Amendment only once, when
it restates the question put to the parties for reargument in this case. See
ante, at 8.
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relegate the States to precisely the trivial role that opponents of the Constitution feared they would occupy. 17
In National League of Cities, we spoke of fire prevention,
police protection, sanitation, and public health as "typical of
[the services] performed by state and local governments in
discharging their dual functions of administering the public
law and furnishing public services." 426 U. S., at 851. Not
only are these activities remote from any normal concept of
interstate commerce, they are also activities that epitomize
the concerns of local, democratic self-government. See
supra n. 5. In emphasizing the need to protect traditional
governmental functions, we identified the kinds of activities
engaged in by state and local governments that affect the everyday lives of people. These are services that people lwiwe"'
~ to understand and evaluate as well as the right, in
a democracy, to oversee. 18 We recognized that "it is funcAs the amici argue, "the ability of the [S]tates to fulfill their role in the
constitutional scheme is dependent solely upon their effectiveness as instruments of self-government." Brief of Twenty-Four States as Amicus
Curiae 50. See also Brief of the National League of Cities et alas Amicus
Curiae (a brief on behalf of every major organization representing the concerns of State and local governments).
18
The Framers recognized that the most effective democracy occurs at
local levels of government, where people with first hand knowledge of local
problems have more ready access to public officials responsible for dealing
with them. E . g., The Federalist No. 17, at 107; No.45, at 316. This is as
true today as it was when the Constitution was adopted. "Participation is
likely to be more frequent, and exercised at more different stages of a governmental activity at the local level, or in regional organizations, than at
the state and federal levels. [Additionally,] the proportion of people actually involved from the total population tends to be greater, the lower the
level of government, and this, of course, better approximates the citizen
participation ideal." ACIR, Citizen Participation in the American Federal
System 95 (1979).
Moreover, we have witnessed in recent years the rise of numerous special interest groups that engage in sophisticated lobbying, and make substantial campaign contributions to some members of Congress. These
groups are thought to have significant influence in the shaping and enactment of certain types of legislation. Contrary to the Court's view, a
17
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tions such as these which governments are created to provide
... " and that the states and local governments are better
able than the national government to perform them. 426
U. S., at 851.
The Court maintains that the standard approved in N ational League of Cities "disserves principles of democratic
self government." Ante, at 18. In reaching this conclusion,
the Court looks myopically only to persons elected to positions in the federal government. It disregards entirely the
far more effective role of democratic self-government at the
state and local levels. One must compare realistically the
operation of the state and local governments with that of the
federal government. Federal legislation is drafted primarily
by the staffs of the congressional committees. In view of the
hundreds of bills introduced at each session of Congress and
the complexity of many of them, it is virtually impossible for
even the most conscientious legislators to be truly familiar
with many of the statutes enacted. Federal departments
and agencies ~y are authorized to write regulations.
Often these are m~e important than the text of the statutes.
~ the original legislation, these are drafted largely by
staff personnel.
lhe administration and enforcement
of fe eral aws and regu ~tions necessarily are largely in the
hands of staff and civil service employees. These employees
may have little or no knowledge of the States and localities
that will be affected by the statutes and regulations for which
they are responsible. In any case, they hardly are as accessible and responsive as those who occupy analogous positions
in State and local governments.
In drawing this contrast, I imply no criticism of these federal employees or the officials who are ultimately in charge.
The great majority are conscientious and faithful to their
duties. My point is simply that members of the immense
federal bureaucracy are not elected, know less about the
"political process" that functions in this way is unlikely to safeguard the
sovereign rights of States and localities.

'.
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IV

The question presented in this case is whether the extension of the FLSA to the wages and hours of employees of a
city-owned transit system unconstitutionally impinges on
fundamental state sovereignty. The Court's sweeping holding does far more than simply answer this question in the
negative. In overruling National League of Cities, today's
opinion apparently authorizes federal control, under the auspices of the Commerce Clause, over the terms and conditions
of employment of all state and local employees. Thus, for
purposes of federal regulation, the Court rejects the distinction between public and private employers that had been
drawn carefully in National League of Cities. The Court's
action reflects a serious misunderstanding, if not an outright
rejection, of the history of our country and the intention of
the Framers of the Constitution. 19
I return now to the balancing test approved in National
League of Cities and accepted in Hodel, Long Island R. R.,
and FERC v. Mississippi. OJnder this test, the Court
should consider whether the service or activity at issue is one
that "the states and their polibca sUbdivisions have traditionally afforded their citizens." National League of Cities,
supra, at 855. See ante, at - - . ~ One cannot think of a
19
The opinion of the Court in National League of Cities makes clear that
the very essence of a federal system of government is to impose "definite
limits upon the authority of Congress to regulate the activities of the
States as States by means of the commerce power." See also the Court's
opinion in Fry, supra, at 547 n. 7.
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more fundamental and traditional activity of a State than
determination of the terms and conditions of employment of
its own employees. Moreover, the Court does not find in
this case that the "federal interest is demonstrably greater."
No such finding could have been made, for the state interest
is compelling. The financial impact on States and localities
of displacing their control over wages, hours, overtime regulations, pensions, and labor relations with their employees
could have serious, as well as unanticipated, effects on State
and local planning, budgeting, and the levying of taxes. 20 As
we said in National League of Cities, federal control also
inevitably "displaces state policies regarding the manner in
which [States] will structure delivery of those governmental
services that citizens require." Id., at 847)
The Court emphasizes that municipal operation of an intracity mass transit system is relatively new in the life of our
country. It nevertheless is a classic example of the type of
service traditionally provided by local government. It is
local by definition. It is indistinguishable in principle from
the traditional services of providing and maintaining streets,
public lighting, traffic control, water, and sewerage systems. 21 Services of this kind are precisely those "with which
citizens are more 'familiar[] and minutely conversant.'" The
Federalist, supra, No. 46, p. 316. State and local officials of
course must be intimately familiar with these services and
sensitive to their quality as well as cost. Such officials also
know that their constituents and the press respond to the adequacy, fair distribution, and cost of these services. It is
As Justice Douglas observed in his dissent in Maryland v. Wirtz ,
supra, extention of the FLSA to the States could "disrupt the fiscal policy
of the states and threaten their autonomy in the regulation of health and
education." ld., at 302.
21
In Long Island R . Co. the unanimous Court recognized that "[t]his
Court's emphasis on traditional governmental functions and traditional aspects of state sovereignty was not meant to impose a static historical view
of state functions generally immune from federal regulation. " 455 U. S.,
at 686.
20

/
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this kind of state and local control and accountability that the
Framers understood would insure the vitality and preservation of the federal system that the Constitution explicitly
requires. See National League of Cities, supra, at 847-852.

v
Although the Court's opinion purports to recognize that
the States retain some sovereign power, it does not identify
even a single aspect of stat~thority that would remain
when the Commerce Clause 1s invoked to justify federal
regulation. In Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U. S. 183 (1968),
overruled by National League of Cities and today reaffirmed,
the Court sustained an extension of the FLSA to certain hospitals, institutions, and schools. • Although the Court's opinion in Wirtz was comparatively narrow, Justice Douglas, in
dissent, wrote presciently that the Court's reading of the
Commerce Clause would enable "the National Government
[to] devour the essentials of state sovereignty,, though that
sovereignty is attested by the Tenth Amendment." I d., at
205. Today's decision makes Justice Douglas's fear once
again a realistic one.
As I view the Court' decision today as rejecting the basic
precepts of o~ederal system and limiting the constitutional
role of judicial review, I dissent.
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JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting.
The Court today, in its 5-4 decision, overrules National
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U. S. 833 (1976), a case in
which we held that Congress lacked authority to impose the
requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act on state and
local governments. Because I believe this decision substantially alters the federal system embodied in the Constitution,
I dissent.
I
There are, of course, numerous examples over the history
of this Court in which prior decisions have been reconsidered
and overruled. There have been few cases, however, in
which the principle of stare decisis and the rationale of recent
decisions were ignored as abruptly as we now witness. 1 The
1
National League of Cities, following some changes in the composition
of the Court, had overruled Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U. S. 183 (1968). Un-
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reasoning of the Court in National League of Cities, and the
principle applied there, have been reiterated consistently
over the past eight years. Since its decision in 1976, National League of Cities has been cited and quoted in opinions
joined by every member of the present Court. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reel. Assn., 452 U. S. 264, 287-293
(1981); United Transportation Union v. Long Island R. Co.,
455 U. S. 678, 684-686 (1982); FERC v. Mississippi, 456
U. S. 742, 764-767 (1982). Less than three years ago, in
Long Island R. Co .. , supra, a unanimous Court reaffirmed
the principles of National League of Cities but found them
inapplicable to the regulation of a railroad heavily engaged in
interstate commerce. The Court stated:
"The key prong of the National League ofCities .test applicable to this case is the third one [repeated and reformulated in Hodel], which examines whether 'the
states' compliance with the federal law would directly
impair their ability to structure integral operations
in areas of traditional governmental functions." 455
U. S., at 684.
The Court in that case recognized that the test "may at
times be a difficult one," ibid., but it was considered in that
unanimous decision as settled constitutional doctrine.
As recently as June 1, 1982 the five Justices who constitute
the majority in this case also were the majority in FERC v.
Mississippi. In that case, the Court said:
"In National League of Cities, supra, for example, the
Court made clear that the State's regulation of its relationship with its employees is an 'undoubted attribute of
state sovereignty.' 426 U. S., at 845. Yet, by holding
'unimpaired' California v. Taylor, 353 U. S. 553 (1957),
which upheld a federal labor regulation as applied to
state railroad employees, 426 U. S., at 854, n. 18, N alike National League of Cities, the rationale of Wirtz had not been repeatedly accepted by our subsequent decisions.
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tional League of Cities acknowledged that not all aspects
of a State's sovereign authority are immune from federal
control." 426 U. S., at 764, n. 28.
The Court went on to say that even where the requirements of the National League of Cities standard are met,
"'[t]here are situations in which the nature of the federal
interest advanced may be such that it justifies state submission."' Ibid., quoting Hodel, supra, 452 U. S., at 288 n. 29.
The joint federal/state system of regulation in FERC was
such a "situation," but there was no hint in the Court's opinion that National League of Cities-or its basic standardwas subject to the infirmities discovered today.
Although the doctrine is not rigidly applied to constitutional questions, "any departure from the doctrine of stare
decisis demands special justification." Arizona v. Rumsey,
- - U . S . - - , - - (1984). See also Oregon v. Kennedy,
456 U. S. 667, 691-692 n. 34 (1982) (STEVENS, J., concurring). In the present case, the five Justices who compose
the majority today participated in National League of Cities
and the cases reaffirming it. 2 The stability of judicial decision, and with it respect for the authority of this Court, are
not served by the precipitous overruling of multiple precedents that we witness in this case. 3
Whatever effect the Court's decision may have in weakening the application of stare decisis, it is likely to be less
important than what the Court has done to the Constitution
itself. A unique feature of the United States is the federal
system of government guaranteed by the Constitution and
JUSTICE O'CONNOR, the only new member in the Court since our decision in National League of Cities, has joined the Court in reaffirming its
principles. See United Transportation Union v. Long Island R. Co., 455
U. S. 678 (1982), and FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U. S. 742, 775 (1982)
(O'CONNOR, J., dissenting in part).
3
In this respect, stare decisis represents "a natural evolution from the
very nature of our institutions." Lile, "Some Views on the Rule of Stare
Decisis," 4 Va. L. Rev. 955, 956 (1916).
2
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implicit in the very name of our country. Despite some
genuflecting in Court's opinion to the concept of federalism,
today's decision effectively reduces the Tenth Amendment to
meaningless rhetoric when Congress acts pursuant to the
Commerce Clause. The Court holds that the Fair Labor
Standards Act ["FLSA"] "contravened no affirmative limit
on Congress' power under the Commerce Clause" to determine the wage rates and hours of employment of all state and
local employees. Ante, at 27. In rejecting the traditional
view of our federal system, the Court states:
"Apart from the limitation on federal authority inherent
in the delegated nature of Congress' Article I powers,
the principal means chosen by the Framers to ensure the
role of the states in the federal system lies in the structure of the Federal Government itself." Ante, at 21-22
(emphasis added).
To leave no doubt about its intention, the Court renounces
its decision in National League of Cities because it "inevitably invites an unelected federal judiciary to make decisions
about which state policies its favors and which ones it dislikes." Ante, at 17. In other words, the extent to which the
States may exercise their authority, when Congress purports
to act under the Commerce Clause, henceforth is to be determined from time to time by political decisions made by members of the federal government, decisions the Court says will
not be subject to judicial review. I note that it does not
seem to have occurred to the Court that it-an unelected majority of five Justices-today rejects almost 200 years of the
understanding of the constitutional status of federalism. In
doing so, there is only a single passing reference to the Tenth
Amendment. Nor is so much as a dictum of any court cited
in support of the view that the role of the States in the federal system may depend upon the grace of elected federal officials, rather than on the Constitution as interpreted by this
Court.
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In my opinion that follows, Part II addresses the Court's
criticisms of National League of Cities. Part III reviews
briefly the understanding of federalism that ensured the ratification of the Constitution and the extent to which this
Court, until today, has recognized that the States retain a
signficant measure of sovereignty in our federal system.
Part IV considers the applicability of the FLSA to the indisputably local service provided by an urban transit system.
II
The Court finds that the test of State immunity approved
in National League of Cities and its progeny is unworkable
and unsound in principle. In finding the test to be unworkable, the Court begins by mischaracterizing National League
of Cities and subsequent cases. In concluding that efforts to
define state immunity are unsound in principle, the Court
radically departs from long settled constitutional values
and ignores the role of judicial review in our system of
government.
A
Much of the Court's opinion is devoted to arguing that it is
difficult to define a priori "traditional governmental functions." National League of Cities neither engaged in, nor
required, such a task. 4 The Court discusses and condemns
4

In National League of Cities, we referred to the sphere of state sovereignty as including "traditional governmental functions," a realm which is,
of course, difficult to define with precision. But the luxury of precise definitions is one rarely enjoyed in interpreting and applying the general provisions of our Constitution. Not surprisingly, therefore, the Court's
attempt to demonstrate the impossibility of definition is unhelpful. A
number of the cases it cites simply do not involve the problem of defining
governmental functions. E. g., Williams v. Eastside Mental Health Center, Inc., 669 F. 2d 671 (CAll), cert. denied, 459 U. S. 976 (1982); Friends
of the Earth v. Carey, 552 F. 2d 25 (CA2), cert. denied, 434 U. S. 902
(1977). A number of others are not properly analyzed under the principles
of National League of Cities, notwithstanding some of the language of the
lower courts. E. g., United States v. Best, 573 F. 2d 1095 (CA9 1978) and
Hybttd Equipment Corp. v. City of Akron, 654 F. 2d 1187 (CA6 1981).
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as standards "traditional governmental function[s]," "purely
historical" functions, "'uniquely' governmental functions,"
and "'necessary' governmental services." Ante, at 10-11,
15, 16. But nowhere does it mention that National League
of Cities adopted a familiar type of balancing test for determining whether Commerce Clause enactments transgress
constitutional limitations imposed by the federal nature of
our system of government. This omission is noteworthy,
since the author of today's opinion joined National League of
Cities and concurred separately to point out that the Court's
opinion in that case "adopt[s] a balancing approach [that]
does not outlaw federal power in areas ... where the federal
interest is demonstrably greater and where state . . . compliance with imposed federal standards would be essential."
426 U. S., at 856 (BLACKMUN, J., concurring).
In reading National League of Cities to embrace a balancing approach, JuSTICE BLACKMUN quite correctly cited the
part of the opinion that reaffirmed Fry v. United States, 421
U. S. 542 (1975). The Court's analysis reaffirming Fry explicitly weighed the seriousness of the problem addressed by
the federal legislation at issue in that case, against the effects
of compliance on State sovereignty. 426 U. S., at 852-853.
Our subsequent decisions also adopted this approach of
weighing the respective interests of the States and federal
government. 5 In EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U. S. 226 (1983),
Moreover, rather than carefully analyzing the case law, the Court simply
lists various functions thought to be protected or unprotected by courts interpreting National League of Cities. Ante, at 9-10. In the cited cases,
however, the courts considered the issue of State immunity on the specific
facts at issue; they did not make blanket pronouncements that particular
things inherently qualified as traditional governmental functions or did not.
Having thus considered the cases out of context, it was not difficult for the
Court to conclude that there is no "organizing principle" among them. See
ante, at 10.
5
In undertaking such balancing, we have considered, on the one hand,
the strength of the federal interest in the challenged legislation and the impact of exempting the States from its reach. Central to our inquiry into

·'
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for example, the Court stated that "[t]he principle of immunity articulated in National League of Cities is a functional
doctrine ... whose ultimate purpose is not to create a sacred
province of state autonomy, but to ensure that the unique
benefits of a federal system . . . not be lost through undue
federal interference in certain core state functions." Id., at
236. See also Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., 452 U. S. 264 (1981). In overruling National League of Cities, the Court incorrectly characterizes
the mode of analysis established therein and developed in
subsequent cases. 6
the federal interest is how closely the challenged action implicates the central concerns of the Commerce Clause, viz., the promotion of a national
economy and free trade among the states. See EEOC v. Wyoming, 460
U. S. 226, 244 (STEVENS, J., concurring). See also, for example, United
Transportation Union v. Long Island Rail Road Co., 455 U. S. 678, 688
(1982) ("Congress long ago concluded that federal regulation of railroad
labor services is necessary to prevent disruptions in vital rail service essential to the national economy."); FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U. S. 742, 757
(1982), ("it is difficult to conceive of a more basic element of interstate commerce than electric energy . . . . "). Similarly, we have considered
whether exempting States from federal regulation would undermine the
goals of the federal program. See Fry v. United States, 421 U. S. 542
(1975). See also Hodel , 452 U. S., at 282 (national surface mining standards necessary to insure competition among States does not undermine
States' efforts to maintain adequate intrastate standards). On the other
hand, we have also assessed the injury done to the States if forced to comply with federal Commerce Clause enactments. See National League of
Cities, 426 U. S., at 846-851.
6
In addition, reliance on the Court's difficulties in the tax immunity
field is misplaced. Although the Court has abandoned the "governmental/proprietary" distinction in this field, see New York v. United
States, 326 U. S. 572 (1946), it has not taken the drastic approach of relying
solely on the structure of the federal government to protect the States' immunity from taxation. See Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U. S. 444
(1978). Thus, faced with an equally difficult problem of defining constitutional boundaries of federal action directly affecting the States, we did not
adopt the view many would think naive, that the federal government itself
will protect whatever rights the States may have.

82-1913 & 82-1951-DISSENT
GARCIA v. SAN ANTONIO METRO. TRANSIT AUTH.

8

Moreover, the statute at issue in this case, the FLSA, is
the identical statute that was at issue in National League of
Cities. Although JusTICE BLACKMUN's concurrence noted
that he was "not untroubled by certain possible implications
of the Court's opinion" in National League of Cities, it also
stated that "the result with respect to the statute under challenge here [the FLSA] is necessarily correct." 426 U. S., at
856 (emphasis added). His opinion for the Court today does
not discuss the statute, nor identify any changed circumstances that warrant the conclusion today that National
League of Cities is. necessarily wrong.
B
Today's opinion does not explain how the States' role in the
electoral process guarantees that particular exercises of the
Commerce Clause power will not infringe on residual State
sovereignty. 7 Members of Congress are elected from the
various States, but once in office they are members of the
federal government. 8 Although the States participate in the
Late in its opinion, the Court suggests that after all there may be some
"affirmative limits the constitutional structure might impose on federal action affecting the States under the Commerce Clause." Ante, at 27. The
Court asserts that "[i]n the factual setting of these cases the internal safeguards of the political process have performed as intended." Ibid. The
Court does not explain the basis for this judgment. Nor does it identify
the circumstances in which the "political process" may fail and "affirmative
limits" are to be imposed. Presumably, such limits are to be determined
by the Judicial Branch even though it is "unelected." Today's opinion,
however, has rejected the balancing standard and suggests no other standard that would enable a court to determine when there has been a malfunction of the "political process." The Court's failure to specify the "affirmative limits" on federal power, or when and how these limits are to be
determined, may well be explained by the transparent fact that any such
attempt would be subject to precisely the same objections on which it relies
to overrule National League of Cities.
8
One can hardly imagine this Court saying that because Congress is
composed of individuals, individual rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights
are amply protected by the political process. Yet, the position adopted
7
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Electoral College, this is hardly a reason to view the President as a representative of the States' interest against federal encroachment. We noted recently "the hydraulic pressure inherent within each of the separate Branches to exceed
the outer limits of its power . . . . " Immigration and
Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U. S. 919, - (1983). The Court offers no reason to think that this pressure will not operate when Congress seeks to invoke its powers under the Commerce Clause, notwithstanding the electoral role of the States. 9
today is indistinguishable in principle. The Tenth Amendment also is an
essential part of the Bill of Rights. See infra, at - - .
9
At one time in our history, the view that the structure of the federal
government sufficed to protect the States might have had a somewhat
more practical, although not a more logical, basis. Professor Wechsler,
whose seminal article in 1954 proposed the view adopted by the Court today, predicated his argument on assumptions that simply do not accord
with current reality. Professor Wechsler wrote: "National action has ...
always been regarded as exceptional in our polity, an instrusion to be justified by some necessity, the special rather than the ordinary case."
Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States
in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 Colum.
L. Rev. 543, 544 (1954). Not only is the premise of this view clearly at
odds with the proliferation of national legislation over the past 30 years,
but "a variety of structural and political changes in this century have combined to make Congress particularly insensitive to state and local values."
Advisory Comm'n on Intergovernmental Relations [ACIR], Regulatory
Federalism: Policy, Process, Impact and Reform 50 (1984). The adoption
of the Seventeenth Amendment (providing for direct election of senators),
the weakening of political parties on the local level, and the rise of national
media, among other things, have made Congress increasingly less representative of State and local interests, and more likely to be responsive to
the demands of various national constituencies. Id., at 50-51. As one
observer explained, "As Senators and members of the House develop independent constituencies among groups such as farmers, businessmen, laborers, environmentalists, and the poor, each of which generally supports
certain national initiatives, their tendency to identify with state interests
and the positions of state officials is reduced." Kaden, "Federalism in the
Courts: Agenda for the 1980s," in ACIR, The Future of Federalism in the
'80s, at 97 (1981).
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The Court apparently thinks that the States' success at
obtaining federal funds for various projects and exemptions
from the obligations of some federal statutes is indicative of
the "effectiveness of the federal political process in preserving the States' interests .... " Ante, at 23-24. 10 But
such political success is not relevant to the question whether
the political processes are the proper means of enforcing constitutional limitations. 11 The fact that Congress generally
See also Kaden, Politics, Money, and State Sovereignty: The Judicial
Role, 79 Colurn. L. Rev. 847 (1979) (changes in political practices and the
breadth of national initiatives mean that the political branches "may no
longer be as well suited as they once were to the task of safeguarding the
role of the states in the federal system and protecting the fundamental
value of federalism") and ACIR, Regulatory Federalism, supra, at 1-24
(detailing the "dramatic shift" in kind offederal regulation applicable to the
States over the past two decades). Thus, even if one were to ignore the
numerous problems with the Court's position in terms of constitutional
theory, there would remain serious questions as to its factual premises.
10
The Court believes that the significant financial assistance afforded the
States and localities by the federal government is relevant to the constitutionality of extending Commerce Clause enactments to the States. See
ante, at 23-24, 26. This Court has never held, however, that the mere
disbursement of funds by the federal government establishes a right to
control activities that benefit from such funds. See Pennhurst State
School v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1, 17-18 (1981). Regardless of the willingness of the federal government to provide federal aid, the constitutional
question remains the same: whether the federal statute violates the sovereign powers reserved to the States by the Tenth Amendment.
11
Apparently in an effort to reassure the States, the Court identifies
several major statutes that thus far have not been made applicable to State
governments: the Federal Power Act, 16 U. S. C. 824(f); the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U. S. C. § 152(2); the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 29 U. S. C. § 402(e); the Occupational Safety
and Health Act, 29 U. S. C. § 652(5); the Employee Retirement Insurance
Security Act, 29 U. S. C. §§ 1002(32), 1003(b)(1); and the Sherman Act, 15
U. S. C. § 1, et seq.; see Parker v. Brown, 317 U. S. 341 (1943). Ante, at
24. The Court does not suggest that this restraint will continue after its
decision here. Indeed, it is unlikely that special interest groups will fail to
accept the Court's open invitation to urge Congress to extend these and
other statutes to apply to the States and their local subdivisions.
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does not transgress constitutional limits on its power to reach
State activities does not make judicial review any less necessary to rectify the cases in which it does do so. 12 The States'
role in our system of government is a matter of constitutional
law, not of legislative grace. "The powers not delegated to
the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to
the States, are reserved to the States, respectively, or to the
people." U. S. Const., Amend. 10.
More troubling than the logical infirmities in the Court's
reasoning is the result of its holding, i. e., that federal political officials, invoking the Commerce Clause, are the sole
judges of the limits of their own power. This result is inconsistent with the fundamental principles of our constitutional
system. See, e. g., The Federalist No. 78 (Hamilton). At
least since Marbury v. Madison it has been the settled province of the federal judiciary "to say what the law is" with
respect to the constitutionality of acts of Congress. 1
Cranch 137, 177 (1803). In rejecting the role of the judiciary
in protecting the States from federal overreaching, the
Court's opinion offers no explanation for ignoring the teaching of the most famous case in our history. 13
This Court has never before abdicated responsibility for assessing the
constitutionality of challenged action on the ground that affected parties
theoretically are able to look out for their own interests through the electoral process. As the Court noted in National League of Cities, a much
stronger argument as to inherent structural protections could have been
made in either Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (1976) or Myers v. United
States , 272 U. S. 52 (1926), than can be made here. In these cases, the
President signed legislation that limited his authority with respect to certain appointments and thus arguably "it was no concern of this Court that
the law violated the Constitution." 426 U. S., at 841-842 n. 12. The
Court nevertheless held the laws unconstitutional because they infringed
on presidential authority, the President's consent notwithstanding. The
Court does not address this point; nor does it cite any authority for its contrary view.
18
The Court states that the decision in National League of Cities "invite[s] an unelected federal judiciary to make decisions about which state
policies it favors and which ones its dislikes." Curiously, the Court then
12
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III
A

In our federal system, the States have a major role that
cannot be preempted by the national government. As contemporaneous writings and the debates at the ratifying conventions make clear, the States' ratification of the Constitution was predicated on this understanding of federalism.
Indeed, the Tenth Amendment was adopted specifically to
ensure that the important role promised the States by the
proponents of the Constitution was realized.
Much of the initial opposition to the Constitution was
rooted in the fear that the national government would be too
powerful and eventually would eliminate the States as viable
political entities. This concern was voiced repeatedly until
proponents of the Constitution made assurances that a bill of
rights, including a provision explicitly reserving powers in
the States, would be among the first business of the new Congress. Samuel Adams argued, for example, that if the several States were to be joined in "one entire Nation, under one
Legislature, the Powers of which sl}all extend to every Subject of Legislation, and its Laws be supreme & controul the
whole, the Idea of Sovereignty in these States must be lost."
Letter from Samuel Adams to Richard Henry Lee (Dec. 3,
1787), reprinted in Anti-Federalists versus Federalists 159
(J. Lewis ed. 1967). Likewise, George Mason feared that
suggests that under the application of the "traditional" governmental function analysis, "the states cannot serve as laboratories for social and economic experiment." Ante, at 17, citing Justice Brandeis's famous observation in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U. S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting). Apparently the Court believes that when "an unelected
federal judiciary" makes decisions as to whether a particular function is one
for the federal or state governments, the States no longer may engage in
"social and economic experiment." Ante, at 17. The Court does not explain how leaving the States virtually at the mercy of the federal government, without recourse to judicial review, will enhance their opportunities
to experiment and serve as "laboratories."
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"the general government being paramount to, and in every
respect more powerful than the state governments, the latter
must give way to the former." Address in the Ratifying
Convention of Virginia (June 4-12, 1788), reprinted in AntiFederalists versus Federalists, supra, at 208-209.
Antifederalists raised these concerns in almost every State
ratifying convention. 14 See generally 1-4, Debates in the
Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal
Constitution (J. Elliot 2d. cd. 1854). As a result, eight
States voted for the Constitution only after proposing amendments to be adopted after ratification. 15 All eight of these included among their recommendations some version of what
later became the Tenth Amendment. Ibid. So strong was
the concern that the proposed Constitution was seriously defective without a specific bill of rights, including a provision
reserving powers to the States, that in order to secure the
votes for ratification, the Federalists eventually conceded
that such provisions were necessary. See Schwartz, The
Bill of Rights: A Documentary History, 505 and passim
(1971). It was thus generally agreed that consideration of a
bill of rights would be among the first business of the new
Congress. See generally 1 Annals of Congress 432-437
(June 8, 1789) (remarks of James Madison). Accordingly,
the 10 amendments that we know as the Bill of Rights were
proposed and adopted early in the first session of the First
Congress. Schwartz, The Bill of Rights, supra, 983-1167.
"Opponents of the Constitution were particularly dubious of the Federalists' claim that the States retained powers not delegated to the United
States in the absence of an express provision so providing. For example,
James Winthrop wrote that "[i]t is a mere fallacy ... that what rights are
not given are reserved." Letters of Agrippa, reprinted in Schwartz, The
Bill of Rights: A Documentary History. 510, 511 (1971).
l& Indeed, the Virginia legislature came very close to withholding ratification of the Constitution until the adoption of a bill of rights that included, among other things, the substance of the Tenth Amendment. See
Schwartz, The Bill of Rights, supra, at 762-766 and passim.
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This history, which the Court simply ignores, documents
the integral role of the Tenth Amendment in our constitutional theory. It exposes as well, I believe, the fundamental
character of the Court's error today. Far from being "unsound in principle," ante, at 18, judicial enforcement of the
Tenth Amendment is essential to maintaining the federal system so carefully designed by the Framers and adopted in the
Constitution.
B
The Framers had definite ideas about the nature of the
Constitution's division of authority between the federal and
state governments. In The Federalist No. 39, for example,
Madison explained this division by drawing a series of contrasts between the attributes of a "national" government and
those of the government to be established by the Constitution. While a national form of government would possess an
"indefinite supremacy over all persons and things," the form
of government contemplated by the Constitution instead consisted of "local or municipal authorities [which] form distinct
and independent portions of the supremacy, no more subject
within their respective ·spheres to the general authority than
the general authority is subject to them, within its own
sphere." The Federalist No. 39, p. 256 (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
Under the Constitution, the sphere of the proposed government extended to jurisdiction of "certain enumerated objects,
only, ... leav[ing] to the several States a residuary and inviolable sovereignty over all other objects." Ibid.
Madison elaborated on the content of these separate
spheres of sovereignty in The Federalist No. 45:
"The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution
to the Federal Government are few and defined. Those
which are to remain in the State Governments are numerous and indefinite. The former will be exercised
principally on external objects, as war, peace, negotiation, and foreign commerce; . . . . The powers reserved
to the several States will extend to all the objects,
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which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the
lives, liberties and properties of the people; and the internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the State."
!d., at 313.
Madison considered that the operations of the federal government would be "most extensive and important in times of
war and danger; those of the State Governments in times of
peace and security." Ibid. As a result of this division of
powers, the State governments generally would be more important than the federal government. Ibid.
The Framers believed that the separate sphere of sovereignty reserved to the States would ensure that the States
would serve as an effective "counterpoise" to the power of
the federal government. The States would serve this essential role because they would attract and retain the loyalty of
their citizens. The roots of such loyalty, the Founders
thought, were found in the objects peculiar to State government. For example, Hamilton argued that the States "regulat[e] all those personal interests and familiar concerns to
which the sensibility of individuals is more immediately·
awake .... " The Federalist No. 17, supra, p. 107. Thus,
he maintained that the people would perceive the States as
"the immediate and most visible guardian of life and property," a fact which "contributes more than any other circumstance to impressing upon the minds of the people affection,
esteem and reverence towards the government." Ibid.
Madison took the same position, explaining that "the people
will be more familiarly and minutely conversant" with the
business of State governments, and "with the members of
these, will a greater proportion of the people have the ties of
personal acquaintance and friendship, and of family and party
attachments .... " The Federalist No. 46, p. 316. Like
Hamilton, Madison saw the States' involvement in the everyday concerns of the people as the source of their citizens' loyalty. Ibid. See also Nagel, Federalism as a Fundamental

...
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Value: National League of Cities in Perspective, 1981 Sup.
Ct. Rev. 81 (1981).
Thus, the harm to the States that results from federal
overreaching under the Commerce Clause is not simply a
matter of dollars and cents. National League of Cities, 426
U. S., at 846-851. Nor is it a matter of the wisdom or folly
of certain policy choices. Cf. ante, at 17. Rather, by usurping functions traditionally performed by the States, federal
overreaching under the Commerce Clause undermines the
constitutionally mandated balance of power between the
States and the federal government, a balance designed to
protect our fundamental liberties.

c
The emasculation of the powers of the States that can result from the Court's decision is predicated on the Commerce
Clause as a power "delegated to the United States" by the
Constitution. The relevant language states: "Congress shall
have power ... to regulate commerce with foreign nations
and among the several states and with the Indian tribes."
Art. I, § 8. Section eight identifies a score of powers, listing
the authority to lay taxes, borrow money on the credit of the
United States, pay its debts, and provide for the common defense and the general welfare before its brief reference to
"Commerce." It is clear from the debates leading up to the
adoption of the Constitution that the commerce to be regulated was that which the states themselves lacked the practical capability to regulate. See, e. g., 1 M. Farrand, The
Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 (rev. ed. 1937);
The Federalist Nos. 7, 11, 22, 42, 45. See also EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U. S. 226, 265 (1983) (POWELL, J., dissenting).
Indeed, the language of the clause itself focuses on activities
that only a national government could regulate: commerce
with foreign nations and Indian tribes and "among" the several states.
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To be sure, this Court has construed the Commerce Clause
to accommodate unanticipated changes over the past two centuries. As these changes have occurred, the Court has had
to decide whether the federal government has exceeded its
authority by regulating activities beyond the capability of a
single state to regulate or beyond legitimate federal interests
that outweighed the authority and interests of the States.
In so doing, however, the Court properly has been mindful of
the essential role of the States in our federal system.
The opinion for the Court in National League of Cities was
faithful to history in its understanding of federalism. The
Court observed that "our federal system of government imposes definite limits upon the authority of Congress to regulate the activities of States as States by means of the commerce power." 426 U. S., at 842. The Tenth Amendment
was invoked to prevent Congress from exercising its "power
in a fashion that impairs the States' integrity or their ability
to function effectively in a federal system." !d., at 842-843,
quoting Fry v. United States, 421 U. S. 542, 547 n. 7 (1975)).
This Court has recognized repeatedly that State sovereignty is a fundamental component of our system of government. More than a century ago, 'in Lane County v. Oregon,
7 Wall. 71 (1868), the Court stated that the Constitution
recognized "the necessary existence of the States, and,
within their proper spheres, the independent authority of the
States." It concluded, as Madison did, that this authority
extended to "nearly the whole charge of interior regulation
... ; to [the States] and to the people all powers not expressly
delegated to the national government are reserved." I d., at
76. Recently, in Community Communications Co. v. City
of Boulder, 455 U. S. 40, 53 (1982), the Court recognized that
the state action exemption from the antitrust laws was based
on State sovereignty. Similarly, in United Transportation
Union v. Long Island R . Co., 455 U. S. 678, 683 (1982), although finding the Railway Labor Act applicable to a stateowned railroad, the unanimous Court was careful to say that

·.
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the States possess constitutionally preserved sovereign
powers.
Again, in Federal Regulatory Commission v. Mississippi,
456 U. S. 742, 752 (1982), in determining the constitutionality
of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act, the Court explicitly considered whether the Act impinged on state sovereignty in violation of the Tenth Amendment. These represent only a few of the many cases in which the Court has
recognized not only the role, but the importance, of state
sovereignty. See also, e. g., United States v. Fry, supra;
Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U. S. 514 (1926); Coyle v.
Oklahoma, 221 U. S. 559 (1911). As Justice Frankfurter
noted, the States are not merely a factor in the "shifting economic arrangements" of our country, Kovacs v. Cooper, 336
U. S. 77, 95 (1949) (Justice Frankfurter, concurring), but
constitute a "coordinate element in the system established by
the Framers for governing our Federal Union." National
League of Cities, supra, at 849.
D

In contrast, the Court today propounds a view of federalism that pays only lip service to the role of the States. Although it says that the States "unquestionably do 'retai[n]
a significant measure of sovereign authority,"' ante, at 20
(quoting EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 269 (POWELL,
J., dissenting)), it fails to recognize the broad, yet specific
areas of sovereignty that the Framers intended the States to
retain. Indeed, the Court barely acknowledges that the
Tenth Amendment exists. 16 That Amendment states explicitly that "[t]he powers not delegated to the United States ...
are reserved to the States." U. S. Const., Amend. 10. The
Court recasts this language to say that the States retain their
sovereign powers "only to the extent that the Constitution
18
The Court's opinion mentions the Tenth Amendment only once, when
it restates the question put to the parties for reargument in this case. See
ante, at 8.
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has not divested them of their original powers and transferred those powers to the Federal Government." Ante, at
20. This rephrasing is not a distinction without a difference;
rather, it reflects the Court's unprecedented view that Congress is free under the Commerce Clause to assume a State's
traditional sovereign power, and to do so without judicial
review of its action. Indeed, the Court's view of federalism appears to relegate the States to precisely the trivial
role that opponents of the Constitution feared they would
occupy. 17
In National League of Cities, we spoke of fire prevention,
police protection, sanitation, and public health as "typical of
[the services] performed by state and local governments in
discharging their dual functions of administering the public
law and furnishing public services." 426 U. S., at 851. Not
only are these activities remote from any normal concept of
interstate commerce, they are also activities that epitomize
the concerns of local, democratic self-government. See
supra, n. 5. In emphasizing the need to protect traditional
governmental functions, we identified the kinds of activities
engaged in by state ·and local governments that affect the
everyday lives of citizens. These are services that people
are in a position to understand and evaluate, and in a democracy, have the right to oversee. 18 We recognized that "it is
17

As the amici argue, "the ability of the [S]tates to fulfill their role in the
constitutional scheme is dependent solely upon their effectiveness as instruments of self-government." Brief of Twenty-Four States as Amicus
Curiae 50. See also Brief of the National League of Cities et al as Amicus
Curiae (a brief on behalf of every major organization representing the concerns of State and local governments).
18
The Framers recognized that the most effective democracy occurs at
local levels of government, where people with first hand knowledge of local
problems have more ready access to public officials responsible for dealing
with them. E. g., The Federalist No. 17, at 107; No. 45, at 316. This is
as true today as it was when the Constitution was adopted. "Participation
is likely to be more frequent, and exercised at more different stages of a
governmental activity at the local level, or in regional organizations, than
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functions such as these which governments are created to
provide . . ." and that the states and local governments are
better able than the national government to perform them.
426 U. S., at 851.
The Court maintains that the standard approved in N ational League of Cities "disserves principles of democratic
self government." Ante, at 18. In reaching this conclusion,
the Court looks myopically only to persons elected to positions in the federal government. It disregards entirely the
far more effective role of democratic self-government at the
state and local levels. One must compare realistically the
operation of the state and local governments with that of the
federal government. Federal legislation is drafted primarily
by the staffs of the congressional committees. In view of the
hundreds of bills introduced at each session of Congress and
the complexity of many of them, it is virtually impossible for
even the most conscientious legislators to be truly familiar
with many of the statutes enacted. Federal departments
and agencies customarily are authorized to write regulations.
Often these are more important than the text of the statutes.
As is true of the original legislation, these are drafted largely
by staff personnel. The administration and enforcement of
federal laws and regulations necessarily are largely in the
hands of staff and civil service employees. These employees
may have little or no knowledge of the States and localities
at the state and federal levels. [Additionally,] the proportion of people actually involved from the total population tends to be greater, the lower the
level of government, and this, of course, better approximates the citizen
participation ideal." ACIR, Citizen Participation in the American Federal
System 95 (1979).
Moreover, we have witnessed in recent years the rise of numerous special interest groups that engage in sophisticated lobbYing, and make substantial campaign contributions to some members of Congress. These
groups are thought to have significant influence in the shaping and enactment of certain types of legislation. Contrary to the Court's view, a
''political process" that functions in this way is unlikely to safeguard the
sovereign rights of States and localities. See supra, n. 9.
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that will be affected by the statutes and regulations for which
they are responsible. In any case, they hardly are as accessible and responsive as those who occupy analogous positions
in State and local governments.
In drawing this contrast, I imply no criticism of these federal employees or the officials who are ultimately in charge.
The great majority are conscientious and faithful to their
duties. My point is simply that members of the immense
federal bureaucracy are not elected, know less about the
services traditionally rendered by states and localities, and
are inevitably less responsive to recipients of such services,
than are state legislatures, city councils, boards of supervisors, and state and local commissions, boards, and agencies.
It is at these state and local levels-not in Washington as
the Court so mistakenly thinks-that "democratic self-government" is best exemplified.
IV
The question presented in this case is whether the extension of the FLSA to the wages and hours of employees of a
city-owned transit system unconstitutionally impinges on
fundamental state sovereignty. The Court's sweeping holding does far more than simply answer this question in the
negative. In overruling National League of Cities, today's
opinion apparently authorizes federal control, under the auspices of the Commerce Clause, over the terms and conditions
of employment of all state and local employees. Thus, for
purposes of federal regulation, the Court rejects the distinction between public and private employers that had been
drawn carefully in National League of Cities. The Court's
action reflects a serious misunderstanding, if not an outright
rejection, of the history of our country and the intention of
the Framers of the Constitution. 19
The opinion of the Court in National League of Cities makes clear that
the very essence of a federal system of government is to impose "definite
limits upon the authority of Congress to regulate the activities of the
19
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I return now to the balancing test approved in National
League of Cities and accepted in Hodel, Long Island R. Co.,
and FERC v. Mississippi. See supra, n. 5 and ante, at
The Court does not find in this case that the "federal
interest is demonstrably greater." 426 U. S., at 856
(BLACKMUN, J., concurring). No such finding could have
been made, for the state interest is compelling. The financial impact on States and localities of displacing their control
over wages, hours, overtime regulations, pensions, and labor
relations with their employees could have serious, as well as
unanticipated, effects on State and local planning, budgeting,
and the levying of taxes. 20 As we said in National League of
Cities, federal control of the terms and conditions of employment of State employees also inevitably "displaces state policies regarding the manner in which [States] will structure delivery of those governmental services that citizens require."
Id., at 847.
The Court emphasizes that municipal operation of an intracity mass transit system is relatively new in the life of our
country. It nevertheless is a classic example of the type of
service traditionally provided by local government. It is
local by definition. It is indistinguishable in principle from
the traditional services of providing and maintaining streets,
public lighting, traffic control, water, and sewerage systems. 21 Services of this kind are precisely those "with which
citizens are more 'familiarly and minutely conversant.' " The
States as States by means of the commerce power." See also the Court's
opinion in Fry v. United States, 421 U. S. 542, 547 n. 7 (1975).
211
As Justice Douglas observed in his dissent in Maryland v. Wirtz, 392
U. S. 183, 201 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Extension of the FLSA to the
States could "disrupt the fiscal policy of the states and threaten their
autonomy in the regulation of health and education." !d., at 203.
21
In Long Island R. Co. the unanimous Court recognized that "[t]his
Court's emphasis on traditional governmental functions and traditional aspects of state sovereignty was not meant to impose a static historical view
of state functions generally immune from federal regulation." 455 U. S.,
at 686.

82-1913 & 82-1951-DISSENT
GARCIA v. SAN ANTONIO METRO. TRANSIT AUTH.

23

Federalist, supra, No. 46, p. 316. State and local officials of
course must be intimately familiar with these services and
sensitive to their quality as well as cost. Such officials also
know that their constituents and the press respond to the adequacy, fair distribution, and cost of these services. It is
this kind of state and local control and accountability that the
Framers understood would insure the vitality and preservation of the federal system that the Constitution explicitly
requires. See National League of Cities, supra, at 847-852.

v
Although the Court's opinion purports to recognize that
the States retain some sovereign power, it does not identify
even a single aspect of state authority that would remain
when the Commerce Clause is invoked to justify federal
regulation. In Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U. S. 183 (1968),
overruled by National League of Cities and today reaffinned,
the Court sustained an extension of the FLSA to certain hospitals, institutions, and schools. Although the Court's opinion in Wirtz was comparatively narrow, Justice Douglas, in
dissent, wrote presciently that the Court's reading of the
Commerce Clause would enable "the National Government
[to] devour the essentials of state sovereignty, though that
sovereignty is attested by the Tenth Amendment." I d., at
205. Today's decision makes Justice Douglas's fear once
again a realistic one.
As I view the Court's decision today as rejecting the basic
precepts of our federal system and limiting the constitutional
role of judicial review, I dissent.

To: The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan
Justice White
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
Justice Rehnquist
Justice Stevens
Justice O'Connor
From:

Justice Powell
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JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting.
The Court today, in its 5-4 decision, overrules National
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U. S. 833 (1976), a case in
which we held that Congress lacked authority to impose the
requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act on stat~ and
local governments. Because I believe this decision substantially alters the federal system embodied in the Constitution,
I dissent.
I
There are, of course, numerous examples over the history
of this Court in which prior decisions have been reconsidered
and overruled. I ea:afee~lll however, DO CllSii in which the
prmc1p e o s are ectsts
·
as we now
1
witness. The reasoning oft e Court in National League of
1
National League of Cities, following some changes in the composition
of the Court, had overruled Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U. S. 183 (1968). Un-
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Cities, and the principle applied there, have been reiterated
consistently over the past eight years. Since its decision in
1976, National League of Cities has been cited and quoted in
opinions joined by every member of the present Court.
Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reel. Assn., 452 U. S.
264, 287-293 (1981); United Transportation Union v. Long
Island R. R., 455 U. S. 678, 684-686 (1982); FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U. S. 742, 764-767 (1982). Less than three
years ago, in Long Island R. R., supra, a unanimous Court
reaffirmed the principles of National League of Cities but
found them inapplicable to the regulation of a railroad heavily
engaged in interstate commerce. The Court stated:
"The key prong of the National League of Cities test
applicable to this case is the third one [repeated and
reformulated in Hodel], which examines whether 'the
states' compliance with the federal law would directly
impair their ability to structure integral operations in
areas of traditional governmental functions."
455 U. S., at 684. The Court in that case recognized that the

test "may at times be a difficult one," ibid., but it was considered in that unanimous decision as settled constitutional
doctrine.
As recently as June 1, 1982 the five Justices who constitute
the majority in this case also were the majority in FERC v.
Mississippi. In that case, the Court said:
"In National League of Cities, supra, for example, the
Court made clear that the State's regulation of its relationship with its employees is an 'undoubted attribute of
state sovereignty.' 426 U. S., at 845. Yet, by holding
'unimpaired' California v. Taylor, 353 U. S. 553 (1957),
which upheld a federal labor regulation as applied to
state railroad employees, 426 U. S., at 854. n. 18, National League of Cities acknowledged that not all aspects
like National League of Cities, the ~ of Wirtz had not been repeatedly accepted by our subsequent decisions.
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of a State's sovereign authority are immune from federal
control."
426 U. S., at 764 n. 28. The Court went on to say that even
where the requirements of the National League of Cities
standard are met, "'[t]here are situations in which the nature
of the federal interest advanced may be such that it justifies
state submission."' Ibid., quoting Hodel, supra, 452 U. S.,
at 288 n. 29. The joint federal/state system of regulation in
FERC was such a "situation," but there was no hint in the
Court's opinion that National League of Cities-or its basic
standard-was subject to the infirmities discovered today.
The doctrine of stare decisis is never entirely persuasive on
a constitutional question. City of Akron v. Akron Center for
Reproductive Health, 462 U. S. 416,- (1983). Nevertheless, even in such a case, iloweve11 a "departure from the doctrine of stare decisis demands special justification." Arizona
v. Rumsey,-- U. S. - - , - - (1984). See also Oregon v.
Kennedy, 456 U. S. 667, 691-692 n. 34 (1982) (JUSTICE STEVENS, concurring). In the present case, the five Justices
who compose the majority today· participated in National
League of Cities and the cases reaffirming it. 2 The stability
of judicial decision, and with it respect for the authority of
this Court, are not served by the ae~'Pt overruling of multiple precedents we witness in this case. 3
Whatever effect the Court's decision may have i:q weakening the application of stare decisis, it is likely to be less
important than what the Court has done to the Constitution
JUSTICE O'CONNOR succeeded Justice Stewart in September 1981, and
participated in United Transportation Union v. Long Island R. Co., 455
U. S. 678 (1982), and FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U. S. 742 (1982).
3
As we observed recently, "stare decisis is a doctrine that demands respect in a society governed by the rule of law." City of Akron v. Akron
Center for Reproductive Health, Inc.,- U. S . - (1983). In this respect, stare decisis represents "a natural evolution from the very nature of
our institutions." Lile, "Some Views on the Rule of Stare Decisis," 4 Va.
L. Rev. 955t 56 (1916).
2

·.
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itself. A unique feature of the United Statesfs the federal
system guaranteed by the Constitution and Implicit in the
very name of our country. Despite some genuflecting in
Court's opinion to the concept of federalism, today's decision
effectively reduces the Tenth Amendment to meaningless
rhetoric when Congress acts pursuant to the Commerce
Clause. The Court holds that the Fair Labor Standards Act
["FLSA"] "contravened no affirmative limit on Congress'
power under the Commerce Clause" to determine the wage
rates and hours of employment of all state and local employees. Ante, at 27. In rejecting the traditional view of
our federal system, the Court states:
"Apart from the limitation on federal authority inherent
in the delegated nature of Congress' Article I powers,
the principal means chosen by the Framers to ensure the
role of the states in the federal system lies in the structure of the Federal Government itself."

Ante, at 21-22 (emphasis added).
To leave no doubt about its intention, the Court renounces
its decision in National League of Cities because it "inevitably invites an unelected federal judiciary to make decisions about which state policies its favors and which ones it
dislikes." Ante, at 17. In other words, the extent to which
the States may exercise their authority, when Congress purports to act under the Commerce Clause, henceforth is to be
determined from time to time by political decisions made by
members of the federal government, decisions the Court says
will not be subject to judicial review. I note that it does not
seem to have occurred to the Court that it-an unelected majority of five Justices-today rejects almost 200 years of the
understanding of the constitutional status of federalism. In
doing so, there is only a single passing reference to the Tenth
Amendment. Nor is so much as a dictum of any court cited
in support of the view that the role of the States in the federal system may depend upon the grace of elected federal of-

,.,
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ficials, rather than on the Constitution as interpreted by this
Court.
In my opinion that follows, Part II addresses the Court's
criticisms of National League of Cities. Part III reviews
briefly the understanding of federalism that ensured the ratification of the Constitution and the extent to which this
Court, until today, has recognized that the States retain a
signficant measure of sovereignty in our federal system.
Part IV considers the applicability of the FLSA to the indisputably local service provided by an urban transit system.
II
The Court finds that the test of State immunity approved
in National League of Cities and its progeny is unworkable
and unsound in principle. In finding the test to be unworkable, the Court begins by mischaracterizing National League
of Cities and subsequent cases. In concluding that efforts to
define state .immunity are unsound in principle, the Court
radically departs from lon set led
constitu..--------~~~ and
t e ro e of judicial review in our system of
A

Much of the Court's opinion is devoted to arguing that it is
difficult to define a priori "traditional governmental functions." National League of Cities neither engaged in, nor
required, such a task. 4 The Court discusses and condemns
' In National League of Cities, we referred to the sphere of state sovereignty as including "traditional governmental functions," a realm which is,
of course, difficult to define with precision. But the luxury of precise definitions is one rarely enjoyed in interpreting and applying the general provisions of our Constitution. Not surprisingly, therefore, the Court's attempt to demonstrate the impossibility of definition is ttfi~erj\tlasi~ . A
number of the cases it cites simply do not involve the problem of defining
governmental functions. E . g., Williams v. Eastside Mental Health Center, Inc ., 669 F . 2d 671 (CAll), cert. denied, 459 U. S. 976 (1982); Friends
of the Earth v. Carey, 552 F. 2d 25 (CA2), cert. denied, 434 U. S. 902
(1977). A number of others are not properly analyzed under the principles
of National League of Cities, notwithstanding some of the language of the
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as standards "traditional governmental function[s]," "purely
historical" functions, "'uniquely' governmental functions,"
and "'necessary' governmental services." Ante, at 10-11,
15, 16. But nowhere does it mention that National League
of Cities adopted a familiar type of balancing test for determining whether Commerce Clause enactments transgress
constitutional limitations imposed by the federal nature of
our system of government. This omission is noteworthy,
since the author of today's opinion joined National League of
Cities and concurred separately to point out that the Court's
opinion in that case "adopt[s] a balancing approach [that]
does not outlaw federal power in areas . . . where the federal
interest is demonstrably greater and where state . . . compliance with imposed federal standards would be essential."
426 U. 8., at 856 (JUSTICE BLACKMUN, concurring).
In reading National League of Cities to embrace a balancing approach, JusTICE BLACKMUN quite correctly cited the
part of the opinion that reaffirmed Fry v. United States, 421
U. S. 542 (1975). The Court's analysis reaffirming Fry explicitly weighed the seriousness of the problem addressed by
the federal legislation at issue in that case, against the effects
of compliance on State sovereignty. 426 U. S., at 852-853.
Our subsequent decisions also adopted this approach of
weighing the respective interests of the States and federal
government. 5 In EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U. S. 226 (1983),
lower courts. E. g., WUnited States v. Best, 573 F. 2d 1095 (CA9 1978)
and Hybud Equipment Corp. v. City of Akron, 654 F. 2d 1187 (CA6 1981).
Moreover, rather than carefully analyzing the case law, the Court simply
lists various functions thought to be protected or unprotected by courts interpreting National League of Cities . Ante, at 9-10. In the cited cases,
however, the courts considered the issue of State immunity on the specific
facts at issue; they did not make blanket pronouncements that particular
things inherently qualified as traditional governmental functions or did not.
Having thus considered the cases out of context, it was not difficult for the
Court to conclude that there is no "organizing principle" among them. See
ante, at 10.
6
In undertaking such balancing, we have considered, on the one hafld,
the strength of the federal interest in the challenged legislation and the im-
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for example, the Court stated that "[t]he principle of immunity articulated in National League of Cities is a functional
doctrine . . . whose ultimate purpose is not to create a sacred
province of state autonomy, but to ensure that the unique
benefits of a federal system . . . not be lost through undue
federal interference in certain core state functions." I d., at
236. See also Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U. S. 264 (1981). In overruling National League of Cities, the Court incorrectly characterizes
the mode of analysis established therein and developed in
subsequent cases. 6
Moreover, the statute at issue in this case, the FLSA, is
the identical statute that was at issue in National League of
pact of exempting the States from its reach. Central to our inquiry into
the federal interest is how closely the challenged action implicates the central concerns of the Commerce Clause, viz., the promotion of a national
economy and free trade among the states. See EEOC v. Wyoming, 460
U. S. 226, 244 (JUSTICE STEVENS, concUrring). /!J-:-r1 Untted ransp ation Union v. Long Island Rail Road Co., 455 U. S. 678, 688 (1982) ("Con- ....___ _ _ _ __ _ _
gress long ago concluded that federal regulation of railroad labor services is
necessary to prevent disruptions in vital rail service essential to the national economy."); FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U. S. 742, 757 (1982), ("it is
difficult to conceive of a more basic element of interstate commerce than
electric energy . . . ."). Similarly, we have considered whether exempting States from federal regulation would undermine the goals of the federal
program. See Fry v. United States, 421 U. S. 542 (1975). See also Hodel,
452 U. S. at 282 (national surface mining standards necessary to insure
competition among States does not undermine States' efforts to maintain
c:\.h.o
adequate intrastate standards). On the other hand, we have~ssessed the
injury done to the States if forced to comply with federal Commerce Clause
enactments. See National League of Cities , 426 U. S., at 846-851.
6
In addition, reliance on the Court's difficulties in the tax immunity
field is misplaced. Although the Court has abandoned the "governmental/proprietary" distinction in this field, see New York v. United
States, 326 U. S. 572 (1946), it has not taken the drastic approach of relying
solely on the structure of the federal government to protect the States' immunity from taxation. See Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U. S. 444
(1978). Thus, faced with an equally difficult problem of defining constitutional boundaries of federal action directly affecting the States, we did not
adopt the view many would think naive, that the federal government itself
will protect whatever rights the States may have.
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Cities. Although JuSTICE BLACKMUN's concurrence noted
that he was "not untroubled by certain possible implications
of the Court's opinion" in National League of Cities , it also
stated that "the result with respect to the statute under challenge here [the FLSA] is necessarily correct." 426 U. S. , at
856 (emphasis added). His opinion for the Court today does
not discuss the statute, nor identify any changed circumstances that warrant Hlaf1ef'€~:fietmlK~--=-------L--------B
Today's opinion does not explain how the States' role in the
electoral process guarantees that particular exercises of the
Commerce Clause power will not infringe on residual State
sovereignty. 7 Members of Congress are elected from the
various States, but once in office they are members of the
federal government. 8 Although the States participate in the
Electoral College, this is hardly a reason to view the President as a representative of the States' interest against fed7

Late in its opinion, the Court suggests that after all there may be some
"affirmative limits the constitutional structure might impose on federal action affecting the States under the Commerce Clause." Ante, at 27. The
Court asserts that "[i]n the factual setting of these cases the internal safeguards of the political process have performed as intended." Ibid. The
Court does not explain the basis for this judgment. Nor does it identify
the circumstances in which the "political process" may fail and "affirmative
limits" are to be imposed. Presumably, such limits are to be determined
by the Judicial Branch even though it is "unelected." Today's opinion,
however, has rejected the balancing standard and suggests no other standard that would enable a court to determine when there has been a malfunction of the "political process." The Court's failure to specify the "affirmative limits" on federal power, or when and how these limits are to be
determined, may well be explained by the transparent fact that any such
attempt would be subject to precisely the same objections on which it relies
to overrule National League of Cities.
8
One can hardly imagine this Court saying that because Congress is
~\.A h c. .j
compose of individuals, individual rights are amply protected by the ~
~~- 1~ process.
Yet, the position adopted today is indistinguishable in
•also is
principle. The Tenth Amendment v. 11s a6 ~tee f1i an essential part of the
Bill of Right~fut6 ~ho t:tl6 ee viewe6 a~ sud1:1 See infra, at - - .
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eral encroachment. We noted recently "the hydraulic pressure inherent within each of the separate Branches to exceed
the outer limits of its power . . . . " Immigration and
Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U. S. 919, - (1983). The Court offers no reason to think that this pressure will not operate when Congress seeks to invoke its powers under the Commerce Clause, notwithstanding the electoral role of the States. 9
At one time in our history, the view that the structure of the federal
~\
government sufficed to rotect the States might have hadJE;'Oinewhat more
practical, although not more logical, basis. Professor Wechsler, whose
seminal article in 1954 proposed the view adopted by the Court today,
predicated his argument on assumptions that simply do not accord with
current reality. Professor Wechsler wrote: "National action has . . .
always been regarded as exceptional in our polity, an instrusion to be justified by some necessity, the special rather than the ordinary case."
Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States
in the Composition and Selection ·of the National Government, 54 Colum.
L. Rev. 543, 544 (1954). Not only is the premise of this view clearly at
odds with the proliferation of national legislation over the past 30 years,
but "a variety of structural and political changes in this century have combined to make Congress particularly insensitive to state and local values."
Advisory Comm'n on Intergovernmental Relations [ACIR], Regulatory
Federalism: Policy, Process, Impact and Reform 50 (1984). The adoption
of the Seventeenth Amendment (providing for direct election of senators),
the weakening of political parties on the local level, and the rise of national
media, among other things, have made Congress increasingly less representative of State and local interests, and more likely to be responsive to
the demands of various national constituencies. I d., at 50-51. As one
observer explained, "As Senators and members of the House develop independent constituencies among groups such as farmers, businessmen, laborers, environmentalists, and the poor, each of which generally supports
certain national initiatives, their tendency to identify with state interests
and the positions of state officials is reduced." Kaden, "Federalism in the
Courts: Agenda for the 1980s," in ACIR, The Future of Federalism in the _,._ o.J'808)97 (1981).
)
See also Kaden, Politics, Money, and State Sovereignty: The Judicial
Role, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 847 (1979) (changes in political practices and the
breadth of national initiatives mean that the political branches "may no
longer be as well suited as they once were to the task of safeguarding the
9
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The Court apparently thinks that the States' success at
obtaining federal funds for various projects and exemptions
from the obligations of some federal statutes is indicative of
the "effectiveness of the federal political process in preserving the States' interests .... " Ante, at 23-24. 10 But
po 1 1ca success is not relevant to the question whether the
political processes are the proper means of enforcing constitutional limitations. 11 The fact that Congress generally does
not transgress constitutional limits on its power to reach
State activities does not make judicial review any less necessary to rectify the iH:fre~tteflcj cases in which it does do so. 12

)-

role of the states)._n the federal system and protecting the fundamental ~
value of federalismT"))Mf ACIR, Regulatory Federalism, supra, at 1-24 ~
(detailing the "drruh'atic shift" in kind offederal regulation applicable to the
States over the past two decades). Thus, even if one were to ignore the
numerous problems with the Court's position in terms of constitutional
theory, there would remain serious questions as to its factual premises.
10
The Court believes that the significant financial assistance afforded the
States and localities by the federal government is relevant to the constitutionality of extending Commerce Clause enactments to the States. See
ante, at 23-24, 26. This Court has never held, however, that the mere
disbursement of funds by the federal government establishes a right to
control activities that benefit from such funds. See Pennhurst State
School v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1, 17-18 (1981). Regardless of the willingness of the federal government to provide federal aid, the constitutional
question remains the same: whether the federal statute violates the sovereign powers reserved to the States by the Tenth Amendment.
11
Apparently in an effort to reassure the States, the Court identifies
several major statutes that thus far have not been made applicable to State
governments: the Federal Power Act, 16 U. S. C. 824(f); the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U. S. C. § 152(2); the Labor-Management Reporting and Discloeure Aot, 29 U. S. C. § 402(e); the Ooropational Safety~
and Health Act, 29 U. S. C. § 652(5); the Employee Retirement Insurance
•
Serority Act, 29 U.S. C. §§1002(32), 1003(b)(l); and tche Shennan Act,
Parker v. Brown, 317 U. S. 341 (1943). Ante, at 24. The Court does not:
suggest that this restraint will continue after its decision ~\.
Indeed, it is unlikely that special interest groups will fail._t~ ~;:~~t- t~e
Court's open invitation to urge Congress to extend these and other statutes to apply to the States and their local subdivisions.
12
This Court has never before abdicated responsibility for assessing the
constitutionality of challenged action on the ground that affected parties

I>~
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The States' role in our system of government is a matter of
constitutional law, not of legislative grace. "The powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States, respectively, or to the people." U. S. Const., Amend. 10.
More troubling than the logical infirmities in the Court's
reasoning is the result of its holding, i. e., that federal political officials, invoking the Commerce Clause, are the sole
judges of the limits of their own power. This result is inconsistent with the fundamental principles of our constitutional
system. See, e. g., The Federalist No. 78 (Hamilton). At
least since Marbury v. Madison it has been the settled province of the federal judiciary "to say what the law is" with respect to the constitutionality of acts of Congress. In rejecting the role of the judiciary in protecting the States from
federal overreaching, the Court's opinion offers no explanation for ignoring the teaching of the most famous case in our .
history. 13
theoretically are able to look out for their own interests through the electoral process. As the Court noted in National League of Cities, a much
stronger argument as to inherent structural protections could have been
made in either Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (1976) or Myers v. United
States, 272 U. S. 52 (1926), than can be made here. In these cases, the
President signed legislation that limited his authority with respect to certain appointments and thus arguably "it was no concern of this Court that
the law violated the Constitution." 426 U.S., at 841-842.n. 12. The
Court nevertheless held the laws unconstitutional because they infringed
on presidential authority, the President's consent notwithstanding. The
Court does not address this point; nor does it cite any authority for its contrary view.
13
The Court states that the decision in National League of Cities "invite[s] an unelected federal judiciary to make decisions about which state
policies it favors and which ones its dislikes." Curiously, the Court then
suggests that under the application of the "traditional" governmental function analysis, "the states cannot serve as laboratories for social and economic experiment." Ante, at 17, citing Justice Brandeis' famous observation in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U. S. 262, 311 (1932) (lffistie ~
Brandeis, dissenting). Apparently the Court believes that when "an unelected fe eral judiciary'' makes decisions as to whether a particular function is one for the federal or state governments, the States no longer may
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III
A

In our federal system, the States have a major role that
cannot be preempted by the national government. As contemporaneous writings and the debates at the ratifying conventions make clear, the States' ratification of the Constitution was predicated on this understanding of federalism.
Indeed, the Tenth Amendment was adopted specifically to
ensure that the important role promised the States by the
proponents of the Constitution was realized.
Much of the initial opposition to the Constitution was
rooted in the fear that the national government would be too
powerful and eventually would eliminate the States as viable
political entities. This concern was voiced repeatedly until
proponents of the Constitution made assurances that a bill of
rights, including a provision explicitly reserving powers in
the States, would be among the first business of the new Congress. Samuel Adams argued, for example, that if the several States were to be joined in "one entire Nation, under one
Legislature, the Powers of which shall extend to every Subject of Legislation, and its Laws be supreme & controul the
whole, the Idea of Sovereignty in these States must be lost."
Letter from Samuel Adams to Richard Henry Lee (Dec. 3,
1787), reprinted in Anti-Federalists versus Federalists 159
(J. Lewis ed. 1967). Likewise, George Mason feared that
"the general government being paramount to, and in every
respect more powerful than the state governments, the latter
the Court does not
must give way to the former." Address in the Ratifying
Convention of Virginia (June 4-12 1788), reprinted in Anti- eJc la.l.V\ ~ow \~v~
Federalists versus Federalists, supra, at 208-209.
~/StzLh.!;. vi d~AAllt ct¥
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Antifederalists raised these concerns in almost every State
ratifying convention. 14 See generally Elliot, Debates in the
Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal
Constitution (1854). As a result, eight States voted for the
Constitution only after proposing amendments to be adopted
after ratification. 15 All eight of these included among their
recommendations some version of what later became the
Tenth Amendment. Ibid. So strong was the concern that
the proposed Constitution was seriously defective without a
specific bill of rights, including a provision reserving powers
to the States, that in order to secure the votes for ratification, the Federalists eventually conceded that such provisions were necessary. See Schwartz, A Documentary History of the Bill of Rights, supra, at 505 and passim. It was
thus generally agreed that consideration of a bill of rights
would be among the first business of the new Congress. See
generally 1 Annals of Congress 432-437 (June 8, 1789) (remarks of James Madison). Accordingly, the ten amendments that we know as the Bill of Rights were proposed and
adopted early in the first session of the First Congress.
Schwartz, A Documentary History of the Bill of Rights,
supra, 983-1167.
This history, which the Court simply ignores, documents
the integral role of the the Tenth Amendment in our constitutional theory. It exposes as well, I believe, the fundamental
character of the Court's error today. Far from being "unsound in principle," ante, at 18, judicial enforcement of the
14
Opponents of the Constitution were particularly dubious of the Federalistl claim that the States retained powers not delegated to the United
Stales in the absence of an express provision so providing. For example,
James Winthrop wrote that "[i]t is a mere fallacy .. . that what rights are
not given are reserved." Letters of Agrippa, reprinted in Schwartz, The
Bill of Rights, supra, at 510, 511.
16
Indeed, the Virginia legislature came very close to withholding ratification of the Constitution until the adoption of a bill of rights that in- ·
eluded, among other things, the substance of the Tenth Amendment. See
Schwartz, The Bill of Rights, supra, at 761 66 and passi m.
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Tenth Amendment is essential to maintaining the federal system so carefully designed by the Framers and adopted in the
Constitution.
B

The Framers had definite ideas about the nature of the
Constitution's division of authority between the federal and
state governments. In The Federalist No. 39, for example,
Madison explained this division by drawing a series of contrasts between the attributes of a "national" government and
those of the government to be established by the Constitution. While a national form of government would possess an
"indefinite supremacy over all persons and things," the form
of government contemplated by the Constitution instead consisted of "local or municipal authorities [which] form distinct
and independent portions of the supremacy, no more subject
within their respective spheres to the general authority than
the general authority is subject to them, within its own
sphere." The Federalist No. 39, p. 256 (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
Under the Constitution, the sphere of the proposed government extended to jurisdiction of "certain enumerated objects,
only, ... leav[ing] to the several States a residuary and inviolable sovereignty over all other objects." Id.
Madison elaborated on the content of these separate
spheres of sovereignty in The Federalist No. 45:
"The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution
to the Federal Government are few and defined. Those
which are to remain in the State Governments are numerous and indefinite. The former will be exercised
principally on external objects, as war, peace, negotiation, and foreign commerce; . . . . The powers reserved
to the several States will extend to all the objects,
which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the
lives, liberties and properties of the people; and the internal order, improvement, and prosperity oft,he State."
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Id., at 313.

15

Madison considered that the operations of the
federal government would be "most extensive and important
in times of war and danger; those of the State Governments
in times of peace and security." Ibid. As a result of this
division of powers, the State governments generally would
be more important than the federal government. Ibid.
The Framers believed that the separate sphere of sovereignty reserved to the States would ensure that the States
would serve as an effective "counterpoise" to the power of
the federal government. The States would serve this essential role because they would attract and retain the loyalty of
their citizens. The roots of such loyalty, the Founders
thought, were found in the objects peculiar to State government. For example, Hamilton argued that the States "regulat[e] all those personal interests and familiar concerns to
which the sensibility of individuals is more immediately
awake .... " The Federalist No. 17, supra, p. 107. Thus,
he maintained that the people would perceive the States as
"the immediate and most visible guardian of life and property," a fact which "contributes more than any other circumstance to impressing upon the minds of the people affection,
esteem and reverence towards the government." Ibid.
Madison took the same position, explaining that "the people
will be more familiarly and minutely conversant" with the
business of State governments, and "with the members of
these, will a greater proportion of the people have the ties of
personal acquaintance and friendship, and of family and party
attachments .... " The Federalist No. 46, p. 316. Like
Hamilton, Madison saw the States' involvement in the everyday concerns of the people as the source of their citizens' loyalty. Id. See also Nagel, Federalism as a Fundamental
Value: National League of Cities in Perspective, 1981 Sup.
Ct. Rev. 81 (1981).
Thus, the harm to the States that results from federal
overreaching under the Commerce Clause is not simply a
matter of dollars and cents. National League of Cities, 426
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U. S., at 846-851. Nor is it a matter of the wisdom or folly
of certain policy choices. Cf. ante, at 17. Rather, by usurping functions traditionally performed by the States, federal
overreaching under the Commerce Clause undermines the
constitutionally mandated balance of power between the
States and the federal government, a balance designed to
protect our fundamental liberties.

c
The emasculation of the powers of the States that can result from the Court's decision is predicated on the Commerce
Clause as a power "delegated to the United States" by the
Constitution. The relevant language states: "Congress shall
have power ... to ~egulate commerce with foreign nations
and among the several states and with the Indian tribes."
Art. I, § 8. Section eight identifies a score of powers, listing
the authority to lay taxes, borrow money on the credit of the
United States, pay its debts, and pr~vide for the common defense and the general welfare before its brief reference to
"Commerce." It is clear from the debates leading up to the
adoption of the Constitution that the commerce to be regulated was that which the states themselves were powerless to
regulate. See, e. g., 1M. Farrand, The Records ofthe Federal Convention of 1787 (rev. ed. 1937); The Federalist Nos.
7, 11, 22, 42, 45. See also EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U. S.
226, 265 (1983) (JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting). Indeed, the
language of the clause itself focuses on activities that only a
national government could regulate: commerce with foreign
nations and Indian tribes and "among" the several states.
To be sure, this Court has construed the Commerce Clause
to accommodate unanticipated changes over the past two centuries. As these changes have occurred, the Court has had
to decide whether the federal government has exceeded its
aut ority ~ regulating activities beyond the capability of a
single state to regulate or beyond legitimate federal interests
that outweighed the authority and interests of the States.
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In so doing, however, the Court properly has been mindful of
the essential role of the States in our federal system.
The opinion for the Court in National League of Cities was
faithful to history in its understanding of federalism. The
Court observed that "our federal system of government imposes definite limits upon the authority of Congress to regulate the activities of States as States by means of the commerce power." 426 U. S., at 842. The Tenth Amendment
was invoked to prevent Congress from exercising its "power
in a fashion that impairs the States' integrity or their ability
to function effectively in a federal system." I d., at 842-843,
quoting Fry v. United States, 421 U. S. 542, 547 n. 7 (1975)).
This Court has recognized repeatedly that State sovereignty is a fundamental component of our system of government. More tha~ a century ago, in Lane County v. Oregon,
"7 4 U. 8. ~7 Wall.} 71 (1868), the Court stated that the Constitution recognized "the necessary existence of the States,
and, within their proper spheres, the independent authority
of the States." It concluded, as Madison did, that this authority extended to "nearly the whole charge of interior regulation ... ; to [the States] and to the people all powers not
expressly delegated to the national government are reserved." I d., at 76. Recently, in Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U. S. 40, 53 (1982), the
Court recognized that the state action exemption from the
antitrust laws was based on State sovereignty. Similarly, in
United Transportation Union v. Long Island Railroad Co.,
455 U. S. 678, 683 (1982), although finding the Railway
Labor Act applicable to a state-owned railroad, the unanimous Court was careful to say that the States possess. constitutionally preserved sovereign powers.
Again, in Federal Regulatory Commission v. Mississippi,
456 U. S. 742, 752 (1982), in determining the constitutionality
of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act, the Court explicitly considered whether the Act impinged on state sovereignty in violation of the Tenth Amendment. These repre-
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sent only a few of the many cases in which the Court has
recognized not only the role, but the importance, of state
sovereignty. See also, e. g., United States v. Fry, supra;
Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U. S. 514 (1926); Coyle v.
Oklahoma, 221 U. S. 559 (1911). As Justice Frankfurter
noted, the States are not merely a factor in the "shifting economic arrangements" of our country, Kovacs v. Cooper, 336
U. S. 77, 95 (1949) (Justice Frankfurter, concurring), but
constitute a "coordinate element in the system established by
the Framers for governing our Federal Union." National
League of Cities, supra, at 849.

D
In contrast, the Court today propounds a view of federalism that pays only lip service to the role of the States. Although it says that the States "unquestionably do 'retai[n] a
significant measure of sovereign authority,"' ante, at 20
(quoting EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U. S. 226, 269 (POWELL,
J., dissenting)), it fails to recognize the broad, yet specific
areas of sovereignty that the Framers intended the States to
retain. Indeed, the Court barely acknowledges that the
Tenth Amendment exists. 16 That Amendment states explicitly that "[t]he powers not delegated to the United States ...
are reserved to the States." U. S. Const., Amend. 10. The
Court recasts this language to say that the States retain their
sovereign powers "only to the extent that the Constitution
has not divested them of their original powers and transferred those powers to the Federal Government." Ante, at
20. This rephrasing is not a distinction without a difference;
rather, it reflects the Court's unprecedented view that Congress is free under the Commerce Clause to assume a State's
traditional sovereign powel) WI ou JUdicial review of its
action. Indeed, the Court's view of federalism appears to
The Court's opinion mentions the Tenth Amendment only once, when
it restates the question put to the parties for reargument in this case. See
ante, at 8.
18
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relegate the States to precisely the trivial role that opponents of the Constitution feared they would occupy. 17
In National League of Cities, we spoke of fire prevention,
police protection, sanitation, and public health as "typical of
[the services] performed by state and local governments in
discharging their dual functions of administering the public
law and furnishing public services." 426 U. S., at 851. Not
only are these activities remote from any normal concept of
interstate commerce, they are also activities that epitomize
the concerns of local, democratic self-government. See
supra n. 5. In emphasizing the need to protect traditional
governmental functions, we identified the kinds of activities ·
en a ed in b state and local governments that affect the everyday lives of
These are services that people
ike tteility to understand and evaluate as well as the right, in
a democracy, to oversee. 18 We recognized that "it is funcAs the amici argue, "the ability of the [S]tates to fulfill their role in the
constitutional scheme is dependent solely upon their effectiveness as instruments of self-government." Brief of Twenty-Four States as Amicus
Curiae 50. See also Brief of the National League of Cities et al as Amicus
Curiae (a brief on behalf of every major organization representing the concerns of State and local governments).
18
The Framers recognized that the most effective democracy occurs at
local levels of government, where people with first hand knowledge of local
problems have more ready access to public officials responsible for dealing
with them. E. g., The Federalist No. 17, at 107; No.45, at 316. This is as
true today as it was when the Constitution was adopted. "Participation is
likely to be more frequent, and exercised at more different stages of a governmental activity at the local level, or in regional organizations, than at
the state and federal levels. [Additionally,] the proportion of people actually involved from the total population tends to be greater, the lower the
level of government, and this, of course, better approximates the citizen
participation ideal." ACIR, Citizen Participation in the American Federal
System 95 (1979).
Moreover, we have witnessed in recent years the rise of numerous special interest groups that engage in sophisticated lobbying/and make substantial campaign contributions to some members of Congress. These
groups are ·thought to have significant influence in the shaping and enactment of certain types of legislation. Contrary to the Court's view, a
17
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tions such as these which governments are created to provide
. . ." and that the states and local governments are better
able than the national government to perform them. 426
U. S., at 851.
The Court maintains that the standard approved in N ational League of Cities "disserves principles of democratic
self government." Ante, at 18. In reaching this conclusion,
the Court looks myopically only to persons elected to positions in the federal government. It disregards entirely the
far more effective role of democratic self-government at the
state and ·local levels. One must compare realistically the
operation of the state and local governments with that of the
federal government. Federal legislation is drafted primarily
by the staffs of the congressional committees. In view of the
hundreds of bills introduced at each session of Congress and
the complexity of many of them, it is virtually impossible for
even the most conscientious legislators to be truly familiar
with many of the statutes enacted. Federal de artments
and agencies
·
are authorize to write regulations.
\
Often these are more important than the text of the statutes.
-- ------. the original legislation, these are drafted largely by
staff personnel. ~ lJ!e administration and enforcement
of federal laws and regulations necessarily are largely in the
hands of staff and civil service employees. These employees
may have little or no knowledge of the States and localities
that will be affected by the statutes and regulations for which
they are responsible. In any case, they hardly are as accessible and responsive as those who occupy analogous positions
in State and local governments.
In drawing this contrast, I imply no criticism of these federal employees or the officials who are ultimately in charge.
The great majority are conscientious and faithful to their
duties. My point is simply that members of the immense
federal bureaucracy are not elected, know less about the
"political process" that functions in this way is unlikely to safeguard the
sovereign rights of States and localities.
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services traditionally rendered by states and localities, and
are inevitably less responsive to recipients of such services,
than are state legislatures, city councils, ~boards of su er~----.--~
VIsors 9i 18 !31 agencies.
'

The question presented in this case is whether the extension of the FLSA to the wages and hours of employees of a
city-owned transit system unconstitutionally impinges on
fundamental state sovereignty. The Court's sweeping holding does far more than simply answer this question in the
negative. In overruling National League of Cities, today's
opinion apparently authorizes federal control, under the auspices of the Commerce Clause, over the terms and conditions
of employment of all state and local employees. Thus, for \
purposes of federal regulation, the Court rejects the distinction between public and private employers that had been
drawn carefully in National League of Cities. The Court's
action reflects a serious misunderstanding, if not an outright
rejection, of the history of our country and the intention of
the Framers of the Constitution. 19
I return now to the balancing test approved in National
League of Cities and accepted in Hodel, Long Island R. R.,
and FERC v. Mississippi. Under this test, the Court
should consider whether the service or activity at issue is one
that "the states and their political subdivisions have traditionally afforded their citizens." National League of Cities,
supra, at 855. See ante, at - - . One cannot think of a
19
The opinion of the Court in National League of Cities makes clear that
the very essence of a federal system of government is to impose "definite
limits upon the authority of Congress to regulate the activities of th~
States as States by means of the commerce power." See also the Court's
opinion in Fry, supra, at 547 n. 7.

"7_
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more fundamental and traditional activity of a State than
determination of the terms and conditions of employment of
its own employees. Moreover, the Court does not find in
this case that the "federal interest is demonstrably greater."
No such finding could have been made, for the state interest
is compelling. The financial impact on States and localities
of displacing their control over wages, hours, overtime regulations, pensions, and labor relations with their employees
could have serious, as well as unanticipated, effects on State
and local planning, budgeting, and the levying of taxes. 20 As
we said in National League of Cities, federal control also
inevitably "displaces state policies regarding the manner in
which [States] will structure delivery of those governmental
services that citizens require." ld., at 847.
The Court emphasizes that municipal operation of an intracity mass transit system is relatively new in the life of our
country. It nevertheless is a classic example of the type of
service traditionally provided by local government. It is
local by definition. It is indistinguishable in principle from
the traditional services of providing and maintaining streets,
public lighting, traffic control, water, and sewerage systems. 21 Services of this kind are recisely those "with which
citizens are more 'familiar. and minutely conversant.
e
Federalist, supra, No. 46, p. 316. State and local officials of
course must be intimately familiar with these services and
sensitive to their quality as well as cost. Such officials also
know that their constituents and the press respond to the adequacy, fair distribution, and cost of these services. It is
20

As Justice Dou las observed in his dissent in Ma land v. Wirtz
e tates could "disrupt the fiscal policy
of the states nd threaten their autonomy in the regulation of health and
education." !d., at 302.
21
In Long Island R . Co. the unanimous Court recognized that "[t]his
Court's emphasis on traditional governmental functions and traditional aspects of state sovereignty was not meant to impose a static historical view
of state functions generally immune from federal regulation." 455 U. S. ,
at 686.
supra, exten ion of the FLSA to
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this kind of state and local control and accountability that the
Framers understood would insure the vitality and preservation of the federal system that the Constitution explicitly
requires. See National League of Cities, supra, at 847-852.

v
Although the Court's opinion purports to recognize that
the States retain some sovereign power, it does not identify
even a single aspect of state authority that would remain
when. the Commerce Clause is invoked to justify federal
regulation. In Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U. S. 183 (1968),
overruled by National League of Cities and today reaffirmed,
the Court sustained an extension of the FLSA to certain hospitals, institutions, and schools. Although the Court's opinion in Wirtz was comparatively narrow, Justice Douglas, in
dissent, wrote presciently that the Court's reading of the
Commerce Clause would enable "the National Government
[to] devour the essentials of state sovereignty, though that
sovereignty is attested by the Tenth Amendment." I d., at
205. Today's decision makes Justice Douglas's fear once
again a realistic one.
As I view the Court' decision today as re ·ectin the basic
precepts of ou e era sys em and limiting the constitutional
role of judicial review, I dissent.
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JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting.
The Court today, in its 5-4 decision, overrules National
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U. S. 833 (1976), a case in
which we held that Congress lacked authority to impose the
requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act on state and
local governments. Because I believe this decision substantially alters the federal system embodied in the Constitution,
I dissent.
I
There are, of course, numerous examples over the history
of this Court in which prior decisions have been reconsidered
and overruled. There have been cases, however, in which
the principle of stare decisis and the rationale of recent decisions were ignored as abruptly as we now witness. 1 The
'National League of Cities, following some changes in the composition
of the Court, had overruled Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U. S. 183 (1968). Un-
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reasoning of the Court in National League of Cities, and the
principle applied there, have been reiterated consistently
over the past eight years. Since its decision in 1976, N ational League of Cities has been cited and quoted in opinions
joined by every member of the present Court. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reel. Assn., 452 U. S. 264, 287-293
(1981); United Transportation Union v. Long Island R. R.,
455 U. S. 678, 684-686 (1982); FERC v. Mississippi, 456
U. S. 742, 764-767 (1982). Less than three years ago, in
Long Island R. R., supra, a unanimous Court reaffirmed the
principles of National League of Cities but found them inapplicable to the regulation of a railroad heavily engaged in interstate commerce. The Court stated:
"The key prong of the National League of Cities test
applicable to this case is the third one [repeated and
reformulated in Hodel], which examines whether 'the
states' compliance with the federal law would directly
impair their ability to structure integral operations in
areas of traditional governmental functions."
455 U. S., at 684. The Court in that case recognized that the
test "may at times be a difficult one," ibid., but it was considered in that unanimous decision as settled constitutional
doctrine.
As recently as June 1, 1982 the five Justices who constitute
the majority in this case also were the majority in FERC v.
Mississippi. In that case, the Court said:
"In National League of Cities, supra, for example, the
Court made clear that the State's regulation of its relationship with its employees is an 'undoubted attribute of
state sovereignty.' 426 U. S., at 845. Yet, by holding
'unimpaired' California v. Taylor, 353 U. S. 553 (1957),
which upheld a federal labor regulation as applied to
state railroad employees, 426 U. S., at 854. n. 18, NalikeNational League of Cities, the rationale of Wirtz had not been repeatedly accepted by our subsequent decisions.

'•
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tional League of Cities acknowledged that not all aspects
of a State's sovereign authority are immune from federal
control."
426 U. S., at 764 n. 28.

The Court went on to say that even
where the requirements of the National League of Cities
standard are met, "'[t]here are situations in which the nature
of the federal interest advanced may be such that it justifies
state submission."' Ibid., quoting Hodel, supra, 452 U. S.,
at 288 n. 29. The joint federal/state system of regulation in
FERC was such a "situation," but there was no hint in the
Court's opinion that National League of Cities-or its basic
standard-was subject to the infirmities discovered today.
The doctrine of stare decisis is never entirely persuasive on
a constitutional question. City of Akron v. Akron Center for
Reproductive Health, 462 U. S. 416, - - (1983). Nevertheless, even in such a case, a "departure from the doctrine of
stare decisis demands special justification." Arizona v.
Rumsey, - - U. S. - - , - - (1984). See also Oregon v.
Kennedy, 456 U. S. 667, 691-692 n. 34 (1982) (JUSTICE STEVENS, concurring) . . In the present case, the five Justices
who compose the majority today participated in National
League of Cities and the cases reaffirming it. 2 The stability
of judicial decision, and with it respect for the authority of
this Court, are not served by the precipitous overruling of
multiple precedents we witness in this case. 3
Whatever effect the Court's decision may have in weakening the application of stare decisis, it is likely to be less
2
JUSTICE O'CONNOR succeeded Justice Stewart in September 1981, and
participated in United Transportation Union v. Long Island R. Co, 455
U. S. 678 (1982), and FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U. S. 742 (1982).
3
As we observed recently, "stare decisis is a doctrine that demands respect in a society governed by the rule of law." City of Akron v. Akron
Center for Reproductive Health, Inc ., U. S. (1983). In this respect, stare decisis represents "a natural evolution from the very nature of
our institutions." Lile, "Some Views on the Rule of Stare Decisis," 4 Va.
L. Rev. 955, 956 (1916).
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important than what the Court has done to the Constitution
itself. A unique feature of the United States government is
the federal system guaranteed by the Constitution and implicit in the very name of our country. Despite some genuflecting in Court's opinion to the concept of federalism, today's decision effectively reduces the Tenth Amendment to
meaningless rhetoric when Congress acts pursuant to the
Commerce Clause. The Court holds that the Fair Labor
Standards Act ["FLSA"] "contravened no affirmative limit
on Congress' power under the Commerce Clause" to determine the wage rates and hours of employment of all state and
local employees. Ante, at 27. In rejecting the traditional
view of our federal system, the Court states:
"Apart from the limitation on federal authority inherent
in the delegated nature of Congress' Article I powers,
the principal means chosen by the Framers to ensure the
role of the states in the federal system lies in the structure of the Federal Government itself."
Ante, at 21-22 (emphasis added).
To leave no doubt about its intention, the Court renounces
its decision in National League of Cities because it "inevitably invites an unelected federal judiciary to make decisions about which state policies its favors and which ones it
dislikes." Ante, at 17. In other words, the extent to which
the States may exercise their authority, when Congress purports to act under the Commerce Clause, henceforth is to be
determined from time to time by political decisions made by
members of the federal government, decisions the Court says
will not be subject to judicial review. I note that it does not
seem to have occurred to the Court that it-an unelected majority of five Justices-today rejects almost 200 years of the
understanding of the constitutional status of federalism. In
doing so, there is only a single passing reference to the Tenth
Amendment. Nor is so much as a dictum of any court cited
in support of the view that the role of the States in the federal system may depend upon the grace of elected federal of-

..
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ficials, rather than on the Constitution as interpreted by this
Court.
In my opinion that follows, Part II addresses the Court's
criticisms of National League of Cities. Part III reviews
briefly the understanding of federalism that ensured the ratification of the Constitution and the extent to which this
Court, until today, has recognized that the States retain a
signficant measure of sovereignty in our federal system.
Part IV considers the applicability of the FLSA to the indisputably local service provided by an urban transit system.
II
The Court finds that the test of State immunity approved
in National League of Cities and its progeny is unworkable
and unsound in principle. In finding the test to be unworkable, the Court begins by mischaracterizing National League
of Cities and subsequent cases. In concluding that efforts to
define state immunity are unsound in principle, the Court
radically departs from long settled constitutional values and
ignores the role of judicial review in our system of
government.
A

Much of the Court's opinion is devoted to arguing that it is
difficult to define a priori "traditional governmental functions." National League of Cities neither engaged in, nor
required, such a task. 4 The Court discusses and condemns
'InNational League of Cities, we referred to the sphere of state sovereignty as including "traditional governmental functions," a realm which is,
of course, difficult to define with precision. But the luxury of precise definitions is one rarely enjoyed in interpreting and applying the general provisions of our Constitution. Not surprisingly, therefore, the Court's attempt to demonstrate the impossibility of definition is irrelevant". A
number of the cases it cites simply do not involve the problem of defining
governmental functions. E. g., Williams v. Eastside Mental Health Center, Inc., 669 F. 2d 671 (CAll), cert. denied, 459 U. S. 976 (1982); Friends
of the Earth v. Carey, 552 F. 2d 25 (CA2), cert. denied, 434 U. S. 902
(1977). A number of others are not properly analyzed under the principles
of National League of Cities, notwithstanding some of the language of the
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as standards "traditional governmental function[s]," "purely
historical" functions, "'uniquely' governmental functions,"
and "'necessary' governmental services." Ante, · at 10-11,
15, 16. But nowhere does it mention that National League
of Cities adopted a familiar type of balancing test for determining whether Commerce Clause enactments transgress
constitutional limitations imposed by the federal nature of
our system of government. This omission is noteworthy,
since the author of today' s opinion joined National League of
Cities and concurred separately to point out that the Court's
opinion in that case "adopt[s] a balancing approach [that]
does not outlaw federal power in areas ... where the federal
interest is demonstrably greater and where state . . . compliance with imposed federal standards would be essential."
426 U. S., at 856 (JUSTICE BLACKMUN, concurring).
In reading National League of Cities to embrace a balancing approach, JUSTICE BLACKMUN quite correctly cited the
part of the opinion that reaffirmed Fry v. United States, 421
U. S. 542 (1975). The Court's analysis reaffirming Fry explicitly weighed the seriousness of the problem addressed by
the federal legislation at issue in that case, against the effects
of compliance on State sovereignty. 426 U. S., at 852-853.
Our subsequent decisions also adopted this approach of
weighing the respective interests of the States and federal
government. 5 In EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U. S. 226 (1983),
lower courts. E . g., United States v. Best, 573 F. 2d 1095 (CA91978) and
Hybud Equipment Corp. v. City of Akron, 654 F. 2d 1187 (CA6 1981).
Moreover, rather than carefully analyzing the case law, the Court simply
lists various functions thought to be protected or unprotected by courts interpreting National League of Cities. Ante, at 9-10. In the cited cases,
however, the courts considered the issue of State immunity on the specific
facts at issue; they did not make blanket pronouncements that particular
things inherently qualified as traditional governmental functions or did not.
Having thus considered the cases out of context, it was not difficult for the
Court to conclude that there is no "organizing principle" among them. See
ante, at 10.
5
In undertaking such balancing, we have considered, on the one hand,
the strength of the federal interest in the challenged legislation and the im-
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for example, the Court stated that "[t]he principle of immunity articulated in National League of Cities is a functional
doctrine ... whose ultimate purpose is not to create a sacred
province of state autonomy, but to ensure that the unique
benefits of a federal system . . . not be lost through undue
federal interference in certain core state functions." I d., at
236. · See also Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U. S. 264 (1981). In overruling National League of Cities, the Court incorrectly characterizes
the mode of analysis established therein and developed in
subsequent cases. 5
pact of exempting the States from its reach. Central to our inquiry into
the federal interest is how closely the challenged action implicates the central concerns of the Commerce Clause, viz., the promotion of a national
economy and free trade among the states. See EEOC v. Wyoming, 460
U. S. 226, 244 (JUSTICE STEVENS, concurring). See also for example
United Transportation Union v. Long Island Rail Road Co., 455 U. S.
678, 688 (1982) ("Congress long ago concluded that federal regulation of
railroad labor services is necessary to prevent disruptions in vital rail service essential to the national economy."); FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U. S.
742, 757 (1982), ("it is difficult to conceive of a more basic element of interstate commerce than electric energy .. . ."). Similarly, we have considered whether exempting States from federal regulation would undermine
the goals of the federal program. See Fry v. United States, 421 U. S. 542
(1975). See also Hodel, 452 U. S. at 282 (national surface mining standards
necessary to insure competition among States does not undermine States'
efforts to maintain adequate intrastate standards). On the other hand, we
have also assessed the injury done to the States if forced to comply with
federal Commerce Clause enactments. See National League of Cities, 426
U. S., at 846-851.
6
In addition, reliance on the Court's difficulties in the tax immunity
field is misplaced. Although the Court has abandoned the "go:vernmentaUproprietary" distinction in this field, see New York v. United
States, 326 U. S. 572 (1946), it has not taken the drastic approach of relying
solely on the structure of the federal government to protect the States' immunity from taxation. See Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U. S. 444
(1978). Thus, faced with an equally difficult problem of defining constitutional boundaries of federal action directly affecting the States, we did not
adopt the view many would think naive, that the federal government itself
will protect whatever rights the States may have.
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Moreover, the statute at issue in this case, the FLSA, is
the identical statute that was at issue in National League of
Cities. Although JUSTICE BLACKMUN's concurrence noted
that he was "not untroubled by certain possible implications
of the Court's opinion" in National League of Cities, it also
stated that "the result with respect to the statute under challenge here [the FLSA] is necessarily correct." 426 U. S., at
856 (emphasis added). His opinion for the Court today does
not discuss the statute, nor identify any changed circumstances that warrant the conclusion today that National
League of Cities is necessarily wrong.
B
Today's opinion does not explain how the States' role in the
electoral process guarantees that particular exercises of the
Commerce Clause power will not infringe oh residual State
sovereignty. 7 Members of Congress are elected from the
various States, but once in office they are members of the
federal government. 8 Although the States participate in the
7
Late in its opinion, the Court suggests that after all there may be some
"affirmative limits the constitutional structure might impose on federal action affecting the States under the Commerce Clause." Ante, at 27. The
Court asserts that "[i]n the factual setting of these cases the internal safeguards of the political process have performed as intended." Ibid. The
Court does not explain the basis for this judgment. Nor does it identify
the circumstances in which the "political process" may fail and "affirmative
limits" are to be imposed. Presumably, such limits are to be determined
by the Judicial Branch even though it is "unelected." Today's opinion,
however, has rejected the balancing standard and suggests no other standard that would enable a court to determine when there has been a malfunction of the "political process." The Court's failure to specify the "affirmative limits" on federal power, or when and how these limits are to be
determined, may well be explained by the transparent fact that any such
attempt would be subject to precisely the same objections on which it relies
to overrule National League of Cities.
8
One can hardly imagine this Court saying that because Congress is
composed of individuals, individual rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights
are amply protected by the political process. Yet, the position adopted
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Electoral College, this is hardly a reason to view the President as a representative of the States' interest against federal encroachment. We noted recently "the hydraulic pressure inherent within each of the separate Branches to exceed
the outer limits of its power . . . . " Immigration and
Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U. S. 919, - (1983). The Court offers no reason to think that this pressure will not operate when Congress seeks to invoke its powers under the Commerce Clause, notwithstanding the electoral role of the States. 9
today is indistinguishable in principle. The Tenth Amendment also is an
essential part of the Bill of Rights. See infra, at - - .
9
At one time in our history, the view that the structure of the federal
government sufficed to protect the States might have had a somewhat
more practical, although not a more logical, basis. Professor Wechsler,
whose seminal article in 1954 proposed the view adopted by the Court today, predicated his argument on assumptions that simply do not accord
with current reality. Professor Wechsler wrote: "National action has ...
always been regarded as exceptional in our polity, an instrusion to be justified by some necessity, the special rather than the ordinary case."
Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States
in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 Colurn.
L. Rev. 543, 544 (1954). Not only is the premise of this view clearly at
odds with the proliferation of national legislation over the past 30 years,
but "a variety of structural and political changes in this century have combined to make Congress particularly insensitive to state and local values."
Advisory Comm'n on Intergovernmental Relations [ACIR], Regulatory
Federalism: Policy, Process, Impact and Reform 50 (1984). The adoption
of the Seventeenth Amendment (providing for direct election of senators),
the weakening of political parties on the local level, and the rise of national
media, among other things, have made Congress increasingly less representative of State and local interests, and more likely to be responsive to
the demands of various national constituencies. Id., at 50-51. As one
observer explained, "As Senators and members of the House develop independent constituencies among groups such as farmers, businessmen, laborers, environmentalists, and the poor, each of which generally supports
certain national initiatives, their tendency to identify with state interests
and the positions of state officials is reduced." Kaden, "Federalism in the
Courts: Agenda for the 1980s," in ACIR, The Future of Federalism in the
'80s, at 97 (1981).

82-1913 & 82-1951-DISSENT
10

GARCIA v. SAN ANTONIO METRO. TRANSIT AUTH.

The Court apparently thinks that the States' success at
obtaining federal funds for various projects and exemptions
from the obligations of some federal statutes is indicative of
the "effectiveness of the federal political process in preserving the States' interests .... " Ante, at 23-24. 10 But
political success in obtaining federal grants is not relevant to
the question whether the political processes are the proper
means of enforcing constitutional limitations. 11 The fact that
See also Kaden, Politics, Money, and State Sovereignty: The Judicial
Role, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 847 (1979) (changes in political practices and the
breadth of national initiatives mean that the political branches "may no
longer be as well suited as they once were to the task of safeguarding the
role of the states in the federal system and protecting the fundamental
value of federalism") and ACIR, Regulatory Federalism, supra, at 1-24
(detailing the "dramatic shift" in kind of federal regulation applicable to the
States over the past two decades). Thus, even if one were to ignore the
numerous problems with the Court's position in terms of constitutional
theory, there would remain serious questions as to its factual premises.
10
The Court believes that the significant financial assistance afforded the
States and localities by the federal government is relevant to the constitutionality of extending Commerce Clause enactments to the States. See
ante, at 23-24, 26. This Court has never held, however, that the mere
disbursement of funds by the federal government establishes a right to
control activities that benefit from such funds. See Pennhurst State
School v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1, 17-18 (1981). Regardless of the willingness of the federal government to provide federal aid, the constitutional
question remains the same: whether the federal statute violates the sovereign powers reserved to the States by the Tenth Amendment.
11
Apparently in an effort to reassure the States, the Court identifies
several major statutes that thus far have not been made applicable to State
governments: the Federal Power Act, 16 U. S. C. 824(f); the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U. S. C. § 152(2); the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 29 U. S. C. § 402(e); the Occupational Safety
and Health Act, 29 U. S. C. § 652(5); the Employee Retirement Insurance
Security Act, 29 U. S. C. §§ 1002(32), 1003(b)(l); and the Sherman Act, 15
U. S. C. § 1, et seq.; see Parker v. Brown, 317 U. S. 341 (1943). Ante, at
24. The Court does not suggest that this restraint will continue after its
decision here. Indeed, it is unlikely that special interest groups will fail to
accept the Court's open invitation to urge Congress to extend these and
other statutes to apply to the States and their local subdivisions.
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Congress generally does not transgress constitutional limits
on its power to reach State activities does not make judicial
review any less necessary to rectify the cases in which it does
do so. 12 The States' role in our system of government is a
matter of constitutional law, not of legislative grace. "The
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
States, respectively, or to the people." U. S. Const.,
Amend. 10.
More troubling than the logical infirmities in the Court's
reasoning is the result of its holding, i. e., that federal political officials, invoking the Commerce Clause, are the sole
judges of the limits of their own power. This result is inconsistent with the fundamental principles of our constitutional
system. See, e. g., The Federalist No. 78 (Hamilton). At
least since Marbury v. Madison it has been the settled province of the federal judiciary "to say what the law is" with respect to the constitutionality of acts of Congress. In rejecting the role of the judiciary in protecting the States from
federal overreaching, the Court's opinion offers no explanation for ignoring the teaching of the most famous case in our
history. 13
This Court has never before abdicated responsibility for assessing the
constitutionality of challenged action on the ground that affected parties
theoretically are able to look out for their own interests through the electoral process. As the Court noted in National League of Cities, a much
stronger argument as to inherent structural protections could have been
made in either Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (1976) or Myers v. United
States, 272 U. S. 52 (1926), than can be made here. In these cases, the
President signed legislation that limited his authority with respect to certain appointments and thus arguably "it was no concern of this Court that
the law violated the Constitution." 426 U. S., at 841-842 n. 12. · The
Court nevertheless held the laws unconstitutional because they infringed
on presidential authority, the President's consent notwithstanding. The
Court does not address this point; nor does it cite any authority for its contrary view.
13
The Court states that the decision in National League of Cities "invite[s] an unelected federal judiciary to make decisions about which state
12
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III
A
In our federal system, the States have a major role that
cannot be preempted by the national government. As contemporaneous writings and the debates at the ratifying conventions make clear, the States' ratification of the Constitution was predicated on this understanding of federalism.
Indeed, the Tenth Amendment was adopted specifically to
ensure that the important role promised the States by the
proponents of the Constitution was realized.
Much of the initial opposition to the Constitution was
rooted in the fear that the national government would be too
powerful and eventually would eliminate the States as viable
political entities. This concern was voiced repeatedly until
proponents of the Constitution made assurances that a bill of
rights, including a provision explicitly reserving powers in
the States, would be among the first business of the new Congress. Samuel Adams argued, for example, that if the several States were to be joined in "one entire Nation, under one
Legislature, the Powers of which shall extend to every Subject of Legislation, and its Laws be supreme & controul the
whole, the Idea of Sovereignty in these States must be lost."
Letter from Samuel Adams to Richard Henry Lee (Dec. 3,
1787), reprinted in Anti-Federalists versus Federalists 159
policies it favors and which ones its dislikes." Curiously, the Court then
suggests that under the application of the "traditional" governmental function analysis, "the states cannot serve as laboratories for social and economic experiment." Ante, at 17, citing Justice Brandeis's famous observation in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U. S. 262, 311 (1932) (Justice
Brandeis, J., dissenting). Apparently the Court believes that when "an
unelected federal judiciary" makes decisions as to whether a particular
function is one for the federal or state governments, the States no longer
may engage in "social and economic experiment." Ante, at 17. The
Court does not explain how leaving the States virtually at the mercy of the
federal government, without recourse to judicial review, will enhance their
opportunities to experiment and serve as "laboratories."
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(J. Lewis ed. 1967). Likewise, George Mason feared that
"the general government being paramount to, and in every
respect more powerful than the state governments, the latter
must give way to the former." Address in the Ratifying
Convention of Virginia (June 4-12 1788), reprinted in AntiFederalists versus Federalists, supra, at 208-209.
Antifederalists raised these concerns in almost every State
ratifying convention. 14 See generally Elliot, Debates in the
Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal
Constitution (1854). As a result, eight States voted for the
Constitution only after proposing amendments to be adopted
after ratification. 15 All eight of these included among their
recommendations some version of what later became the
Tenth Amendment. Ibid. So strong was the concern that
the proposed Constitution was seriously defective without a
specific bill of rights, including a provision reserving powers
to the States, that in order to secure the votes for ratification, the Federalists eventually conceded that such provisions were necessary. See Schwartz, A Documentary History of the Bill of Rights, supra, at 505 and passim. It was
thus generally agreed that consideration of a bill of rights
would be among the first business of the new Congress. See
generally 1 Annals of Congress 432-437 (June 8, 1789) (remarks of James Madison). Accordingly, the ten amendments that we know as the Bill of Rights were proposed and
adopted early in the first session of the First Congress.
Opponents of the Constitution were particularly dubious of the Federalists claim that the States retained powers not delegated to the United
States in the absence of an express provision so providing. For example,
James Winthrop wrote that "[i]t is a mere fallacy ... that what rights are
not given are reserved." Letters of Agrippa, reprinted in Schwartz, The
Bill of Rights, supra, at 510, 511.
16
Indeed, the Virginia legislature came very close to withholding ratification of the Constitution until the adoption of a bill of rights that included, among other things, the substance of the Tenth Amendment. See
Schwartz, The Bill of Rights, supra, at 762-766 and passim.
14
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Schwartz, A Documentary History of the Bill of Rights,
supra, 983-1167.
This history, which the Court simply ignores, documents
the integral role of the the Tenth Amendment in our constitutional theory. It exposes as well, I believe, the fundamental
character of the Court's error today. Far from being "unsound in principle," ante, at 18, judicial enforcement of the
Tenth Amendment is essential to maintaining the federal system so carefully designed by the Framers and adopted in the
Constitution.
B

The Framers had definite ideas about the nature of the
Constitution's division of authority between the federal and
state governments. In The Federalist No. 39, for example,
Madison explained this division by drawing a series of contrasts between the attributes of a "national" government and
those of the government to be established by the Constitution. While a national form of government would possess an
"indefinite supremacy over all persons and things," the form
of government contemplated by the Constitution instead consisted of "local or municipal authorities [which] form distinct
and independent portions of the supremacy, no more subject
within their respective spheres to the general authority than
the general authority is subject to them, within its own
sphere." The Federalist No. 39, p. 256 (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
Under the Constitution, the sphere of the proposed government extended to jurisdiction of "certain enumerated objects,
only, ... leav[ing] to the several States a residuary and inviolable sovereignty over all other objects." Id.
Madison elaborated on the content of these separate
spheres of sovereignty in The Federalist No. 45:
"The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution
to the Federal Government are few and defined. Those
which are to remain in the State Governments are numerous and indefinite. The former will be exercised
principally on external objects, as war, peace, negotia-
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tion, and foreign commerce; . . . . The powers reserved
to the several States will extend to all the objects,
which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the
lives, liberties and properties of the people; and the internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the State."

I d., at 313. Madison considered that the operations of the
federal government would be "most extensive and important
in times of war and danger; those of the State Governments
in times of peace and security." Ibid. As a result of this
division of powers, the State governments generally wo~ld
be more important than the federal government. Ibid.
The Framers believed that the separate sphere of sovereignty reserved to the States would ensure that the States
would serve as an effective "counterpoise" to the power of
the federal government. The States would serve this essential role because they would attract and retain the loyalty of
their citizens. The roots of such loyalty, the Founders
thought, were found in the objects peculiar to State government. For example, Hamilton argued that the States "regulat[e] all those personal interests and familiar concerns to
which the sensibility of individuals is more immediately
awake .... " · The Federalist No. 17, supra, p. 107. Thus,
he maintained that the people would perceive the States as
"the immediate and most visible guardian of life and property," a fact which "contributes more than any other circumstance to impressing upon the minds of the people affection,
esteem and reverence towards the government." Ibid.
Madison took the same position, explaining that "the people
will be more familiarly and minutely conversant" with the
business of State governments, and "with the members of
these, will a greater proportion of the people have the ties of
personal acquaintance and friendship, and of family and party
attachments .... " The Federalist No. 46, p. 316. Like
Hamilton, Madison saw the States' involvement in the everyday concerns of the people as the source of their citizens' loyalty. !d. See also Nagel, Federalism as a Fundamental
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Value: National League of Cities in Perspective, 1981 Sup.
Ct. Rev. 81 (1981).
Thus, the harm to the States that results from federal
overreaching under the Commerce Clause is not simply a
matter of dollars and cents. National League of Cities, 426
U. S., at 846-851. Nor is it a matter of the wisdom or folly
of certain policy choices. Cf. ante, at 17. Rather, by usurping functions traditionally performed by the States, federal
overreaching under the Commerce Clause undermines the
constitutionally mandated balance of power between the
States and the federal government, a balance designed to
protect our fundamental liberties.

c
The emasculation of the powers of the States that can result from the Court's decision is predicated on the Commerce
Clause as a power "delegated to the United States" by the
Constitution. The relevant language states: "Congress shall
have power . . . to regulate commerce with foreign nations
and among the several states and with the Indian tribes."
Art. I, § 8. Section eight identifies a score of powers, listing
the authority to lay taxes, borrow money on the credit of the
United States, pay its debts, and provide for the common defense and the general welfare before its brief reference to
"Commerce." It is clear from the debates leading up to the
adoption of the Constitution that the commerce to be regulated was that which the states themselves were powerless to
regulate. See, e. g., 1M. Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 (rev. ed. 1937); The Federalist Nos.
7, 11, 22, 42, 45. See also EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U. S.
226, 265 (1983) (JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting). Indeed; the
language of the clause itself focuses on activities that only a
national government could regulate: commerce with foreign
nations and Indian tribes and "among" the several states.
To be sure, this Court has construed the Commerce Clause
to accommodate unanticipated changes over the past two cen-
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turies. As these changes have occurred, the Court has had
to decide whether the federal government has exceeded its
authority by regulating activities beyond the capability of a
single state to regulate or beyond legitimate federal interests
that outweighed the authority and interests of the States.
In so doing, however, the Court properly has been mindful of
the essential role of the States in our federal system.
The opinion for the Court in National League of Cities was
faithful to history in its understanding of federalism. The
Court observed that "our federal system of government imposes definite limits upon the authority of Congress to regulate the activities of States as States by means of the commerce power." 426 U. S., at 842. The Tenth Amendment
was invoked to prevent Congress from exercising its "power
in a fashion that impairs the States' integrity or their ability
to function effectively in a federal system." I d., at 842-843,
quoting Fry v. United States, 421 U. S. 542, 547 n. 7 (1975)).
This Court has recognized repeatedly that State sovereignty is a fundamental component of our system of government. More than a century ago, in Lane County v. Oregon,
7 Wall. 71 (1868), the Court stated that the Constitution recognized "the necessary existence of the States, and, within
their proper spheres, the independent authority of the
States." It concluded, as Madison did, that this authority
extended to "nearly the whole charge of interior regulation
... ; to [the States] and to the people all powers not expressly
delegated to the national government are reserved." I d., at
76. Recently, in Community Communications Co. v. City
of Boulder, 455 U. S. 40, 53 (1982), the Court recognized that
the state action exemption from the antitrust laws was based
on State sovereignty. Similarly, in United Transportation
Union v. Long Island Railroad Co., 455 U. S. 678, 683
(1982), although finding the Railway Labor Act applicable to
a state-owned railroad, the unanimous Court was careful to
say that the States possess constitutionally preserved sovereign powers.
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Again, in Federal Regulatory Commission v. Mississippi,
456 U. S. 742, 752 (1982), in determining the constitutionality
of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act, the Court explicitly considered whether the Act impinged on state sovereignty in violation of the Tenth Amendment. These represent only a few of the many cases in which the Court has
recognized not only the role, but the importance, of.. state
sovereignty. See also, e. g., United States v. Fry, supra;
Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U. S. 514 (1926); Coyle v.
Oklahoma, 221 U. S. 559 (1911). As Justice Frankfurter
noted, the States are not merely a factor in the "shifting economic arrangements" of our country, Kovacs v. Cooper, 336
U. S. 77, 95 (1949) (Justice Frankfurter, concurring), but
constitute a "coordinate element in the system established by
the Framers for governing our Federal Union." National
League of Cities, supra, at 849.

D
In contrast, the Court today propounds a view of federalism that pays only lip service to the role of the States. Although it says that the States "unquestionably do 'retai[n] a
significant measure of sovereign authority,'" ante, at 20
(quoting EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U. S. 226, 269 (POWELL,
J., dissenting)), it fails to recognize the broad, yet specific
areas of sovereignty that the Framers intended the States to
retain. Indeed, the Court barely acknowledges that the
Tenth Amendment exists. 16 That Amendment states explicitly that "[t]he powers not delegated to the United States ...
are reserved to the States." U. S. Const., Amend. 10. The
Court recasts this language to say that the States retain their
sovereign powers "only to the extent that the Constitution
has not divested them of their original powers and transferred those powers to the Federal Government." Ante, at
18
The Court's opinion mentions the Tenth Amendment only once, when
it restates the question put to the parties for reargument in this case. See
ante, at 8.
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20. This rephrasing is not a distinction without a difference;
rather, it reflects the Court's unprecedented view that Congress is free under the Commerce Clause to assume a State's
traditional sovereign power, and to do so without judicial review of its action. Indeed, the Court's view of federalism
appears to relegate the States to precisely the trivial role
that opponents of the Constitution feared they would
occupy. 17
In National League of Cities, we spoke of fire prevention,
police protection, sanitation, and public health as "typical of
[the services] performed by state and local governments in
discharging their dual functions of administering the public
law and·furnishing public services." 426 U. S., at 851. Not
only are these activities remote from any normal concept of
interstate commerce, they are also activities that epitomize
the concerns (}f local, democratic self-government. See
supra n. 5. In emphasizing the need to protect traditional
governmental functions, we identified the kinds of activities
engaged in by state and local governments that affect the everyday lives of citizens. These are services that people are
in a position to understand and evaluate as well as the right,
in a democracy, to oversee. 18 We recognized that "it is funcAs the amici argue, "the ability of the [S]tates to fulfill their role in the
constitutional scheme is dependent solely upon their effectiveness as instruments of self-government." Brief of Twenty-Four States as Amicus
Curiae 50. See also Brief of the National League of Cities et alas Amicus
Curiae (a brief on behalf of every major organization representing the concerns of State and local governments).
18
The Framers recognized that the most effective democracy occurs at
local levels of government, where people with first hand knowledge of local
problems have more ready access to public officials responsible for d~aling
with them. E. g., The Federalist No. 17, at 107; No.45, at 316. This is as
true today as it was when the Constitution was adopted. "Participation is
likely to be more frequent, and exercised at more different stages of a governmental activity at the local level, or in regional organizations, than at
the state and federal levels. [Additionally,] the proportion of people actually involved from the total population tends to be greater, the lower the
level of government, and this, of course, better approximates the citizen
17
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tions such as these which governments are created to provide
. . ." and that the states and local governments are better
able than the national government to perform them. 426
U. S., at 851.
The Court maintains that the standard approved in N ational League of Cities "disserves principles of democratic
self government." Ante, at 18. In reaching this conclusion,
the Court looks myopically only to persons elected to positions in the federal government. It disregards entirely the
far more effective role of democratic self-government at the
state and local levels. One must compare realistically the
operation of the state and local governments with that of the
federal government. Federal legislation is drafted primarily
by the staffs of the congressional committees. In view of the
hundreds of bills introduced at each session of Congress and
the complexity of many of them, it is virtually impossible for
even the most conscientious legislators to be truly familiar
with many of the statutes enacted. Federal departments
and agencies customarily are authorized to write regulations.
Often these are more important than the text of the statutes.
As is true of the original legislation, these are drafted largely
by staff personnel. The administration and enforcement of
federal laws and regulations necessarily are largely in the
hands of staff and civil service employees. These employees
may have little or no knowledge of the States and localities
that will be affected by the statutes and regulations for which
they are responsible. In any case, they hardly are as accesparticipation ideal." ACIR, Citizen Participation in the American Federal
System 95 (1979).
Moreover, we have witnessed in recent years the rise of numerous special interest groups that engage in sophisticated lobbying, and make substantial campaign contributions to some members of Congress. These
groups are thought to have significant influence in the shaping and enactment of certain types of legislation. Contrary to the Court's view, a
"political process" that functions in this way is unlikely to safeguard the
sovereign rights of States and localities.
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sible and responsive as those who occupy analogous positions
in State and local governments.
In drawing this contrast, I imply no criticism of these federal employees or the officials who are ultimately in charge.
The great majority are conscientious and faithful to their
duties. My point is simply that members of the immense
federal bureaucracy are not elected, know less about the
services traditionally rendered by states and localities, and
are inevitably less responsive to recipients of such services,
than are state legislatures, city councils, boards of supervisors, and state and local commissions, boards, and agencies.
It is at these state and local levels-not in Washington as the
Court so mistakenly thinks-that "democratic self government" is best exemplified.
IV
The question presented in this case is whether the extension of the FLSA to the wages and hours of employees of a
city-owned transit system unconstitutionally impinges on
fundamental state sovereignty. The Court's sweeping holding does far more than simply answer this question in the
negative. In overruling National League of Cities, today's
opinion apparently authorizes federal control, under the auspices of the Commerce Clause, over the terms and conditions
of employment of all state and local employees. Thus, for
purposes of federal regulation, the Court rejects the distinction between public and private employers that had been
drawn carefully in National League of Cities. The Court's
action reflects a serious misunderstanding, if not an outright
rejection, of the history of our country and the intention of
the Framers of the Constitution. 19
19

The opinion of the Court in National League of Cities makes clear that
the very essence of a federal system of government is to impose "definite
limits upon the authority of Congress to regulate the activities of the
States as States by means of the commerce power." See also the Court's
opinion in Fry, supra, at 547 n. 7.
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I return now to the balancing test approved in National
League of Cities and accepted in Hodel, Long Island R. R.,
and FERC v. Mississippi. Under this test, the Court
should consider whether the service or activity at issue is one
that "the states and their political subdivisions have traditionally afforded their citizens." National League of Cities,
supra, at 855. See ante, at - - . One cannot think of a
more fundamental and traditional activity of a State than
determination of the terms and conditions of employment of
its own employees. Moreover, the Court does not find in
this case that the "federal interest is demonstrably greater."
No such finding could have been made, for the state interest
is compelling. The financial impact on States and localities
of displacing their ycontrol over wages, hours, overtime regulations, pensions, and labor relations with their employees
could have serious, as well as unanticipated, effects on State
and local planning, budgeting, and the levying of taxes. 20 As
we said in National League of Cities, federal control also
inevitably "displaces state policies regarding the manner in
which [States] will structure delivery of those governmental
services that citizens require." Id., at 847.
The Court emphasizes that municipal operation of an intracity mass transit system is relatively new in the life of our
country. It nevertheless is a classic example of the type of
service traditionally provided by local government. It is
local by definition. It is indistinguishable in principle from
the traditional services of providing and maintaining streets,
public lighting, traffic control, water, and sewerage systems. 21 Services of this kind are precisely those "with which
20

As Justice Douglas observed in his dissent in Maryland v. Wirtz,

supra, extension of the FLSA to the States could "disrupt the fiscal policy

of the states and threaten their autonomy in the regulation of health and
education." Id., at 302.
21
In Long Island R. Co. the unanimous Court recognized that "[t]his
Court's emphasis on traditional governmental functions and traditional aspects of state sovereignty was not meant to impose a static historical view
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citizens are more 'familiarly and minutely conversant.'" The
Federalist, supra, No. 46, p. 316. State and local officials of
course must be intimately familiar with these services and
sensitive to their quality as well as cost. Such officials also
know that their constituents and the press respond to the adequacy, fair distribution, and cost of these services. It is
this kind of state and local control ;:md accountability that the
Framers understood would insure the vitality and preservation of the federal system that the Constitution explicitly
requires. See National League of Cities, supra, at 847-852.

v
Although the Court's opinion purports to recognize that
the States retain some sovereign power, it does not identify
even a single aspect of state authority that would remain
when the Commerce Clause is invoked to justify federal
regulation. In Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U. S. 183 (1968),
overruled by National League of Cities and today reaffirmed,
the Court sustained an extension of the FLSA to certain hospitals, institutions, and schools. Although the Court's opinion in Wirtz was comparatively narrow, Justice Douglas, in
dissent, wrote presciently that the Court's reading of the
Commerce Clause would enable "the National Government
[to] devour the essentials of state sovereignty, though that
sovereignty is attested by the Tenth Amendment." I d., at
205. Today's decision makes Justice Douglas's fear once
again a realistic one.
As I view the Court's decision today as rejecting the basic
precepts of our federal system and limiting the constitutional
role of judicial review, I dissent.

of state functions generally immune from federal regulation. " 455 U. S. ,
at 686.
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The Court today, m its 5-4 decision, overrules National
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U. S. 833 (1976), a case in
which we held that Congress lacked authority to impose the
requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act on state and
local governments. Because I believe this decision substantially alters the federal system embodied in the Constitution,
I dissent.
I
There are, of course, numerous examples over the history
of this Court in which prior decisions have been reconsidered
and overruled. There have been few cases, however, in
which the principle of stare decisis and the rationale of recent
decisions were ignored as abruptly as we now witness. 1 The
1
National League of Cities , following some changes in the composition
of the Court, had overruled Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U. S. 183 (1968). Un-
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reasoning of the Court in National League of Cities, and the
principle applied there, have been reiterated consistently
over the past eight years. Since its decision in 1976, N ational League of Cities has been cited and quoted in opinions
joined by every member of the present Court. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reel. Assn., 452 U. S. 264, 287-293
(1981); United Transportation Union v. Long Island R. Co.,
455 U. S. 678, 684-686 (1982); FERC v. Mississippi, 456
U. S. 742, 764-767 (1982). Less than three years ago, in
Long Island R. Co.(, supra, a unanimous Court reaffirmed
the principles of National League of Cities but found them
inapplicable to the regulation of a railroad heavily engaged in
interstate commerce. The Court stated:
"The key prong of the National League of Cities test applicable to this case is the third one [repeated and reformulated in Hodel], which examines whether 'the
states' compliance with the federal law would directly
impair their ability to structure integral operations
in areas of traditional governmental functions." 455
U. S., at 684.
The Court in that case recognized that the test "may at
times be a difficult one," ibid., but it was considered in that
unanimous decision as settled constitutional doctrine.
As recently as June 1, 1982 the five Justices who constitute
the majority in this case also were the majority in FERC v.
Mississippi. In that case, the Court said:
"In National League of Cities, supra, for example, the
Court made clear that the State's regulation of its relationship with its employees is an 'undoubted attribute of
state sovereignty.' 426 U. S., at 845. Yet, by holding
'unimpaired' California v. Taylor, 353 U. S. 553 (1957),
which upheld a federal labor regulation as applied to
state railroad employees, 426 U. S., at 854, n. 18, N alike National League of Cities, the rationale of Wirtz had not been repeatedly accepted by our subsequent decisions.
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tional League of Cities acknowledged that not all aspects
of a State's sovereign authority are immune from federal
control." 426 U. S., at 764, n. 28.
The Court went on to say that even where the requirements of the National League of Cities standard are met,
"'[t]here are situations in which the nature of the federal
interest advanced may be such that it justifies state submission."' Ibid., quotjng Hodel, supra, 452 U. S., at 288 n. 29.
The joint federal/state system of regulation in FERC was
such a "situation," but there was no hint in the Court's opinion that National League of Cities-or its basic standardwas subject to the infirmities discovered today.
Although the doctrine is not rigidly applied to constitutional questions, "any departure from the doctrine of stare
decisis demands special justification." Arizona v. Rumsey,
- - U . S . - - , - - (1984). See also Oregon v. Kennedy,
456 U. S. 667, 691-692 n. 34 (1982) (STEVENS, J., concurring). In the present case, the five Justices who compose
the majority today participated in National League of Cities
and the cases reaffirming it. 2 The stability of judicial decision, and with it respect for the authority of this Court, are
not served by the precipitous overruling of multiple precedents that we witness in this case. 3
Whatever effect the Court's decision may have in weakening the application of stare decisis, it is likely to be less
important than what the Court has done to the Constitution
itself. A unique feature of the United States is the federal
system of government guaranteed by the Constitution and
JUSTICE O'CONNOR, the only new member in the Court since our decision in National League of Cities, has joined the Court in reaffirming its
principles. See United Transportation Union v. Long Island R. Co., 455
U. S. 678 (1982), and FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U. S. 742, 775 (1982)
(O'CONNOR, J., dissenting in part).
8
Ift this l"esped,Stare decisis represents "a natural evolution from the
very nature of our institutions." Lile, "Some Views on the Rule of Stare
Decisis," 4 Va. L. Rev. 955, 956 (1916).
2
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implicit in the very name of our country. Despite some
genuflecting in Court's opinion to the concept of federalism,
today's decision effectively reduces the Tenth Amendment to
meaningless rhetoric when Congress acts pursuant to the
Commerce Clause. The Court holds that the Fair Labor
Standards Act ["FLSA"] "contravened no affirmative limit
on Congress' power under the Commerce Clause" to determine the wage rates and hours of employment of all state and
local employees. Ante, at 27. In rejecting the traditional
view of our federal system, the Court states:
"Apart from the limitation on federal authority inherent
in the delegated nature of Congress' Article I powers,
the principal means chosen by the Framers to ensure the
role of the states in the federal system lies in the structure of the Federal Government itself." Ante, at 21-22
(emphasis added).
To leave no doubt about its intention, the Court renounces
its decision in National League of Cities because it "inevitably invites an unelected federal judiciary to make decisions
about which state policies its favors and which ones it dislikes." Ante, at 17. In other words, the extent to which the
States may exercise their authority, when Congress purports
to act under the Commerce Clause, henceforth is to be determined from time to time by political decisions made by members of the federal government, decisions the Court says will
not be subject to judicial review. I note that it does not
seem to have occurred to the Court that it-an unelected majority of five Justices-today rejects almost 200 years of the
understanding of the constitutional status of federalism. In
doing so, there is only a single passing reference to the Tenth
Amendment. Nor is so much as a dictum of any court cited
in support of the view that the role of the States in the federal system may depend upon the grace of elected federal officials, rather than on the Constitution as interpreted by this
Court.
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In my opinion that follows, Part II addresses the Court's
criticisms of National League of Cities. Part III reviews
briefly the understanding of federalism that ensured the ratification of the Constitution and the extent to which this
Court, until today, has recognized that the States retain a
signficant measure of sovereignty in our federal system.
Part IV considers the applicability of the FLSA to the indisputably local service provided by an urban transit system.
II
The Court finds that the test of State immunity approved
in National League of Cities and its progeny is unworkable
and unsound in principle. In finding the test to be unworkable, the Court begins by mischaracterizing National League
of Cities and subsequent cases. In concluding that efforts to
define state immunity are unsound in principle, the Court
radically departs from long settled constitutional values
and ignores the role of judicial review in our system of
government.
A
Much of the Court's opinion is devoted to arguing that it is
difficult to define a priori "traditional governmental ftmctions." National League of Cities neither engaged in, nor
required, such a task. 4 The Court discusses and condemns
• In National League of Cities, we referred to the sphere of state sovereignty as including "traditional governmental functions," a realm which is,
of course, difficult to define with precision. But the luxury of precise definitions is one rarely enjoyed in interpreting and applying the general provisions of our Constitution. Not surprisingly, therefore, the Court's
attempt to demonstrate the impossibility of definition is unhelpful. A
number of the cases it cites simply do not involve the problem of defining
governmental functions. E. g., Williams v. Eastside Mental Health Center, Inc., 669 F. 2d 671 (CAll), cert. denied, 459 U. S. 976 (1982); Friends
of the Earth v. Carey, 552 F. 2d 25 (CA2), cert. denied, 434 U. S. 902
(1977). A number of others are not properly analyzed under the principles
of National League of Cities, notwithstanding some of the language of the
lower courts. E. g., United States v. Best, 573 F. 2d 1095 (CA91978) and
Hybud Equipment Corp. v. City of Akron, 654 F. 2d 1187 (CA6 1981).
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as standards "traditional governmental function[s]," "purely
historical" functions, "'uniquely' governmental functions,"
and "'necessary' governmental services." Ante, at 10-11,
15, 16. But nowhere does it mention that National League
of Cities adopted a familiar type of balancing test for determining whether Commerce Clause enactments transgress
constitutional limitations imposed by the federal nature of
our system of government. This omission is noteworthy,
since the author of today's opinion joined National League of
Cities and concurred separately to point out that the Court's
opinion in that case "adopt[s] a balancing approach [that]
does not outlaw federal power in areas ... where the federal
interest is demonstrably greater and where state ... compliance with imposed federal standards would be essential."
426 U. S., at 856 (BLACKMUN, J., concurring).
In reading National League of Cities to embrace a balancing approach, JusTICE BLACKMUN quite correctly cited the
part of the opinion that reaffirmed Fry v. United States, 421
U. S. 542 (1975). The Court's analysis reaffirming Fry explicitly weighed the seriousness of the problem addressed by
the federal legislation at issue in that ~ase, against the effects
of compliance on State sovereignty. 426 U. S., at 852-853.
Our subsequent decisions also adopted this approach of
weighing the respective interests of the States and federal
government. 5 In EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U. S. 226 (1983),
Moreover, rather than carefully analyzing the case law, the Court simply
lists various functions thought to be protected or unprotected by courts interpreting National League of Cities. Ante, at 9-10. In the cited cases,
however, the courts considered the issue of State immunity on the specific
facts at issue; they did not make blanket pronouncements that particular
things inherently qualified as traditional governmental functions or did not.
Having thus considered the cases out of context, it was not difficult for the
Court to conclude that there is no "organizing principle" among them. See
ante, at 10.
• In undertaking such balancing, we have considered, on the one hand,
the strength of the federal interest in the challenged legislation and the impact of exempting the States from its reach. Central to our inquiry into
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for example, the Court stated that "[t]he principle of immunity articulated in National League of Cities is a functional
doctrine ... whose ultimate purpose is not to create a sacred
province of state autonomy, but to ensure that the unique
benefits of a federal system . . . not be lost through undue
federal interference in certain core state functions." Id., at
236. See also Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., 452 U. S. 264 (1981). In overruling N ational League of Cities, the Court incorrectly characterizes
the mode of analysis established therein and developed in
subsequent cases. 6
the federal interest is how closely the challenged action implicates the central concerns of the Commerce Clause, viz., the promotion of a national
economy and free trade among the states. See EEOC v. Wyoming, 460
U. S. 226, 244 (STEVENS, J., concurring). See also, for example, United
Transportation Union v. Long Island Rail Road Co., 455 U. S. 678, 688
(1982) ("Congress long ago concluded that federal regulation of railroad
labor services is necessary to prevent disruptions in vital rail service essential to the national economy."); FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U. S. 742, 757
(1982), ("it is difficult to conceive of a more basic element of interstate commerce than electric energy . . . . "). Similarly, we have considered
whether exempting States from federal regulation would undermine the
goals of the federal program. See Fry v. United States, 421 U. S. 542
(1975). See also Hodel, 452 U. S., at 282 (national surface mining standards necessary to insure competition among States does not undermine
States' efforts to maintain adequate intrastate standards). On the other
hand, we have also assessed the injury done to the States if forced to comply with federal Commerce Clause enactments. See National League of
Cities, 426 U. S., at 846-851.
6
In addition, reliance on the Court's difficulties in the tax immunity
field is misplaced. Although the Court has abandoned the "governmentaUproprietary" distinction in this field, see New York v. United
States, 326 U. S. 572 (1946), it has not taken the drastic approach of relying
solely on the structure of the federal government to protect the States' immunity from taxation. See Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U. S. 444
(1978). Thus, faced with an equally difficult problem of defining constitutional boundaries of federal action directly affecting the States, we did not
adopt the view many would think naive, that the federal government itself
will protect whatever rights the States may have .

. ;· ..
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Moreover, the statute at issue in this case, the FLSA, is
the identical statute that was at issue in National League of
Cities. Although JUSTICE BLACKMUN's concurrence noted
that he was "not untroubled by certain possible implications
of the Court's opinion" in National League of Cities, it also
stated that "the result with respect to the statute under challenge here [the FLSA] is necessarily correct." 426 U. S., at
856 (emphasis added). His opinion for the Court today does
not discuss the statute, nor identify any changed circumstances that warrant the conclusion today that National
League of Cities is necessarily wrong.
B

Today's opinion does not explain how the States' role in the
electoral process guarantees that particular exercises of the
Commerce Clause power will not infringe on residual State
sovereignty. 7 Members of Congress are elected from the
various States, but once in office they are members of the
federal government. 8 Although the States participate in the
Late in it~ opinion, the Court suggests that after all there may be some
"affirmative limits the constitutional structure might impose on federal action affecting the States under the Commerce Clause." Ante, at 27. The
Court asserts that "[i]n the factual setting of these cases the internal safeguards of the political process have performed as intended." Ibid. The
Court does not explain the basis for this judgment. Nor does it identify
the circumstances in which the "political process" may fail and "affirmative
limits" are to be imposed. Presumably, such limits are to be determined
by the Judicial Branch even though it is "unelected." Today's opinion,
however, has rejected the balancing standard and suggests no other standard that would enable a court to determine when there has been a malfunction of the "political process." The Court's failure to specify the "affirmative limits" on federal power, or when and how these limits are to be
determined, may well be explained by the transparent fact that any such
attempt would be subject to precisely the same objections on which it relies
to overrule National League of Cities.
8
One can hardly imagine this Court saying that because Congress is
composed of individuals, individual rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights
are amply protected by the political process. Yet, the position adopted
7

'.
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Electoral College, this is hardly a reason to view the President as a representative of the States' interest against federal encroachment. We noted recently "the hydraulic pressure inherent within each of the separate Branches to exceed
the outer limits of its power . . . ." Immigration and
Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U. S. 919, - (1983). The Court offers no reason to think that this pressure will not operate when Congress seeks to invoke its powers under the Commerce Clause, notwithstanding the electoral role of the States. 9
today is indistinguishable in principle. The Tenth Amendment also is an
essential part of the Bill of Rights. See infra, at - - .
9
At one time in our history, the view that the structure of the federal
government sufficed to protect the States might have had a somewhat
more practical, although not a more logical, basis. Professor Wechsler,
whose seminal article in 1954 proposed the view adopted by the Court today, predicated his argument on assumptions that simply do not accord
with current reality .• Professor Wechsler wrote: "National action has ...
always been regarded as exceptional in our polity, an inftrusion to be justified by some necessity, the special rather than the ordinary case."
Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States
in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 Colum.
L. Rev. 543, 544 (1954). Not only is the premise of this view clearly at
odds with the proliferation of national legislation over the past 30 years,
but "a variety of structural and political changes in this century have combined to make Congress particularly insensitive to state and local values."
Advisory Comm'n on Intergovernmental Relations [ACIR], Regulatory
Federalism: Policy, Process, Impact and Reform 50 (1984). The adoption
of the Seventeenth Amendment (providing for direct election of senators),
the weakening of political parties on the local level, and the rise of national
media, among other things, have made Congress increasingly less representative of State and local interests, and more likely to be responsive to
the demands of various national constituencies. !d., at 50-51. As one
observer explained, "As Senators and members of the House develop independent constituencies among groups such as farmers, businessmen, laborers, environmentalists, and the poor, each of which generally supports
certain national initiatives, their tendency to identify with state interests
and the positions of state officials is reduced." Kaden, "Federalism in the
Courts: Agenda for the 1980s," in ACIR, The Future of Federalism in the
'80s, at 97 (1981).
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The Court apparently thinks that the States' success at
obtaining federal funds for various projects and exemptions
from the obligations of some federal statutes is indicative of
the "effectiveness of the federal political process in preserving the States' interests .... " Ante, at 23-24. 10 But
such political success is not relevant to the question whether
the political processes are the proper means of enforcing constitutional limitations. 11 The fact that Congress generally
See also Kaden, Politics, Money, and State Sovereignty: The Judicial
Role, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 847 (1979) (changes in political practices and the
breadth of national initiatives mean that the political branches "may no
longer be as well suited as they once were to the task of safeguarding the
role of the states in the federal system and protecting the fundamental
value of federalism") and ACIR, Regulatory Federalism, supra, at 1-24
(detailing the "dramatic shift" in kind of federal regulation applicable to the
States over the past two decades). Thus, even if one were to ignore the
numerous problems with the Court's position in terms of constitutional
theory, there would remain serious questions as to its factual premises.
10
The Court believes that the significant financial assistance afforded the
States and localities by the federal government is relevant to the constitutionality of extending Commerce Clause enactments to the States. See
ante, at 23-24, 26. This Court has never held, however, that the mere
disbursement of funds by the federal government establishes a right to
control activities that benefit from such funds. See Pennhurst State
School v. Haldernw,n, 451 U. S. 1, 17-18 (1981). Regardless of the willingness of the federal government to provide federal aid, the constitutional
question remains the same: whether the federal statute violates the sovereign powers reserved to the States by the Tenth Amendment.
11
Apparently in an effort to reassure the States, the Court identifies
several major statutes that thus far have not been made applicable to State
governments: the Federal Power Act, 16 U. S. C. 824(f); the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U. S. C. § 152(2); the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 29 U. S. C. § 402(e); the Occupational Safety
and Health Act, 29 U. S. C. § 652(5); the Employee Retirement Insurance
Security Act, 29 U. S. C. §§ 1002(32), 1003(b)(1); and the Sherman Act, 15
U. S. C. § 1, et seq.; see Parker v. Braum, 317 U. S. 341 (1943). Ante, at
24. The Court does not suggest that this restraint will continue after its
decision here. Indeed, it is unlikely that special interest groups will fail to
accept the Court's open invitation to urge Congress to extend these and
other statutes to apply to the States and their local subdivisions .

..
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does not transgress constitutional limits on its power to reach
State activities does not make judicial review any less necessary to rectify the cases in which it does do so. 12 The States'
role in our system of government is a matter of constitutional
law, not of legislative grace. "The powers not delegated to
the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to
the States, are reserved to the States, respectively, or to the
people." U. S. Const., Amend. 10.
More troubling than the logical infirmities in the Court's
reasoning is the result of its holding, i. e., that federal political officials, invoking the Commerce Clause, are the sole
judges of the limits of their own power. This result is inconsistent with the fundamental principles of our constitutional
system. See, e. g., The Federalist No. 78 (Hamilton). At
least since Marbury v. Madison it has been the settled province of the federal judiciary "to say what the law is" with
respect to the constitutionality of acts of Congress. 1
Cranch 137, 177 (1803). In rejecting the role of the judiciary
in protecting the States from federal overreaching, the
Court's opinion offers no explanation for ignoring the teaching of the most famous case in our history. 13
This Court has never before abdicated responsibility for assessing the
constitutionality of challenged action on the ground that affected parties
theoretically are able to look out for their own interests through the electoral process. As the Court noted in National League of Cities, a much
stronger argument as to inherent structural protections could have been
made in either Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (1976) or Myers v. United
States, 272 U. S. 52 (1926), than can be made here. In these cases, the
President signed legislation that limited his authority with respect to certain appointments and thus arguably ''it was no concern of this Court that
the law violated the Constitution." 426 U. S., at 841-842 n. 12. The
Court nevertheless held the laws unconstitutional because they infringed
on presidential authority, the President's consent notwithstanding. The
Court does not address this point; nor does it cite any authority for its contrary view.
18
The Court states that the decision in National League of Cities "invite[s] an unelected federal judiciary to make decisions about which state
policies it favors and which ones its dislikes." Curiously, the Court then
12

r
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III
A
In our federal system, the States have a major role that
cannot be preempted by the national government. As contemporaneous writings and the debates at the ratifying conventions make clear, the States' ratification of the Constitution was predicated on this understanding of federalism.
Indeed, the Tenth Amendment was adopted specifically to
ensure that the important role promised the States by the
proponents of the Constitution was realized.
Much of the initial opposition to the Constitution was
rooted in the fear that the national government would be too
powerful and eventually would eliminate the States as viable
political entities. This concern was voiced repeatedly until
proponents of the Constitution made assurances that a bill of
rights, including a provision explicitly reserving powers in
the States, would be among the first business of the new Congress. Samuel Adams argued, for example, that if the several States were to be joined in "one entire Nation, under one
Legislature, the Powers of which shall extend to every Subject of Legislation, and its Laws be supreme & controul the
whole, the Idea of Sovereignty in these States must be lost."
Letter from Samuel Adams to Richard Henry Lee (Dec. 3,
1787), reprinted in Anti-Federalists versus Federalists 159
(J. Lewis ed. 1967). Likewise, George Mason feared that
suggests that under the application of the "traditional" governmental function analysis, "the states cannot serve as laboratories for social and economic experiment." Ante, at 17, citing Justice Brandeis's famous observation in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U. S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting). Apparently the Court believes that when "an unelected
federal judiciary'' makes decisions as to whether a particular function is one
for the federal or state governments, the States no longer may engage in
"social and economic experiment." Ante, at 17. The Court does not explain how leaving the States virtually at the mercy of the federal government, without recourse to judicial review, will enhance their opportunities
to experiment and serve as "laboratories."
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"the general government being paramount to, and in every
respect more powerful than the state governments, the latter
must give way to the former." Address in the Ratifying
Convention of Virginia (June 4-12, 1788), reprinted in AntiFederalists versus Federalists, supra, at 208-209.
Antifederalists raised these concerns in almost every State
ratifying convention. 14 See generally 1-4, Debates in the
Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal
Constitution (J. Elliot 2d. cd. 1854). As a result, eight
States voted for the Constitution only after proposing amendments to be adopted after ratification. 15 All eight of these included among their recommendations some version of what
later became the Tenth Amendment. Ibid. So strong was
the concern that the proposed Constitution was seriously defective without a specific bill of rights, including a provision
reserving powers to the States, that in order to secure the
votes for ratification, the Federalists eventually conceded
that such provisions were necessary. See Schwartz, The
Bill of Rights: A Documentary History, 505 and passim
(1971). It was thus generally agreed that consideration of a
bill of rights would be among the first business of the new
Congress. See generally 1 Annals of Congress 432-437
(June 8, 1789) (remarks of James Madison). Accordingly,
the 10 amendments that we know as the Bill of Rights were
proposed and adopted early in the first session of the First
Congress. Schwartz, The Bill of Rights, supra, 983-1167.
Opponents of the Constitution were particularly dubious of the Federalists' claim that the States retained powers not delegated to the United
States in the absence of an express provision so providing. For example,
James Winthrop wrote that "[i]t is a mere fallacy ... that what rights are
not given are reserved." Letters of Agrippa, reprinted in Schwartz, The
Bill of Rights: A Documentary History. 510, 511 (1971).
15
Indeed, the Virginia legislature came very close to withholding ratification of the Constitution until the adoption of a bill of rights that included, among other things, the substance of the Tenth Amendment. See
Schwartz, The Bill of Rights, supra, at 762-766 and passim.
14
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This history, which the Court simply ignores, documents
the integral role of the Tenth Amendment in our constitutional theory. It exposes as well, I believe, the fundamental
character of the Court's error today. Far from being "unsound in principle," ante, at 18, judicial enforcement of the
Tenth Amendment is essential to maintaining the federal system so carefully designed by the Framers and adopted in the
Constitution.
B

The Framers had definite ideas about the nature of the
Constitution's division of authority between the federal and
state governments. In The Federalist No. 39, for example,
Madison explained this division by drawing a series of contrasts between the attributes of a "national" government and
those of the government to be established by the Constitution. While a national form of government would possess an
"indefinite supremacy over all persons and things," the form
of government contemplated by the Constitution instead consisted of "local or municipal authorities [which] form distinct
and independent portions of the supremacy, no more subject
within their respective spheres to the general authority than
the general authority is subject to them, within its own
sphere." The Federalist No. 39, p. 256 (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
Under the Constitution, the sphere of the proposed government extended to jurisdiction of "certain enumerated objects,
only, ... leav[ing] to the several States a residuary and inviolable sovereignty over all other objects." Ibid.
Madison elaborated on the content of these separate
spheres of sovereignty in The Federalist No. 45:
"The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution
to the Federal Government are few and defined. Those
which are to remain in the State Governments are numerous and indefinite. The former will be exercised
principally on external objects, as war, peace, negotiation, and foreign commerce; . . . . The powers reserved
to the several States will extend to all the objects,
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which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the
lives, liberties and properties of the people; and the internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the State."
Id., at 313.
Madison considered that the operations of the federal government would be "most extensive and important in times of
war and danger; those of the State Governments in times of
peace and security." Ibid. As a result of this division of
powers, the State governments generally would be more important than the federal government. Ibid.
The Framers believed that the separate sphere of sovereignty reserved to the States would ensure that the States
would serve as an effective "counterpoise" to the power of
the federal government. The States would serve this essential role because they would attract and retain the loyalty of
their citizens. The roots of such loyalty, the Founders
thought, were found in the objects peculiar to jtate government. For example, Hamilton argued that the States "regulat[e] all those personal interests and familiar concerns to
which the sensibility of individuals is more immediately
awake . ... " The Federalist No. 17, sy:p/a, p. 107. Thus,
he maintained that the people would perceive the States as
"the immediate and most visible guardian of life and property," a fact which "contributes more than any other circumstance to impressing upon the minds of the people affection,
esteem and reverence towards the government." Ibid.
Madison took the same position, explaining that "the people
will be more familiarly and minutely conversant" with the
business of _s'tate governments, and "with the members of
these, will a greater proportion of the people have the ties of
personal acquaintance and friendship, and of family and party
attachments .... " The Federalist No. 46, p. 316. Like
Hamilton, Madison saw the States' involvement in the everyday concerns of the people as the source of their citizens' loyalty. Ibid. See also Nagel, Federalism as a Fundamental
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Value: National League of Cities in Perspective, 1981 Sup.
Ct. Rev. 81 (1981).
Thus, the hann to the States that results from federal
overreaching under the Commerce Clause is not simply a
matter of dollars and cents. National League of Cities, 426
U. S., at 846-851. Nor is it a matter of the wisdom or folly
of certain policy choices. Cf. ante, at 17. Rather, by usurping functions traditionally performed by the States, federal
overreaching under the Commerce Clause undermines the
constitutionally mandated balance of power between the
States and the federal government, a balance designed to
protect our fundamental liberties.

c
The emasculation of the powers of the States that can result from the Court's decision is predicated on the Commerce
Clause as a power "delegated to the United States" by the
Constitution. The relevant language states: "Congress shall
have power ... to regulate commerce with foreign nations
and among the several states and with the Indian tribes."
Art. I, § 8. Section eight identifies a score of powers, listing
the authority to lay taxes, borrow money on the credit of the
United States, pay its debts, and provide for the common defense and the general welfare before its brief reference to
"Commerce." It is clear from the debates leading up to the
adoption of the Constitution that the commerce to be regulated was that which the states themselves lacked the practical capability to regulate. See, e. g., 1 M. Farrand, The
Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 (rev. ed. 1937);
The Federalist Nos. 7, 11, 22, 42, 45. See also EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U. S. 2~6, 265 (1983) (POWELL, J., dissenting).
Indeed, the language of the clause itself focuses on activities
that only a national government could regulate: commerce
with foreign nations and Indian tribes and "among" the several states.
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To be sure, this Court has construed the Commerce Clause
to accommodate unanticipated changes over the past two centuries. As these changes have occurred, the Court has had
to decide whether the federal government has exceeded its
authority by regulating activities beyond the capability of a
single state to regulate or beyond legitimate federal interests
that outweighed the authority and interests of the States.
In so doing, however, the Court properly has been mindful of
the essential role of the States in our federal system.
The opinion for the Court in National League of Cities was
faithful to history in its understanding of federalism. The
Court observed that "our federal system of government imposes definite limits upon the authority of Congress to regulate the activities of States as States by means of the commerce power." 426 U. S., at 842. The Tenth Amendment
was invoked to prevent Congress from exercising its "power
in a fashion that impairs the States' integrity or their ability
to function effectively in a federal system." I d., at 842-843,
quoting Fry v. United States, 421 U. S. 542, 547 n. 7 (1975)).
This Court has recognized repeatedly that ,State sovereignty is a fundamental component of our system of government. More than a century ago, in Lane County v. Oregon,
7 Wall. 71 (1868), the Court stated that the Constitution
recognized "the necessary existence of the States, and,
within their proper spheres, the independent authority of the
States." It concluded, as Madison did, that this authority
extended to "nearly the whole charge of interior regulation
... ; to [the States] and to the people all powers not expressly
delegated to the national government are reserved." I d., at
76. Recently, in Community Communications Co. v. City
of Boulder, 455 U. S. 40, 53 (1982), the Court recognized that
the state action exemption from the antitrust laws was based
on ~tate sovereignty. Similarly, in United Transportation
Union v. Long Island R. Co., 455 U. S. 678, 683 (1982), although finding the Railway Labor Act applicable to a stateowned railroad, the unanimous Court was careful to say that
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the States possess constitutionally preserved sovereign
powers.
Again, in Federal Regulatory Commission v. Mississippi,
456 U. S. 742, 752 (1982), in determining the constitutionality
of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act, the Court explicitly considered whether the Act impinged on state sovereignty in violation of the Tenth Amendment. These represent only a few of the many cases in which the Court has
recognized not only the role, but the importance, of state
sovereignty. See also, e. g., United States v. Fry, supra;
Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U. S. 514 (1926); Coyle v.
Oklahoma, 221 U. S. 559 (1911). As Justice Frankfurter
noted, the States are not merely a factor in the "shifting economic arrangements" of our country, Kovacs v. Cooper, 336
U. S. 77, 95 (1949) (Justice Frankfurter, concurring), but
constitute a "coordinate element in the system established by
the Framers for governing our Federal Union." National
League of Cities, supra, at 849.
D
In contrast, the Court today propounds a view of federalism that pays only lip service to the role of the States. Although it says that the States "unquestionably do 'retai[n]
a significant measure of sovereign authority,"' ante, at 20
(quoting EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 269 (POWELL,
J., dissenting)), it fails to recognize the broad, yet specific
areas of sovereignty that the Framers intended the States to
retain. Indeed, the Court barely acknowledges that the
Tenth Amendment exists. 16 That Amendment states explicitly that "[t]he powers not delegated to the United States ...
are reserved to the States." U. S. Const., Amend. 10. The
Court recasts this language to say that the States retain their
sovereign powers "only to the extent that the Constitution
The Court's opinion mentions the Tenth Amendment only once, when
it restates the question put to the parties for reargument in this case. See
ante, at 8.
18
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has not divested them of their original powers and transferred those powers to the Federal Government." Ante, at
20. This rephrasing is not a distinction without a difference;
rather, it reflects the Court's unprecedented view that Congress is free under the Commerce Clause to assume a State's
traditional sovereign power, and to do so without judicial
review of its action. Indeed, the Court's view of federalism appears to relegate the States to precisely the trivial
role that opponents of the Constitution feared they would
occupy.'7
In National League of Cities, we spoke of fire prevention,
police protection, sanitation, and public health as "typical of
[the services] performed by state and local governments in
discharging their dual functions of administering the public
law and furnishing public services." 426 U. S., at 851. Not
only are these activities remote from any normal concept of
interstate commerce, they are also activities that epitomize
the concerns of local, democratic self-government. See
supra, n. 5. In emphasizing the need to protect traditional
governmental functions, we identified the kinds of activities
engaged in by state and local governments that affect the
everyday lives of citizens. These are services that people
are in a position to understand and evaluate, and in a democracy, have the right to oversee. 18 We recognized that "it is
17
As the amici argue, "the ability of the [S]tates to fulfill their role in the
constitutional scheme is dependent solely upon their effectiveness as instruments of self-government." Brief of Twenty-Four States as Amicus
Curiae 50. See also Brief of the National League of Cities et al as Amicus
Curiae (a brief on behalf of every major organization representing the concerns of State and local governments).
18
The Framers recognized that the most effective democracy occurs at
local levels of government, where people with first hand knowledge of local
problems have more ready access to public officials responsible for dealing
with them. E. g., The Federalist No. 17, at 107; No. 45, at 316. This is
as true today as it was when the Constitution was adopted. "Participation
is likely to be more frequent, and exercised at more different stages of a
governmental activity at the local level, or in regional organizations, than
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functions such as these which governments are created to
provide . . ." and that the states and local governments are
better able than the national government to perform them.
426 U. S., at 851.
The Court maintains that the standard approved in N ational League of Cities "disserves principles of democratic
self government." Ante, at 18. In reaching this conclusion,
the Court looks myopically only to persons elected to positions in the federal government. It disregards entirely the
far more effective role of democratic self-government at the
state and local levels. One must compare realistically the
operation of the state and local governments with that of the
federal government. Federal legislation is drafted primarily
by the staffs of the congressional committees. In view of the
hundreds of bills introduced at each session of Congress and
the complexity of many of them, it is virtually impossible for
even the most conscientious legislators to be truly familiar
with many of the statutes enacted. Federal departments
and agencies customarily are authorized to write regulations.
Often these are more important than the text of the statutes.
As is true of the original legislation, these are drafted largely
by staff personnel. The administration and enforcement of
federal laws and regulations necessarily are largely in the
hands of staff and civil service employees. These employees
may have little or no knowledge of the States and localities
at the state and federal levels. [Additionally,] the proportion of people actually involved from the total population tends to be greater, the lower the
level of government, and this, of course, better approximates the citizen
participation ideal." ACIR, Citizen Participation in the American Federal
System 95 (1979).
Moreover, we have witnessed in recent years the rise of numerous special interest groups that engage in sophisticated lobbying, and make substantial campaign contributions to some members of Congress. These
groups are thought to have significant influence in the shaping and enactment of certain types of legislation. Contrary to the Court's view, a
''political process" that functions in this way is unlikely to safeguard the
sovereign rights of States and localities. See supra, n. 9.
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that will be affected by the statutes and regulations for which
they are responsible. In any case, they hardly are as accessible and responsive as those who occupy analogous positions
in State and local governments.
In drawing this contrast, I imply no criticism of these federal employees or the officials who are ultimately in charge.
The great majority are conscientious and faithful to their
duties. My point is simply that members of the immense
federal bureaucracy are not elected, know less about the
services traditionally rendered by states and localities, and
are inevitably less responsive to reCipients of such services,
than are state legislatures, city councils, boards of supervisors, and state and local commissions, boards, and agencies.
It is at these state and local levels-not in Washington as
the Court so mistakenly thinks-that "democratic self-government" is best exemplified.
IV
The question presented in this case is whether the extension of the FLSA to the wages and hours of employees of a
city-owned transit system unconstitutionally impinges on
fundamental state sovereignty. The Court's sweeping holding does far more than simply answer this question in the
negative. In overruling National League of Cities, today's
opinion apparently authorizes federal control, under the auspices of the Commerce Clause, over the terms and conditions
of employment of all state and local employees. Thus, for
purposes of federal regulation, the Court rejects the distinction between public and private employers that had been
drawn carefully in National League of Cities. The Court's
action reflects a serious misunderstanding, if not an outright
rejection, of the history of our country and the intention of
the Framers of the Constitution. 19
11
The opinion of the Court in National League of Cities makes clear that
the very essence of a federal system of government is to impose "definite
limits upon the authority of Congress to regulate the activities of the
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I return now to the balancing test approved in National
League of Cities and accepted in Hodel, Long Island R. Co.,
and FERC v. Mississippi. See supra, n. 5 and ante, at
- - . The Court does not find in this case that the "federal
interest is demonstrably greater." 426 U. S., at 856
(BLACKMUN, J., concurring). No such finding could have
been made, for the state interest is compelling. The financial impact on States and localities of displacing their control
over wages, hours, overtime regulations, pensions, and labor
relations with their employees could have serious, as well as
unanticipated, effects on ,State and local planning, budgeting,
and the levying of taxes. 20 As we said in National League of
Cities, federal control of the terms and conditions of employment of State employees also inevitably "displaces state policies regarding the manner in which [States] will structure delivery of those governmental services that citizens require."
Id., at 847.
The Court emphasizes that municipal operation of an intracity mass transit system is relatively new in the life of our
country. It nevertheless is a classic example of the type of
service traditionally provided by local government. It is
local by definition. It is indistinguishable in principle from
the traditional services of providing and maintaining streets,
public lighting, traffic control, water, and sewerage systems. 21 Services of this kind are precisely those "with which
citizens are more 'familiarly and minutely conversant.'" The
States as States by means of the commerce power. " See also the Court's
opinion in Fry v. United States, 421 U. S. 542, 547 n. 7 (1975).
00
As Justice Douglas observed in his dissent in Maryland v. Wirtz, 392
U. S. 183, 201 (Douglas, J. , dissenting). Extension of the FLSA to the
States could "disrupt the fiscal policy of the states and threaten their
autonomy in the regulation of health and education." I d., at 203.
21
In Long Island R. Co. the unanimous Court recognized that "[t]his
Court's emphasis on traditional governmental functions and traditional aspects of state sovereignty was not meant to impose a static historical view
of state functions generally immune from federal regulation." 455 U. S.,
at 686.
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Federalist, su1A(No. 46, p. 316. State and local officials of
course must "be i~timately familiar with these services and
sensitive to their quality as well as cost. Such officials also
know that their constituents and the press respond to the adequacy, fair distribution, and cost of these services. It is
this kind of state and local control and accountability that the
Framers understood would insure the vitality and preservation of the federal system that the Constitution explicitly
requires. See National League of Cities, supra, at 847-852.

v
Although the Court's opinion purports to recognize that
the States retain some sovereign power, it does not identify
even a single aspect of state authority that would remain
when the Commerce Clause is invoked to justify federal
regulation. In Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U. S. 183 (1968),
overruled by National League of Cities and today reaffirmed,
the Court sustained an extension of the FLSA to certain hospitals, institutions, and schools. Although the Court's opinion in Wirtz was comparatively narrow, Justice Douglas, in
dissent, wrote presciently that· the Court's reading of the
Commerce Clause would enable "the National Government
[to] devour the essentials of state sovereignty, though that
sovereignty is attested by the Tenth Amendment." I d., at
205. Today's decision makes Justice Douglas's fear once
again a realistic one.
As I view the Court's decision today as rejecting the basic
precepts of our federal system and limiting the constitutional
role of judicial review, I dissent.

To: The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan
Justice White
Justice Marshall
Justice Blaclanun
Justice Rehnquist
Justice Stevens
Justice O'Connor
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JUSTICE POWELL, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE REHNQUIST, and JUSTICE O'CONNOR join, dissenting.
The Court today, in its 5-4 decision, overrules National
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U. S. 833 (1976), a case in
which we held that Congress lacked authority to impose the
requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act on state and
local governments. Because I believe this decision substantially alters the federal system embodied in the Constitution,
I dissent.
I
There are, of course, numerous examples over the history
of this Court in which prior decisions have been reconsidered
and overruled. There have been few cases, however, in
which the principle of stare decisis and the rationale of recent
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decisions were ignored as abruptly as we now witness. 1 The
reasoning of the Court in National League of Cities, and the
principle applied there, have been reiterated consistently
over the past eight years. Since its decision in 1976, N ational League of Cities has been cited and quoted in opinions
joined by every member of the present Court. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reel. Assn., 452 U. S. 264, 287-293
(1981); United Transportation Union v. Long Island R. Co.,
455 U. S. 678, 684-686 (1982); FERC v. Mississippi, 456
U. S. 742, 764-767 (1982). Less than three years ago, in
Long Island R. Co., supra, a unanimous Court reaffirmed
the principles of National League of Cities but found them
inapplicable to the regulation of a railroad heavily engaged in
interstate commerce. The Court stated: '
"The key prong of the National League of Cities test applicable to this case is the third one [repeated and reformulated in Hodel], which examines whether 'the
states' compliance with the federal law would directly
impair their ability to structure integral operations
in areas of traditional governmental functions." 455
U. S., at 684.
The Court in that case recognized that the test "may at
times be a difficult one," ibid., but it was considered in that
unanimous decision as settled constitutional doctrine.
As recently as June 1, 1982 the five Justices who constitute
the majority in this case also were the majority in FERC v.
Mississippi. In that case, the Court said:
"In National League of Cities, supra, for example, the
Court made clear that the State's regulation of its relationship with its employees is an 'undoubted attribute of
1

National League of Cities, following some changes in the composition
of the Court, had overruled Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U. S. 183 (1968). Unlike National League of Cities, the rationale of Wirtz had not been repeatedly accepted by our subsequent decisions.
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state sovereignty.' 426 U. S., at 845. Yet, by holding
'unimpaired' California v. Taylor, 353 U. S. 553 (1957),
"·--"~~-which upheld a federal labor regulation as applied to
state railroad employees, 426 U. S., at 854, n. 18, N ational League of Cities acknowledged that not all aspects
of a State's sovereign authority are immune from federal
control." 426 U. S., at 764, n. 28.
The Court went on to say that even where the requirements of the National League of Cities standard are met,
"'[t]here are situations in which the nature of the federal
interest advanced may be such that it justifies state submission."' Ibid., quoting Hodel, supra, 452 U. S., at 288 n. 29.
The joint federal/state system of regulation in FERC was
such a "situation," but there was no hint in the Court's opinion that National League of Cities-or its basic standardwas subject to the infirmities discovered today.
Although the doctrine is not rigidly applied to constitutional questions, "any departure from the doctrine of stare
decisis demands special justification." Arizona v. Rumsey,
--U.S.--,-- (1984). See also Oregon v. Kennedy,
456 U. S. 667, 691-692 n. 34 (1982) (STEVENS, J., concurring). In the present case, the five Justices who compose
the majority today participated in National League of Cities
and the cases reaffirming it. 2 The stability of judicial decision, and with it respect for the authority of this Court, are
not served by the precipitous overruling of multiple precedents that we witness in this case. 3
zJusTICE O'CONNOR, the only new member in the Court since our decision in National League of Cities, has joined the Court in reaffirming its
principles. See United Transportation Union v. Long Island R. Co., 455
U. S. 678 (1982), and FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U. S. 742, 775 (1982)
(O'CONNOR, J ., dissenting in part).
3
As one commentator noted, stare decisis represents "a natural evolution from the very nature of our institutions." Lile, "Some Views on the
Rule of Stare Decisis," 4 Va. L. Rev. 955, 956 (1916).
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Whatever effect the Court's decision may have in weakening the application of stare decisis, it is likely to be less
important than what the Court has done to the Constitution
itself. A unique feature of the United States is the federal
system of government guaranteed by the Constitution and
implicit in the very name of our country. Despite some
genuflecting in Court's opinion to the concept of federalism,
today's decision effectively reduces the Tenth Amendment to
meaningless rhetoric when Congress acts pursuant to the
Commerce Clause. The Court holds that the Fair Labor
Standards Act ["FLSA"] "contravened no affirmative limit
on Congress' power under the Commerce Clause" to determine the wage rates and hours of employment of all state and
local employees. · Ante, at 27. In rejecting the traditional
view of our federal system, the Court states:
"Apart from the limitation on federal authority inherent
in the delegated nature of Congress' Article I powers,
the principal means chosen by the Framers to ensure the
role of the states in the federal system lies in the structure of the Federal Government itself." Ante, at 21-22
(emphasis added).
To leave no doubt about its intention, the Court renounces
its decision in National League of Cities because it ''inevitably invites an unelected federal judiciary to make decisions
about which state policies its favors and which ones it dislikes." Ante, at 17. In other words, the extent to which the
States may exercise their authority, when Congress purports
to act under the Commerce Clause, henceforth is to be determined from time to time by political decisions made by members of the federal government, decisions the Court says will
not be subject to judicial review. I note that it does not
seem to have occurred to the Court that it-an unelected majority of five Justices-today rejects almost 200 years of the
understanding of the constitutional status of federalism. In
doing so, there is only a single passing reference to the Tenth
Amendment. Nor is so much as a dictum of any court cited
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in support of the view that the role of the States in the federal system may depend upon the· grace of elected federal officials, rather than on the Constitution as interpreted by this
Court.
In my opinion that follows, Part II addresses the Court's
criticisms of National League of Cities. Part III reviews
briefly the understanding of federalism that ensured the ratification of the Constitution and the extent to which this
Court, until today, has recognized that the States retain a
signficant measure of sovereignty in our federal system.
Part IV considers the applicability of the FLSA to the indisputably local service provided by an urban transit system.
II
The Court finds that the test of State immunity approved
in National League of Cities and its progeny is unworkable
and unsound in principle. In finding the test to be unworkable, the Court begins by mischaracterizing National League
of Cities and subsequent cases. In concluding that efforts to
define state immunity are unsound in principle, the Court
radically departs from long settled constitutional values
and ignores the role of judicial review in our system of
government.
A
Much of the Court's opinion is devoted to arguing that it is
difficult to define a priori "traditional governmental functions." National League of Cities neither engaged in, nor
required, such a task. 4 The Court discusses and condemns
• In National League of Cities, we referred to the sphere of state sovereignty as including ''traditional governmental functions," a realm which is,
of course, difficult to define with precision. But the luxury of precise definitions is one rarely enjoyed in interpreting and. applying the general provisions of our Constitution. Not surprisingly, therefore, the Court's
attempt to demonstrate the impossibility of definition is unhelpful. A
number of the cases it cites simply do not involve the problem of defining
governmental functions. E . g., Williams v. Eastside Mental Health Center, Inc., 669 F. 2d 671 (CAll), cert. denied, 459 U. S. 976 (1982); Friends
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as standards ''traditional governmental function[s]," "purely
historical" functions, "'uniquely' governmental functions,"
and "'necessary' governmental services." Ante, at 10-11,
15, 16. But nowhere does it mention that National League
of Cities adopted a familiar type of balancing test for determining whether Commerce Clause enactments transgress
constitutional limitations imposed by the federal nature of
our system of government. This omission is noteworthy,
since the author of today's opinion joined National League of
Cities and concurred separately to point out that the Court's
opinion in that case "adopt[s] a balancing approach [that]
does not outlaw federal power in areas ... where the federal
interest is demonstrably greater and where state . . . compliance with imposed federal standards would be essential."
426 U. S., at 856 (BLACKMUN, J., concurring).
In reading National League of Cities to embrace a balancing approach, JUSTICE BLACKMUN quite correctly cited the
part of the opinion that reaffirmed Fry v. United States, 421
U. S. 542 (1975). The Court's analysis reaffirming Fry explicitly weighed the seriousness ofthe problem addressed by
the federill legislation at issue in that case, against the effects
of compliance on State sovereignty. 426 U. S., at 852-853.
Our subsequent decisions also adopted this approach of
of the Earth v. Carey, 552 F. 2d 25 (CA2), cert. denied, 434 U. S. 902
(1977). A number of others are not properly analyzed under the principles
of National League of Cities, notwithstanding some of the language of the
lower courts. E. g., United States v. Best, 573 F. 2d 1095 (CA9 1978) and
Hybud Equipment Corp. v. City of Akron, 654 F. 2d 1187 (CA6 1981).
Moreover, rather than carefully analyzing the case law, the Court simply
lists various functions thought to be protected or unprotected by courts interpreting National League of Cities. Ante, at 9-10. In the cited cases,
however, the courts considered the issue of State immunity on the specific
facts at issue; they did not make blanket pronouncements that particular
things inherently qualified as traditional governmental functions or did not.
Having thus considered the cases out of context, it was not difficult for the
Court to conclude that there is no "organizing principle" among them. See
ante, at 10.
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weighing the respective interests of the States and federal
government. 5 In EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U. S. 226 (1983),
for example, the Court stated that "[t]he principle of immunity articulated in National League of Cities is a functional
doctrine . . . whose ultimate purpose is not to create a sacred
province of state autonomy, but to ensure that the unique
benefits of a federal system . . . not be lost through undue
federal interference in certain core state functions." I d., at
236. See also Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., 452 U. S. 264 (1981). In overruling N ational League of Cities, the Court incorrectly characterizes
the mode of analysis established therein and developed in
·
subsequent cases. 6
5
_
In undertaking such balancing, we have considered, on the one hand,
the strength of the federal interest in the challenged legislation and the impact of exempting the States from its reach. Central to our inquiry into
the federal interest is how closely the challenged action implicates the central concerns of the Commerce Clause, viz., the promotion of a national
eeonomy and free trade among the states. See EEOC v. Wyoming, 460
U. S. 226, 244 (STEVENS, J., concurring). See also, for example, United
Transportation Union v. Long Island Rail Road Co., 455 U. S. 678, 688
(1982) ("Congress long ago concluded that federal regulation of railroad
labor services is necessary to prevent disruptions in vital rail service essential to the national economy."); FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U. S. 742, 757
(1982), (''it is difficult to conceive of a more basic element of interstate commerce than electric energy . . . . "). Similarly, we have considered
whether exempting States from federal regulation would undermine the
goals of the federal program. See Fry v. United States, 421 U. S. 542
(1975). See also Hodel, 452 U. S., at 282 (national surface mining standards necessary to insure competition among States does not undermine
States' efforts to maintain adequate intrastate standards). On the other
hand, we have also assessed the injury done to the States if forced to comply with federal Commerce Clause enactments. See National League of
Cities, 426 U. S., at 846-851.
5
In addition, reliance on the Court's difficulties in the tax immunity
field is misplaced. Although the Court has abandoned the "governmental/proprietary" distinction in this field, see New York v. United
States, 326 U. S. 572 (1946), it has not taken the drastic approach of relying
solely on the structure of the federal government to protect the States' im-
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Moreover, the statute at issue in this case, the FLSA, is
the identical statute that was at issue in National League of
Cities. Although JUSTICE BLACKMUN's concurrence noted
that he was "not untroubled by certain possible implications
of the Court's opinion" in National League of Cities, it also
stated that ''the result with respect to the statute under challenge here [the FLSA] is necessarily correct." 426 U. S., at
856 (emphasis added). His opinion for the Court today does
not discuss the statute, nor identify any changed circumstances that warrant the conclusion today that National
League of Cities is necessarily wrong.
B
Today's opinion does not explain how the States' role in the
electoral process guarantees that particular exercises of the
Commerce Clause power will not infringe on residual State
sovereignty. 7 Members of Congress are elected from the
various States, but once in office they are members of the
munity from taxation. See Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U. S. 444
(1978). Thus, faced with an equally difficult problem of defining constitutional boundaries of federal action directly affecting the States, we did not
adopt the view many would think naive, that the federal government itself
will protect whatever rights the States may have.
7
Late in its opinion, the Court suggests that after all there may be some
"affirmative limits the constitutional structure might impose on federal action affecting the States under the Commerce Clause." Ante, at '2:7. The
Court asserts that "[i]n the factual setting of these cases the internal safeguards of the political process have performed as intended." Ibid. The
Court does not explain the basis for this judgment. Nor does it identify
the circumstances in which the "political process" may fail and "affirmative
limits" are to be imposed. Presumably, such limits are to be determined
by the Judicial Branch even though it is "unelected." Today's opinion,
however, has rejected the balancing standard and suggests no other standard that would enable a court to determine when there has been a malfunction of the "political process." The Court's failure to specify the "affirmative limits" on federal power, or when and how these limits are to be
determined, may well be explained by the transparent fact that any such
attempt would be subject to precisely the same objections on which it relies
to overrule National League of Cities.

'

.
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federal government. 8 Although the States participate in the
Electoral College, this is hardly a reason to view the President as a representative of the States' interest against federal encroachment. We noted recently "the hydraulic pressure inherent within each of the separate Branches to exceed
the outer limits of its power . . . ." Immigration and
Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U. S. 919, - (1983). The Court offers no reason to think that this pressure will not operate when Congress seeks to invoke its powers under the Commerce Clause, notwithstanding the electoral role of the States. 9
One. Can hardly imagine this Court saying that because Congress is
composed ofindividuals, individual rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights
are amply protected by the political process. Yet, the position adopted
today is indistinguishable in principle. The Tenth Amendment also is an
essential part of the Bill of Rights. See infra, at - - .
'At one time in our history, the view that the structure of the federal
government sufficed to protect the States might have had a somewhat
more practical, although not a more logical, basis. Professor Wechsler,
whose seminal article in 1954 proposed the view adopted by the Court today, predicated his argument on assumptions that simply do not accord
with current reality. Professor Wechsler wrote: "National action has . . .
always been regarded as exceptional in our polity, an intrusion to be justified by some necessity, the special rather than the ordinary case."
Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States
in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 Colum.
L. Rev. 543, 544 (1954). Not only is the premise of this view clearly at
odds with the proliferation of national legislation over the past 30 years,
but "a variety of structural and political changes in this century have combined to make Congress particularly insensitive to state and local values."
Advisory Comm'n on Intergovernmental Relations [ACIR], Regulatory
Federalism: Policy, Process, Impact and Reform 50 (1984). The adoption
of the Seventeenth Amendment (providing for direct election of senators),
the weakening of political parties on the local level, and the rise of national
media, among other things, have made Congress increasingly less representative of State and local interests, and more likely to be responsive to
the demands of various national constituencies. Id., at 50-51. As one
observer explained, "As Senators and members of the House develop independent constituencies among groups such as farmers, businessmen, laborers, environmentalists, and the poor, each of which generally supports
8
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The Court apparently thinks that the States' success at
obtaining federal funds for various projects and exemptions
from the obligations of some federal statutes is indicative of
the "effectiveness of the federal political process in preserving the States' interests.... " Ante, at 23-24. 10 But
such political success is not relevant to the question whether
the political processes are the proper means of enforcing constitutional limitations. 11 The fact that Congress generally
certain national initiatives, their tendency to identify with state interests
and the positions of state officials is reduced." Kaden, "Federalism in the
Courts: Agenda for the 1980s," in ACIR, The Future of Federalism in the
'80s, at 97 (1981).
See also Kaden, Politics, Money, and State Sovereignty: The Judicial
Role, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 847 (1979) (changes in political practices and the
breadth of national initiatives mean that the political branches "may no
longer be as well suited as they once were to the task of safeguarding the
role of the states in the federal system and protecting the fundamental
value of federalism") and ACIR, Regulatory Federalism, supra, at 1-24
(detailing the "dramatic shift" in kind of federal regulation applicable to the
States over the past two decades). Thus, even if one were to ignore the
numerous problems with the Court's position in terms of constitutional
theory, there would remain serious questions as to its factual premises.
10
The Court believes that the significant financial assistance afforded the
States and localities by the federal government is relevant to the constitutionality of extending Commerce Clause enactments to the States. See
ante, at 23-24, 26. This Court has never held, however, that the mere
disbursement of funds by the federal government establishes a right to
control activities that benefit from such funds. See Pennhurst State
School v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1, 17-18 (1981). Regardless of the willingness of the federal government to provide federal aid, the constitutional
question remains the same: whether the federal statute violates the sovereign powers reserved to the States by the Tenth Amendment.
11
Apparently in an effort to reassure the States, the Court identifies
several major statutes that thus far have not been made applicable to State
governments: the Federal Power Act, 16 U. S. C. 824(f); the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U. S. C. § 152(2); the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 29 U. S. C. § 402(e); the Occupational Safety
and Health Act, 29 U. S. C. § 652(5); the Employee Retirement Insurance
Security Act, 29 U. S. C. §§ 1002(32), 1003(b)(1); and the Sherman Act, 15
U. S. C. § 1, et seq.; see Parker v. Brown, 317 U. S. 341 (1943). Ante, at

'
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does not transgress constitutional limits on its power to reach
State activities does not make judicial review any less necessary to rectify the cases in which it does do so. 12 The States'
role in our system of government is a matter of constitutional
law, not of legislative grace. "The powers not delegated to
the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to
the States, are reserved to the States, respectively, or to the
people." U. S. Const., Amend. 10.
More troubling than the logical infinnities in the Court's
reasoning is the result of its holding, i. e., that federal political officials, invoking the Commerce Clause, are the sole
judges of the limits of their own power. This result is inconsist~nt with the fundamental principles of our constitutional
system. See, e. g., The Federalist No. 78 (Hamilton). At
least since Marbury v. Madison it has been the settled province of the federal judiciary "to say what the law is" with
respect to the constitutionality of acts of Congress. 1
Cranch 137, 177 (1803). In rejecting the role of the judiciary
in protecting the States from federal overreaching, the
Court's opinion offers no explanation for ignoring the teach24. The Court does not suggest that this restraint will continue after its
decision here. Indeed, it is unlikely that special interest groups will fail to
accept the Court's open invitation to urge Congress to extend these and
other statutes to apply to the States and their local subdivisions.
11
This Court has never before abdicated responsibility for assessing the
constitutionality of challenged action on the ground that affected parties
theoretically are able to look out for their own interests through the electoral process. As the Court noted in National League of Cities, a much
stronger argument as to inherent structural protections could have been
made in either Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (1976) or Myers v. United
States, 272 U. S. 52 (1926), than can be made here. In these cases, the
President signed legislation that limited his authority with respect to certain appointments and thus arguably ''it was no concern of this Court that
the law violated the Constitution." 426 U. S., at 841-842 n. 12. The
Court neyertheless held the laws unconstitutional because they infringed
on presidential authority, the President's consent notwithstanding. The
Court does not address this point; nor does it cite any authority for its contrary view.
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ing of the most famous case in our history. 13

III
A
In our federal system, the States have a major role that
cannot be preempted by the national government. As contemporaneous writings and the debates at the ratifying conventions make clear, the States' ratification of the Constitution was predicated on this understanding of federalism.
Indeed, the Tenth Amendment was adopted specifically to
ensure that the important role promised the States by the
proponents of the Constitution was realized.
Much of the initial opposition to the Constitution was
rooted in the fear that the national government would be too
powerful and eventually would eliminate the States as viable
political entities. This concern was voiced repeatedly until
proponents of the Constitution made assurances that a bill of
rights, including a provision explicitly reserving powers in
the States, would be among the first business of the new Congress. Samuel Adams argued, for example, that if the several States \Vere to be joined in "one entire Nation, under one
Legislature, the Powers of which shall extend to every Subject of Legislation, and its Laws be supreme & controul the
whole, the Idea of Sovereignty in these States must be lost."
11

The Court states that the decision in National League of Cities "invite[s] an unelected federal judiciary to make decisions about which state
policies it favors and which ones its dislikes." Curiously, the Court then
suggests that under the application of the ''traditional" governmental function analysis, "the states cannot serve as laboratories for social and economic experiment." Ante, at 17, citing Justice Brandeis's famous observation in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U. S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting). Apparently the Court believes that when "an unelected
federal judiciary" makes decisions as to whether a particular function is one
for the federal or state governments, the States no longer may engage in
"social and economic experiment." Ante, at 17. The Court does not explain how leaving the States virtually at the mercy of the federal government, without recourse to judicial review, will enhance their opportunities
to experiment and serve as "laboratories."
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Letter from Samuel Adams to Richard Henry Lee (Dec. 3,
1787), reprinted in Anti-Federalists versus Federalists 159
(J. Lewis ed. 1967). Likewise, George Mason feared that
''the general government being paramount to, and in every
respect more powerful than the state governments, the latter
must give way to the former." Address in the Ratifying
Convention of Virginia (June 4-12, 1788), reprinted in AntiFederalists versus Federalists, supra, at 208-209.
Antifederalists raised these concerns in almost every State
ratifying convention. 14 See generally 1-4, Debates in the
Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal
Constitution (J. Elliot 2d. cd. 1854). As a result, eight
States voted for the Constitution only after proposing amendments to be adopted after ratification. 15 All eight of these included among their recommendations some version of what
later became the Tenth Amendment. Ibid. So strong was
the concern that the proposed Constitution was seriously defective without a specific bill of rights, including a provision
reserving powers to the States, that in order to secure the
votes for ratification, the Federalists eventually conceded
that such provisions were necessary. See Schwartz, The
Bill of Rights: A Documentary History, 505 and passim
(1971). It was thus generally agreed that consideration of a
bill of rights would be among the first business of the new
Congress. See generally 1 Annals of Congress 432-437
(June 8, 1789) (remarks of James Madison). Accordingly,
the 10 amendments that we know as the Bill of Rights were
14
Opponents of the Constitution were particularly dubious of the Federalists' claim that the States retained powers not delegated to the United
States in the absence of an express provision so providing. For example,
James Winthrop wrote that "(i]t is a mere fallacy ... that what rights are
not given are reserved." Letters of Agrippa, reprinted in Schwartz, The
Bill of Rights: A Documentary History. 510, 511 (1971).
16
Indeed, the Virginia legislature came very close to withholding ratification of the Constitution until the adoption of a bill of rights that included, among other things, the substance of the Tenth Amendment. See
Schwartz, The Bill of Rights, supra., at 762-766 and passim.
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proposed and adopted early in the first session of the First
Congress. Schwartz, The Bill of Rights, supra, 983-1167.
This history, which the Court simply ignores, documents
the integral role of the Tenth Amendment in our constitutional theory. It exposes as well, I believe, the fundamental
character of the Court's error today. Far from being "unsound in principle," ante, at 18, judicial enforcement of the
Tenth Amendment is essential to maintaining the federal system so carefully designed by the Framers and adopted in the
Constitution.
B

The Framers had definite ideas about the nature of the
Constitution's division of authority between the federal and
state governments. In The Federalist No. 39, for example,
Madison explained this division by drawing a series of contrasts between the attributes of a "national" government and
those of the government to be established by the Constitution. While a national form of government would possess an
''indefinite supremacy over all persons and things," the form
of government contemplated by the Constitution instead consisted of "local or municipal authorities [which] form distinct
and independent portions of the supremacy, no more subject
within their respective spheres to the general authority than
the general authority is subject to them, within its own
sphere." The Federalist No. 39, p. 256 (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
Under the Constitution, the sphere of the proposed government extended to jurisdiction of "certain enumerated objects,
only, ... leav(ing] to the several States a residuary and inviolable sovereignty over all other objects." Ibid.
Madison elaborated on the content of these separate
spheres of sovereignty in The Federalist No. 45:
"The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution
to the Federal Government are few and defined. Those
which are to remain in the State Governments are numerous and indefinite. The former will be exercised
principally on external objects, as war, peace, negotia-
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tion, and foreign commerce; . . . . The powers reserved
to the several States will extend to all the objects,
which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the
lives, liberties and properties of the people; and the internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the State."
Id., at 313.
Madison considered that the operations of the federal government would be "most extensive and important in times of
war and danger; those of the State Governments in times of
peace and security." Ibid. As a result of this division of
powers, the State governments generally would be more important than the federal government. · Ibid.
The Framers believed that the separate sphere of sovereignty reserved to the States would ensure that the States
would serve as an effective "counterpoise" to the power of
the federal government. The States would serve this essential role because they would attract and retain the loyalty of
their citizens. The roots of such loyalty, the Founders
thought, were found in the objects peculiar to state government. For example, Hamilton argued that the States "regulat[e] all those personal interests and familiar concerns to
which the sensibility of individuals is more immediately
awake . . . . " The Federalist No. 17, p. 107. Thus, he
maintained that the people would perceive the States as "the
immediate and most visible guardian of life and property," a
fact which "contributes more than any other circumstance to
impressing upon the minds of the people affection, esteem
and reverence towards the government." Ibid. Madison
took the same position, explaining that ''the people will be
more familiarly and minutely conversant" with the business
of state governments, and ''with the members of these, will a
greater proportion of the people have the ties of personal acquaintance and friendship, and of family and party attachments . . . ." The Federalist No. 46, p. 316. Like Hamilton, Madison saw the States' involvement in the everyday
concerns of the people as the source of their citizens' loyalty.
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Ibid. See also Nagel, Federalism as a Fundamental Value:
National League of Cities in Perspective, 1981 Sup. Ct. Rev.

81 (1981).
Thus, the hann to the States that results from federal
overreaching under the Commerce Clause is not simply a
matter of dollars and cents. National League of Cities, 426
U. S., at 846-851. Nor is it a matter of the wisdom or folly
of certain policy choices. Cf. ante, at 17. Rather, by usurping functions traditionally performed by the States, federal
overreaching under the Commerce Clause undermines the
constitutionally mandated balance of power between the
States and the federal government, a balance designed to
protect our fundamental liberties.

c
The emasculation of the powers of the States that can result from the Court's decision is predicated on the Commerce
Clause as a power "delegated to the United States" by the
Constitution. The relevant language states: "Congress shall
have power . . . to regulate commerce with foreign nations
and among the several states and with the Indian tribes."
Art. I, § 8. Section eight identifies a score of powers, listing
the authority to lay taxes, borrow money on the credit of the
United States, pay its debts, and provide for the common defense and the general welfare before its brief reference to
"Commerce." It is clear from the debates leading up to the
adoption of the Constitution that the commerce to be regulated was that which the states themselves lacked the practical capability to regulate. See, e. g. , 1 M. Farrand, The
Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 (rev. ed. 1937);
The Federalist Nos. 7, 11, 22, 42, 45. See also EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U. S. 226, 265 (1983) (POWELL, J., dissenting).
Indeed, the language of the clause itself focuses on activities
that only a national government could regulate: commerce
with foreign nations and Indian tribes and "among" the several states.
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To be sure, this Court has construed the Commerce Clause
to accommodate unanticipated changes over the past two centuries. As these changes have occurred, the Court has had
to decide whether the federal government has exceeded its
authority by regulating activities beyond the capability of a
single state to regulate or beyond legitimate federal interests
that outweighed the authority and interests of the States.
In so doing, however, the Court properly has been mindful of
the essential role of the States in our federal system.
The opinion for the Court in National League of Cities was
faithful to history in its understanding of federalism. The
Court observed that "our federal system of government imposes definite limits upon the authority of Congress to regulate the activities of States as States by means of the commerce power." 426 U. S., at 842. The Tenth Amendment
was invoked to prevent Congress from exercising its "power
in a fashion that impairs the States' integrity or their ability
to function effectively in a federal system." /d., at 842-843,
quoting Fry v. United States, 421 U. S. 542, 547 n. 7 (1975)).
This Court has recognized repeatedly that state sovereignty is a fundamental component of our system of government. More than a century ago, in Lane County v. Oregon,
7 Wall. 71 (1868), the Court stated that the Constitution
recognized ''the necessary existence of the States, and,
within their proper spheres, the independent authority of the
States." It concluded, as Madison did, that this authority
extended to "nearly the whole charge of interior regulation
... ; to [the States] and to the people all powers not expressly
delegated to the national government are reserved." I d., at
76. Recently, in Community Communications Co. v. City
of Boulder, 455 U. S. 40, 53 (1982), the Court recognized that
the state action exemption from the antitrust laws was based
on state sovereignty. Similarly, in United Transportation
Union v. Long Island R. Co., 455 U. S. 678, 683 (1982), although finding the Railway Labor Act applicable to a stateowned railroad, the unanimous Court was careful to say that
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the States possess constitutionally preserved sovereign
powers.
Again, in Federal Regulatory Commission v. Mississippi,
456 U. S. 742, 752 (1982), in determining the constitutionality
of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act, the Court explicitly considered whether the Act impinged on state sovereignty in violation of the Tenth Amendment. These represent only a few of the many cases in which the Court has
recognized not only the role, but the importance, of state
sovereignty. See also, e. g., United States v. Fry, supra;
Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U. S. 514 (1926); Coyle v.
Oklahoma, 221 U. S. 559 (1911). As Justice Frankfurter
noted, the States are not merely a factor in the "shifting economic arrangements" of our country, Kovacs v. Cooper, 336
U. S. 77, 95 (1949) (Justice Frankfurter, concurring), but
constitute a "coordinate element in the system established by
the Framers for governing our Federal Union." National
League of Cities, supra, at 849.
D
In contrast, the Court today propounds a view of federalism that pays only lip service to the role of the States. Although it says that the States ''unquestionably do 'retai[n]
a significant measure of sovereign authority,"' ante, at 20
(quoting EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 269 (POWELL,
J., dissenting)), it fails to recognize the broad, yet specific
areas of sovereignty that the Framers intended the States to
retain. Indeed, the Court barely acknowledges that the
Tenth Amendment exists. 16 That Amendment states explicitly that "[t]he powers not delegated to the United States ...
are reserved to the States." U. S. Const., Amend. 10. The
Court recasts this language to say that the States retain their
sovereign powers "only to the extent that the Constitution
11
The Court's opinion mentions the Tenth Amendment only once, when
it restates the question put to the parties for reargument in this case. See
ante, at 8.
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has not divested them of their original powers and transferred those powers to the Federal Government." Ante, at
20. This rephrasing is not a distinction without a difference;
rather, it reflects the Court's unprecedented view that Congress is free under the Commerce Clause to assume a State's
traditional sovereign power, and to do so without judicial
review of its action. Indeed, the Court's view of federalism appears to relegate the States to precisely the trivial
role that opponents of the Constitution feared they would
occupy. 17
In National League of Cities, we spoke of fire prevention,
police protection, sanitation, and public health as ''typical ~f
[the services] performed by state and local governments in
discharging their dual functions of administering the public
law and furnishing public services." 426 U. S., at 851. Not
only are these activities remote from any normal concept of
interstate commerce, they are also activities that epitomize
the concerns of local, democratic self-government. See
supra, n. 5. In emphasizing the need to protect traditional
governmental functions, we identified the kinds of activities
engaged in by state and local governments that affect the
everyday lives of citizens. These are services that people
are in a position to understand and evaluate, and in a democracy, have the right to oversee. 18 We recognized that "it is
17
As the amici argue, ''the ability of the [S]tates to fulfill their role in the
constitutional scheme is dependent solely upon their effectiveness as instruments of self-government." Brief of Twenty-Four States as Amicus
Curiae 50. See also Brief of the National League of Cities et al as Amicus
Curiae (a brief on behalf of every major organization representing the concerns of State and local governments).
11
The Framers recognized that the most effective democracy occurs at
local levels of government, where people with first hand knowledge of local
problems have more ready access to public officials responsible for dealing
with them. E. g., The Federalist No. 17, at 107; No. 45, at 316. This is
as true today as it was when the Constitution was adopted. "Participation
is likely to be more frequent, and exercised at more different stages of a
governmental activity at the local level, or in regional organizations, than
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functions such as these which governments are created to
provide . . . " and that the states and local governments are
better able than the national government to perform them.
426 U. S., at 851.
The Court maintains that the standard approved in N ational League of Cities "disserves principles of democratic
self government." Ante, at 18. In reaching this conclusion,
the Court looks myopically only to persons elected to positions in the federal government. It disregards entirely the
far more effective role of democratic self-government at the
state and local levels. One must compare realistically the
operation of the state and local governments with that of the
federal government. Federal legislation is drafted primarily
by the staffs of the congressional committees. In view of the
hundreds of bills introduced at each session of Congress and
the complexity of many of them, it is virtually impossible for
even the most conscientious legislators to be truly familiar
with many of the statutes enacted. Federal departments
and agencies customarily are authorized to write regulations.
Often these are more important than the text of the statutes.
As is true of the original legislation, these are drafted largely
by staff personnel. The administration and enforcement of
federal laws and regulations necessarily are largely in the
hands of staff and civil service employees. These employees
may have little or no knowledge of the States and localities
at the state and federal levels. [Additionally,] the proportion of people actually involved from the total population tends to be greater, the lower the
level of government, and this, of course, better approximates the citizen
participation ideal." ACIR, Citizen Participation in the American Federal
System 95 (1979).
Moreover, we have witnessed in recent years the rise of numerous special interest groups that engage in sophisticated lobbying, and make substantial campaign contributions to some members of Congress. These
groups are thought to have significant influence in the shaping and enactment of certain types of legislation. Contrary to the Court's view, a
"political process" that functions in this way is unlikely to safeguard the
sovereign rights of States and localities. See supro, n. 9.

82-1913 & 82-1951-DISSENT
GARCIA v. SAN ANTONIO METRO. TRANSIT AUTH.

21

that will be affected by the statutes and regulations for which
they are responsible. In any case, they hardly are as accessible and responsive as those who occupy analogous positions
in State and local governments.
In drawing this contrast, I imply no criticism of these federal employees or the officials who are ultimately in charge.
The great majority are conscientious and faithful to their
duties. My point is simply that members of the immense
federal bureaucracy are not elected, know less about the
services traditionally rendered by States and localities, and
are inevitably less responsive to recipients of such services,
than are state legislatures, city councils, boards of supervisors, and state and local commissions, boards, and agencies. It is at these state and local levels-not in Washington
as the Court so mistakenly thinks-that "democratic selfgovernment" is best exemplified.

IV
The question presented in this case is whether the extension of the FLSA to the wages and hours of employees of a
city-owned transit system unconstitutionally impinges on
fundamental state sovereignty. The Court's sweeping holding does far more than simply answer this question in the
negative. In overruling National League of Cities, today's
opinion apparently authorizes federal control, under the auspices of the Commerce Clause, over the terms and conditions
of employment of all state and local employees. Thus, for
purposes of federal regulation, the Court rejects the distinction between public and private employers that had been
drawn carefully in National League of Cities. The Court's
action reflects a serious misunderstanding, if not an outright
rejection, of the history of our country and the intention of
the Framers of the Constitution. 19
The opinion of the Court in National League of Cities makes clear that
the very essence of a federal system of government is to impose "definite
limits upon the authority of Congress to regulate the activities of the
11
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I return now to the balancing test approved in National
League of Cities and accepted in Hodel, Long Island R. Co.,
and FERC v. Mississippi. See supra, n. 5 and ante, at
- - . The Court does not find in this case that the "federal
interest is demonstrably greater." 426 U. S., at 856
(BLACKMUN, J., concurring). No such finding could have
been made, for the state interest is compelling. The financial impact on States and localities of displacing their control
over wages, hours, overtime regulations, pensions, and labor
relations with their employees could have serious, as well as
unanticipated, effects on state and local planning, budgeting,
and the levying of taxes. 20 As we said in National League of
Cities, federal control of the terms and conditions of employment of State employees also inevitably "displaces state policies regarding the manner in which [States] will structure delivery of those governmental services that citizens require."
Id., at 847.
The Court emphasizes that municipal operation of an intracity mass transit system is relatively new in the life of our
country. It nevertheless is a classic example of the type of
service traditionally provided by local government. It is
local by definition. It is indistinguishable in principle from
the traditional services of providing and maintaining streets,
public lighting, traffic control, water, and sewerage systems. 21 Services of this kind are precisely those ''with which
citizens are more 'familiarly and minutely conversant.'" The
States as States by means of the commerce power." See also the Court's
opinion in Fry v. United States, 421 U. S. 542, 547 n. 7 (1975).
• As Justice Douglas observed in his dissent in Maryland v. Wirtz, 392
U. S. 183, 201 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Extension of the FLSA to the
States could "disrupt the fiscal policy of the states and threaten their
autonomy in the regulation of health and education.'' /d., at 203.
21
In Long Island R. Co. the unanimous Court recognized that "[t]his
Court's emphasis on traditional governmental functions and traditional aspects of state sovereignty was not meant to impose a static historical view
of state functions generally immune from federal regulation." 455 U. S.,
at 686.
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Federalist, No. 46, p. 316. State and local officials of course
must be intimately familiar with these services and sensitive
to their quality as well as cost. Such officials also know that
their constituents and the press respond to the adequacy, fair
distribution, and cost of these services. It is this kind of
state and local control and accountability that the Framers
understood would insure the vitality and preservation of the
federal system that the Constitution explicitly requires. See
National League of Cities, supra, at 847-852.

v
Although the Court's opinion purports to recognize that
the States retain some sovereign power, it does not identify
even a single aspect of state authority that would 17emain
when the Commerce Clause is invoked to justify federal
regulation. In Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U. S. 183 (1968),
overruled by National League of Cities and today reaffirmed,
the Court sustained an extension of the FLSA to certain hospitals, institutions, and schools. Although the Court's opinion in Wirtz was comparatively narrow, Justice Douglas, in
dissent; wrote presciently that the Court's reading of the
Commerce Clause would enable "the National Government
[to] devour the essentials of state sovereignty, though that
sovereignty is attested by the Tenth Amendment." I d., at
205. Today's decision makes Justice Douglas's fear once
again a realistic one.
As I view the Court's decision today as rejecting the basic
precepts of our federal system and limiting the constitutional
role of judicial review, I dissent.
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Center

' "'1?";~

Reproductive Health,
~a__

v

tJ:r.i:..s... case,

AQWiW P E•

1\

~ u.s . • __ ) (1983).
tl ft
~departure

u.s.

Rumsey,
Kennedy,

456 U.S.

concurring).

__,
667,

for

(\J<L.,Qrf4l...ss1

;1

<E.ven in

from the doctr inc of

stare decisis demands special justification."

rl L. fd. J

~

Arizona v.

112-

(1984).

L,ctl-691"' n. 34

In the present case,

See
(1982)

also Oregon v.
(JUSTICE STEVENS.?

the five Justices who

compose the majority today participated in National League
of Cities and the cases reaffirming it.

2

The stability of

2 Justice O'Connor succeeded Justice Stewart in
September 1981, and participated in United Transportation
Union v. Long Island R.~Co., 455 U.S. 678,- eQ4 6860-(1982)~
and FERC v. Mississippi, 456 u.s. 742r-764 7Q~tl982).

J

~·

...
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judicial decision, and with it respect for the authority
of this Court, are not served by the abrupt overruling of
multiple precedents we witness in this case.

3

Whatever effect the Court's decision may have
in weakening

the

application of

stare

decisis,

il-

tfiis

is

likely to be less important than what the Court has done
to

the

United

Constitution
States

is

itself.

the

A unique

federal

feature

of

the

system guaranteed

by

the

Constitution and implicit in the very name of our country.
Despite

some

genuflecting

in

Court's

opinion

to

the

3 As we observed recently, "stare decisis is a
doctrine that demands respect in a society governed by the
rule of
law."
City of Akron v.
Akron Center for
Reproductive Health, Inc., ~ u.s. ---~983).
In this
respect, stare decisis represents "a rlatural evolution
from the very nature of our institutions."
Lile, "Some ?
Views on the Rule of Sta~ Decis:s," 4 Va. L. Rev. 95},~ lf
(1916).
"See also, 8. §
1HckJr Tl=le Supreme Court e:l'\a(the
of

..........

Idea of
the

Pre~£ess

Q2

(1970) :

Pt:1ited SLates (1928+--

Htl~hes,

The Sapr ewe Cotlf'"t

7.

concept of federalism,
effectively
rhetoric
Clause.

reduc~

when

today' s decision caR be 'JiQwea

the

Congress

Tenth
acts

Amendment
pursuant

2"-

to meaningless

to

the

Commerce

The Court holds that the Fair Labor Standards Act

["FLSA"]

"contravened

power

under

rates

and

employees.

the

no

Commerce

hours
Ante,

of

affirmative
Clause"

employment

at

27.

In

of

limit on Congress'

to determine
all

rejecting

state
the

the
and

wage
local

tradi tiona!

view of our federal system, the Court states:
"Apart from the limitation on federal authority
inherent in the delegated nature of Congress'
Article I powers, the principal means chosen by
the Framers to ensure the role of the states in
the federal system lies in the structure of the
~ederal ~overnmen jt "

\t~l\Ante, at 21~ 22 (emphasis added).
The "structure" said to "ensure the role of the
I\ )

states

in

the

federal

system' 1s

j lJj ' J .5
S. :> Y' ~
thei--r~ fun.ct t
in

.rf.

-hJ-r

"the

selection of both the Executive and Legislative Branches

'·
, 1

8.

~;)..

of

the

federal

doubt

about

decision

in

government".

its

Id. ,

intention,

National

the

League

at .c?!'f.
Court

of

To

leave

renounces

Cities

because

no
its
it

"inevitably invites an unelected federal judiciary to make
decisions about which state policies its favors and which
ones

it

dislikes".

Ante,

at

17.

In

other

words,

the

extent to which the States may exercise their authority,
Y\

whe ~

Congress purports to act under the Commerce Clause,

~~~

determined

from

time

to

time by political

)\

decisions

made

by

members

of

the

federal

government,

decisions the Court says will not be subject to judicial
review.

~I

note

that

it

does

not

seem

to

have

occurred to the Court that it - anJ' unelected majority of
five

Justices

today

rejects

almost

200

years

of

the

understanding of the constitutional status of federalism.

11' .. , . . . .

9.

a-~~~

In doing so, there is only sbQ ~ me~tion of the Tenth
1\
Amendment.

Nor is so much as a dictum of any court cited

in support of the view that the role of the States in the
federal

system

may

federal

officials,

depend

upon

rather

than

the
on

grace

the

of

elected

Constitution

as

interpreted by this Court.

~pinion

In

that

follows,

Part

II

addresses

the Court's criticisms of National League of Cities.

Part

III reviews briefly the understanding of federalism that
ensured

the

ratification

extent to which

of

this Court,

the

Constitution

until today,

and

the

has recognized

that the States retain a signficant measure of sovereignty
in

our

federal

applicability

of

system.
the

FLSA

Part
to

the

IV

considers

indisputably

the
local

service provided by an urban transit system.

.,-

..

~·

10.

II
The

Court

finds

that

the

test

of

State

immunity

approved in National League of Cities and its progeny is
unworkable and unsound in principle.
to be

unworkable,

National

League

the Court begins
of

Cities

concluding

that

unsound

principle,

long

in

efforts
the

and

to

by mischaracterizing

subsequent

define

Court

In finding the test

state

radically

cases.

In

immunity

are

departs

from

settled principles of constitutionalism and of

the

role of judicial review in our system of government.
A

Much of
that

it

is

governmental

the

Court's

difficult

to

functions."

opinion
define

is
a

National

devoted
priori

to

"traditional

League

neither engaged in, nor required, such a task.

arguing

of
4

Cities

The Court

Footnote(s) 4 will appear on following pages.

,,
').·

...

1

11.

and

functions,"

"purely

governmental
services."

'
~

~~

condemns

discusses

/\

"traditional

historical"

function f'j "

and

functions,

"'necessary'

Ante, at 10-11, 15, 16.

governmental
"'uniquely'
governmental

But nowhere does it

4 In National League of Cities, we referred to
the sphere of state sovereignty as including "traditional
governmental functions," a realm which is, of course,
difficult to define with precision.
But the luxury of
precise definitions is one rarely enjoyed in interpreting
and applying the general provisions of our Constitution.
Not surprisingly,
therefore,
the Court's attempt to
demonstrate
the
impossibility
of
definition
is
unpersuasive.
A number of the cases it cites simply do
not
involve
the
problem
of
defining
governmental
functions.
E. g., Williams v. Eastside Mental Health
Center, Inc., 669 F.2d 671 (CAll), cert. denied, 459 u.s.
976 (1982): Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 552 F.2d 2V
(CA2) , cer t. denied, 434 u.S. 90~ ( 1977) .
A number of
others are not properly analyzed under the principles of
National League of Cities, notwithstanding some of the
language of the low_,er courts.
E.g., in United States v.
Best, 573 F.2d 109'S (CA9 1978) aJ1-d Hybud Equipment Corp.
v. City of Akron, 654 F. 2d 118V' (CA6 1981) •
Moreover,
rather than carefully analyzing the case law, the Court
simply lists various functions thought to be protected or
unprotected by courts interpreting National League of
Cities.
Ante, at 9-10.
In the cited cases, however, the
courts considered the issue of State immunity on the
specific facts at issue; they did not make blanket
pronouncements that particular things inherently qualified
as traditional governmental functions or did not.
Having
thus considered the cases out of context, it · ~
su.r.prisin9 tl:lat: t:fie CGnrt could --Hntl no "or nizing
principle" among them.
See ante, at 10.

lP'"lt.{.

~:./
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mention that National League of Cities adopted a familiar
type

of

Clause

balancing

test

enactments

for

determining whether

transgress

constitutional

Commerce

limitations

imposed by the federal nature of our system of government.
os~ial:t:y

This omission is
of

today 1 s

opinion

joined

concurred separately to
that case "adopt[s]
outlaw

federal

interest

is

compliance

lle4;.e

in

imposed

426

National League of Cities and

~tnd-

demonstrably

essential."

since the author

.....

that the Court 1 s opinion in

a balancing approach

power

with

noteworthy,

u.s. ,

where

areas
greater

and where

federal
at

[that]
the

federal

state

standards

856

does not

(JUSTICE

would

be

BLACKMON_,

concurring).

J

In
embrace

a

reading

balancing

National

approach,

League
JUSTICE

of

Cities

BLACKMON

to

quite

'·

13.

Vlv---

correctly cited -efl.a.t part of the opinion that reaffirmed
~

v.

United States,

analysis

421 u.s.

reaffirming

seriousness

of

the

542

(1975).

explicitly

problem

addressed

The Court • s
weighed

by

the

the

federal

legislation at issue in that case, against the effects of
compliance
Our

on State

subsequent

weighing
federal

the

sovereignty.

decisions
respective

government. 5

In

also

426

adopted

interests
EEOC

v.

of

u.s.,
this
the

Wyoming,

at

852-853.

approach
States
460

u.s.

of
and
226

5 In
undertaking
such
balancing,
we
have
considered, on the one hand, the strength of the federal
interest in the challenged legislation and the impact of
exempting the States from its reach.
Central to our
inquiry into the federal interest is how closely the
challenged action implicates the central concerns of the
~3 Commerce Clause,
viz.,
the promotion of a national
\ S 'V
economy and free trade among the states.
See EEOC v.
(10 v· '
WYoming, ~ S. Ct. }:QS4t -r&6-5 (1983) (JUSTICE STEVENS
V\
concurring). ~.J!!l:lsog. United Transportation Union v. Long
~~
Island Rail Road Co. , 455 u.S. 678, 688 ( 1982) ("Congress
long ago concluded that federal regulation of railroad
labor services is necessary to prevent disruptions in
vi tal rail service essential to the national economy.") ;
Footnote continued on next page.

v
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for

{1983),

principle
Cities
purpose
autonomy,
federal

functional
not

but

to

to

ensure

See

stated

a

the

province

unique

"[t]he

League of

whose

sacred

that

that

in National

doctrine

create

system .

interference
236.

~

a

is

Court

iu?tmni ~articulated

of

is

the

example,

ultimate
of

state

benefits of

a

not be lost through undue , federal

in

certain

also

Hodel

Reclamation Ass 'n.,

452

core
v.

u.s.

state

functions."

Virginia

Surface

264

{1981).

Id.,
Mining

at

&

In overruling

FERC v. Mississippi, 456 u.s. 742, 757 {1982), {"it is
difficult
to conceive of
a more basic element of
interstate commerce than electric energy
.").
Similarly, we have considered whether exempting States
from federal regulation would undermine the goals of the
federal program. ~~ e$ Fry v. United States, 421 u.s. 542
{1975) ~ee also H3Mel, 452 u.s. at 282 {national surface
mining sta~ards necessary to insure competition among
States does not undermine States' efforts to maintain
adequate intrastate standards).
On the other hand, we
have assessed the injury done to the States if forced to
comply with federal Commerce Clause enactments.
See
National League of Cities, 426 u.s., at 846-851.

'·

15.

National

League

of

Cities,

the

incorrectly

Court

characterizes the mode of analysis established therein and
developed in subsequent cases. 6
Moreover,
FLSA,

is

National

the
League

the

statute

identical
of

at

issue

statute

Cities.

in

that

Although

this

was

case,

at

JUSTICE

issue

the
in

BLACKMON's

concurrence noted that he was "not untroubled by certain
possible implications of the Court's opinion" in National
League

of

Cities,

it also stated

that

"the

result with

6 rn
addition,
reliance
on
the
Court's
difficulties in the tax immunity field is misplaced.
Although
the
Court
has
abandoned
the
"governmental/proprietary" distinction in this field, see
New York v. United States, 326 u.s. 572 (1946), it has not
taken the drastic approach of relying solely on the
structure of the federal government to protect the States'
immunity from taxation.
See Massachusetts v. United
States, 435 u.s. 444 (1978).
Thus, faced with an equally
difficult problem of defining constitutional boundaries of
federal action directly affecting the States, we did not
adopt the view many would think naive, that the federal
government itself will protect whatever rights the States
may have.

'·4•

16.

t u-.F5LA]
respect to the statute under challenge here is necessarily
correct."
for

the

426

u.s.,

Court

identify

any

today

"

at 856 (emphasis added).
does

changed

not

discuss

the

His opinion
statute,

that

circumstances

nor

warrant

a

different holding.
B

Today's opinion does not explain how the States' role
in

the

electoral

process

guarantees

that

particular

~

exercises of the Commerce Clause power .,do" not infringe on
residual

State

.
t y. 7
sovereign

Alth~

the

States

7 Late in its opinion, the Court suggests that
after all there may be some "affirmative limits the
constitutional structure might impose on federal action
affecting the States under the Commerce Clause." Ante, at
27.
The Court asserts that " [ i] n the factual setting of
these cases the internal safeguards of the political
process have performed as intended." Ibid.
But. -the Court identifiestandards- as
o
d- untl-er whatc.i-f'-eums-t-aRC.e-she
"political
process"
may
fai 1
and
"affirmative
imits" are to be imposed.
Presumably, such
limits are t
be determined by the Judicial Branch even
Footnote continued on next page.
·~~~
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participate

in

the

Electoral

College,

reason to view the President as a

this

is

hardly a

representative of

States' interest against federal encroachment.

the

8

Members of

Congress are elected from the various States, but once in
office
noted

they are members of
recently

"the

the

hydraulic

federal government.
pressure

inherent

8

We

within

each of the separate Branches to exceed the outer limits
~-

of

its

power

II

Immigration and

r~

Naturalization

.~,

it
is
"unelec ed".
~ today's opinion .!\ ~
the balancing
tandard , ~~QHQQ iA tbe- ~Quer.;U. '
caGes
a-.s .OSl.e-t.I.Jl~d, nd suggests no other standard-,_
that would enable a court t
determine when t ~
he has been
a malfunction of the "poli ical process".
The Court's
unwil li ngq,e~s er- i-Rabilit;y to specify the ' ffirmative "' J
limits" on federal power, or w-hen and how these limits are)V
to be determined, may well be explained by the transparent
fact that any such attempt would be subject to precisely
the same objections on which it relies to overrule
National ~eague of Cities.
One can hardly 1magine this Court saying that
because Congress is composed of individuals, individual
rights are amply protected by the legislative process.
Yet, the position adopted today is indistinguishable in
principle.
The
Tenth
Amendment was
adopted
as
an
essential part of the Bill of Rights and should be ~d
as such.
See infra, at
•
~

>'

,•

18.

Service

v.

Chadha,

Court offers no reason to think

The
that this pressure will

not operate when Congress seeks to invoke its powers under
the Commerce Clause, notwithstanding the electoral role of
the States. 9

9 At one time in our history, the view that the
structure of the federal government sufficed to protect
the States might have had somewhat more practical,
although not more logical, basis.
Professor Wechsler,
whose seminal article in 1954 proposed the view adopted by
the Court today, predicated his argument on assumptions
that simply do not accord with current reality.
Professor
Wechsler wrote: .. National action has
always been
regarded as exceptional in our polity, an instrusion to be
justified by some necessity, the special rather than the
ordinary case...
Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of
Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and
Selection of the National Government, 54 Colum. L. Rev.
543, 544 {1954).
Not only is the premise of this view
clearly at odds with
the
~ roliferation
of national
legislation over the past ,75 years, but .. a variety of '1
structural and political c anges in this ce~y ha~ ~
combined to make Congress particularly insensi~ to state
and local values...
Advisory Comm' n on Intergovernmental
Relations [ACIR], Regulatory Federalism: Policy, Process,
Impact and Reform 50
{1984).
The adoption of the
Seventeenth Amendment {providing for direct election of
senators), the weakening of political parties on the local
level, and the rise of national media, among other things,
have
~ ongress
~0
ee
increasingly
less
represe tative of State and local interests, and more
Footnote continued on next page.
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The
success
and

Court

at obtaining

exemptions

statutes
federal

apparently

is

from

federal
the

indicative

political

thinks
funds

for

obligations
of

process

the
in

that

the

States'

various projects
of

some

"effectiveness
preserving

the

federal
of

the

States'

•
likely to be responsive to the demands of various national
constituencies.
Id.,
at
50-51.
As
one
observer
explained, "As Senators and members of the House develop
independent constituencies among groups such as farmers,
businessmen, laborers, environmentalists, and the poor,
each
of
which
generally
supports
certain
national
initiatives,
their
tendency
to
identify with
state
interests
and
the
positions of state officials
is
reduced."
Kaden, "Federalism in the Courts: Agenda fo ~'l ,.\
the 1980s," in ACIR, The Future of Federalism in the '8 0;3.1~
{1981) •
r-,J
See also Kaden, Politics, Money, and State
~
Sovereignty: The Judicial Role, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 84; ~~
(1979) (changes in political practices and the breadth of
national initiatives mean that the political branches "may
no longer be as well suited as they once were to the task
of safeguarding the role of the states in the federal
system
and
protecting
the
fundamental
valueS of
federalism.") and ACIR, Regulatory Federalism, supra, at
1- 24 (detailing the "dramatic shift" in kind of federal
regulation applicable to the States over the past two
decades).
Thus, even if one were to ignore the numerous
problems
with
the
Court's
position
in
terms
of
constitutional
theory,
there
would
remain
serious
questions as to its factual premises.

,.,

•'

~

.
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~
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interests • • •
is

not

"Ante, at 23-24. 10

relevant

to

the

question

But political success
whether

the

political

processes are the proper means of enforcing constitutional
limitations. 11

The fact that Congress generally does not

10 The
Court
that
the
significant
financial assistance affor
States and localities by
the
federal
governmen
is
relevant
to
the
constitutionality of extend ng Commerce Clause enactments
to the States.
See ante, a
23-24, 26.
This Court has
never
held
~QE
implied,
however,
that
the
mere
disbursement
of
funds
by
the
federal
government
establishes a right to contr 1 activities that benefit
from such funds.
See Pennhurs State School v. Halderman,
4(jl§} u.s. 1, 17-18 (1981) • Re ardless of the willingness
of the federal government to pay iR \iOO~il er pef't= for ..,the constitutional question remains
the
federal statute violates the
sovereign powers reserved to the States by the Tenth
Amendment 11
..,1-zjc;A.& ¥
~
The r£-tma t 'Sa Qne effort to reassure t:Re etabils (}~ ~
ajor statutes tha thus far have not been
~ade applicable
o State governments: the Federal Power
Act, 16 u.s.c. '-82 (f); the Nat' s ,] Labor ~elations Act !-17
29 u.s.c. §1521 ) ; the Labor-Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act, 9 u.s.c. §402(e); the Occupational Safety
and Health Act, 29 u.s.c. §652(5); the Employee Retiremen
Insurance Sec rity Act, 29 u.s.c. §§
(
, 1002 32 ;
and the Sher n Act, Parker v. Brown, 317 u.s. 341 (194 ) •
Ante, at 2
The Court does not suggest that
th1s res aint will continue after
its decision is
underst d.
Indeed, it is unlikely that special interest
groups
ill fail to accept the Court's open invitation to
Congress to extend these and other statutes to apply
Footnote continued on next page.
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transgress
State

constitutional

activities does

limits

not make

on

its

power

to

reach

judicial review any less

necessary to rectify the infrequent cases in which it does
do so. 12

The States' role in our system of government is

a matter of constitutional law, not of legislative grace.
"The

powers

Constitution,

not
nor

delegated

to

prohibited

the
by

United
it

to

States

the

by

the

States,

are

to the States and their local subdivisions.

12 This
Court
has
never
efore
abdicated
responsibility for assessing the c stitutionality of
challenged action on the ground t
t affected parties
o:-------.....__;:
t;:.
h~e~o~r:...::e::..t::.:l~
·c
~a lly
are
ab1e
to
1 ook
for
their
own
1nterests
As the Court noted
League of
1 _
Cities, a much stronger argument
inherent structural GA~
protections cou1.d. pave been made in \;Buckley v. Valeo, 4~
u.s. 1 (1976}.; - . . Myers v. United States, 272 u.s. 52
(1926} , than can be made 1Jith r;Q&pect tq 1 i mi tat ions '*' ~,..q,
~Re Cemmerce Qla~~e.
In these cases, the President signed
legislation
·
limited his authority with respect to
certain
ointments and thus arguably "it was no concern
of t 's Court that the law violated the Constitution."
u.s., at 841-842 n. 12. The Court nevertheless held
laws unconstitutional because
they
infringed on
presidential
authority,
the
President's
consent
notwithstanding.
The Court does not address this point;
nor does it cite any authority for its contrary view.

22.

reserved to the States,

u.s.

respectively, or to the people."

Const., Amend. 10.
More

troubling

than

the

logical

infirmities

in

the Court's reasoning is the result of its holding, i. e.,

I~ )'4._~~14.
that
the

federal
limits

inconsistent

political officials

~

of

their

with

the

constitutional system.
(Hamilton).

own

are

the sole

See, e

This

result

principles

of

is
our

.g., The Federalist No. 78

At least since Marbury v. Madison it has been

the settled province of the federal judiciary "to say what
the law is" with respect to the constitutionality of acts
In rejecting

of Congress.
protecting
Court • s

the

opinion

the

States

from

offers

no

role of

federal

explanation

the

judiciary in

overreaching,
for

ignoring

teaching of the most famous case in our history. 13

Footnote~

~
.)

power.

fundamental

judges of

13 will appear on following pages.

the
the

23.

III

lJ,wk &w" ~J

A

s\.sL1

Federalism refers to the dual federal

aRd state

<system of our country, a 51ystem in wl:lieh the States play a

().),·~
major

role

government.

that

cannot

be

preempted

by

the

~deral

As contemporaneous writings and the debates

at the ratifying conventions make clear beyoRd all

,f71 _,v"Y

;:::;:.

w~

13 The Court states that the decision in National
League of Cities "invite[s] an unelected federal judiciary
to make decisions about which state policies it favors and
which ones its dislikes."
Curiously, the Court then
suggests that under the application of the "traditional"
governmental function analysis, "the states cannot serve
as laboratories for social and economic experiment".
Ante, at 17, citing Justice Brandeis' famous observation
~New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 u.s.
262, 311
Apparently the Court believes that when "an
unelected federal judiciary" makes decisions as to whether
a particular function is one for the federal or state
governments, the States no longer may engage in "social
and economic experiment".
Ante, at 17. ['fhe argument is
especially perplexing in light of the Court's ruling that
the federal government alone will make these decisions. It
is
unclear
how
the
States
are
afforded
any more
opportunity
to
serve
as
"laboratories"
in
these

~ ircumstances.:.J

hP

Y--1~ --- 

rr/

~gu~t,

~

~~~~=r&- ~~~.,._'3.d-~~sl

~ ~~ ~ ~r-c.6'1~
~t.Z-~c~Ly

~f- ;J¢& P mf'a.. ~u..f~~;~
~ r~~~~k,..a-rr-~
the

States'

ratification

of

the

Constitution

predicated on this understanding of federalism.

was

":-.:, ~ --the ~m~~
, roled
+-->
II

I /"'\..

~4N~

adopted 0 ~~~~VL
promised

the

tJ.COl

1/.l '

Indeed,

~

\/)8~~~endment
\

was

States by
. }-;, .J.Ij, />'

the -

~fot~t•l"- ,~ ~&~
~--

.proponents of the Consti-tution was reaH ze&w-

See, e. g.,

Lf3 z__ -l.jJ?
James Madison, 1 Annals of Congress ~June
1 789) •

Much
Constitution
government
eliminate
-e.xamQle,

of
was

would

the
rooted
be

too

to
in

the

fear

powerful

and

the States as viable political entities.

)w

the

Jb&;L vJ

-Foe

jvU- )

Samuel Adams arguedj \that if the several States
• _. f

were \ to

be

Legislature,

joined
the

in

Powers

"one
of

entire

which

Nation,

shall

extend

under
to

one
every

Subject of Legislation, and its Laws be supreme & controul

,·

25.

the whole, the Idea of Sovereignty in these States must be
lost ...
(Dec.

Letter
3,

from

159

Adams

reprinted

1787),

Federalists

Samuel

(J.

Lewis

in
ed.

to

Richard

Henry

Anti-Federalists

versus

Likewise,

1967).

Lee

George

Mason feared that .. the general government being paramount
to,

and

in

governments,

every
the

respect
latter

more

must

powerful

give

way

than
to

the

the

state

former ...

Address in the Ratifying Convention of Virginia (June 4-12
1788) ,

reprinted

in Anti-Federalists versus Federalists,

supra, at 208-209.
Antifederalists

raised

these concerns

every State ratifying convention. 14

in almost

~~~

See) Elliot, Debates

14 opponents
of
the
Constitution
were
particularly dubious of the Federalist claim that the
States retained powers not delegated to the United States
in the absence of an express provision so providing.
For
example, the Letters of Brutus called the claim that
Footnote continued on next page.

\

··,.

26.

"tn the

~

Several State Cot:tueot ions on the Adopt..i OR of the

Federal Constitution
-......._

(1854).

As a

result,

eight States

voted for the Constitution only after proposing amendments
to be adopted after

ratification. 15

All eight of these

included among their recommendations some version of what
later became the Tenth Amendment. Ibid.
concern

that

the

proposed

So strong was the

Constitution

was

defective without a specific bill of rights,

seriously

including a

provision reserving powers to the States, that in order to

~~

~'

/::{.'

-~

,{.- \~

~~v,~~~~
"'f

secure

the

votes

for

ratification,

the

Federalists

-

nondelegated powers were reserved to the States •more
{
\
specious than solid."
Letters of Brutus, reprinted in
Schwartz,
The Bill of Rights, supra, at 505,
507.
Similarly, James Winthrop wrote that "[i]t is a mere
------------~f~a~l~l
~a
~
c~
y
that what rights are not given are
reserv
Letters of Agrippa, reprinted in Schwartz, The
Bill of Ri1~ s, supra, at 510, 511.
he Virginia legislature came very close to
refusing to ratify the Constitution until the adoption of
a Bill of Right r
See Schwartz, The Bill of Rights,
supra, at 762 - 76 and passim.
~~ 2-z/ ~

~d~~T~
1.

?

'

~.

.' ..

.....

27.

eventually conceded that such provisions were necessary.
See Schwartz, A Documentary History of the Bill of Rights,
supra,

at 505 and passim.

It was

thus generally agreed

~

that the

pr-e~eserl

of a bill of rights would be among the

first business of the new Congress.
amendments
proposed
&

that

and

we

adopted

st Congress.

know

as

early

the

in the

Accordingly, the ten
Bill

of

first

Rights

session bf

were
the

Id., at 983- 1167.

This history,

which the Court

~ignores,

1\.

documents the integral role of the the Tenth Amendment in
our constitutional theory.

It exposes as well, I believe,

the fundamental character of the Court's error today.
from being "unsound in principle," ante, at 18,
enforcement

..

of

the

Tenth

Amendment

is

Far

judicial

essential

to

28.

maintaining

the

~Cstj~1
system .1'\ ad~pted
by

federal

the

Constitution.
B

The

Framers

had

definite

~~~4-

ideas

about

~

the

Constitution's division of authority between the federal
and state governments.

In The Federalist No.

39,

for example, Madison explained this division by drawing a
series of contrasts between the attributes of a national
government
While

a

and

those

national

of

form

of

a

federal

form of

government

would

government.
possess

an

.. indefinite supremacy over all persons and things, ..

the

federal

the

form

Constitution

of

government

instead

consisted

contemplated
of

"local

or

by

municipal

authorities [which] form distinct and independent portions

~

29.

spheres

to

authority

is

\ ~ ~is+ tJo. ~"<. J

.!.2.::!:J

the

general

subject

to

authority
them,

than

the

general

its

own

sphere."

within

( T Co·~ eel. t1ftl'l

cJSt25Y
""

Under

the Constitution,

the sphere of the

proposed government extended to jurisdiction of
.

enumerated objects, only,
States

a

residuary

other objects."

and

leav[ing]

inviolable

"certain

to the several

sovereignty

over

all

Id.

Madison

elaborated

on

the

separate spheres of sovereignty in

~he
v~

content

of

these

Federalist
No. 45:
c::>'
.. '-

... v

"The
powers
delegated
by
the
proposed
Constitution to the Federal Government are few
and defined.
Those which are to remain in the
State Governments are numerous and indefinite.
The former will be exercised principally on
external objects, as war, peace, negotiation,
and foreign commerce;
The powers
reserved to the several States will extend to
all the objects, which, in the ordinary course
of affairs, concern the lives, liberties and
properties of the people; and the internal
order,
improvement,
and
prosperity
of
the
State."
Madison considered that the operations of
the

federal

government

would

be

"most

extensive

and

,.

30.

important in times of war and danger; those of the State
Governments in times of peace and security."

Ibid.

As a

result of this division of powers, the State governments
would

have a distinct advantage

over the federal government.

in

Ibid.

The Framers believed that the separate sphere of
sovereignty reserved to the States would ensure that the
States would serve as an effective "counterpoise" to the
power of the federal government.

The States would serve

this essential role because they would attract and retain
the loyalty of their citizens.

The roots of such loyalty,

the Founders thought, were found in the objects peculiar
to State government.
the

States

"regulat [e)

For
all

example,

Hamil ton argued

those personal

that

interests and

familiar concerns to which the sensibility of individuals

31.

is more immediately aware." ) Thus, he maintained that
:t?Qopl Q

uet:J:ld

~sible

,.,hk oC..
percp1Ve.;1 the

States

as

"the

immediate

~ ~

and

guardia rP-1 f life and property," a fact whicH-

"contributeiP

any

other

circumstance

to

impressing upon the minds of the people affection, esteem
and reverence towards the government."

Wf.

17, J a-t! 107.
that

"the

conversant"

Madison took

people
with

will
the

be

The Federalist No.

the same position, explaining
more

business of

familiarly

and

minutely

State governments,

and

"i w{ ith the members of these, will a greater proportion of
the

people

friendship,

have

ties

of

personal

acquaintance

and of family and party attachments •

The Federalist No.
the States'

the

f''

46) ~

involvement

316.
in

and

..

Like Hamilton, Madison saw

the everyday concerns of

people as the source of their citizens' loyalty. Id.

the
See

32.

also

Nagel,

League

of

\;;;;

Federalism as

Cities

in

a

Fundamental Value:

Perspective.,

1981

S~

717

National
Rev.

81

~

(1981) •
Thus,
federal

the harm to the States that results from

overreaching

under

the

Commerce

simply a matter of dollars and cents.
Cities,

426

u.s.,

at 846-851.

Clause

by

not

National League of

Nor is it a matter of the

wisdom or folly of certain policy choices.
17.

is

Cf. ante, at

Rather, by usurping functions traditionally performed
the

States,

federal

overreaching

under

the

Commerce

Clause undermines the constitutionally mandated balance of
power

between

the

States

and

the

federal

government,

balance designed to protect our fundamental liberties.

,.

a

33.

The opinion for the Court in National League of
Cities

was

faithful

to history

in

its

understanding

of

~ ~~-

6bserv~

federalism. )

that

"our

federal

system

of

government imposes definite limits upon the authority of
Congress to regulate the activities of States as States by
~.){,

us. J

<itJ.. ~

means of the commerce power, ") tQ.g eo at t

lrJ;:j
Amendment
II

}to

~ ~

·,1\vJ..J
maJ(e

R9t

power in a fashion that impairs the States'
their

ability

system."'
States,

function

14·Ul!l.,

.426

421

recognized

to

u.s.

at

542,

repeatedly

effectively

in

e:x:gn~'ise

integrity or
a

842-843 > tquoting > KfY. v.

547 n.

that

7

(1975))

State

1(

Wall.)

...::·.·,

71

(1868),

federal
United

This Court has

sovereignty

fundamental component of our system of government.
than a century ago,

Tenth

-C.o._ .&,(.~~~ ·Js

tl:lae __.,..,..Congress may

elga:r

tlhe

1nvokea

in Lane County v. Oregon, 74

is

a

More

u.s.

(7

the Court stated that the Constitution

34.

recognized

"the necessary existence of

within their proper spheres,
the

It

States."

the

States,

and,

the independent authority of

concluded,

as

Madison

did,

that

this

authority extended to "nearly the whole charge of interior
regulation

[the States 1 and to the people all

to

.;

•

powers not expressly delegated to the national government
are

reserved."

Communications
(1982) ,

exemption

the

Id.,

fVl'\i'
Co.

v.

Court

from

the

at

76.

C i t y of

recognized
antitrust

Recently,
Bo u 1 de r ,
that
laws

in

4 55

the
was

Community

U. S •
state

based

.£3

40,

action
State

on

sovereignty.

Similarly, in United Transportation Union v.

Long

Railroad

Island

although

finding

state-owned

the

railroad,

455 ~ 678,

Co.,
Railway
the

Labor

Act

683

(1982),

applicable

to

a

~.c~k~

Court 1\

recognj zed

tAA- d:,_ ~~ ·~f
~ States
possess
constitutionally
preserved

tb~

t:b ~

sovereign

.

~ '1'/t~~ . . /;

"'

~

.

35.

powers.
456

~ ..Ph

u.s.

Federal Regulatory Connnieeion v. Mississippi,

742,

752

constitutionality

of

(1982)'
the

Public

in
Utility

Regulatory

Policies Act, the Court explicitly considered whether the
Act

impinged

on

state

Tenth Amendment.

sovereignty

in

violation

of

the

These represent only a few of the many

cases in which the Court has recognized not only the role,
but
~'

the

importance,

United

Mitchell, 269
559
not

(1911).

States

u.s.

of
v.

state sovereignty.
~'

supra;

See also,

e.

& Eddy

v.

Metcalf

514 (1926); Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221

As Justice Frankfurter noted, the States are

merely

a

factor

in

the

"shifting

95

(1949)

(Justice

Frankfurter,

economic
336

u.s.

concurring),

but

arrangements" of our country, Kovacs v. Cooper,
77'

u.s.

constitute a "coordinate element in the system established

36.

by the Framers for governing our Federal Uni

National

League of Cities, supra, at 849.

:D
In con tr as t,

the Court today

.

of federalism that pays only lip service
the States . al't€l fails
of

impc:rs'±-rt'9'--t~

the

States

measure

EEOC
-

v.

the

an

ackaowled.!ie th.Q
the States.

"unquestionably

of

sovereign
Wyoming,

dissenting)),
specific

FLSA

-eo

it

areas

States

acknowledges

of

to
that

do

u.s.

fails

to

retain.
the

Tenth

226,

that

Indeed,

a

ante,

at

269

recognize

sovereignty

impacto - -

Although it says that

'retai[n]

authority,'"
460

.potenti:~

the
the

Amendment

the

significant
20

(quoting

(POWELL,

J. ,

broad,

yet

Framers

intended

Court
exists.

16

barely
That

16 The

Court's
opinion
mentions
the
Tenth
Amendment only once, when it restates the question put to
the parties for reargument in this case.
See ante, at 8.

.
'

37.

Amendment

states

explicitly

that

delegated to the United States •
States."
language

u.s.
to

Const., Amend. 10.

say

that

the

States

"[t] he

powers

not

. are reserved to the
The Court recasts this
retain

their

sovereign

powers "only to the extent that the Constitution has not
divested
those

them

powers

of
to

their
the

original

Federal

powers

and

Government."

transferred

Ante,

at

20.

This rephrasing is not a distinction without a difference;
1\

·~i-f
./
~

is

reflects the Court's unprecedented view that Congress

free

under

the

Commerce

Clause

to

assume

a

State's

traditional sovereign power without judicial review of its

action.\

7Indeed,

the Court's view of

federa~a~;s"

the States to precisely the trivial role that opponents of
the Constitution feared they would occupy •

.. it

~ ••

38.

In National League of Cities, we spoke of fire
prevention,
health as

police

protection,

"typical of

sanitation,

[the services]

and

public

performed by state

and local governments in discharging their dual functions
of

administering

services."
activities
commerce,

426
remote
they

the

public

u.s.,

at

law
851.

and

furnishing

Not

only

from any normal concept of

are

also

activities

that

In

5.

emphasizing

governmental

the

functions,

need

we

to

protect

identified

these

interstate

epitomize

concerns of local, democratic self-government.
n.

are

public

the

the

See supra
traditional
kinds

of

activities engaged in by state and local governments that
affect the everyday lives of people.

These are services

that people have the ability to understand and
well

as

the

right,

in

a

democracy,

to

eva ~u~e

as

oversee ~ We

Footnote(s) 17 will appear on following pages.

39.

recognized

that

"it

is

governments are created
states

and

local

functions

such

to provide

governments

are

national government to perform them.

as
"

better
426

these

which

and that the
able

u.s. ,

than

the

at 851.

IV.

17 The Framers recognized that the most effective
..,l'tt-~ democracy
occurs at local levels of government, where
peopl~etoe first hand knowledge of local problems ~
~ more
ready access to public officials responsible for
dealing with them.
E. g., The Federalist No. 17, at 107;
No.45, at 316.
This is as true today as it was when the
Constitution was adopted.
"Participation is likely to be
more frequent, and exercised at more different stages of a
governmental activity at the local level, or in regional
organizations, than at the state and federal levels.
[Additionally,] the proportion of people actually involved
from the total population tends to be greater, the lower
the level of government, and this, of course, better
pproximates the citizen participation ideal."
ACIR,
i tizen Participation in the American Federal System 95
(1979) •
\1

recognized

that

"it

is

governments are created
states

and

local

functions

such

n

to provide

governments

are

national government to perform them.

as

better
426

these
and

able

which

that the
than

u.s. ,

the

at 851.

IV.

17 The Framers recognized that the most effective
~~~~ democracy
occurs at local levels of government, where
peopl~aue first hand knowledge of local problems ~
~ more
ready access to public officials responsible for
dealing with them.
E. g., The Federalist No. 17, at 107;
No.45, at 316.
This is as true today as it was when the
Constitution was adopted.
"Participation is likely to be
more frequent, and exercised at more different stages of a
governmental activity at the local level, or in regional
organizations, than at the state and federal levels.
[Additionally,) the proportion of people actually involved
from the total population tenda to .be _a_rA.;l_r&>r
.o..h~
~ - -- -

\1

. •-

lfp/ss

12/14/84

Rider A, p. 39 Garcia

witnessed in recent years the
Moreover, We have
;nterests groups that engage in sophisticated
rise of numerous special •
substantial campaign contributions to some
lobbying, and make
se groups are thought to have significant
members of Congress. The

influence in the shaping and passing of
This is hardly the way the
Court thinks
localities.

certaina(~egislation.

"political process" fmaart? ens - as the

_ to safeguard the sovereign rights of states and

40.

The question presented
the

extension

employees

of

the

of

unconstitutionally
sovereignty.
than

simply

overruling

FLSA

to

in this case is whether
the

wages

impinges

on

hours

of

transit

system

fundamental

State

city-owned

a

and

The Court's sweeping holding does far more
answer
National

this

question

League

of

in

the

Cities,

negative.

today's

In

opinion

apparently authorizes federal control, under the auspices
of the Commerce Clause, 18 over the terms and conditions of

~~~
~
asculation (o f the powers of the States
that can result rom t~~ decision is predicated on the
Commerce Clause as a power "delegated to the United
States" by the ~t.
The relevant language
states: "Congress shall have power
to regulate
commerce with foreign nations and among the several states
and with the Indian tribes."
Art. I, §8.
Section 8
identifies a score of powers, listing the authority to lay
taxes, borrow money on the credit of the United States,
pay its debts, provide for the common defense and the
general welfare before its brief reference to "Commerce."
It is clear from the debates leading up to the adoption of
the Constitution that the commerce to be regulated was
that which
the
states
themselves were powerless to
Footnote continued on next page.

41.

employment of
purposes

of

Thus,

for

rejects

the

all state and local employees.
federal

regulation,

the

Court

distinction between public and private employers that had
been drawn carefully

in National League of Cities.

The

~

Court's

action

reflects

a

misunderstanding,

if

not

an

'\
outright rejection, of the history of our country and the
intention of the Framers of the Constitution. 19

~..,-r~~lJ~

~o>

regulate.
See 1
Farran , The Records of the Federal
Convention of 178 , 21
ev. ed. 1937).
See also EEOC v.
Wyoming,
460 U.S.
226,
265
( 1983)
(JUSTICE POWELL,
dissenting).
Indeed, the language of the clause itself
focuses on activities that only a national government
could regulate:
commerce with foreign nations and Indian
tribes and "among" the several states.
To be sure,
this Court has construed the
Commerce Clause to accommodate unanticipated changes over
the past two centuries.
As these changes have occurred,
the Court has had to decide whether the federal government
has extended its authority in regulating activities beyond
the capability of a single state to regulate or beyond
legitimate federal interests that outweighed the authority
and interfgts of the states.
0 ~r
The opinion of the Court in National Lea~ue _;.
~ of Cities makes clear that ehc eery ceec!l'\8@ 85 ane eral
~~'
system of government d~~o to impose "definite limits upon
~ he author1ty of Congress to regulate the activities of
the States as States by means of the commerce power." See
also the Court's opinion in~' supra, at 547 n. 7.

'

.

42.

~

AceordiR ~ ,

I

return

to

the

balancing

test

"'\

approved
Hodel,
~\

in
Long

National

League

of

Island

R. R.~

Cities

and

FERC

and

accepted

in

v.

Mississipp tl)

\t}' ~~"- sloJl ~;w
""'" whether the service or activity at issue is one that "the

¥

states and their political subdivisions have traditionally
afforded
supra,

at

~ in

their

National

855.

See ante, at

this

case

demonstrably

te-Jf:IM

citizens."

of

Cities,
not

the

"federal

interest

is

greater" ....

a mJ:;;::erwd j t

~uld

that

League

~

have been

.1\

The

o.f

ita

-o
~w""
n--- ~~t::

~~ J for

financial

the state interest is

impact

on

States

and

localities of displacing their control over wages, hours,
overtime regulations,

I

pensions,

and labor

relations with

43.

-~~~~

their

unanticipated

A

have

could

employees

serious

..t

and

pa r b~s

J4/ a-u.fC ~<c""j I

r~

effects

on

State

and

local

budgeting

and

"

As we said in National League of Cities, federal

~~

control "displaces state policies regarding the manner in

~

which

I:~

~fwill

structure delivery of those governmental

services that citizens require."

Id., at 847.

The Court emphasizes that municipal operation of
an intra-city mass transit system is relatively new in the
life of our country.
of

the

type

of

It nevertheless is a classic example

service

traditionally

provided

?l-.~~d' 4
t'1ngu1s
~
h a bl e 1n. pr1nc1p
• . . 1e

government ~

ItC~

by

local

f rom th e

traditional services of providing and maintaining streets,

20 As Justice Douglas observed in his dissent in
Maryland v. Wirtz, supra, extent ion of the FLSA to the
States could "disrupt the fiscal policy of the states and
threaten their autonomy in the regulation of health and
education." Id., at 302.

44.

public

lighting,

systems. 21
11

Wi th

Services

which
111

State

local

and

The

with

control,

of

citizens

conversant.

familiar

traffic

this

are

kind

more

Federalist,

officials
these

1

are

and

supra,

and

sewerage

precisely

familiar []

of course

services

water,

No.
must

those

and

minutely

46,

at

be

sensitive

316.

intimately
to

their

~~~~~.
quali~ , .

as

we~l

ou~u

officials also know that their constituents

~

as

"\

the

press

respond

to

the

~'
.~\.{ distribution, and cost of these services.

jf,f · /
~r-~ ·~( ~
,~ ~).
s
\, '-

'(

and

local control

understood

would

~~~~\._

preservation of

the

/(~

\,..V ~ •

~ ,~

\-

""\ 'ic
Y

\\

~

is this kind

accountability

insure

the

that

vitality

the
and

federal system that the Constitution

~~ ~'»~} ~ - - - 21

'0

and

fair

\\

~ -t" ?,

1("

state

Framers

·~ t" / ( , /

\('

of

adequacy,

.. X
{

/

~

'y,)

rn Long Island R.R.. G9:i:;-: the unanimous Court
recognized that 11 [t] his Court 1 s emphasis on traditional
governmental functions and traditional aspects of state
sovereignty was not meant to impose a static historical
view of state functions generally immune from federal
regulation. 11 455 u.s., at 686.

~.)~~ /~~y· ~ I J!)
v ~~-~.' '\.~ ..~~ / '<' f~>-v·
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45.

explicitly

requires.

See

National

League

of

Cities,

supra, at 847-852.
The Court maintains that the standard approved
in National League of Cities "disserves the principles of

/

\

democratic self government."
this

conclusion,

persons
It

elected

disregards

the

Ante, at xxx.

Court

to positions
entirely

the

looks
in
far

In reaching

myopically

the

federal

more

only

to

government.

effective

role

of

democratic self government at the state and local levels.
One must compare realistically the operation of the state
and local governments with that of the federal government.
Federal legislation is drafted primarily by the staffs of
the congressional committees.
bills

introduced

at

each

In view of the hundreds of

session

of

Congress

and

the

it is virtually impossible for

46.

even

the

familiar

most
with

conscientious
many

of

the

legislators
statutes

to

be

enacted.

truly
Federal

departments and agencies typically are authorized to write
regulations.

Often these are more important than the text

of the statutes.
drafted

Like the original legislation, these are

largely

administration
regulations

by

and

staff

personnel.

enforcement

of

Thus,

federal

necessarily

of

the

laws

and

staff

and

civil service employees.
In recognizing
works,

I

that

this

imply no criticism of

or

the

is
that

members

of

the

immense

H.s;
serv1ces

federal

traditionally

bureaucracy
rendered

by

~~
states

and

localities,

and

1

are

less

responsive

to

'

'

& ~:

>'

~islatures,

1t fair to

Ante, at

v
Although

the

Court's

opinion

purports

to

recognize that the States retain some sovereign power, it

~

..,

does not identify even a single aspect of state authority
that would remain when the Commerce Clause is invoked to
justify federal regulation.
overruled
reaffirmed,

by

National

In Maryland v. Wirtz, supra,

League

of

Cities

and

today

the Court sustained an extension of the FLSA

·.
,.

48.

to certain hospitals, institutions, and schools.
the

Court's

Justice

opinion

Douglas,

in Wirtz

in dissent,

was

Although

comparatively

wrote presciently

narrow,
that

the

Court's reading of the Commerce Clause would enable "the
National Government

[to]

devour

sovereignty,

that

sovereignty

Tenth

though

Amendment".

Justice

Douglas's

!d.,
fear

at

205.

once

the essentials of state
is attested by

Today' s
again

a

the

decision makes
realistic

one.
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Garcia

v.

San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority et

al.
Donovan v.

San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority et

al.
JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting.
The Court today, in its 5-4 decision, overrules
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426
case in which we held

<l>t-

=tz
.._:=:;,
8 ~Cf)

>
o5
- u
--

~&..!~

&~.~2: u

czwa:-J
a.
en
:;):;:)
CI)Q.

N
~

,....

u.s.

833 (1976), a

that Congress lacked authority to

impose the requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act on

0..

Ln

state

and

local

governments.

Because

I

believe

this

~

~

decision substantially alters the federal system embodied

;!) i
in . the Constitution, I dissent.
I

There

are,

of

course,

numerous

examples

over

the

history of this Court in which prior decisions have been
reconsidered

and

overruled.

I

can

recall,

however,

no

'

I.

2.

case in which the principle of stare decisis was ignored
as we now witness. 1

as flagrantly
Court

in

National

League

of

The reasoning of the

Cities,

and

the

principle

applied there, have been reiterated consistently over the
past eight years.

Since

its decision in 1976, National

League of Cities has been cited and quoted
joined by every member of

the present Court.

Virginia Surface Mining & Reel. Assn., 452
293

(1981):

United

R.R. ,_455 U.S.
456

u.s.

Transportation

678,

684-686

742, 764-767

Union

(1982):

u.s.
v.

Hodel v.
264, 287-

Long

Island

FERC v. Mississippi,

Less than three years ago,

(1982).

in Long Island R.R., supra,

in opinions

a unanimous Court reaffirmed

the principles of National League of Cities but found them
inapplicable

to

the

regulation

engaged in interstate commerce.

of

a

railroad

The Court stated:

heavily

3.

"The key prong of the National League of Cities
test applicable to this case is the third one
[repeated and reformulated in Hodel], which
examines whether 'the states' compliance with
the federal law would directly impair their
ability to structure integral operations in
areas of traditional governmental functions.'"
455

u.s.,

at 684.

The Court in that case recognized that

the test "may at times be a difficult one," ibid., but it
was

considered

in

that

unanimous

decision

as

settled

constitutional doctrine.
As recently as June 1, 1982 the five Justices who
constitute

the

majority

in

this

majority in FERC v. Mississippi.

case

also

were

the

In that case, the Court

said:
"In National League of Cities,
supra,
for
example, the Court made clear that the State's
regulation
of
its
relationship
with
its
employees is an 'undoubted attribute of state
sovereignty.'
426 u.s., at 845.
Yet,
by
holding 'unimpaired' California v. Taylor, 353
u.s. 553 (1957}, which upheld a federal labor
regulation
as
applied
to
state
railroad
employees, 426 U.S., at 854. n. 18, National
League of Cities acknowledged that not all
aspects of a State's sovereign authority are
immune from federal control."

..
,,

4.

426

u.s.,

even

at 764 n.

where

the

28.

The Court went on to say that

requirements

of

the National

League

of

Cities standard are met, "'[t]here are situations in which
the nature of the federal

interest advanced may be such

that

submission.'"

it

Hodel,

justifies
452

u.s.,

system

of

supra,

federal/state

state

at

288

Ibid.,

n.

regulation

29.

in

quoting

The

FERC was

joint
such

a

"situation", but there was no hint in the Court's opinion
that National League of Cities - or its basic standard was subject to the infirmities discovered today.
The doctrine of stare decisis is never entirely
persuasive on a constitutional question.
Akron Center
(1983).
"departure

for

Reproductive Health,

Nevertheless,
from

the

even

doctrine

in

City of Akron v.
462 U.S.

such a case,

of

stare

416,

however,

decisis

a

demands

....

5.

special justification."
(1984).
691-692 n.
the

Arizona v. Rumsey,

See also Oregon v.
34

present

(1982)
case,

Kennedy,

(JUSTICE STEVENS,

the

five

Justices

456

u.s.

__,

u.s.

667,

concurring).
who

compose

In
the

majority today participated in National League of Cities
and the cases reaffirming it. 2
decision,

The stability of judicial

and with it respect for

the authority of this

Court, are not served by the abrupt overruling of multiple
precedents we witness in this case. 3
Whatever effect the Court's decision may have
in

weakening

the

application

of

stare

decisis,

it

is

likely to be less important than what the Court has done
to

the

United

Constitution
States

is

the

itself.
federal

A unique

feature

of

the

system guaranteed

by

the

Constitution and implicit in the very name of our country.

6.

Despite

some

concept

of

genuflecting
federalism,

in

Court's

today's

opinion

decision

to

the

effectively

reduces the Tenth Amendment to meaningless rhetoric when
Congress acts pursuant to the Commerce Clause.
holds

that

the

Fair

Labor

Standards

The Court

Act

[ "FLSA"]

"contravened no affirmative limit on Congress' power under
the Commerce Clause" to determine the wage rates and hours
of employment of all state and local employees.
27.

In

rejecting

the

traditional

view of

our

Ante, at
federal

system, the Court states:
"Apart from the limitation on federal authority
inherent in the delegated nature of Congress'
Article I powers, the principal means chosen by
the Framers to ensure the role of the states in
the federal system lies in the structure of the
Federal Government itself."
Ante, at 21-22 (emphasis added).
To

leave

no

doubt

about

its

intention,

the

Court renounces its decision in National League of Cities

7.

because

it

"inevitably

invites

an

unelected

federal

judiciary to make decisions about which state policies its
favors

and

which

ones

it

dislikes".

Ante,

at

17.

In

other words, the extent to which the States may exercise
their authority, when Congress purports to act under the
Commerce Clause, henceforth is to be determined from time
to

time

by

political

decisions

made

by members of

the

federal government, decisions the Court says will not be
subject to judicial review.
to

have

occurred

to

the

I note that it does not seem
Court

that

it

-

an

unelected

majority of five Justices - today rejects almost 200 years
of

the

understanding

federalism.
reference

of

the

constitutional

status

of

In doing so, there is only a single passing

to the Tenth Amendment.

Nor

is so much as a

dictum of any court cited in support of the view that the

..

8.

role of the States in the federal system may depend upon
the grace of elected federal officials, rather than on the
Constitution as interpreted by this Court.
In my opinion that follows, Part II addresses the
Court's criticisms of National League of Cities.
reviews

briefly

ensured

the

the

understanding

ratification

of

the

of

Part III

federalism

Constitution

and

that
the

extent to which this Court, until today, has recognized
that the States retain a signficant measure of sovereignty
in

our

system.

federal

applicability

of

the

Part

FLSA

to

the

IV

considers

indisputably

the
local

service provided by an urban transit system.
II
The

Court

finds

that

the

test

of

State

immunity

approved in National League of Cities and its progeny is

9.

unworkable and unsound in principle.
to be unworkable,
National

League

the Court begins by mischaracter iz ing
of

concluding

that

unsound

principle,

long

in

In finding the test

Cities

efforts
the

and

to

subsequent

define

Court

state

cases.

In

immunity

are

radically departs

settled principles of constitutionalism and of

from
the

role of judicial review in our system of government.
A

Much of
that

it

is

governmental

the Court's
difficult

to

functions."

opinion
define

is devoted
a

National

priori

to

"traditional

League

of

neither engaged in, nor required, such a task. 4
discusses

and

condemns

as

standards

arguing

Cities

The Court

"traditional

governmental function[s] ,"

"purely historical" functions,

"'uniquely'

functions,"

governmental

and

"'necessary'

•

'·

<

10.

governmental

services."

nowhere

it mention

does

Ante ,

at

10 -11 ,

that National

15 ,

16 •

League of

But

Cities

adopted a familiar type of balancing test for determining
whether

Commerce

Clause

enactments

transgress

constitutional limitations imposed by the federal nature
of our system of government.

This omission is noteworthy,

since the author of today's opinion joined National League
of Cities and concurred separately to point out that the
Court's

opinion

in

that

case

"adopt[s]

a

balancing

approach [that] does not outlaw federal power in areas
. where the federal interest is demonstrably greater and
where

state

compliance

standards would be essential."
BLACKMUN concurring).

:..,
(

with

imposed

federal

426 U.S., at 856

(JUSTICE

11.

In

reading National League of Cities to embrace a

balancing approach, JUSTICE BLACKMUN quite correctly cited
the

part

States,

of

the

opinion

that

542

(1975).

u.s.

421

reaffirmed KE.Y_ v.
The

Court's

United

analysis

reaffirming Fry explicitly weighed the seriousness of the
problem addressed by the federal legislation at issue in
that

case,

against

' sovereignty.
decisions

426

also

respective

the

effects

u.s.,

adopted

interests

of

compliance

at

852-853.

this

approach

of

the

Our
of

States

immunity

the

Court

articulated

stated

that

"[t]he

in National League of

State

subsequent

weighing
and

government. 5 In EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226
example,

on

the

federal

(1983), for

principle
Cities

is

of
a

functional doctrine • • . whose ultimate purpose is not to
create a sacred province of state autonomy, but to ensure

r

'

'·

'I

12.

not be

that the unique benefits of a federal system
lost

through undue

federal

interference

state functions." Id., at 236.

in certain core

See also Hodel v. Virginia

u.s.

Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n., 452
In

overruling

National

League

of

264 (1981).

Cities,

the

Court

incorrectly characterizes the mode of analysis established
therein and developed in subsequent cases. 6
Moreover,
FLSA,

is

National

the

the

statute

identical

League of

at

issue

statute

Cities.

in

that

this

was

at

Although JUSTICE

case,
issue

the
in

BLACKMUN 's

concurrence noted that he was "not untroubled by certain
possible implications of the Court's opinion" in National
League of

Cities,

it

also stated that

"the result with

respect to the statute under challenge here [the FLSA]
necessarily correct."

426 U.S., at 856

is

(emphasis added).

13.

His

opinion

statute,

for

nor

the

Court

identify

today

any

does

changed

not

discuss

circumstances

the
that

warrant a different holding.
B

Today's opinion does not explain how the States' role
in

the

electoral

process

guarantees

that

particular

exercises of the Commerce Clause power will not infringe
on residual State sovereignty. 7

Members of Congress are

elected from the various States, but once in office they
are

members

States

of

the

participate

federal
in

the

government. 8
Electoral

Although

College,

this

the
is

hardly a reason to view the President as a representative
of the States' interest against federal encroachment.
noted

recently

"the

hydraulic

pressure

We

inherent within

each of the separate Branches to exceed the outer limits

.'

of

its

power

46 2 u . s .

Service v • Chadha ,
offers

no

Immigration and Naturalization

II

reason

to

think

919 ,
that

(1983).
this

The Court

pressure will not

operate when Congress seeks to invoke its powers under the
Commerce Clause, notwithstanding the electoral role of the
States. 9
The
success
and

exemptions

federal

is

from

• .

federal
the

indicative

political

interests.
not

apparently

at obtaining

statutes

is

Court

thinks
funds

obligations
of

process

the
in

to

the

the

States'

various projects
of

some

"effectiveness
preserving

" Ante, at 23-24. 10

relevant

for

that

the

federal
of

the

States'

But political success

question whether

the

political

processes are the proper means of enforcing constitutional
limitations. 11

The fact that Congress generally does not

15.

transgress

constitutional

limits

State activities does not make

on

its

power

to

reach

judicial review any less

necessary to rectify the infrequent cases in which it does
do so.

12

The States' role in our system of government is

a matter of constitutional law, not of legislative grace.
"The

powers

Constitution,

not
nor

delegated

prohibited

reserved to the States,

u.s.

to

the
by

United States by
it

to

the

States,

are

respectively, or to the people."

Const., Amend. 10.
More

troubling

than

the

logical

infirmities

the Court's reasoning is the result of its holding, i.
that

the

federal political officials,
the sole

judges of

invoking

the

the

in
~'

Commerce

Clause,

are

limits of their own

power.

This result is inconsistent with the fundamental

principles of our constitutional system.

See, e .g., The

..'

...
,.

'

16.

Federalist No.

78

(Hamilton).

At least since Marbury v.

Madison it has been the settled province of the federal
judiciary "to say what the law

is"

with respect to the

constitutionality of acts of Congress.

In rejecting the

role

the

of

federal

the

judiciary

overreaching,

explanation for

in

protecting

the

Court's

opinion

States
offers

from
no

ignoring the teaching of the most famous

case in our history.l3
III
A

In our

federal

system,

the States have a major

role that cannot be preempted by the national government.
As

contemporaneous

writings

and

the

debates

at

the

ratifying conventions make clear, the States' ratification
of the Constitution was predicated on this understanding

·'

17.

of

specifically
the

Indeed,

federalism.

States

the Tenth Amendment was adopted

to ensure that the
by

the

proponents

of

the

important role promised
of

the

Constitution

was

realized.
Much
Constitution
.government

was

fear

made

repeatedly
assurances

and

the

national

This

Constitution

powerful

that

eliminate the States as viable political entities.
voiced

too

the

the

to

would

was

be

in

opposition

eventually

concern

would

rooted

initial

until
that

proponents
a

bill

of

of

the

rights,

including a provision explicitly reserving powers in the
States,

would

Congress.

be

among

the

first

Samuel Adams argued,

business

of

the

new

for example, that if the

several States were to be joined in "one entire Nation,
under one Legislature, the Powers of which shall extend to

'

'

,.

•

,,

18.

every Subject of Legislation,
controul

the

whole,

the

States must be lost."
Henry Lee
versus

(Dec.

George Mason

Idea

feared

of

Sovereignty

in

&

these

Letter from Samuel Adams to Richard

3, 1787),

Federalists

and its Laws be supreme

159

reprinted

(J.

that

Lewis
"the

in Anti-Federalists

ed.

general

Likewise,

196 7) •

government being

paramount to, and in every respect more powerful than the
state

governments,

former."
(June

the

latter

must

give

way

to

the

Address in the Ratifying Convention of Virginia

4-12

1788),

reprinted

in

Anti-Federalists

versus

Federalists, supra, at 208-209.
Antifederalists
every
Elliot,

State

ratifying

Debates

raised these concerns
convention. 14

See

in almost
generally

in the Several State Conventions on the

Adoption of the Federal Constitution (1854).

As a result,

19.

eight

States

voted

for

the

Constitution

only

after

proposing amendments to be adopted after ratification. 15
All

eight of these

some

included among

version of what

Ibid.

So

strong

Constitution was

later

was

became

the

seriously

their

concern

recommendations

the Tenth Amendment.
that

the

defective without

proposed

a

specific

bill of rights, including a provision reserving powers to
the

States,

ratification,
such

that
the

provisions

in

order

Federalists
were

to

secure

eventually

necessary.

See

the

votes

for

conceded

that

Schwartz,

A

Documentary History of the Bill of Rights, supra, at 505
and

passim.

It

was

thus

generally

agreed

that

consideration of a bill of rights would be among the first
business of the new Congress.
Congress

432-437

(June

8,

See generally 1 Annals of
1789)

(remarks

of

James

.. -

·.
• t

',

~
'·

•·'.'

20.

Madison).

Accordingly, the ten amendments that we know as

the Bill of Rights were proposed and adopted early in the
first

session

of

the

First

Schwartz,

Congress.

Documentary History of the Bill of Rights,

supra,

A

983 -

1167.
This history, which the Court simply

ignores,

documents the integral role of the the Tenth Amendment in
our constitutional theory.

It exposes as well, I believe,

the fundamental character of the Court's error today.
from being "unsound in principle," ante,
enforcement

of

maintaining

the

the

Tenth

federal

Amendment

at 18, judicial
is

B

.

essential

to

system so carefully designed by

the Framers and adopted in the Constitution.

~:,.

Far

21.

The Framers had definite ideas about the nature of
the

Constitution's

division

of

federal and state governments.

authority

between

the

In The Federalist ' No. 39,

for example, Madison explained this division by drawing a
series of contrasts between the attributes of a "national"
government and those of the government to be established
by the Constitution.
would
and

possess an

things,"

Constitution

While a national form of government

"indefinite supremacy over all persons

the form of government contemplated by the
instead

consisted

of

"local

or

municipal

authorities [which] form distinct and independent portions
of the supremacy, no more subject within their respective
spheres

to

the

general

authority

than

the

general

authority is subject to them, within its own sphere."
Federalist No. 39, p. 256

(J. Cooke ed. 1961).

The

Under the

22.

Constitution,
extended

the

sphere

to jurisdiction of

only,

leav[ing]

of

the

proposed

government

"certain enumerated objects,

to the several States a residuary

and inviolable sovereignty over all other objects."
Madison

elaborated

on

the

content

of

Id.
these

separate spheres of sovereignty in The Federalist No. 45:
"The
powers
de leg a ted
by
the
proposed
Constitution to the Federal Government are few
and defined.
Those which are to remain in the
State Governments are numerous and indefinite.
The former will be exercised principally on
external objects, as war, peace, negotiation,
and foreign commerce:
The powers
reserved to the several States will extend to
all the objects, which, in the ordinary course
of affairs, concern the lives, liberties and
properties of the people: and the internal
order,
improvement,
and
prosperity
of
the
State."
Id.,

at 313.

the

federal

Madison considered that the operations of
government

would

be

"most

extensive

and

important in times of war and danger: those of the State
Governments in times of peace and security."

Ibid.

As a

..

23.

result of this division of powers, the State governments
generally

would

government.

be

more

important

than

the

federal

Ibid.

The Framers believed that the separate sphere of
sovereignty reserved to the States would ensure that the
States would serve as an effective "counterpoise" to the
power of the federal government.

The States would serve

this essential role because they would attract and retain
the loyalty of their citizens.

The roots of such loyalty,

the Founders thought, were found in the objects peculiar
to State government.
the States "regulat [e)

For
all

example,

Hamilton argued that

those personal

interests and

familiar concerns to which the sensibility of individuals
is more immediately awake • • •
supra, p. 107.

"

The Federalist No. 17,

Thus, he maintained that the people would

24.

perceive

the

States as

"the

immediate

and most

visible

guardian of life and property," a fact which "contributes
more than any other circumstance to impressing upon the
minds
towards

of

the

the

people

affection,

government."

Ibid.

that

"the

esteem

and

reverence

Madison

took

the

same

people

will

be

more

position,

explaining

familiarly

and minutely conversant" with the business of

State governments, and "with the members of these, will a
greater proportion of the people have the ties of personal
acquaintance

and

attachments • . •
Hamilton,

Madison

friendship,

loyalty.

of

family

and

party

The Federalist No. 46, p. 316.

II

saw

everyday concerns of
citizens'

and

the

States'

the people as

Id.

involvement

in

the source of

Like
the
their

See also Nagel, Federalism as a

25.

Fundamental

Value:

National

League

of

Cities

in

Perspective, 1981 Sup. Ct. Rev. 81 (1981).
Thus, the harm to the States that results from
federal

overreaching

under

the

Commerce Clause

simply a matter of dollars and cents.
Ci t i e s , 4 26 U• S • , at 8 4 6-8 51 •

by

not

National League of

Nor i s it a rna t t e r of the

wisdom or folly of certain policy choices.
17.

is

Cf. ante, at

Rather, by usurping functions traditionally performed
the States,

federal

overreaching

under

the Commerce

Clause undermines the constitutionally mandated balance of
power

between the States and the federal government,

a

balance designed to protect our fundamental liberties.

c
The emasculation of the powers of the States that
can result from the Court's decision is predicated on the

•"

'

f

_,

}.

·.
'

...

.
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Commerce

Clause

as

States"

by

the

states:

"Congress

a

power

"delegated

Constitution.
shall

have

The

to

the

United

relevant

language

to

regulate

power

commerce with foreign nations and among the several states
and with the Indian tribes."

Art.

I, §8.

Section eight

identifies a score of powers, listing the authority to lay
taxes, borrow money on the credit of the United States,
pay its debts, and provide for the common defense and the
general welfare before its brief reference to "Commerce."
It is clear from the debates leading up to the adoption of
the
that

Constitution
which

regulate.
Federal

that

the
See,

states
e.

Convention

Federalist

Nos.

the commerce

7,

to be

themselves

were

regula ted was
powerless

to

g., 1 M. Farrand, The Records of the
of
11,

(rev.

1787

22,

42,

45.

ed.
See

1937):

The

also EEOC v.

27.

Wyoming,

460

dissenting).
focuses

on

u.s.

226,

Indeed,

265

(1983)

(JUSTICE

POWELL,

the language of the clause itself

activities

that

only

a

national government

could regulate: commerce with foreign nations and Indian
tribes and "among" the several states.
To

be

sure,

this

Court

has

construed

the

Commerce Clause to accommodate unanticipated changes over
the past two centuries.

As these changes have occurred,

the Court has had to decide whether the federal government
has exceeded its authority in regulating activities beyond
the capability of a single state to regulate or beyond
legitimate federal interests that outweighed the authority
and interests of the States.

In so doing, however, the

Court properly has been mindful of the essential role of
the States in our federal system.

'·

"' .

..,

.,,

..
~)~

'

•

·'·
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The opinion for the Court in National League of
Cities was
federalism.

faithful

to history

in

its

understanding of

The Court observed that "our federal system

of government imposes definite limits upon the authority
of Congress to regulate the activities of States as States
by means of the commerce power."

4 26 U.S. , at 84 2.

Tenth

prevent

Amendment

exercising

was

invoked

"power

its

in

a

to

fashion

Congress

that

impairs

The
from
the

States' integrity or their ability to function effectively
in a federal system.'"
United States, 421

u.s.

Id.,

at 842-843, quoting !.E.Y_ v.

542, 547 n. 7 (1975)).

This Court has recognized repeatedly that State
sovereignty is a
government.

More than a century ago,

Oregon, 74 U.S.

..

<j"·•:

,
j

fundamental component of our system of
in Lane County v.

(7 Wall.) 71 ( 1868), the Court stated that

29.

the

Constitution

the

States,

recognized

and,

within

"the

necessary

their

proper

existence of
spheres,

It concluded,

independent authority of the States."

the
as

Madison did, that this authority extended to "nearly the
whole charge of interior regulation . • • ; to [the States]
and to the people all powers not expressly delegated to
the

national

Recently,

in

government
Community

are

reserved."

Communications

Co.

Id. ,

at

v.

City

7 6.
of

Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 53 (1982}, the Court recognized that
the

state

based

on

action exemption
State

from

sovereignty.

the

antitrust

Similarly,

in

laws was
United

Transportation Union v. Long Island Railroad Co., 455 U.S.
678,

683

(1982},

although

finding

the Railway Labor Act

applicable to a state-owned railroad, the unanimous Court

.;

30.

was

careful

say

to

that

the

possess

States

constitutionally preserved sovereign powers.
Again,
Mississippi, 456

in

u.s.

constitutionality

Federal

Regulatory

Commission

v.

742, 752 (1982), in determining the

of

the

Public

Utility

Regulatory

Policies Act, the Court explicitly considered whether the
Act

impinged

on

Tenth Amendment.

state

sovereignty

in

violation of

the

These represent only a few of the many

cases in which the Court has recognized not only the role,
but the
~,

importance,

United

States

of
v.

state sovereignty.
~,

supra:

See also,

e.

& Eddy

v.

Metcalf

Mitchell, 269 U.S. 514 (1926): Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221
559
not

(1911).
merely

u.s.

As Justice Frankfurter noted, the States are
a

factor

in

the

"shifting

arrangements" of our country, Kovacs v.

Cooper,

economic
336 U.S.

.,.

'

·.

31.

77,

95

(Justice

(1949)

Frankfurter,

concurring),

but

constitute a "coordinate element in the system established
by the Framers for governing our Federal Union."

National

League of Cities, supra, at 849.
D

In contrast,

the Court today propounds a view

of federalism that pays only lip service to the role of
the

Although

States.

"unquestionably
sovereign
Wyoming,
fails

Tenth

->

' ·"I

'retai[n]

authority,'"
460 U.s.

to

226,

recognize

sovereignty
retain.

do

that

Indeed,
Amendment

it

ante,
269

the

the

says
a

that

significant

at

20

the

States

measure

(quoting

EEOC

of
v.

(POWELL, J., dissenting)), it

broad,

Framers

yet

specific

intended

the

areas

of

States

to

the Court barely acknowledges that the
exists. 16

That

Amendment

states

32.

explicitly that "[t]he powers not delegated to the United
States •

• are r.eserved to the States."

Amend.

The Court recasts this

language to say that

retain

powers

the

10.

States

extent

that

the

their

sovereign

Constitution

has

not

U.s. Const.,

"only

divested

to

the

them of

their original powers and transferred those powers to the
Federal Government."
a

Arite, at 20.

This rephrasing is not

distinction without a difference;

rather,

it

reflects

the Court's unprecedented view that Congress is free under
the

Commerce

sovereign

Clause

power

to

without

assume
judicial

a

State's

review

of

traditional
its action.

Indeed, the Court's view of federalism appears to relegate
the States to precisely the trivial role that opponents of
the Constitution feared they would occupy.

..

17

33.

In National League of Cities, we spoke of fire
prevention,
health as

police

protection,

"typical of

sanitation,

[the services]

and

public

performed by state

and local governments in discharging their dual functions
of

administering

services."
activities
commerce,

426
remote
they

the

public

u.s.,

at

law
851.

and

furnishing

Not

only

from any normal concept of

are

also

activities

that

In

5.

emphasizing

governmental

the

functions,

need

we

to

protect

identified

these

interstate

epitomize

concerns of local, democratic self-government.

n.

are

public

the

the

See supra
traditional
kinds

of

activities engaged in by state and local governments that
affect the everyday lives of people.

These are services

that people have the ability to understand and evaluate as
well

as

the

right,

in

a

democracy,

to

oversee. 18

We

•,'

.,

34.

recognized

that

"it

is

governments are created
states

and

local

functions

such

as

to provide

governments

are

these

which

" and that the
better

able

426

u.s.,

national government to perform them.

than

the

at 851.

The Court maintains that the standard approved
in

National

League

of

Cities

"disserves

democratic self government."

Ante,

this

looks

conclusion,

persons
It

the

Court

elected to positions

disregards

entirely

the

at 18.

more

of

In reaching

myopically

in the
far

principles

only

to

federal government.
effective

role

of

democratic self-government at the state and local levels.
One must compare realistically the operation of the state
and local governments with that of the federal government.
Federal legislation is drafted primarily by the staffs of
the congressional committees.

In view of the hundreds of

,

'

·"

35.

bills

introduced

at

each

session

of

Congress

and

the

complexity of many of them, it is virtually impossible for
even

the

familiar

most
with

conscientious
many

of

the

legislators
statutes

to

be

enacted.

truly
Federal

departments and agencies typically are authorized to write
regulations.

Often these are more important than the text

of the statutes.
drafted

Like the original legislation, these are

largely

administration

by

and

staff

personnel.

enforcement

of

Thus,

federal

laws

the
and

regulations necessarily are largely in the hands of staff
and

civil

service

employees.

These

employees

may

have

little or no knowledge of the States and localities that
will be affected by the statutes and regulations for which
they

..

are

responsible.

In any case,

they hardly are as

36.

accessible and responsive as those who occupy analogous
positions in State and local governments.
In drawing this contrast, I imply no criticism of
these

federal

ultimately

in

employees
charge.

or
The

the

officials
great

who

majority

conscientious and faithful to their duties.

are
are

My point is

simply that members of the immense federal bureaucracy are
not elected,

know less about the services traditionally

rendered by states and localities, and are inevitably less
responsive to recipients of such services, than are state
legislatures, city councils, and boards of supervisors of
local agencies.

Thus, while I share the Court's concern

with "principles of democratic self-government,"

I think

they are better served by National League of Cities than
the Court's position today.

.,

37.

IV.
The question presented
the

extension

employees

of

the

of

a

unconstitutionally
sovereignty.
than

to

the

wages

city-owned
impinges

on

and

hours

of

transit

system

fundamental

state

The Court's sweeping holding does far more

simply

overruling

FLSA

in this case is whether

answer
National

this

question

League

of

in

the

Cities,

negative.

today's

In

opinion

apparently authorizes federal control, under the auspices
of the Commerce Clause, over the terms and conditions of
employment of
purposes

of

all state and
federal

local employees.

regulation,

the

Court

Thus,

for

rejects

the

distinction between public and private employers that had
been drawn carefully

in National r.. eague of Cities.

'I'he

Court's action reflects a serious misunderstanding, if not

.,.

38.

an outright rejection, of the history of our country and
the intention of the Framers of the Constitution. 19
I return now to the balancing test approved in
National

League

Island R.R.

of

Cities

and

accepted

, and FERC v. Mississippi.

in Hodel,

Long

Under this test,

the Court should consider whether the service or activity
at

issue

is

one

that

"the

states

and

their

political

subdivisions have traditionally afforded their citizens."
National League of Cities, supra, at 855.
One

cannot

think

of

a

more

See ante, at
fundamental

and

traditional activity of a State than determination of the
terms and conditions of employment of its own employees.
Moreover, the Court does not find
"federal

interest

is

demonstrably

finding could have been made,

·.

for

in this case that the
greater."

No

such

the state interest is

39.

compelling.

The

financial

impact

on

States

and

localities of displacing their control over wages, hours,
overtime regulations, pensions, and labor relations with
their

employees

could

unanticipated,

effects

budgeting,

the

and

have
on

serious,

State

levying of

and

taxes. 20

as
local

well

as

planning,

As we said

in

National League of Cities, federal control also inevitably
"displaces state policies regarding the manner
[States]

will

structure

delivery of

services that citizens require."

in which

those governmental

Id., at 847.

The Court emphasizes that municipal operation of
an intra-city mass transit system is relatively new in the
life of our country.

It nevertheless is a classic example

of the type of service traditionally provided by local
government.

It

is

local

by

definition.

It

is

•''

l.

40.

indistinguishable
services

of

in

providing

principle
and

from

the

maintaining

traditional

streets,

public

lighting, traffic control, water, and sewerage systems. 21
Services

of

this

kind

citizens are more
The Federalist,

1

are

precisely

familiar []

supra, No.

those

"with which

and minutely conversant.

46, p.

316.

1

"

State and local

officials of course must be intimately familiar with these
services and sensitive to their quality as well as cost.
Such officials also know that their constituents and the
press respond to the adequacy, fair distribution, and cost
of these services.
control

and

It

is

accountability

this
that

kind of
the

state and local

Framers

understood

would insure the vitality and preservation of the federal
system

that

the

Constitution

explicitly

requires.

See

National League of Cities, supra, at 847-852.

..

.."

41.

v
Although

the

Court's

opinion

purports

to

recognize that the States retain some sovereign power, it
does not identify even a single aspect of state authority
that would remain when the Commerce Clause is invoked to
justify

federal

regulation.

In

Maryland

v.

Wirtz,

392

U.S. 183 (1968) ,overruled by National League of Cities and
today reaffirmed, the Court sustained an extension of the
FLSA

to

certain

hospitals,

Although

the Court's opinion

narrow,

Justice

that

the

Court's

Douglas,
reading

institutions,
in Wirtz

in dissent,
of

the

and

schools.

was comparatively
wrote

Commerce

presciently
Clause

would

enable "the National Government [to] devour the essentials
of state sovereignty, though that sovereignty is attested

',.

42.

by the Tenth Amendment".

Id., at 205.

Today's decision

makes Justice Douglas's fear once again a realistic one.
As I view the Court' decision today as rejecting the
basic

precepts

of

ourfederal

system

and

limiting

constitutional role of judicial review, I dissent.
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1 National Lea~ue of Cities,
following some
changes in the composit1on of the Court, had overruled
Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 u.s. 183 (1968).
Unlike National
League of Cities, the holding of Wirtz had not been
repeatedly accepted by our subsequent decisions.
2Justice 0 'Connor succeeded Justice Stewart in
September 1981, and participated in United Transportation
Union v. Long Island R. Co., 455 u.s. 678 (1982), and FERC
V. MlSSissippi, 456 U.S .-=r4"2 (1982).
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3 As we observed recently, "stare decisis is a
doctrine that demands respect in a society governed by the
rule of
law." City of Akron v.
Akron Center for
Reproductive Health, Inc.,
U.S. ___ (1983).
In this
respect, stare decisis represents "a natural evolution
from the very nature of our institutions."
Li le, "Some
Views on the Rule of Stare Decisis," 4 Va. L. Rev. 955,956
(1916).
4 In National League of Cities, we referred to
the sphere of state sovereignty as including "traditional
governmental functions," a realm which is, of course,
difficult to define with precision.
But the luxury of
precise definitions is one rarely enjoyed in interpreting
and applying the general provisions of our Constitution.
Not surprisingly,
therefore,
the Court's attempt to
demonstrate
the
impossibility
of
definition
is
unpersuasive.
A number of the cases it cites simply do
not
involve
the
problem
of
defining
governmental
functions.
E. g., Williams v. Eastside Mental Health
Center, Inc., 669 F.2d 671 (CAll), cert. denied, 459 u.s.
976 (1982): Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 552 F.2d 25
(CA2), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 902 (1977).
A number of
others are not properly analyzed under the principles of
National League of Cities, notwithstanding some of the
language of the lower courts.
E.g., in United States v.
Best, 573 F.2d 1095 (CA9 1978) and Hybud Equipment Corp.
v. City of Akron, 654 F. 2d 1187 (CA6 1981).
Moreover,
rather than carefully analyzing the case law, the Court
simply lists various functions thought to be protected or
unprotected by courts interpreting National League of
Cities. Ante, at 9-10. In the cited cases, however, the
courts considered the issue of State immunity on the
specific facts at issue; they did not make blanket

pronouncements that particular things inherently qualified
as traditional governmental functions or did not. Having
thus considered the cases out of context, it was not
difficult for the Court to conclude that there is no
"organizing principle" among them. See ante, at 10.
5 In
undertaking
such
balancing,
we
have
considered, on the one hand, the strength of the federal
interest in the challenged legislation and the impact of
exempting the States from its reach.
Central to our
inquiry into the federal interest is how closely the
challenged action implicates the central concerns of the
Commerce Clause,
viz., the promotion of a national
economy and free trade among the states.
See EEOC v.
Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 244 (JUSTICE STEVENS, concurring}.
E. g. United Transportation Union v. Long Island Rail Road
Co.,
455 U.S. 678, 688 (1982}
("Congress long ago
concluded that federal regulation of railroad labor
services is necessary to prevent disruptions in vital rail
service essential to the national economy."}:
FERC v.
Mississiepi, 456 u.s. 742, · 757 (1982}, ("it is difficult
to conce1ve of a more basic element of interstate commerce
than electric energy
• "} .
Similarly, we have
considered
whether
exempting
States
from
federal
regulation would undermine the goals of the federal
program.
See!£[ v. United States, 421 u.s. 542 (1975}.
See also Hodel, 452 U.S. at 282 (national surface mining
standards necessary to insure competition among States
does not undermine States' efforts to maintain adequate
intrastate standards}.
On the other hand, we have
assessed the injury done to the States if forced to comply
with federal Commerce Clause enactments.
See National
League of Cities, 426 U.S., at 846-851.
6 In
addition,
reliance
on
the
Court's
difficulties in the tax immunity field is misplaced.
Although
the
Court
has
abandoned
the
"governmental/proprietary" distinction in this field, see
New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572 (1946}, it has not
taken the drast1c approach of relying solely on the
structure of the federal government to protect the States'
immunity from taxation.
See Massachusetts v. United
States, 435 u.s. 444 (1978}. Thus, faced with an equally
difficult problem of defining constitutional boundaries of
federal action directly affecting the States, we did not

..

adopt the view many would think naive, that the federal
government itself will protect whatever rights the States
may have.
7 Late in its opinion, the Court suggests that
after all there may be some "affirmative limits the
constitutional structure might impose on federal action
affecting the States under the Commerce Clause." Ante, at
27.
The Court asserts that " [ i] n the factual setting of
these cases the internal safeguards of the political
process have performed as intended." Ibid. The Court does
not explain the basis for this judgment.
Nor does it
identify
the circumstances
in which
the
"political
process" may fail and "affirmative limits" are to be
imposed.
Presumably, such limits are to be determined by
the Judicial Branch even though it is "unelected".
Today's op1n1on, however, has rejected the balancing
standard and suggests no other standard that would enable
a court to determine when there has been a malfunction of
the "political process".
The Court's failure to specify
the "affirmative limits" on federal power, or when and how
these limits are to be determined, may well be explained
by the transparent fact that any such attempt
would be
subject to precisely the same objections on which it
relies to overrule National League of Cities.
8 one can hardly imagine this Court saying that
because Congress is composed of individuals, individual
rights are amply protected by the legislative process.
Yet, the posit ion adopted today is ind ist ingui shable in
principle.
The Tenth Amendment was adopted as an
essential part of the Bill of Rights and should be viewed
as such. See infra, at
9 At one time in our history, the view that the
structure of the federal government sufficed to protect
the States might have had somewhat more practical,
although not more logical, bas is.
Professor Wechsler,
whose seminal article in 1954 proposed the view adopted by
the Court today, predicated his argument on assumptions
that simply do not accord with current reality. Professor
Wechsler wrote: "National action has
always been
regarded as exceptional in our polity, an instrusion to be
justified by some necessity, the special rather than the
ordinary case."
Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of

Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and
Selection of the National Government, 54 Colum. L. Rev.
543, 544 (1954).
Not only is the premise of this view
clearly at odds with the proliferation of national
legislation over the past 30 years, but "a variety of
structural and political changes in this century have
combined to make Congress particularly insensitive to
state
and
local
values."
Advisory
Comm'n
on
Intergovernmental Relations [ACIR], Regulatory Federalism:
Policy, Process,
Impact and Reform 50
(1984).
The
adoption of the Seventeenth Amendment (providing for
direct election of senators), the weakening of political
parties on the local level, and the rise of national
media, among other things, have made Congress increasingly
less representative of State and local interests, and more
likely to be responsive to the demands of various national
constituencies.
Id.,
at
50-51.
As
one
observer
explained, "As Senators and members of the House develop
independent constituencies among groups such as farmers,
businessmen, laborers, environmentalists, and the poor,
each
of
which
generally
supports
certain
national
initiatives,
their
tendency
to
identify with
state
interests
and
the positions of state officials
is
reduced."
Kaden, "Federalism in the Courts: Agenda for
the 1980s," in ACIR, The Future of Federalism in the '80s
97 (1981).
See also Kaden, Politics, Money, and State
Sovereignty: The Judicial Role, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 847
(1979) (changes in political practices and the br~adth of
national initiatives mean that the political branches "may
no longer be as well suited as they once were to the task
of safeguarding the role of the states in the federal
system
and
protecting
the
fundamental
value
of
federalism.") and ACIR, Regulatory Federalism, su~ra, at
1- 24 (detai 1 ing the "dramatic shift" in kind of eder al
regulation applicable to the States over the past two
decades).
Thus, even if one were to ignore the numerous
problems
with
the
Court's
position
in
terms
of
constitutional
theory,
there
would
remain
serious
questions as to its factual premises.
10 The
Court
believes
that
the
significant
financial assistance afforded the States and localities by
the
federal
government
is
relevant
to
the
constitutionality of extending Commerce Clause enactments

to the States.
See ante, at 23-24, 26. This Court has
never held, however, that the mere disbursement of funds
by the federal government establishes a right to control
activities that benefit from such funds.
See Pennhur st
State School v. Halderman, 451 u.s. 1, 17-18 (1981).
Regardless of the willingness of the federal government to
provide federal aid, the constitutional question remains
the same:
whether the federal statute violates the
sovereign powers reserved to the States by the Tenth
Amendment.
11 Apparently in an effort to reassure the States,
the Court identifies several major statutes that thus far
have not been made applicable to State governments: the
Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. 824(f) ~ the Labor Management
Relations Act, 29 u.s.c. §152 (2) ~ the Labor-Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act, 29 u.s.c. §402(e) ~ the
Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 u.s.c. §652(5) ~ the
Employee Retirement Insurance Security Act, 29 U.S.C.
§§1002 (32), 1003 (b) (1} ~ and the Sherman Act, Parker v.
Brown, 317 u.s. 341 (1943}. Ante, at 24. The Court does
not suggest that this restra1nt will continue after its
decision is understood.
Indeed, it is unlikely that
special interest groups will fail to accept the Court 1 s
open invitation to urge Congress to extend these and other
statutes
to
apply
to
the States and
their
local
subdivisions.
12 This
Court
has
never
before
abdicated
responsibility for assessing the constitutionality of
challenged action on the ground that affected parties
theoretically are able to look out for their own interests
through the electoral process.
As the Court noted in
National League of Cities, a much stronger argument as to
inherent structural protections could have been made in
e i the r Buck 1 e y v • Va 1 eo , 4 2 4 U . S • 1 ( 19 7 6 ) or My e r s v •
United States, 272 u.s. 52 (1926), than can be made here.
In these cases, the President signed legislation that
limited his authority with respect to certain appointments
and thus arguably "it was no concern of this Court that
the law violated the Constitution." 426 u.s., at 841-842
n.
12.
The
Court
nevertheless
held
the
laws
unconstitutional because they infringed on presidential
authority, the President 1 s consent notwithstanding.
The

..., ,

·'

Court does not address this point;
authority for its contrary view.

nor does it cite any

13 The Court states that the decision in National
League of Cities "invite[s] an unelected federal judiciary
to make decisions about which state policies it favors and
which ones its dislikes."
Curiously, the Court then
suggests that under the application of the "traditional"
governmental function analysis, "the states cannot serve
as laboratories for social and economic experiment".
Ante, at 17, citing Justice Brandeis' famous observation
in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932)
(Justice Brandeis, dissenting).
Apparently the Court
believes that when "an unelected federal judiciary" makes
decisions as to whether a particular function is one for
the federal or state governments, the States no longer may
engage in "social and economic experiment". Ante, at 17.
The Court's decision putting federal Commerce Clause
enactments beyond judicial review, however, surely does
not
enhance the
States'
opportunities to serve as
"laboratories."
14 opponents of the Constitution were particularly
dubious of the Federalist claim that the States retained
powers not delegated to the United States in the absence
of an express provision so providing. For example, James
Winthrop wrote that " [ i] t is a mere fallacy .
• that
what rights are not given are reserved."
Letters of
Agrippa, reprinted in Schwartz, The Bill of Rights, supra,
at 510, 511.
15 Indeed, the Virginia legislature came very
close to withholding ratification of the Constitution
until the adoption of a bill of rights that included,
among other things, the substance of the Tenth Amendment.
See Schwartz, ~he Bill of Rights, supra, at 762 - 766 and
passim.
16 The
Court's
opinion
mentions
the
Tenth
Amendment only once, when it restates the question put to
the parties for reargument in this case. See ante, at 8.
17 As the amici argue, "the ability of the [S]tates
to fulfill their role in the constitutional scheme is
dependent solely upon their effectiveness as instruments

f •.•

..;>

of self-government."
Brief of Twenty-Four States as
Amicus Curiae 50. See also Brief of the National League
of Cities et al as Amicus Curiae (a brief on behalf of
every major organizat1on representing the concerns of
State and local governments).
18 The Framers recognized that the most effective
democracy occurs at local levels of government, where
people with first hand knowledge of local problems have
more ready access to public officials responsible for
dealing with them. E. g., The Federalist No. 17, at 107;
No.45, at 316. This is as true today as it was when the
Constitution was adopted.
"Participation is likely to be
more frequent, and exercised at more different stages of a
governmental activity at the local level, or in regional
organizations, than at the state and federal levels.
[Additionally,] the proportion of people actually involved
from the total population tends to be greater, the lower
the level of government, and this, of course, better
approximates the citizen participation ideal."
ACIR,
Citizen Participation in the American Federal System 95
(1979).
Moreover, we have witnessed in recent years the
rise of numerous special interest groups that engage in
sophisticated lobbying, and make substantial campaign
contributions to some members of Congress.
These groups
are thought to have significant influence in the shaping
and enactment of certain types of legislation.
Contrary
to the Court's view, a "political process" that functions
in this way is unlikely to safeguard the sovereign rights
of States and localities.
19 The opinion of the Court in National
League of Cities makes clear that the very essence of a
federal system of government is to impose "definite limits
upon the authority of Congress to regulate the activities
of the States as States by means of the commerce power."
See also the Court's opinion in~' supra, at 547 n. 7.
20 As Justice Douglas . observed in his dissent in
Maryland v. Wirtz, supra, extention of the FLSA to the
States could "disrupt the fiscal policy of the states and
threaten their autonomy in the regulation of health and
education." Id., at 302.

..

21 In Long Island R. Co. the unanimous Court
recognized that "[t]his Court's emphasis on traditional
governmental functions and traditional aspects of state
sovereignty was not meant to impose a static historical
view of state functions generally immune from federal
regulation." 455 U.S., at 686.

....

·.•
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DISS ANN-POW
82-1913 and 82-1951 Garcia

JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting.
The Court today,

in its 5-4 decision, overrules

National League of Cities v. Usery, 426

u.s.

833 (1976), a

case in which we held that Congress lacked authority to
impose the requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act on
local

governments.

Because

I

believe

this

Cam't, I 'Lespeetful-ly dissent.

)a

I

There

are,

of

course,

numerous

examples

over

the

history of this Court in which prior decisions have been
reconsidered

and

overruled.

I

can

recall,

however,

no

case in which the principle of stare decisis was ignored

..

2.

as flagrantly as we now witness.
Cburt

in

National

League

of

1

The reasoning of

Cities,

and

the

the

principle

applied there, have been reiterated consistently over the
past eight years.
been

cited

opinions

and

joined

National League of Cities

quoted,
by

since

every

its

member

287-293

(1981):

Island R. Co.,

455

of

the

in 1974,

present

Court.

u.s.

United Transportation Union v.

Long

u.s.

678,

&

684-686

(1982): and Federal

Energy Regulatory Commission v. Mississippi, 456
764-767 (1982).

in

Reel. Ass'n, 452

H:>del v. Virginia Surface Mining
264,

decision

itself has

u.s.

742,

Less than three years ago, in Long Island

R. Co., supra, a unanimous Court reaffirmed the principles

1 National League of Cities,
following some
changes in the composition of the Court, had overruled
Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 u.s. 183 (1968).
Unlike National
League of Cities, Wirtz had not been repeatedly accepted
by our subsequent decisions.

3.

of National League of Cities but found them inapplicable
to

the

regulation

interstate commerce.

of

a

railroad

heavily

engaged

in

The Court stated:

"The key prong of the National League of Cities
test applicable to this case is the third one
[repeated and reformulated in Hodel), which
examines whether 'the states' compliance with
the federal law would directly impair their
ability to structure integral operations in
areas of traditional governmental functions.'"
Id., at 684.

The Court in that case recognized that the

test

times

"may

at

be

a

application was considered

difficult

one",

id.,

but

its

in that unanimous decision as

settled constitutional doctrine.
Justice Blackmun, the author of today's reversal
of

National

League

of Cities,

wrote

the opinion of

the

Court in FERC v. Mississippi, supra, decided June 1, 1982.
The four Justices who now join Justice Blackmun are the

<

t

4.

four who joined his opinion
Mississippi.

in

its entirety

in FERC v.

In that case, the Court

"In National League of Cities v. Usery, supra,
for example, the Court made clear that the
State's regulation of its relationship with its
employees is an 'undoubted attribute of state
sovereignty.'
Id., at 845.
Yet, by holding
'unimpaired' California v. Taylor, 353 u.s. 553
(1957), which upheld a federal labor regulation
as applied to state railroad employees, 426
u.s., at 854. n. 18, National League of Cities
acknowledged that not all aspects of a State 1 s
sovereign authority are immune from federal
control."
Id., n.
even

p.

28,

where

the

764.

lk__~

T~te

"\

requirements

Cities standard are met,

it

the

National

system

of

of

interest advanced may be such

justifies state submission".

federal/state

League

"there are situations in which

the nature of the federal
that

of

went on to say that

regulation

Ibid.
in

The

FERC

was

joint
such

a

"situation", but there was no hint in Justice Blackmun's
q>inion

that

National

League

of

Cities

-

or

its

basic

5.

standard

that

he

was

reiterated

subject

to

the

infirmities discovered today •
. It is true
does

not

that

the doctrine of stare decisis

apply with the same

force

in a constitutional

case as it does where the meaning of the Constitution is
mt

at

issue.

Reproductive
this case,

City

Health,
however,

of

103

Akron

v.

Ct.

2481

S.

Akron
(1983).

u.s.

456

u.s.

667,

concurring).

(1984) •
691

Even

for
in

"any departure from the doctrine of

stare decisis demands special justification."
Rumsey,

Center

n.

Arizona v.

See also Oregon v. Kennedy,
34

(1982)

(JUSTICE

STEVENS

In the present case, the five Justices who

compose the majority today participated in National League
of Cities and the cases reaffirming it. 2

The stability of

Footnote(s) 2 will appear on following pages •

.,, .

6.

judicial decision,

and with it respect for

the authority

of this Court, are not served by the abrupt overruling of

~~ts we witness
A

in this case. 3

Whatever effect the Court's decision may have
in weakening

the

application of

stare decisis,

this

is

likely to be less important than what the Court has done
to

the

united

Constitution
States

Constitution

is
and

its

itself.
federal

implicit

in

A unique

feature

of

the

system guaranteed

by

the

the

country

name

of

our

2 Justice O'Connor succeeded Justice Stewart 1n
September 1981, and participated in United Transportation
Union v. Long Island R. Co., 455 u.s. 678, 684-686 (1982),
and FERC v~ Mississippi, 456 u.s. 742, 764-767 (1982)~
As we observed recently, "stare decisis is a
doctrine that demands respect in a society governed by the
rule of law." City of Akron v.
Akron Center
for
Reproductive Health, Inc., ___ u.s. ___ (1983). See also,
e. g., Bickel, The Supreme Court and the Idea of Progress
82 (1970); Hughes, The Supreme Court of the United States
(1928).
In this respect, stare decisis represents "a
natural
evolution
from
the
very
nature
of
our
institutions."
Lile, "Some Views on the Rule of Stare
Decisis," 4 Va. L. Rev. 955-956 (1916).

I'~

7.

itself.

Despite some genuflecting in Court's opinion to

the concept of federalism, today's decision can be viewed
, A
as

effectively

~

rc:ea&i1tg._ the

k
/
~ ,e.g; !!i; iliJJii: ffE.t..- .
~

CoRsti t nt ten.

Standards Act

The

Court

["FLSA")

Tenth
holds

~ · ~~

Amendment \.o tileft:Ref"

"')

that

the

Fair

Labor

"contravened no affirmative limit

on Congress' power under the Commerce Clause" to determine
the wage rates and hours of employment of all state and
local

employees.

at

27.

In

rejecting

the

traditional view of our federal system, the Court states:
"Apart from the limitation on federal authority
inherent in the delegated nature of Congress'
Article I powers, the principal means chosen by
the Framers to ensure the role of the states in
~e federal system lies in the structure of the
federal government 96'~~nt."
Ante, at 21, 22 (emphasis added).

1\

~~
The "structure" relied upon

is~ the

6-L

f-&et that bhe

fk_ ~ fi:l~-i.L ~J

states have- "'& ~ e-le in the selection of both the Executive

A

t

and Legislative Branches of the federal government".

•'l•
l

Id.

~

8.

~0--~.h._ ~
-Olr . t;LJ~~

Ne-me-R-1:~~....-oi~,.s...-JIJQJ:::Le....-c;;;,~

Athe

Tenth

~ · ~~ii::1
C..:~

;:;o

Amendment ~ 11'1!5- et~

~~~~\'~

if ~; as "&R&I::tr[ing)" ehE 'tdl e= o r the
.........
_.;..s..j~~''- 1-tu. ~k~ ~ ~ J-4
states .

is cited for the holding that the
fl

role of states in the federal

systemA~ ~

rW.- ~rY(Aa.~~

AConst1 tution
states

may

itself.

~

. -; he

exercise

their

extent

authority

to

now

which
is

to

the
be

determined from time to time by political decisions of the
~

Congress and the President, decisions the CourtAsays will
not be subject to judicial review.
/

least

remarkable

criticism

of

(

aspect

National

of

the

League

Id.
- )

Court] s
of

Indeed, not the
opinion

Cities

is

its

because

it

?

"inevitably invites an unelected federal judiciary to make
d~~ ions about which state policies it favors

ooes

it dislikes".

Ante,

at

occur to the Court that it -

17.

It does

and which

not

seem to

an "unelected" majority of
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RIDERB7 SALLY-POW
The "structure" said to "ensure the role of the
states in the federal system is their function in "the
selection of both the Executive and Legislative Branches
of the federal government".

Id., at 27.

To leave no

doubt about its intention, the Court renounces its
decision in National League of Cities because it
"inevitably invites an un y elected federal judiciaf t o make
decisions about which state policies its favors and which
ones it dislikes".

Ante, at 17.

In other words, the

extent to which the states may exercise their authority,
where Congress purports to act under the Commerce Clause,
now is to be determined from time to time by political
decisions made in Washington, decisions the Court says

~.

•1-• ~~

\':

.I.

'

...

2.

will not be subject to judicial review.

!d.

I note in

passing, it does not seem to have occurred to the Court
that it - and unp elected majority of five Justices - today
rejects almost 200 years of the understanding of the
constitutional status of federalism.

In doing so, there

is only the barest mention of the Tenth Amendment.

so much as a dictum

~ any court~ ted

Nor is

in support of the

view that the role and authority of the states in the

~

federal system depend upon the grace of elected federal
~

t:L£-

/A<,·~~ ~ ~

officials rather than the Constitution~ ~!£ .

'

'

~

9.

1ve

Justices

-

today

rejects

almost

200 years of

he

the canst· tutional status of fed~l~ ---- '

~~

will return later to the Court •·s t£eatment of

<.4a .u?s Jt£
federalism.

First,

I

·

;wzi2c(:., )

will address i ts~ r i tic ism of the

, { \ general standard of National League o f-Cities.

_/

II
The

Court

~n
....

finds

the

test

of

State

immunity

National League of Cities and its progeny is

unworkable and
eeRolYBiGA5--do

~st

that

unsound
~

in principle.

-wiUu1taae

to be unworkable, the

sc..r,.l-ti-fty.

Ifl my '+'iew,
In

finding

Cou~~~rizes

the

National

"\

League of Cities and subsequent cases.

the ~

Ifr-eencluaing

5'~.

~

t~t ~~

~

/

) ;

~
Court ~ adically departs from long settled principles

lfp/ss 12/07/84
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J1f

nu_~_s

In the opinion that follows, I will address in Part II~-'\
criticism of the rationale of National League of Cities
and the standard it applied.
the

Part III will review briefly

understandin1at=e~~ti~f
"

the

Constitution and the extent to which this Court, until
today, has recognized that we have a federal system in
which the states retain a signficant measure of
sovereignty.

Part IV will consider the applicability of
~,L.e..--~

the FLSA to the indisputabld local ~service provided by an
urban transit system.

10.

of constitutionalism and of the role of judicial review in
our system of government.
A

Much of
that

it

is

governmental

the

Court's

difficult

to

functions."

opinion
define

is devoted
a

National

priori

to

"traditional

League

neither engaged in, nor required, such a task. 4

~

arguing

of

Cities

The Court

~

y(~~.•
4 In Natio
ue of Cities,
referred to
the sphere of state overeig
as including "traditional
governmental function ," a realm
ich
f course,
difficult
to
define
~
the
C
t's
a tempt
to
/
demonstrate
i~
. ._,;'*'lila
i!llpossibili t
is
s.elftewhat. ;;::>
A number of . ~· the cases it cites do not
nvol ve, the problem of
ef ining governmental functions.
E.g., Williams v. Eastsi e Mental Health Center Inc., 669
F.2d 671 (CAll),
cer • denied
459 u.s. 976 (1982):
Friends of the Earth
• Carey, 552 F.2d 25 (CA2), cert.
denied, 434 u.s. 90
(1977).
A number of others are not
roperly an·a lyzed
der the principles of National League
o Cities
notwithstanding some of the language of
the lower > cour
E.g., in United States v. Best, 573
F.2d 1095 (CA 1978) and Hybud Equipment Corp. v. City of
Akron, 654
• 2d 1187 (CA6 1981). Moreover, rather than
carefully nalyzing the case law, the Court simply lists
various
unctions thought to be protected or unprotected
by co ts interpreting National League of Cities.
Ante,
at
-10.
In the cited cases, however,
the courts
Footnote continued on next page.

11.

teaay

discusses

"purely

"traditional

historical"
and

functions,"

functions,
"'necessary'

governmental
"'uniquely'

functions,"
governmental

governmental

services."

fh_(Ante,

at

National

10;-11,

15,

League

of

~ ht)LL~

-1

balancing - test
enactments

for

16 •..)( ...-NOwhere
Cities

aft~

/

determining

transgres~

does

i~s

it mention

-PFQ9eftY

whether

adopted

Commerce

a

Clause

constitutional limitations imposed

by the federal nature of our system of government.

This

01 ~$
BLACKMON,

omission

wno

that

oest tbe

~
A. concurred

of Cities,

separately to note that the Court's opinion in

wf'~)
consi ered the issue of state immunity on the specific
facts · GQ£~ ~ t; they did not make blanket pronouncements
that particular things inherently qualified as traditional
governmental functions or did not. Having thus considered
the cases out of context, it is not surprising that
could find no "organizing principle"
ante, at 10.

12.

that case
not

ou~w
11,

interest

~dopt[sl

a balancing approach [that] does

federal power in areas • • • where the federal
is demonstrably

compliance
essential."

with

greater

imposed

federal

u.s.,

426

and where state
standards
(JUSTICE

856

at

•

• •

would

be

BLACKMON

concurring) •
National League of Cities to embrace a
balancing approach, JUSTICE BLACKMON quite correctly cited
that part of the
United States, 421
reaffirming

~

er
u.s.

opinion that reaffirmed .Ell. v.

542 (1975).

The Court's analysis

explicitly weighed the seriousness of the

problem addressed by the federal legislation at issue in
that

case,

sovereignty.

against

the

426

u.s.,

effects
at

of

compliance

852-853.

Our

on State
subsequent

~al~t~~:;;·~·:::::
~~

~~

(
rl..Lf-''0_:<>: .R. . A S,
------~==~~
~~~~
Footnote(s) 5 will appear on following pages •

• 4[':·, ....

'·,

13.

u.s.

v. Wyoming,

46-~

stated

"(t]he principle of

that

226

(1983),

for

example,

the Court

immunity articulated

in

tational League of Cities is a functional doctrine • • •
whose ultimate purpose is not to create a sacred province
of state autonomy, but to ensure that the unique benefits

61

Pf?'

undert king
such
balancing,
we
have
considered, on the o e hand, the federal interest in the
challenged legislatio
and the impact of exempting the
States from its
Central to our inquiry into the
federal interest is
ow closely the challenged action
implicates the ~ concerns of the Commerce Clause,
viz., the promotion of a national economy and free trade
among the states.
See EEOC v. Wyoming, 103 s. Ct. 1054,
1065 (1983) (JUSTICE STEVENS concurring).
E. g. United
Transportation Union v. Long Island Rail Road co., 455
u.s. 678, 688 ( 1982) ("Congress long ago concluded that
federal regulation of railroad labor services is necessary
to prevent disruptions in vital rail service essential to
the national economy.")~
FERC v. Mississippi, 456 u.s.
742, 757 (1982), ("it is difficult to conceive of a more
basic element of interstate commerce than electric energy
•
.").
Similarly, we have considered whether
exempting States from federal regulation would undermine
the goals of the federal program.
See Fry v. United
States, 421 u.s. 542 (1975). See also Hodel, 452 u.s. at
282 (national surface mining standards necessary to insure
competition among States does not undermine States'
efforts to maintain adequate intrastate standards) •
On
the other hand, we have assessed the injury done to the
States if forced to comply with federal Commerce Clause
enactments.
See National League of Cities, 426 u.s., at
846-8~1.

~

.

14.

of

a

federal

federal

not

system

interference

Id., at 236.

in

certain

be

lost

core

through

state

undue

functions."

See also Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining

Reclamation Ass'n., 452

u.s.

264 (1981).

&

In i~ baste t~

~verrul~ ~N~a~t~i~o~n~a~l~~L~e~a~g,u~e~--~o~f~~C~l~·t~l~·e~s~,

Fj;sjf? fitnd c

the

Court

Ar : : tizes the mode of analysis established therein
and developed in subsequent cases. 6
Moreover,

it is

-/..e ~~
netewer~y

that the statute at issue

1
in this case,

the FLSA,

is the

6tHfte

statute that was at

1\
issue

in

National

League

of

Cities.

~~

/~

I
'

~

Although

JUSTICE

~~~

6 In addition, the
eliance on the
Court's
difficulties
in
the
tax
irnrn nity field
is
~.
Although
the
Court
has
abandoned
the
"governmental/proprietary" distinction in his field, see
New York v. United States, 326 u.s. 572 (194 ) , it has not
taken the drastic approach of defining the States'
immunity from federal taxation solely in proc dural terms.
See Massachusetts v. United States, 435 u.s. 444 (1978).
Thus, faced with an equally difficult problem f defining
constitutional boundaries of federal action
the
States, we did not lea'J& the::::-States pf'oteet@d only =t;y the

o inherentc-structure~e~~-s~ ~

0

~~~~~

~~
~ ~ ~r- b'

' C..._..,

~ ~k:Zu~_i'=

'

15.

concurrence noted that he was "not untroubled
by certain possible

in

National

implications of the Court's opinion"

League of Cities,

it also stated

that

"the

result with respect to the statute under challenge here is

(~~4.).
necessarily

correct."

u.s.,

426

at

856.

~

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ does
discuss the statute,

IlltiCh

not

less oUer ally basi& fe rzi

B

The Court holds that the
constitutional scheme imposes on the Commerce Clause
to protect the 'States as States' is one of process rather

8nk-J
than

one

of

result."

~at

25.

The Court expressly

rejected this position in National League of Cities, 426

(.

u.s.,

at 841-842 n. 12.

I

be r i-ev-e

t:-aat j

t

should do so
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COMMENT SALLY-POW
Note to Annmarie:
Subpart B (p. 16) commences with the statement
that the Court holds that the "fundamental limitation that
the constitutional scheme imposes on the Commerce Clause
to protect the states as states is one of process rather
than on of result".
flAB's opinion does say this.

But is this a

different protection of the states from HAB's reliance on
the "structure" of the Constitution that vests the
electoral power in the states Y
without some

e l~g~a\ e

It seems to me that

explanation of why the two

"protections" are consistent, it may be better simply to

2.

;;-: .,

,,'

omit from the beginning of the paragraph on p. 15 to the
point marked end near the bottom of page 16.
In others words, Subpart B could begin with the
sentence that commences:
explain • •

"Today's opinion does not

." .

.,
:

..

.

'·

again,

for

this view is both illogical and

inconsistent

with our most fundamental constitutional principles.

I
I

Jl-tA~~
TR.e Gol::l-f't is ....g urel.y correct

the structure of

the

federal

interests of the states.
46

that the Framers intended

"\

(Madison}

nevertheless
conclusion

31

&

a

~9..!....t

See,

(Hamil ton}

long

that

government

step

the

that

fundamental

the

The Federalist Nos.

(Cooke

from

to protect

ed.

1961} •

proposition

protection

of

It

to

is
the

State

sovereignty under the constitution is one of process and

I

I

not of substance.

I

The history of the Tenth Amendment is
t

squarely at odds with
Moreover,

in National

like

League of

the Court's view.

See

infra,

at

JUSTICE BRENNA~ dissent )

Ci

tie%~
opinion
~,
~
..

i

does

not

J

s;>~

explain how , the oeRo4!itutieRal proui sion-. fe£
in

the

electoral

process

.s

guarante ~

that

StateA i~

particular

17.

exercises of the Commerce Clause power do not infringe on
residual

.
t y. 7
sovere1gn

State

participate

in

the

Although

Electoral College,

the

this

is

States
hardly a

reason to view the President as a representative of the
States'

interest

against

federal

encroachment.

M embers of Congress are elected from the various States,

~
I\ once

in

office

they

are

members

of

the

federal

~~~
willi~ness

7 Given its
to rely on the political
process
to
protect
t
States'
interests,
it
is
interesting that the Co rt provides no ~~andards for
judging when this process h &~ h eeq effective~ Late in its
opinion, the Court suggests that there Amay be some
naffirmative limits the constitutional structure might
impose on federal action affectings the States under the
Cl:>mmerce Clause.n Ante, at 27. Asserting that n[i]n the
~ctual setting of these cases the internal safeguards of
fue political process have performed as intended,n ibid.,
the Court does not explain by what test it is able to
reach th~ fiOnclusion.
Nor does the Court
provide
guidance ~ the circumstances in which it may intervene
to enforce such affirmative limits.
These failures make
the Court's recognition of the States'
nspecial and
specific position in our constitutional systemL' ibid.,
sound hollow indeed.
The Court's reluctance to specifyJ
its view of the /a ffirmative limitS"'-. on federal power
undoubtedly stems from the fact that any such attempt
would be subject to precisely the same objections it
raises against National League of Cities •

.'

7
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RIDER17 SALLY-POW
Annmarie:

Note 7 is excellent.

In an effort to make it

somewhat stronger, I have reframed it along the following
lines.

Feel free to edit, or I could go back to your

draft.

* * *
Late in its opinion, the Court suggests that
after all there may be some "affirmative limits the
constitutional structure might impose on federal action
affecting the ~tates under the Commerce Clause".
27.

Ante, at

The opinion then ~ ates that "in the factual setting
~

of [some Aidentified] cases the internal safeguards of the
political process have performed as intended."

Id.

But

the Court identifies no standards as to when and under

2.

what circumstances the "political process" may have failed
and "affirmative limits" are to be imposed.

Presumably,

such limits are to be determined by the Judicial Branch
even if it is "unelected".

But today's opinion has

~rvY"appr~

rejected the balancing standard

'\

~

iR

~e •e~r ~-

)

ca•ee i~ ~as ~rr~€d, and suggests no other standard
that would enable a court to determine when there has been
a malfunction of the "political process".

The Court's

unwillingness or inability to specify the "affirmative
limits" on federal power that it vaguely mentions, or when
and how these limits are to be determined, may well be
explained by the transparent fact that any such
would be subject to precisely the same

attempt ~

objection~ ~
1\

relies on today to overrule National League of Cities.

.

"'•.

,;.·

18.

government. 8

We noted recently

inherent within each of

the separate Branches to exceed

the outer 1 imi ts of its power • •
Naturalization Service v.
(1983} •

"the hydraulic pressure

Chadha,

"
103 S.

Immigration and
Ct.

The Court offers no reason to think

2765,

2784

that

this

pressure will not operate when Congress seeks to invoke
its powers under the Commerce Clause, notwithstanding the
electoral role of the States. 9

l4J~~.

8 one can hardly imagi
this Court saying that
because Congress is composed
individuals, individual
rights are amply protected by the legislative process.
Yet, the fosition adopted today
•
At one time in our h1story, the view that the
structure of the federal government sufficed to protect
~e
States might have had somewhat more practical,
although not more logical, basis. ~ Professor Wechsler,
whose seminal article in 1954 proposed the view adopted by
the Court today, predicated his argument on assumptions
~at
simply no longer accord with historical , reality.
Professor Wechsler wrote: "National action h s
always been regarded as exceptional in our p 1 i ty, an
instrusion to be justified by some necessity,
e special
rather than the ordinary case." Wechsler, Th Political
Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the
ates in the
Cornposi tion and Selection of the National overnment, 54
Footnote continued on next page.

19.

The

'0
u1-).,..
~d

/"

V'
'

tl'
rft1 •

Court

apparently

thinks

that

the

States'

Colum. L. Rev. 543, 544 ( 1954) • Not only is the premise
of this view clearly at odds with the proliferation of
national legislation over the past 25 years, but "a good
rgument can be made that a variety of structural and
·tical changes in this century have combined to make
ngress particularly insensitve to state and local
values."
Advisory Comm' n on Intergovernmental Relations
[ACIR], Regulatory Federalism: Policy, Process, Impact and
Reform 50
(1984).
The adoption of the Seventeenth
Amendment (providing for direct~ ~lection o~enators), the
weakening of political parties ~ the locaf level, and the
rise of national media, among "other things, have led the
Congress to be increasingly less representative of state
and local interests, and more likely to be responsive to
the demands of various national constituencies.
~ at
50-Sl.
As one observer explained, "As Senators and
members of the House develop independent constituencies
among groups such as farmers, businessmen, laborers,
environmentalists, and the poor, each of which generally
supports certain national initiatives, their tendency to
identify with state interests and the positions of state
officials is reduced." Kaden, "Federalism in the Courts:
Agenda for the 1980s," in ACIR, The Future of Federalism
in the '80s (1981). See also Kaden, Politics, Money, and
State Sovereignty: The Judicial Role, 79 Colum. L. Rev.
847 (1979) (changes in political practices and the breadth
of national initiatives mean that the political branches
"may no longer be as well suited as they once were to the
task of safeguarding the role of the states in the federal
system
and
protecting
the
fundamental
value
of
federalism.").
See also ACIR, Regulatory Federalism,
supra, at 1- 24 (detailing the "dramatic shift" in kind of

•
~r;

Y A~
1/~

.
,
~

r

~

y

11
yvk

;\ y /;

two decades).
Thus, even if one were to ignore the
numerous problems with the Court's position in terms of
constitutional
theory,
there
would
remain
serious

question:s;~actu~~ e:ses.

~A;;~~
·
( -t V;0
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GAR18 SALLY-POW
Note to Annmarie:

excellent cites to secondary authority.

-

Kaden is on target.

--

Again, I admire your note

~

with the

Your quote from

What would you think of adding,

following that quote or perhaps at some other place, a
more specific reference to the innumerable special groups
with powerful lobbies that also make generous campaign
contributions to selected members of Congress.

These

groups now have a far greater influence on the voting of
many members of Congress than unorganized individual
opinions in their districts or states.

Indeed, the

average individual often feels incompetent to understand
the complex legislation that may, when it is applied,

''

2.

diminish the opportunity for democracy to work at the
local level.

20.

success at obtaining federal
and

exemptions

statutes
federal

is

the

indicative

political

interests. • •
are not

from

funds

obligations
of

process

the

to

various projects
of

some

federal

"effectiveness

in

preserving

the

~
Bu ~ political

" Ante, at 23-24.

relevant

for

the question whether

the

of

the

States'
successes
political

processes are the proper means of enforcing constitutional
The

limitations.
transgress

fact

that Congress generally does not

constitutional

limits

State activities does not make

on

its

power

to reach

judicial review any less

necessary to rectify the infrequent cases in which it does
do so.

The States' role in our system of government is a

matter

of constitutional law,

"The powers
Constitution,

not

delegated

nor

to

prohibited

not of legislative grace.
the
by

United
it

to

States by
the

States,

the
are

21.

reserved to the States, respectively, or to the people."

u.s.

Const., Amend. 10.
More

troubling

federal political officials are the judges of the limits
of their own power.

This result is inconsistent with the

~~· See,

fundamental principles of our constitutional SGA&me.

"'

e .g., The Federalist No. 78

(Hamilton).

At least since

Marbury v. Madison it has been the settled province of the
federal judiciary "to say what the law is" with respect to
the

constitutionality

of

acts

of

;h.v~~

Congress.

~~dieial;-

.e:;(:>~~Hu_~~~~~~
r~i dw Im'eds~'ito

d4::erem:

j~ficetie"*

in

tl:lQ

con~xt-

-?"''2't..?MHq_.5~~ ~$ ~
tb<o C""""<U<*-..c;l.aJise-..f rOIII t.ftat

Q,f.

?-

;,high -i t always ha; )

This Court has never before abdicated

re~ponsibili ty

- ...._!_<~

for assessing the constitutionality

action

22.

~

on the ground that affected parties theoretically

are able

-

to

look

out

for

their

inter~

own

As

the

Court noted in National League of Cities, a much stronger

~~

\\

argument about inher ent 1'structural protections could have
1\

1\

been made in Buckley v. Valeo, 424
v.

United States,

with respect
these

272

u.s.

52

u.s.

(1926},

1 (1976} and Myers
than can be made

to 1 imitations on the Commerce Clause.

cases,

the

President

signed

legislation

In
~

~h

limited his authority with respect to certain appointments
and thus arguably "it was no concern of this Court that
the law violated the Constitution."

n.

12.

The

Court

nevertheless

426

u.s.
held

at 841-842
the

laws

..

Q

unconstitutional because
authority,

the

they entrenched on presidential

President's consent notwithstanding.

The

23.

Court does not address this point; nor does it cite any
authority for its contrary view.

---

Ill

refers to the
federal

and

state

C::U
l'llicessarill! ....recogRizaa

which Z7"'

* • 6~;.u..-,!'t~l!'!-6b-?.2:i"h"!::G~'a:~~~"Z?2-n::t.~~2;d
tb•t

e

C;j;~~~he

role ~

federal government.

This

understanding of
...___ --i:.n.w-tfte--de~ e.£ this Coar L.

Federalist No. 39, for example, Madison delineated

~ .'

the

elements

~~contrasts
~ tvtr

~~

those

;:f ~~~

of

federalism

drawing

a

series

of

between the attributes of a national government
of

a

federal

.JI-. A

-·-~~-~~tv ~ ~~~~-/
. ~ ~~A/0 ~ v-; .b1

~:::~

by

?

.

form

of

government.

While

a

1

24.

national form of government would possess an "indefinite
supremacy over all persons and things," the federal form
contemplated

by

the

Constitution

il"lettad 5

consisted of "local or municipal authorities [which] form
distinct
more

and

independent

subject

within

portions

their

of

the

respective

supremacy,

spheres

to

no
the

general authority than the general authority is subject to
them,

within

its own sphere."

Constitution,

the

sphere

extended to jurisdiction of
• leav [ ing]

only,

of

Id.,
the

at

256.

proposed

Under

the

government

"certain enumerated objects,

to the several States a residuary

and inviolable sovereignty over all other objects."

Id.

~.),_AA_A~~ ~
~· Th~~detalist No. 45, Madison elaborated on
1'\
the content of
:follows:

?

these separate spheres of

sovereignty ~~

25.

"The
powers
delegated
by
the
proposed
<bnsti tution to the Federal Government are few
and defined.
Those which are to remain in the
State Governments are numerous and indefinite.
The former will be exercised principally on
external objects, as war, peace, negotiation,
and foreign commerce;
The powers
reserved to the several States will extend to
all the objects, which, in the ordinary course
of affairs, concern the lives, liberties and
properties of the people; and the internal
order,
improvement,
and
prosperity
of
the
State."
Id.,

at 313.

the

federal

Madison considered that the operations of
government

would

be

"most

extensive

and

important in times of war and danger; those of the State
Governments in times of peace and security."
result of this division of powers,
would have a distinct advantage
over the federal government.

-·--

I
l

\

\

(

Ibid.

As a

the State governments

in power and importance

Ibid.

Federalists and Antifederalists alike were concerned

\

\

with the potential dangers of power concentrated in the

'\
\
\

\

hands

of a

central government.

See generally Schwartz,

26.

I

i
The Bill of Rights: A Documentary History (2 vols. 1971);
The

Federalist,

Conventions
(1854).

supra;

Elliot,

on the Adoption of

Debates
the

in

the

State

Federal Constitution

The Framers believed, however, that the separate

sphere of sovereignty reserved to the States would ensure
that the States would serve as an effective "counterpoise"
to the federal government.

They believed that the States

would serve this essential role because they would attract
and maintain the loyalty of their citizens.
such

loyalty,

objects

the

Founders

peculiar

to

Hamilton

argued

that

personal

interests

sensibility
Thus,

of

State

and

the

familiar

that

were

government.
States

individuals

he maintained

thought,

is

the

The roots of
found
For

"regulat[e)
concerns

more
people

to

in

the

example,
all

those

which

immediately

the

aware."

would perceive

the

"' .

•

'

•

'it'~.

27.

's tates as "the immediate and most visible guardian of life
and property,"

a

other

circumstance

people

affection,

government."
the

~
w~ h

fact
to

"contributes more

impressing

esteem

and

upon

the minds of

reverence

The Federalist No. 17, at 107.

same position,

explaining

that

than any

towards

the
the

Madison took

"the people

will be

7((~)~
I
I

more familiarly and minutely conversant" with the business

I

I

of State governments,

and

"[w] i th the members of these,

I

i

will a greater proportion of the people have the . ties of
personal

acquaintance and friendship,

party attachments • • •

"

and of

family and

The Federalist No. 46 at 316.

Like Hamilton, Madison saw the States' involvement in the
everyday concerns of
Id.

the people as

the source of

See also Nagel,
N~a=t..:::.i..:::::o:.=..:n~a:..::l:.,____.:L::..::e::..::a~g:L:u::.:e=---

their

Federalism as a
of

Cities

in

28.

Perspective,

1981

Sup.

Ct.

Rev.

(19~

81

---

,, "

y

In

the

ramers' view, the States' ability to., w1 n the loyality o
citizens was essential to their ability to functio J

.......
their

~~ ly ~ n

federal

syste

.

State

Only

-~

governments

~

which

enjoyed

strong

citizen

support

could

serve as a bulwark against overbearing federal power.

The opinion for the Court in Nationa~~~!t

~ r~jt-LrJ.c~~~~.
Cities \r~te

i-J

' ")...-

GR

etttl-inEd -abave.

0

~~

tbQ sam& QGRCeptiQA of federalism as
/\
,
Observing

that

nour

federal

t~t

system of

government imposes definite limits upon the authority of
Congress to regulate the activities of States as States by
means of the commerce power,n the Court invoked the Tenth
Amendment to make clear that n 'Congress may not exercise
\

power in a fashion that impairs the States' integrity or
their

ability

to

function

effectiVely

in

a

federal

31.

matter of dollars and cents.
426

u.s.,

National League of Cities,

at 846-851. Nor is it a matter of the wisdom or

folly of certain policy choices.
recognized in

Cf. ante, at 17J As we

~f~l

N~al

League of cjties, what is at issue

is whether the foundation on which the Framers staked the
States'

continued

vitality
of

"nationaliza~ion"

This

be

eroded

by

the

those ~i~jt[o~

C:::: r~

self-government.

---- ---

will

-------- ~1-

Courtjt•;fz:Z:tt;r.; ;nized

state sovereignty

~emai>Rs

system of government.

1\

that

a fundamental component of our

~~~~~V;

tJ

Cn Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S.

:J .,._

A ~a
(7 Wall.) 71 (1868), for exampl, _ the Court 1"-ei te ; ai e i

~he

~ ~:e ...e aa~e~t.wkQd.-~t>C~•''~ 4 ' %s§£ ~
/\

~

that

the

Constitution

recognized

"the

nee

sary

existence of the States, and, within their proper spheres,

32.

the independent authority of the States."
as Madison did,

that

the whole charge of
States]

and

to

1t

concluded,

this authority extended to "nearly
interior

the

regulation

people

all

powers

not

expressly

delegated to the national government are reserved."
at 76.

M&H!

~cently,

in Community Communications Co.

u.s.

!d.,

40, 49 (1982),

v. City of Boulder,

455

~~~--~~
r~
"\

the state action exemption

~

from the antitrust

laws ~based

on state sovereignty: United

Transportation Union v. Long Island Railroad Co., 455 u.S.
678,

683

(1982) ,

state-owned

applying

railroad

while

the

Railway

recognizing

Labor
that

Act
the

to

States

possess constitutionally preserved sovereign powers:
Federal

Regulatory

Commission

v.

Mississippi,

456

a

and

u.s.

33.

742,

(1982) ,

752

Regulatory

considering whether

Public Utility

.
(TV(~
~1d ~._ $ue)
l:f »~

Policies

Act

~d ~state

violation of the Tenth Amendment.
"baAd illtl

the

~ the ~cases

1\

in

sovereign t y

These represent only a
which

the

Court

~~- ~ H...£. ~ ~~the importance of state sovereignty.

g.,

United

Mitchell, 269

559 (1911).
not

States

u.s.

v.

~

supra;

Metcalf

&

v.

u.s.

As Justice Frankfurter noted, the States are

merely

95

Eddy

514 (1926); Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221

a

factor

in

the

"shifting

(1949)

(Justice

Frankfurter,

economic
336

u.s.

concurring),

but

arrangements" of our country, Kovacs v. Cooper,

77,

has

See also,

recognized~

e.

in

constitute a "coordinate element in the system established
by the Framers for governing our Federal Union."
League of Cities, supra, at 849.

National

35.

w.~L~~
of

1\

powers

that
~

delegated

the

reserved to the States,"

u.s.

States

extent

.k.li

the

United

"[t]he

States

are

Const. Amend.

,S~
3 ~
~
q.me J;.e:i.gR

that&

retain

that

that

.b

to

the

not

/1._.~~~~14

1

Amendment , b¥- s-t a-tjng ..-=="'At

Constitution

pow~ s

has

not

"only

divested

to

the

them of

their original powers and transferred those powers to the
Federal Government," ante, at 20.
a

distinction

m "'--4'"'~

~

~

a

difference,

~~

~--~ 1

lJ6IieP a

without

This rephrasing is not
but

reflects

the

~.H4..-~ iJ&£-

unprecedented

view

that

-·

Congress

is

free~
l to

t-;w4
~~C;
powe~
cl

State's traditional sovereign
~

.

~~Aearr ~~ ~b:J
~~ .

federalism Gff e r&a
~

that

demotes
opponents

occupy.

the States
of

the

"\

to precisely

Constitution

the

~

feared

hi!: \l.le

t-ri u ij l
they

role
would

Samuel Adams, for example, believed that if the

36.

several States were to be joined in "one entire Nation,
under one Legislature, the Powers of which shall extend to
every Subject of Legislation, and its Laws be supreme
controul

the

whole,

States must be lost."
Henry

Lee

(Dec.

Federalists

159

3,
(J.

the

Idea

of

Sovereignty

in

&

these

Letter from Samuel Adams to Richard

~

1787), A ~
Lewis

ed.

Anti-Federalists

1967).

b~wise,

versus
George

Mason feared that "the general government being paramount
to,

and

in every

governments,

the

respect more
latter

must

powerful

give

way

than the state
to

the

former."

Address in the Ratifying Convention of Virginia (June 4-12

------

1788), Anti-Federalists versus Federalists, supra, at 208'
- that the --1-egislati
AltnoUgn
the Framers replied

of

the

---------

~-tgOV;;nment would permit
oppressive Congress,

34.

In contrast, the Court today propounds a view of
federalism that pays only lip service to the role of the
States and

fails

to acknowledge the potential impact of

imposing the FLSA on the States.

Although it

~Bes

that the States "unquestionably do 'retai[n) a significant
measure
EEOC

of

v.

sovereign
Wyoming,

dissenting)),

authority,'"

u.s.

460

it fails

to

ante,

226,

at

269

~road,

20

(quoting

(POWELL,

J.,

yet specific

"

areas of

sovereignty that MadisoR and -.. the

~

Framers

11 The
Court's
opinion
mention
the
Tenth
Amendment only once, when it restates
question put to
the parties for reargument in this cas • , See ante, at 8.

29.

system.'"

u.s.,

426

at

(quoting ...___.
Fry v.

842-843

United

States , 4 21 U• S • 54 2 , 54 7 n • 7 ( 19 7 5) ) •

~~

In National League of Cities, w. spoke of fire
/1

prevention,

police

protection,

sanitation,

and

public

~]
health as "typical of ehe!le performed by state and local
governments

in

"

discharging

administering

the

public

services." 426

u.s.

at 851.

their

law

and

dual

functions

furnishing

of

public

Not only are these activities

~~~~~~
far

from ~ h€ c~e

of interstate commerce, see supra n. 5,

they are activities wftieh epitomize the concerns of

"

'\

local, democratic self-government.

~

- ~~.Jo

w~ecti.oo!t

/IP

.Su. ,('(.,
See fnfxa n.

,

.

~

/

traditional governmental functions,

J ..,),~ ~LL 11_;
...4.~· f'~.d ~ ~
we l'fad:
~;;::~~l;;a.:£l.&.--~1Atttri~hek'i~s of acti vi ties.A that Ji-r iRg " State

I

~

~w~~~
~li 0 5~ ~ .,fh ;th~
h~
government) f.~
1n.to~
e peop l -f~
an d ~~
- wh'1ch
~G&rreacc \J le

e)

~~~t:.-u~~~~ci-tizens feel

A

the-y have the ability as well the right

1\

/ I.

' '

1

30.

I

~

("

ft:::1zP'

to>

' pa.r..ticipate. 10
(\

e;is~ >f .. 4-c

• f..c

zc;:

zb;vW87£$z • <t.-(.

We recognized that "it is functions such

as these which governments are created to provide • • • ,"

\

and that the States' ability to perform such functions is

~

the

key

to

their

"separate

the ~

Thus,

overreaching

under

and

independent

exist~nce.

J

the States that results from federal

the Commerce Clause

is not simply a

10 The Framers recognized that the most effective
democracy occurs at local levels of government, where
people have first hand knowledge of local problems and
more ready access to public officials responsible for
dealing with them. E. g., The Federalist No. 17, at 107;
N:>.45, at 316.
This is as true today as it was when the
Constitution was adopted.
"Participation is likely to be
more frequent, and exercised at more different stages of a
governmental activity at the local level, or in regional
organizations, than at the state and federal levels.
[Additionally,] the proportion of people actually involved
from the total population tends to be greater, the lower
the level of government, and this, of course, better
approximates the citizen participation ideal."
ACIR,
Citizen Participation in the American Federal System 95
(1979).
L.t i~ esP.{'cially ironj c thatt che Court casts
its argument against judicial enforcement of the Tenth
Amendment in terms of the "principles of democratic selfante, at 18L. wh-H:e= appare-ntly tJ:ncwmu!rned.,.
~~~~~~et~~~~~~~eg~'slat~v ~ ~ewer.

/
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In emphasizing the need to protect traditional
governmental functions, we identified the kinds of
activities engaged in by state and local governments that
affect the daily lives of people.

These are services that

people have the ability to understand and evaluate as well
as the right, in a democracy, to
oversee. 10

We recognized that "it is functions such as

these which governments are created to provide

.,"and

that the states and local governments are better able to
perform than the national government.

37.

Convention that such structural protection was
Observing

that

the

three-fourths

of

Constitution,

he

corollary was

that

nost salutary am
it
cont

as

proposed
the

ree

oncluded

required

that

amend

the

to
that

the

logical

trifling minority may reject

dments."

"most

a

States

rightly
a

Constitutio

fearful

Id., at 215.
situation,

Henry regarded
when

the

ptible minority can prevent the alteration of

nost oppressive government."

-

the

most
the

-~

Id., at 215-216.

-----~

'

Opponents

of

the

Constitution

were

particularly

dubious of the Federalist claim that the States retained
powers not delegated to the United States in the absence
of an express provision so providing.
Lettters

of

Brutus

called

the

claim

For example,
that

I

the

nondelegated

38.

)
powers

were

reserved

to

solid."

Letters

of

Bill

Rights,

supra,

of

Winthrop ~

the

States

Brutus,

reprinted

at

505,

507.

not given are reserved."
supra,

these

concerns

every

State.

Conven.t ions
(1854).
after

in

specious

than

Schwartz,

The

Similarly,

James

that "[i]t is a mere fallacy, invented by

the deceptive powers of Mr. Wilson,

Schwartz,

"more

at
in

Letters of Agrippa, reprinted in

510,

the

511.

proposing

raised

conventions

almost

Debates

on the Adoption of
States

Antifederalists

ratifying

See Elliot,

Eight

that what rights are

voted

the

for

amendments

in

Several State

Federal Constitution
the

to

the

of

be

Constitution only
adopted

after

/

ratification.
recommendations
~nth

All

eight

some

Amendment. Ibid.

of

version

these
of

included

what

later

among
became

their
the

So strong was the concern that the

39.

proposed Constitution was
specific bill of rights,
powers
conceded
secure

to

the

that
the

States,
such

votes

seriously defective without a
including a provision reserving

that

the

provisions
for

r

Federalists

were

needed

ratification.

See

eventually

in

order

Schwartz,

to
A

Documentary History of the Bill of Rights, supra, at 505
l.~

and passim.
J

This
~

=•·

~

~""Y r' ~ ~-~--~

hist~~the

integral role of

the Tenth Amendment in our constitutional theory.

~ well,
'\

I

believe,J ~~~~;i.

~~~

of the Court's decisioR today

~.

in principle,"

judicial enforcement of

Tenth Amendment

·It

ante,

at 18,

is essential

Far from being "unsound

to maintaining

the

system adopted by the Constitution.
IV. Applicability of the FLSA to SAMTA

the

federal

aml 10/18/84

~ gz._-111~

,~ ~arcia

~

v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority
FIRST DRAFT

~/
Justice POWELL, dissenting.

~~t~f~~~ The major~ agrees that National League of Cities v. Usery,

~yaf

~

426

u.s.

833

(1976),

correctly held

that Congress'

power

under

the Commerce Clause is limited by the role of the States in the
federal system.

It finds,

however,

that the standard which has

evolved for determining these limits, i.e., whether the exercise
of federal power reaches "traditional governmental functions," is
both unworkable and inconsistent with the principles of federalism on which National League of Cities rests.

Rather than at-

.
~ f- cone 1 u d es t h at t h e
tempt1ng
to re f'1ne t h'1s stan d ar d , t h e maJorlty

jL~L
States are protected amply by the legislative process as long as
1
federal legislation treats States and private parties in the same

~ ~~ ~ ~ 'JL..~ ~ie'+<.. ~c::;__4
I agree with tHe majority that the test thus far ~veloped~

way.

~f'J ~eaLAA-/~A:-J~~ ~
for determining whether considerations of federalism bar particu-

~~

dtJ

lar exercises of the Commerce Clause power is not entirely satis-

.'

.

I

factory.

cannot

legislation

agree,

discriminates

however,
against

that except
the

States,

in cases where
the

legislative

process provides the only constitutional protection against federal overreaching under the Commerce Clause.
I.

The Court finds that the test of State immunity developed in
National League of Cities and its progeny is unworkable and unsound in principle.
In finding

the test to be unworkable, the majority misperceives

the case law.
ty

are

In my view, these conclusions are erroneous.

unsound

In concluding that efforts to define state immuniin principle,

the Court radically departs

from

long settled principles of constitutionalism and of the role of
judicial review in our system of government.
A.

The Test of Traditional Governmental Functions
In claiming that the test which has developed from National

League of Cities and its progeny is unworkable, the Court focuses
on the the third factor

identified in Hodel v. Virginia Surface

Mining & Reclamation Ass'n., 452

.

'

u.s.

264 (1981), that state com-

pliance with
State's]

the

ability

federal obligation must
'to structure

BLACKMUN cites

a

state

under

immunity

there is no

11

long

impair

u.s.

[the

in areas of

at 287-288 (quot-

To make this argument, JUSTICE

list of cases
National

directly

integral operations

traditional governmental functions.' .. 452
ing National League of Cities) •

11

League

involving
of

the question of

Cities.

In

his

view

0rganizing principle .. distinguishing the cases that

have found state immunity from those which have not.

~k.
Draft

at ---

It is, of course, difficult to define traditional governmental functions.

But the majority's attempt to demonstrate its

virtual impossibility is somewhat disingenuous.

A number of the

cases it cites do not involve the problem of defining governmental

functions. 1

A number

of

others

are

not

properly

analyzed

1

~, Williams v. Eastside Mental Health Center, Inc., 669
F.2d 671 (CAll), cert. denied, 459 u.s. 976 (1982), turned on
whether the application of the Fair Labor Standards to employees
of a halfway house would reach the State as a State. The court
held that it did not, because the halfway house was not a state
institution with state employees.
In Friends of the Earth v.
Carey, 552 F.2d 25 (CA2), cert. denied, 434 u.s. 902 (1977), New
York City claimed that requiring it to enforce a plan under the
Footnote continued on next page.

.
L

)

'

.,

.,.

under

the principles of

National League of Cities at all,

withstanding some of the language of the lower courts. 2
over,

rather

than carefully analyzing

the case

law,

notMore-

the Court

simply lists various functions thought to be protected or unprotected by courts interpreting National League of Cities.
at 9-10.

Draft

In the cited cases, however, the courts considered the

issue of state immunity on the specific facts before it; they did
not make blanket pronouncements that particular things inherently

Clean Air Act violated National League of Cities. The Second
Circuit rejected this argument on the ground that the plan in
question was developed by the State and City, not the federal
government.
2 E.g., in United States v. Best, 573 F.2d 1095 (CA9 1978} and
Hybud Equipment Corp. v. City of Akron, 654 F.2d 1187 (CA6 1981},
the courts discussed whether particular activities were integral
governmental functions.
Hybud Equipment, however, did not
involve the authority of Congress to legislate against a claim of
state immunity, but rather the opposite question, whether a state
law interferred with interstate commerce.
The issue in Best was
the authority of a federal court to order a state agency to
suspend the state-created privilege of a driver's license, in a
case where the federal court convicted an individual of drunk
driving on a federal enclave. Similarly, Gold Cross Ambulance
Service v. City of Kansas City, 537 F. Supp. 956 (W.D. Mo. 1982}
held in the alternative that federal antitrust laws could not
prevent the city and state from regulating ambulance services,
citing National League of Cities. On appeal, however, the
decision was affirmed not on the ground that National League of
Cities compelled this result, but under the state action
exemption to the antitrust laws.
705 F.2d 1005 (CA8 1983}, cert
pending, No. 83-183.

·.

.E:Jage

qualified as traditional governmental functions or did not.

:::>.

Hav-

ing thus considered the cases out of context, it is not surprising

that JUSTICE BLACKMUN could find no "organizing principle"

among them.
In addition, the majority's reliance on the Court's difficulties in the tax immunity field is misplaced.

Although the Court

has abandoned the "governmental/proprietary" distinction
~,

see New York v. United States, 326

u.s.

572 (1946), it has

not taken the drastic approach of defining the States'
from federal taxation solely in procedural terms.
in Massachusetts v.

United States,

435

u.s.

~

444

immunity

For example,
(1978), JUSTICE

BRENNAN wrote for the Court that the states could have no constitutional objection to federal taxes that satisfied a three prong

&-<:)

.L

test:

'}- )

that the tax not discriminate against the states;

( ~)

~-

that the tax be based on a fair approximation of use;

(J'}

that

the tax be structured to produce revenues not in excess of the
total cost to the federal government of providing the relevant
benefits.

Id. at 466-467.

Thus, faced with an equally difficult

page o.

problem of defining constitutional boundaries of federal action

~4-u.~uV
~ewaro

the States, we did not leave the States protected only by

1\
J1

\\

the inherent structure of the our federal system.
B. Federalism and Traditional Governmental Functions

~d-e

The majorit:¥ assert 1'"

h~

that any attempt

to define

the scope of state immunity in terms of traditional or integral
governmental functions is "unsound in principle."

j;..
~.

TRQ

rate

Cou~t

important

argues that no distinction "that purports to sepagovernmental

functions

from

other

ones

can

be

faithful to the role of federalism in a democratic society.,." be--

A

ld-

lsa@

~cauB€ lckly such distinction "inevitably invites an unelected federal judiciary to makes decisions about which state policies it
favors

and which ones

it dislikes."

a-.k.

~at

-

..lrl.

I

fully agree

that judicial attempts to judge the wisdom of State policies are
unsound in principle.

I cannot agree, however, that our efforts

to enforce constitutional limitations on the commerce power "inevitably" require us to do so.
difficult as

As I show in Part III infra, as

the task of defining

these limitations is, we are

guided by the core concerns of the Commerce Clause, and the principles of self-government on which rest the essential role of the
States in our constitutional system.
II.
A. Procedural Protection for States as States
The

holds that the "fundamental limitation that the

constitutional scheme imposes on the Commerce Clause to protect
the

'States as States'

sult."

Id. at 25.

is one of process rather than one of re-

The Court expressly rejected this argument in

National League of Cities,
the

doctrine

doing

of

so again.

426

u.s.

at 841-842 n.

stare decisis provides
See FERC v.

12, and thus

an adequate ground

Mississippi,

456

u.s.

742

(1982)

Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, 452
264

(1981).

More importantly, however,

tion adopted

today

is both

for
~

u.s.

I eelieve t Aat the posi-

illogical and

inconsistent with our

most fundamental constitutional principles.
The

Court

is

7 Y

correct

that

the

Framers

intended

the

structure of the federal government to protect the interests of

'•·

pa~e

••

the states.

See,

e • .9...!_,

The Federalist Nos.

46

(Madison)

&

o•

31

.-r..
(Hamilton)

(Cooke ed. 1961).

It is nevertheless a long step from

that proposition to the conclusion that the fundamental protection of State sovereignty under the constitution is one of process and not of substance.

~~~~
~ JUSTICE BRENNAN 1 s e-a_:t i-er dissent

j gap § /7
in National League of Cities, JUSTICE BLACKMUN s opinion for the
1

Court

does

not

State

input

in

explain
the

how

the

constitutional
~

~

"'\

State

for

.

electoral process gJ.laraRt&e that part1cular

exercises of the Commerce Clause power do not

~

provisions

sovereignty.

Although

the

States

infri~
participate

in

the

Electoral College, this is hardly a reason to view the President
as a representative of the States 1
croachment.

interest against federal en-

While members of Congress are elected from the vari-

ous States, once in office they are members of the federal government. 3

As

we

have

noted

recently,

there

is

"the hydraulic

3 one can hardly imagine this Court saying that because Congress
is composed of individuals, individual rights are amply protected
by the legislative process. Yet, the position adopted today
makes no more sense.

page

':J.

pressure inherent within each of the separate Branches to exceed
the outer limits of its power • •
ization Service

v.

Chadha,

103 S.

~

Immigration and Natural-

II

majori-ty offers no reason to think

Ct.

2765,

2784

(1983).

The

that this pressure will not

operate when Congress seeks to invoke its powers under the Commerce Clause, notwithstanding the electoral role of the States. 4
More troubling than the logical gaps in the Court's

~

is

its

result,

i.

e.,

that

federal

judges of the limits of their own power.
sis tent
scheme.

with

the

fundamental

See, e.g.,

principles

The Federalist No.

78

position ~

officials are

the

This result is inconof

our

constitutional

(Hamilton).

At least

since Marbury v. Madison it has been the settled province of the
federal

judiciary

11

to say what the law is 11 with respect to the

maj~apparently

4 The

thinks that the States' success at
obtaining federal funds for various projects and exemptions from
the obligations of some federal statutes is indicative of the
11
effectiveness of the federal political process in preserving the
States' interests . . . . . . Draft at 23-24.
But political
successes are not relevant to the question whether the political
processes are the proper means of enforcing constitutional
limitations. Additionally, the fact that Congress generally does
not transgress constitutional limits on its power to reach State
activities does not make judicial review any less necessary to
rectify the infrequent cases in which it does do so •

•.
:'~~,;~.~~ r

page .tu.

constitutionality of acts of Congress.
different

justification

in

the

Judicial review needs no

context

·~ArW~
from that which it always has.
~

r

of

the

Commerce

Clause

.

'\

This Court has never before abdicated responsibility for assessing the constitutionality of challenged action solely on the
ground that affected parties theoretically are able to look out
~

for their own interests.

As

5e£~1GE

National

.Skf ./1

~ .,.__/-- ~ J
League of Cities, a much stronger argument about inherent struc1\
I

tural protections could have been made in Buckley v. Valeo,

u.s.

1

than

can

(1976)

Clause.

be

and Myers v.
made

with

In these cases,

United States,

respect

to

272

limitations

u.s.
on

52

the

424

(1926),
Commerce

the President signed legislation which

limited his authority with

respect to certain appointments and

thus arguably "it was no concern of this Court that the law vio-

u.s.

lated

the Constitution."

less,

t?-~~
the Court held the laws unconstitutional because they en-

426

at 841-842 n.l2.

Never the-

"
trenched on presidential authority, the President's consent not-

paye

LL.

withstanding.
it cite any authority for its contrary view.
B. Nondiscrimination as a Substantive Standard
The

~~~
~
opinion r~cognizes
'\

m~

straint on

the exercise

of

one

substantive

the Commerce Clause power,

re-

that is

"that Congress not attempt to single out the States for special
burdens

or

otherwise

discriminate

against

them."

The

opinion

argues that this restraint finds its justification "in the procedural nature of th[e]

basic limitation" and is "tailored to com-

pensate

in

than

failings

to dictate

a...._J.<...,
~t

th e

for

a

1

the

national

political

process

sacred province of state autonomy.

rather
In

<-

at

~

~
t ¥* s

ffiaJ0£1

This argument flatly contradicts other premises of

..

op1n1on.

~I

In~e,

the nondiscrimination standard is incon-

""
sistent with the basic premise of State sovereignty as a limitation on the commerce power.

The Court recognizes:

"The central

principle of National League of Cities is that the States occupy

~
a special position in our constitutional system • . • • " D.z;..a.;ft at

..

>·,

page .1...:..

-l:-8.

But

~

th ~ nondiscrimination

standard P£Opose9 by th8 majorit¥

~

requires only that Congress treat the states exactly as it treats
private parties.

Far from reflecting the States' special role in
~

the federal system, this standard .seem• to
with its existence.
854

(States

private

as

Cf.

with

United States, 326

respect

u.s.

to

~ /\ incompatible

National League of Cities, 425

States stand on

parties

~e

572,

"quite different

to Commerce Clause);
577-578

(1946)

u.s.

footing"

at

than

New York v.

(plurality opinion;

specifically rejecting nondiscrimination as sufficient basis for
applying federal tax to States) •

s~,

In - th8 s8cona pla.ce, adoption of

~~~·

tH::J~TIC&

RI.ACJ:CMUN

~

nondis-

crimination standard does not mean that the federal courts will
be free from having to define integral governmental functions or
some equivalent realm of protected state functions.

The opinion

notes in a footnote that not "every statute that does single out
the States for special obligations is unconstitutional ipso facto." Draft at
however,

for

27 n.20.

The Court does not provide a standard, ·

determining which discriminatory statutes are con-

.'
;;".; .. ~!/'.,. ~

•

.

'

stitutional and which are not.
any such

Given that the Court's purpose in

inquiry would be exactly the same as

National League of Cities and its progeny

~~

it is new under

(~ ~,

whether enact-

ments under the
ties),

the Court inevitably will be forced to engage in precise-

ly the same kind of analysis that ~e 6lrPa
~iGeiri~y ~iRa• abjection-

~ ~ --

III.

~~~~

A. A Balancing Approach to State Immunity
Although

I

think

~ ~1/A/1~

~f!'r

PI;:::;:..

the majority is wrong in its view that w

hould abandon our efforts to define the scope of state immunity
from Commerce Clause enactments,

the concerns expressed by the

da,-zh.
Court lead me to conclude that it would be useful to refine the
test thus far

developed.

Our cases

implicitly have balanced a

number of factors in determining whether federal action intrudes
on fundamental attributes of state sovereignty.

On the one hand,

we have considered the federal interest in the challenged legislation and the impact of exempting the States from its reach.

On

"'
·'

page

the

other,

forced

we

to

have

comply.

assessed
As

the

JUSTICE

injury done
BLACKMUN

League of Cities itself .. adopt [ed]

to the States

recognized,

a balancing approach

does not outlaw federal power in areas

.

.l'~.

if

National
[which]

• where the federal

interest is demonstrably greater and where state • • . compliance
with imposed federal standards would be essential ... 426

u.s.

at

856

u.s.

at

(JUSTICE BLACKMUN concurring).

288 n. 29.
helpful

See also Hodel, 452

More explicit articulation of these factors would be

in making clearer

the principles of National League of

Cities.
Central

to

consideration

of

the

federal

interest

is

how

closely the challenged action implicates the core concerns of the
Commerce Clause,

viz.,

free

the

trade

among

1054, 1065 (1983)
upholding

the promotion of a national economy and

states.

See EEOC v.

Wyoming,

(JUSTICE STEVENS concurring).

103 S.

Ct.

For example, in

the application of the Railway Labor Act to a state-

owned railroad, we recognized that .. Congress long ago concluded
that federal regulation of railroad labor services is necessary

·.

paye

to

prevent

national

disruptions

economy."

Rail Road Co.,
Mississippi,

United

455 u.s.

456 u.s.

in vi tal

rail

service essential

Transportation Union v.

678,

688

(1982).

Long

Likewise,

to

.L:>.

the

Island

in FERC v.

742, 757 (1982), we noted that "it is dif-

ficult to conceive of a more basic element of interstate commerce
than electric energy . .
Thus,

II

in determining whether particular state activities are

beyond federal reach, we have been concerned with how closely the
affected activities
Clause. 5

involve

the

basic concerns of

the Commerce

It is helpful to consider the problem of defining the

scope of State immunity in this light.

When the objects of fed-

eral regulation directly involve interstate commerce,

~

it is

~f

unlikely
fined

as

they ~ the kind of activities ~ch we have de"traditional governmental

functions"

or

"indisputable

exemptinj~ates

5 similarly, we have considered whether
from
federal regulation would undermine the goals ofA ~ federal
program.
See Fry v. United States, 421 u.s. 542 (1975). See also
Hodel, 452 u.s. at 282 (national surface mining standards
necessary to insure competition among States does not undermine
States' efforts to maintain adequate intrastate standards).

page

.1 o.

attributes of State sovereignty."
I also think that we can articulate better the other factor
balanced in our cases, i. e., the impact on the States of forcing
them

to

follow

particular

federal

policies.

Although

we

have

?
referred frequently to "traditional governmental functions," this
language

may

be

somewhat misleading.

We

have

not

limited

D

the

1-"t-.c;._f
realm of the States' immunity to the particular activities which

they have performed in the past.

u.s.

Long Island Rail Road Co., 455
~

correctly points

out,

United Transportation Union v.
678, 686 {1982).

such

a

limitation on

~--

As the mathe

States'

freedom to experiment would undermine a vital part of their role
in our
the

federal

limits

Clause power

to

system.
State

Nevertheless,
immunity

in a manner

from

~e~ ~&

,L

it is possible to define

the

reach

of

the

Commerce

consistent with the constitu-

tionally sanctioned role of the States.
The Framers believed that the ctates would serve as an effective "counterpoise" to the federal government because they would
attract and maintain the loyalty of their citizens.

The roots of

~·

...

.~:-~a~::~e

such

loyalty,

the

Founders

thought,

peculiar to State government.
the States "regulat[e]

were

found

in

.L 1.

the objects

For example, Hamilton argued that

all those personal interests and familiar

concerns to which the sensibility of individuals is more immediately aware."

Thus, he maintained that the people would perceive

the States as

"the

immediate and most visible guardian of life

~~and property," a fact wllieb "contributes more than any other circumstance to impressing upon the minds of the people affection,
esteem and reverence towards the government."
17 at 107.

The Federalist No.

Madison took the same position, explaining that "the

people will be more familiarly and minutely conversant" with the
business of State governments, and "[w]ith the members of these,

wr../1<will a greater proportion of the people have the ties of personal
acquaintance and friendship, and of family and party attachments

"

The Federalist No.

saw the States'

46 at 316.

Like Hamilton, Madison

involvement in the everyday concerns of the peo-
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ple

as
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source

of

thei ~
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loy~y.

Id.

See
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Nagel,

"Federalism as

a

Fundamental

Value:

National

League

.10.

of

Cities in Perspective," 1981 Sup. Ct. Rev. 81 (1981).
In the Framers' view, the States' ability to win the loyality ~ _
I

11'1-t.~ .·

of their citizens was essential to their ability to function effectively in their federal system.
enjoyed

the

strong

citizen

Only State governments

support

could

serve

as

a

bulwar

against overbearing federal power.
In National League of Cities,

we spoke of

fire prevention,

police protection, sanitation, and public health as "typical of
those

performed

by

state

and

local

governments

in discharging

their dual functions of administering the public law and furnishing public services." 426

u.s.

at 851.

Not only are these activ-

ities far from the core of interstate commerce, but they are

ac- ~

tivities which epitomize the concerns of local, democratic selfgovernment.
functions,

When we spoke of protecting traditional governmental
we

had

in

mind

the

kinds

of

activities

that

bring

State government into close contact with the people and in which
citizens feel they have the ability as well the right to partici-

.

·,~!~i{~~....
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pate.

We recognized

that

J.~.

"it is functions such as these which

governments are created to provide • • • ," and that the States'
ability to perform such functions is the key to their "separate
and independent existence."
Thus,

the harm to

Id.

the States as a

result of

federal over-

reaching under the Commerce Clause is not simply a matter of dollars and cents.

Nor

is

it a matter of

certain policy choices.

~~~4.

the wisdom or folly of

Instead, we are concerned with whether

the foundation on which the Framers staked the States' continued
vitality will be eroded by the "nationalization" of those functions which epitomize local self-government.
B. Applicability of the FLSA to SAMTA
The

~;~

question

we~ is

case is the applica-

"""

bility of the Fair Labor Standards Act to the wages and hours of
employees of a city-owned

bus system.
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e~a.t -rhese
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conditions of employment affect interstate commer ~aAa bb ~ ~n
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I think it is equally clear, however, that the hours and wages of
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Notwithstanding
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federal funds, local mass
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In contrast,
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the '\. interest of

~e

...e.e.e

loca ~

~
government

in main-

~JP-/od.L~

taining the" pom!r to -s-et the wages and hours of ~ employees of
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its b~ is strong indeed.

In ~oday's world, the operation

of an intracity mass transit system is a paradigmatic example of
local self-government.

There are few institutions of modern ur-

ban life with which citizens are more
conversant."

The Federalist No.

elected officials are subject to

"familiar[]

46 at 316.

and minutely

As a result,

local

~~

oare~ul

scrutiny by voters and

the press with respect to the operation of such systems.

It is

just this kind of local accountability that the Framers believed

-· w fl!i ..L---. ~ J
~~1~~~t--L4J .

engender

~g~ Hppo£t

foF tAe State and local governments >

ensure their vitality in the federal system.
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The application of the FLSA to employees of a city bus sys~

~~
tern is not within the ~ e concerns of the Commerce Clause.

In

contrast, the operation of such a system is precisely the kind of
activity that the Framers thought to be essential to the independence and vitality of local government.

Thus, I conclude that

the balance in this case weighs heavily in favor of the City, and
accordingly, I would affirm.
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The Honorable Lewis F. Powell, Jr.
Supreme Court of the United States
Washington, D.C.
20543
Dear Justice Powell:

~ ~ ~- ~

I have been following your recuperation at a
distance. Having read that you do not intend to sit for
argument in February, I was delighted to see your participation in Garcia v. San Antonio.
As you know, my partner Bill Coleman and others
here labored mightily on that case. Even making allowance
for the prejudices I probably entertain because of their
efforts, I was very impressed with your dissent, which
certainly showed no signs of the handicaps you were working
under.
I'll look forward to seeing you this spring.

STJ)y,

Carl R. Schenker, Jr.
CRS: j lc

CHAMBERS OF

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EDWARDS. NORTHROP

DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
BALTIMORE 21201
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February 27, 1985

Honorable Lewis F. Powell, Jr.
Associate Justice
Supreme Court of the United States
1 First Street, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20543
Dear Mr. Justice Powell:
I have been meaning to write you for some time to tell you how delighted
I was to hear that you are up and about after your operation. I must say your
recent dissent in Garcia v. San Antonio MTA is an outstanding piece of work.
I had hoped that the interference of Congress would be stopped by the
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). Back in 1967, I
dissented in the Three Judge Court in Maryland, et al. v. Wertz, 269 F.Supp.
826 (D.Md. 1967) and Justice Douglas used part of that dissent in his dissent
in the same case in 392 U.S. 183, 88 S.Ct. 2017 (1968).
Prior to the time I came to the Bench, I had been Majority Leader of
the Senate of Maryland, and during that period I was Chairman of the Finance
Committee and before that had chaired a study of taxation and fiscal matters.
I therefore intimately know the relationship of the state to the central
government, and particularly the Legislature to the Congress, etc. I can
tell you without fear of contradiction that the individual Congressmen and
Senators have very little concern whatsoever for various acts that effect
intimately the financial situations of the states. There are, of course,
numerous ways in which the State is subject to Congressional power but
Congress certainly should not be able to reach into the budget making process
and to effect the most careful and continuous consideration that the states
give to fiscal matters and the budgetary process.
This is a particularly bad time for this decision to have been rendered,
when the federal government is seeking to denude itself from the responsibilities
it has undertaken in the last 50 years. Garcia v. San Antonio has a
potentiality of crippling the states as they undertake this tremendous task of
again establishing a viable federalism.
I just wanted to let you know how important your dissent is and hope
it becomes the majority real soon. With all best wishes for your continued
good health and with kindest regards, I am,
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March 5, 1985

Dear Ed:
Your letter of February 27 is particularly appreciated. What has been written in the eastern press - perhaps predictably - generally has approved the Court's decision in Garcia. Your warm approval of the dissent therefore
is particularly gratifying.
You knm•t from actual experience in your. major
roles in state government that the Court's basic assumption
is fallacious. The "structure" of our federal system, without iudicial review, affords minimal protection to state and
local interests as such.
Although my experience was minimal compared to
yours, t did serve for eight year$ on the Virginia State
Board of F.ducation And was Chairman of it. I also ~erved on
other state bo~ies (e.g., the State Library Board, the Commission on the Virginia Economy), and was on the Richmond
City School Board for 11 years. !t ~r.~as clear from my experience that democracy works best when it is closest to the
peopl~.

My thanks also for your concern about my operation. Complications developed that hospitalized me .f or five
weeks, and I still have quite a way to go before regaining
my strength and vitality. I ho?e to return to the Court by
the April arguments, and my physicians say that the long
term prognosis is good.
I hope to see you at the Fourth Circuit JurHcial
Conference in late June.
Sincerely,

Hon. Edward S. Northrop
United States District Court
nistrict of Maryland
Baltimore, Maryland 21201
lfp/ss
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.ju.vrtmt a}111trf cf t4t 'Jnittb .jtalt.&'
J ht,gltittgton. ~ . a} . 2llgt~~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE SAND R A D AY O'CON N OR

April 17, 1985

Dear Lewis,
Enclosed is a copy of part of Gerry Gunther's book
on constitutional law.
I thought you would like to read his
comments about Garcia.
Sincerely,

Justice Powell

Enclosure

!>1ay 1, 1985

Dear Gerry:
Sandra O'Connor was good enough to share with me a
copy of your "Election Year Reflections" that you sent her.
She and I both uere particularly interested in
your comments on G~rcia. I confe5s that the majority deci sion shocked me - both because of it~ lack of respect for
star~ decisis an0 its virtu~] rejection of ju~icial review
of legislation affecting the stP.t~s ~coptea un0er the Commerce Clause. It is heartening for a scholQr of your quality ann distinction to agree with our concerns. r understand
that your "Reflections" will be included in the forthcoming
supplement to your ca~e~o~k.
I agree generally with vour assess~ent of the Burger Court. It is fa!r to Eay that we h~ve not hP~n as "ljberal" as the Warren Court in decisionF effecting t he rights
of defendants in criminal cases. nut the basic rights have
been preserved. Despite Bill Brennan's concern, repeate~ in
a nu~ber of decisions , that a majority is determine~ to
overrule Miranda , in my view no such sentiment exists. Even
apart from precedent, I think Mirandu was correct. E<'h:arc~s
v. Arizona arguably extends Miranda.
The Burger Court - as you noted - has hardly been
ultra conservativ~. You mentioned our decisions on abortions; the First A~endment: and t~e rights of minorities,
women, and illegitimates.
We do have too many fractured courts, with concurring as well as dissenting opinions. This is caused in part
by t he changing nature of our cas~load. I believe we have a
larger percentage of clo se and difficult cases than the
Court did during the Warren an~ earlier years. This is particularly true with reso~ct to the social legislation, enacted in the sixties and seventies, that we must construe •
. ~uch of this, with accompanying regulations, is both complex
and unclear.
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I hope to see you when you are in \'iashington.
Sincerely,

Prof. Gerald Gunther
School of Law
Stanford University
Stanford, California 94305
lfp/ss
cc:

Justice O'Connor

s.. ~.
··-- ~:t~.~~
r----
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THE BURGER COURT:

SOME ELECTION YEAR REFLECTIONS

Nineteen eighty-four seems to

~, . , - -

·"'-~-:r.

particularly apt vantage point for

P

,. S"-

~~Jl~

look to the past as well as the
ure of the u.s. Supreme Court. My
backward and forward glances
e prompted essentially because it is now 15
years since Warren Earl Bu er succeeded Earl Warren as Chief Justice of the
United States; and becau
this~ a presidential election year, an election
whose recent outcome
well have significant impact on the makeup and
direction of the Co
Let me begin with a look backward. Richard Nixon named Warren Burger
to the Court in 1969. Within the next three years, Nixon put three
additional Justices on the Court: Harry Blackmun, William Rehnquist, and
Lewis Powell (but not Clement Haynsworth, and, happily, not Harrold
Carswell, nor Hershel Friday, nor Mildred Lillie). Since Nixon, we have
had three Presidents: Jimmy Carter, Gerald Ford, and the present incumbent.
Carter had no appointments to the Court. Each of the Republicans has chosen
one Justice: Ford named John Paul Stevens; Reagan has so far named Sandra
Day O'Connor. That makes six Justices selected by recent Republican
presidents; plus one Eisenhower appointee, William J. Brennan. Only Byron
White and Thurgood Marshall were the nominees of Democratic Presidents,
Kennedy and Johnson respectively; seven-ninths of the present composition of
the Court, in short, are Republican selections. And all of the recent
Republican Presidents, all those starting with Nixon,-were strong critics of
Warren Court directions; only Kennedy and Johnson were clear supporters of
the Warren Court.
To the pundits in and out of the media in the early 70s, the political
orientation of the nominators gave rise to widespread expectations of a
dramatic turnaround from Warren Court jurisprudence. In the early 70s, The
New York Times, Time Magazine and other periodicals were filled with
headlines and think-pieces and editorials with such titles as "Conservative
Profile of a Nixon Court Discernible, .. ''Supreme Court Begins Swing To The
Right That Was Sought By Nixon," "The Nixon Way," "The Nixon Radicals," and
so forth.
Twelve years ago, in 1972, in the midst of statistical analyses and
editorial comments elaborating such conclusions, I argued that those
assessments were vastly overstated. In an Op-Ed piece in the New York Tin~s
and in a couple of law review articles, I ventured to guess that the Nixon
appointees were not peas out of the same pod, would not be a solid bloc,
were quite distinguishable individuals, were mostly diSinclined to engage in
a radical discarding of Warren Court achievements. "There was no drastic
rush to the right," I argued at the time. "The changes were marginal, not
cataclysmic. [So-called] 'retreats' were more typically refusals to extend
Warren Court tendencies and narrow readings of Warren Court precedents. Not
firm strides to the rear but side-steps and refusals to step forward were
characteristic. And in a considerable number of cases, Warren Court
principles ~ embraced and applied." I concluded that "portrayals of a
dramatic turnabout do not ring true. Rather, I see a Court divided,
1
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uncertain and adrift.•
I have never written anything that produced so much hooting from
colleagues around the country and from some of my friends in journalism. I
was whistling in the dark or currying favor or had leapt from the ivory
tower into the wild blue yonder, the charges went. Some people even bet me
that, if I gave the Nixon appointees another two or three years, I would
surely concede that there had indeed been a radical turnabout.
Well, here it is, 12 years after that, 15 years after Warren Burger
took his seat, and I still have not had to pay up. Indeed, if you will
forgive my egomaniacal self-congratulation, I think that assessment can
still serve as the centerpiece of a retrospective evaluation. And indeed,
some of my sharpest critics in '72 are now on record as agreeing with me. I
recently read a book published not long ago by the Yale University Press, a
book for which a number of constitutional scholars submitted essays
evaluating the work of the Burger Court. All of the scholars are members of
a quite liberal organization called the Society of American Law Teachers,
and SALT sponsored the collection. Well, the title of the book is •The
Burger Court."
But for my purposes, its significant theme is reflected in
its subtitle: the full title goes "The Burger Court: The CounterRevolution That Wasn't."
Quite so. The most controversial, innovative decisions of the Warren
Court still stand:
Brown v. Board of Education, the school segregation
case; Reynolds~ Sims, the:feapportionment decision; even Miranda~
Arizona, requiring detailed warnings when criminal suspects are arrested.
Continuity, not counter-revolution, has been, to many people's surprise, the
dominant theme. And, quite apart from the leading cases, the major trends
of the Warren Court persist. Judicial activism was the hallmark of the
Warren Court; greater judicial self-restraint was one of the refrains of
Richard Nixon in his campaigns and, allegedly, in his selection process.
Yet, if anything can be said of the Burger Court, it is that activism is
still very much a dominant strand in the Court's institutional performance.
It is a more "rootless" activism -- a more centrist, ad hoc activism -- than
that of the Warren Court. But it is activism nonetheless.
After all; a Court -- the Burger Court -- that hands down Roe ~ Wade
and the later cases removing most legal barriers to abortions can hardly be
called a shrinking violet. {My colleague and Dean John Ely, for example,
has called Roe an even worse, more unjustified judicial performance than
Lochner v. New York, the 1905 case striking down a state limit on the hours
bakery employees may work, a case widely conde~ned as instituting three
decades of unjustified economic policy-making by the Supreme Court.)
Moreover, in a rough sketch such as this, it is fair to say that the Burger
Court by and large has not retreated drastically from Warren Court First
Amendment decisions; indeed, much of First Amendment law was put on nore
solid footing in the 70s than it had been in the 60s -- though that footing
has gotten more slippery in the 80s. In the school segregation area, the
Burger Court has not only repudiated Administration efforts to curb busing
remedies but has indeed been remarkably willing to develop new ways of
curbing intradistrict segregation. And, despite increasingly strident
opposition by the Reagan Administration, almost all affirmative action
remedies that have reached the Court have in effect been sustained, from
Bakke, involving preferential admissions in higher education, to Weber,
2

involving preferences by private employers, and Fullilove~ upholding
congressional "set-asides" for minority businesses. And, despite some
nibbling away at the edges of Warren Court doctrine, the Court so far
continues to reject the major Administration pleas to change direction, as
with the most recent group of abortion cases and the denial of tax
exemptions to racially discriminatory private schools.
What has happened, then, to confound so many expectations about the
Republican appointees of the last decade and a half? First of all, most of
the new Justices have obviously taken their robes, their judicial
independence, quite seriously. They have gone their own way, often to the
disappointment of those who named them to the bench -- and one does not have
to stop with the Nixon appointees' rejection of the President's claims in
the Watergate Tapes Case a decade ago to repudiate the excessively
deterministic analyses of those who expect direct quid pro quos by political
nominees, and who exaggerate the impact of politics on the Court. In 1972,
a lot of commentators expected Harry Blackmun to be simply Warren Burger's
Minnesota Twin. I thought that prediction was wrong in 1972; but it was
simply a guess then, unsupported by data. Now, the outcome is quite clear:
Blackmun has proved to be quite independent, lining up on the liberal side
with Brennan and Marshall a surprising and indeed growing number of times.
Lewis Powell, I argued in 1972, seemed to me independent and impressive from
the start; and he has continued to be that in many areas. John Paul Stevens
-- selected by Ford, the least ideological of recent Republican Presidents;
more accurately, perhaps, selected by the best Attorney General in many
years, Edward Levi -- has been quite independent from the beginning. Even
Sandra O'Connor -- expected by some to be merely Rehnquist's Arizona and
Stanford Law School twin -- not long ago spoke for the Court in rejecting
Rehnquist's efforts to undermine the semi-suspect, intermediate scrutiny
level for gender classifications that the Court developed during the mid70s. Of the six sitting appointees of recent Republican Presidents, only
William Rehnquist has shown real eagerness to re-examine and repudiate some
of the major formulations of the Warren Court.
What went wrong? Why haven't the recent Republican Presidents been
more successful in their efforts to change the direction of the Court? I do
not mean to say that they have had no impact, of course: most of the
appointees are more conservative, with respect to states' rights and social
justice and criminal procedure, for example; they lack the overarching value
commitment to equality of the Warren majority, and they are more receptive
to competing claims of individuality and autonomy; and these values have
from time to time had impacts on statutory interpretation and constitutional
law. But I deliberately emphasize the really quite remarkable continuity,
the institutional unwillingness to engage in any radical turning back of the
clock, the phenomenon, in short, of the ··counter-revolution that wasn't."
And that continuity has taken place not because most of the recent
Republican Presidents, like most Presidents in our history, have been
uninterested in and inattentive to the Court. It is precisely because at
least Nixon and Reagan made the Court a campaign issue and because both had
strong ideological disagreements with the Court that expectations of
dramatic changes in constitutional law arose. In the face of that, what
explains the continuity? Let me suggest several factors.
First of all, there is the inherent shortsightedness, the inherent
limited attention span, of most Presidents. By and large, even those
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Presidents who have reason to pay very serious attention to the Court tend
to worry about the Court only with respect to a narrow cluster of issues.
Recall the case of Franklin D. Roosevelt, for example. The major changes in
the economy that the Roosevelt Administration enacted in its first term ran
into repeated vetoes from the Court. FDR was frustrated because the Nine
Old Men stood in his way; and he did not have an opportunity to replace even
one of them during his first term. Shortly after, his Court-Packing plan of
1937 failed in the Senate. But the dam soon broke, and before FDR left
office, he had nine opportunities to send Supreme Court nominations up to
the Hill. All of his appointees proved to be loyal New Dealers in the sense
-- in the only sense -- he hoped: all joined in dramatically changing the
constitutional groundrules by eliminating many of the barriers to
governmental regulation of the economy. But Roosevelt had no special
interest in the ideological direction of the Court beyond that. His
nominees, unanimous about regulatory power, soon spread all over the lot on
issues of individual rights. Again and again, for example, one found Felix
Frankfurter and Robert Jackson on one side, Hugo Black and William 0.
Douglas on the other.
So it really proved to be for Richard Nixon. To Nixon, the critical
issue, virtually the only Court-related one he expressed interest in, was
law and order. Even there, he proved only marginally successful: As I have
said, despite some significant whittling away, there has been no overturning
of major Warren Court criminal procedure landmarks -- at least not yet. As
to most constitutional issues, the Nixon appointees have gone their own
different ways.
For Ronald Reagan, the social issues -- abortion, school prayer, busing
have been central. Sandra O'Connor was with the dissenters in the most
recent abortion cases, to be sure; but she has shown some independence, and
she did repudiate Rehnquist on the sex discrimination issue, as I have
noted.
Another source of explanation for the relatively limited impact of the
Republican Presidents lies in the nature of conservatives and conservatism.
To some conservatives -- for some of those who are conservative rather than
radical reactionary in outlook -- precedent and continuity rank high in the
scale of values. And for those conservatives -- Justice Lewis Powell is
probably the best contemporary example -- well established law is not to be
readily overturned, even if the Justice would not have supported its
creation had he sat on the Warren Court.
The commitment of some conservatives such as Justice Powell to
precedent and continuity and stare decisis has had a great deal to do with
the preservation of so much of the Warren Court and early Burger Court
legacy in recent years. I will remind you simply of the Akron cases just a
couple of years ago -- the major onslaught in the Supreme Court so far on
the principles of Roe v. Wade, the abortion decision. Despite the legal and
political arguments since Roe in 1973, the majority in the Akron cases held
firm to the basic principles of Roe; and the majority opinion by Jus t ice
Powell, contained an eloq~e~ ~
n
e i ortance of stare decisis
even in constitutiona ~I cannot help 1nterpolat1ng here my oubts that
the force of stare decisis and precedent will be quite as strong in the
coming few years, quite apart from new judicial appointments, to which I
will turn in a moment. My interpolation is especially prompted by the most
4

important decision from the Court so far this Term. The decision came down
just a bit more than a month ago, on February 19, in~ v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authority. The case, you may recall, produced a rare
outright overruling of a prior Supreme Court decision. The 5 to 4 decision
in Garcia flatly overruled National League of Cities v. Usery, a case that
had been decided less than a decade earlier, in 1976. There isn't enough
time today to belabor the aspects of the Garcia ruling that troubled me
substantially (quite apart from the immediate issue at stake, the
applicability of the federal Fair Labor Standards Act to the employees of a
municipal transit authority). But there are aspects of the case that seem
to me worth mentioning briefly, for the bearing they may have on the binding
effect of past constitutional norms on future Supreme Court Justices.
The first aspect, and the one most germane to my topic today, is the
source of the overruling that took place in Garcia. The source of the
overruling was the Justices usually viewed as being on the liberal side of
the Court spectrum (though I would note that the principle they overturned
was one that had long been endorsed by the late Justice William o. Douglas,
hardly an arch reactionary). Justice Blackmun wrote the majority opinion in
Garcia; it was Justice Blackmun who was the key switch in voting, for he had
been with the majority, albeit in considerable doubt, in supporting the
result in National League of Cities. Joining Justice Blackmun were Justices
Brennan, Marshall, White and Stevens. The dissenters were Chief Justice
Burger and Justices Powell, Rehnquist and O'Connor. The first point I want
to note about the case is emphasized in Justice Powell's dissent in Garcia.
He suggested that the ruling may "weaken the application of stare decisis,"
and he commented: "The stability of judicial decision, and with it respect
for the authority of this Court, are not served by the precipitous
overruling of multiple precedents that we witness in this case." As I have
noted, it has been so-called conservatives such as Pm-1ell who have been at
the forefront in adhering to a good deal of the Warren Court and early
Burger Court precedents so far. In short, stare decisis and precedent, in a
conservative age, has been largely of aid in results to the liberals. Yet
in Garcia it is the liberals that perform one of the more dramatic
overturnings of precedent in Court history. Can one really believe that, in
future onslaughts on Warren Court precedents, responsible conservatives will
be quite as ready to support decisions with which they disagree and which
were rendered when they were not yet on the Court as readily as has been the
case to a remarkable degree in the history of the Burger Court so far? In
short, I wonder, as a matter of sheer strategy and tactics, whether the
liberals have not inflicted on themselves a fairly substantial wound by
their handling of the National League of Cities line of cases in the recent
Garcia decision.

l

I said I do not want to turn this into an elaborate discussion of
Garcia. But a couple of additional aspects of Garcia are worth noting
fairly briefly. First of all, the alleged limit on Congress involved in
Garcia is states rights -- the state autonomy concern derivable from the
structure of the Constitution and reflected in the lOth Amendment. Many
people who would wail if a First Amendment or equal protection or due
process precedent were overturned would probably say that there is no reason
to cry over a repudiation of the states rights defense. Certainly that
would seem to express the attitude of Justice William J. Brennan: Justice
Brennan had written a vehement (and in my view rather misleading and
exaggerated) dissent in National League of Cities, and the Garcia decision
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may be seen as a triumph for the Brennan view, albeit I believe at
considerable cost. Yet federalism is not quite as reprehensible or
worthless a defense as some of you may think. True, it comes down to us as
a defense long invoked by vested economic interests to subvert national
regulations of the private sector. Indeed, it is the Nine Old Men's resort
to rigid Tenth Amendment notions in the pre-1937 years that produced the
widespread modern notion that states rights concerns, at least so far as
judicial concerns are involved, have long been properly buried. Yet may I
remind you that the issue raised in cases such as National League of Cities
or Garcia, or, especially, FERC v. Mississippi (on the power of the federal
goverment to mandate the agenda of state agencies) are importantly different
from those that were at the forefront in the days when states rights notions
were in disrepute. The new issues were largely unheard of in the New Deal
and subsequent days. The regulatory techniques we are dealing with now have
been resorted to by the federal government only in very recent years -that is the imposition of regulations directly on the states, not on the
private sector; and, even more troublingly, imposing coercive regulations
that require state agencies to act as enforcers and implementers of detailed
federal programs. Justice Brennan's dissent in National League of Cities,
which argued eloquently albeit unpersuasively that the majority decision was
a repudiation of most of our constitutional history, of the spirit of John
Marshall, of Gibbons v. Ogden, of the Darby case, of Wickard v. Filburn, was
in my view alternately wrong or beside the point. Neither the Framers nor
John Marshall nor Gibbons nor Darby nor Wickard ever had to deal with the
issue of direct regulations imposed on states. Whatever may be said of the
merits of the majority's resolution in National League of Cities -- and I
have had my doubts about that -- surely the dissenters argument that this
was a long settled issue was absurd. And the basic thing to be said about a
legitimate judicial concern with states rights concerns, particularly in the
novel late Twentieth Century context, is that a federalism concern permeates
the United States Constitution -- in its text, in its history, and in its
structure. Surely it behooves the Court to take so clearly established
limiting principles seriously, whether or not you agree with its intrinsic
merits as a promoter of local self-government and whether or not you condemn
some of those who have invoked it in the past.
A final, to me most basic point about Garcia, before I return to my
main theme. Justice Blackmun's majority opinion in Garcia comes awfully
close to, if he does not fully endorse, the notion that states rights
retraints on national authority should be viewed as essentially
nonjusticiable issues -- issues to be left to the political processes rather
than to Court implementation. He argues, akin : to Herbert Wechsler's famous
1954 argument about the political safeguards of federalism, that the
structural provisions for assuring representation of state interests in
national decisionmaking are adequate to guarantee sufficient safeguarding of
state autonomy concerns in the political process, and that therefore
judicial review is well nigh unnecessary and inappropriate. I find that a
truly troubling notion. I remind you that when Herbert Wechsler put forward
that argument, in a somewhat different national environment in 1954, he did
not argue that judicial review was therefore wholly inappropriate -- quite
the contrary. The only academic I know of who has made that argument is
Dean Jesse Choper of the law school at U.C. Berkeley. Jesse Choper said in
a 1980 book, ··Judicial Review and the National Political Process,· that all
federalism concerns, like all separation of powers concerns, should be
viewed as nonjusticiable and left to the political process, so that the
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Court could devote itself exclusively to the safeguarding ·of individual and
minority rights. Now, I don't disagree with Jesse about the special
importance of judicial review for individual and minority rights. But I
think it is a significant step beyond, and in my eyes a wholly unjustifiable
step, to consider as nonjusticiable, as new varieties of "political
questions" as it were, a set of major questions clearly arising "under the
Constitution" of the United States.
In my view, that aspect of Garcia casts into question the entire
legitimacy of the Court's authority, at least its legitimacy to the extent
it rests on the rationale traditionally advanced ever since Marbury v.
Madison and, indeed, Hamilton's No. 78 of the Federalist before that. I
think the Court very seriously undermines its own legal underpinnings -- the
underpinnings it resorts to when it does do all the good things it does and
has done for individual rights and minority interests -- when it purports to
pick and choose what it will consider a constitutional issue on the merely
prudential ground that some types of issues ·warrant not merely less
attention from the Court but no attention at all. And yet that comes pretty
close to describing the ultimate thrust oflthe Garcia case. Again, I
tremble some for the future -- especially a future in which judicial power
is likely to be more and more in the hands of Justices who, unlike me, are
not liberal Democrats (although, like me, they may hold some fairly narrow
views of the proper judicial role) --when the liberal majority of 1985
leaves as its legacy to those Justices the message that they are free to
pick and choose among constitutional norms in selecting those that a new
majority chooses to take seriously -- and, in exercising that selection
authority, is free to give very little weight to the force of precedent and
stare decisis to boot.
Enough of my excursion on Garcia. Let me return to my main theme. On
that one, you will recall, I have tried to sketch and to some extent explain
the relatively small amount of impact of the Burger Court on the fabric of
constitutional law, at least so far. But I urge you not to misunderstand
me: I am not trying to paint an admiring portrait of the Burger Court. I
can -- and often do -- go on at great length criticizing particular opinions
and trends. And I have repeatedly criticized the institutional processes of
the present Court. When I said in 1972 that this was a Court diviaed and
adrift, I expected the Justices to get their footing and develop greater
coherence before long. I by and large still await that. It is often a
terribly fragmented Court, with too many separate opinions, too many casual
dicta (for which one can blame the explosion in the number of law clerks
only in part). But none of that seems to me to undercut my basic theme,
that the Burger Court and its Republican appointees have left a remarkable
part of the Warren Court legacy quite intact.
Enough of patting myself on the back about my vision of 1972. Let me
turn to the future. As to that, I am certainly not willing to make any bets
or predictions that there will be as few dramatic changes from the Supreme
Court in the next few years as there have been for the last fifteen. You
hardly need reminding that we have recently had a Presidential election;
Ronald Reagan has been reelected. And today, the majority of the Justices
are 75 or older. In his second term, Ronald Reagan, like Frankli.n
Roosevelt, may well have several opportunities to leave his imprint on the
Court. And President Reagan continued to harp on the social agenda in his
campaign, as you know.
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The kind of impact future Reagan appointments will have will in my view
turn on the nature of those appointments. Will he name people of the ilk of
Ed Meese -- a trusted political ally but not a person with a long-developed,
well-formed constitutional philosophy? Or will he name predominantly people
such as Bob Bork, the former law professor at Chicago and Yale and Solicitor
General in the Nixon Administration, who now sits on the federal Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia?
I suspect that those who fear or desire dramatic long-term change in
Court direction had better look to the Bork rather than the Meese type of
appointee. The Reagan administration has been quite sophisticated, in my
view, in naming some of the nation's outstanding conservative scholars to
Court of Appeals vacancies - - not only Bob Bork but also Nino Scalia of
Chicago, who now sits with Bork on the D.C. Circuit, and Ralph Winter of
Yale, who now sits on the Second Circuit in New York, and Dick Posner and
Frank Easterbrook of Chicago, who now sit on the Seventh Circuit there. A
Bork type of Supreme Court Justice might well be more of an intellectual
force and leader, even more ready to re-examine precedent, than William
Rehnquist has been. A Meese-type appointee can probably be counted on more
reliably in terms of short-term results. But I suspect that the prospects
-- or horrors -- of more basic and more lasting constitutional change are
more likely to be realized from strong-minded academics than from more runof-the-mill political appointees. For better or for worse, academics such
as Bork have thought about constitutional law and the role of the Court for
years, broadly and deeply. They have a considered, coherent (some would say
unduly rigid) philosophy. I doubt that anyone would say that of the Meese
type of nominee. Even now the exclusionary rule is undergoing reexamination. Soon, with the strong prospect of changed personnel, a good
many more well-established parts of Warren Court doctrine may be up for
reconsideration.
Even a Reagan Court of the future will not necessarily be a
catastrophe, though the risks are greater than proved to be the case with
the shrill prophecies of the early 70s about the Nixon-Burger Court. But I
ought not to stop without saying a word about a fear I have about 1984 and
1985 that Dtay more closely resemble an Orwellian nightmare. My fear goes
less to what the Court may do than to what the country may do.
My fear concerns the ongoing campaign to resort to a hitherto unused
method of amending the U.S. Constitution. The 26 amendments to our
Constitution have all been added by one of the : two amendment routes
delineated in Article V: two-thirds of Congress has proposed amendments;
three-fourths of the states have then ratified. The untried alternative
route is to have amendments proposed not by Congress but by a constitutional
convention, a constitutional convention which Congress Must call if twothirds of the states' demand one. Two-thirds of the states today means 34
states. Today, 32 of the necessary 34 state legislatures have applied to
Congress to demand a convention to consider a balanced budget amendment to
the Constitution. If two more states act in the same way, and if Congress
hasn't in the meanwhile proposed an amendment of its own, Congress will have
to call a convention. And no one really knows how .that convention will ~
organized, and, most important, how broad its scope will be. In~ view,
convention delegates may consider any issue perceived by those who elected
them as important to the country; in my view a convention would ~ be
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limited to the single, balanced budget issue. We simply ·have had no
experience with that convention route -- unless you consider the arguably
relevant one of the Philadelphia Convention of 1787, which was called for
narrow purposes and itself became a "runaway•• one.
Convention applications are now pending in a number of states.
Recently, California very nearly became the critical state. \ve \\•ere _a bout
to confront an initiative on the November ballot to press our legislature to
apply for a balanced budget convention -- or else lose all salaries and
other benefits. A California Supreme Court decision removed that issue from
the ballot. But the issue continues very live indeed in other states.
And at the same time, not only fiscal conservatives call for
constitutional change. A scattered number of moderate and liberal leaders
-- with Lloyd Cutler, President Carter's White House Counsel, in the lead
are also holding meetings to consider allegedly necessary constitutional
changes, such as moving toward a parliamentary system or increasing
executive power or what have you. And, though this campaign has not yet hit
the headlines, there is a growing undercurrent of noise claiming, as Lloyd
Cutler does, that the Framers would be shocked if they only knew that there
had been only 26 amendments to the document wrought nearly two centuries
ago.
Why does a constitutional convention give me Orwellian nightmares? I
am not denying the legitimacy of the convention route. Nor do I have
terribly strong feelings about the merits of the balanced budget amendment
(although I think it mighty ironical that some of its strongest supporters
are also among the strongest critics of the Court -- and yet tell us that
the uncertainties in the budget amendment's language would be resolved by,
who else, the Supreme Court, which would thus gain a major role about fiscal
policies, not only the present range of political and social ones.} No, my
concern comes from the process by which we have come so very close to
reaching the necessary number of states to trigger a convention -- a process
which in most state legislatures, I assure you, has been one of perfunctory
debate simply on the pros and cons of fiscal responsibility, with virtually
total inattention to the risks of the convention route -- at least no
discussion beyond unfounded reassurances about the risk-free nature of
calling a limited convention. I think that is an extraordinarily
irresponsible invocation of constitutional processes. And, given the
political dynamics, given one way of sketching the possible scenario if that
convention route is taken, the convention that .confronts us in the wake of
1984 may well produce as much substantial constitutional change than
anything we have seen or indeed can anticipate from the Reagan-Burger Court.

---oOo--
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-May 7, 1985
PERSON~L

Dear John:
I enclose a typewritten draft of "Reflections" by
Gerald Gunther that he sent to Justice O'Connor.
This will be of interest to you, as it was to me.
was particularly pleased by his substantial agreement with
my dissent in Garcia.
I

Although I understan1 that Gerry intends to include these "Reflections" in the supplement to his casebook,
since it has not been published I would not think any public
reference to it would be appropriate. It is an interesting
view of the Burger Court that, in general, is about right.
I recall that you admire Professor Gunther~
Dan Ortiz will be in CharlottesvillP. this weekend
(Saturday and perhaps a part of Sunday) . house hunting. Several realtors have been in touch with Dan. I suppose he
will be with them primarily, but possibly you may have an
opportunity to see him.
Sincerely,

Professor John C. Jeffries, Jr.
School of Law
University of Virginia
Charlottesville, Virginia 22901
lfp/ss
Enc.
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July 3, 1985
Mr. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.
Supreme Court of the United States
Washington, D.C. 20543
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Dear Lewis:
Ever since the Court's Garcia opinion carne down, I have been
mulling the intrinsic defects of that decision.
It seems to me
objectionable on many levels -- of history, of principle, of an
understanding of the processes of government.
I suppose a
professor of constitutional law may be expected to read opinions
critically, but I can think of few opinions in recent years
which I think more disappointing, whether tested by the precepts
of constitutional law or by more general notions of good political
theory.
I have had several occasions to talk about Garcia and its
implications before various groups, such as the National Conference
of State Legislators and the Fourth Circuit Judicial Conference.
At the request of the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental
Relations, I have also written a short article on Garcia. The
article will appear in a forthcoming issue of ACIR's magazine,
Intergovernmental Perspectives.
It occurs to me that the article
might be of interest to you.
I enclose a copy.
I am sure that you must be glad to have the current Term come
to an end. The work does not, of course, end, but at least you
have a bit more flexibility with your schedule.
I was more than
a little interested, as you may suppose, in reading the Grand
Rapids opinions. As one who teaches and writes about the Court
and constitutional law, I welcomed the chance to do the oral
argument in that case.
I think it important that a teacher of
the subject, if given the chance, sharpen his skills by the
argument of a challenging case like Grand Rapids.
I know that I
found the experience immensely stimulating and rewarding.
While at the Judicial Conference, I had the chance to chat
briefly with your son. He is making a palpable mark for himself
in the practice, and I am sure you are proud of him.
It was also
good to see Jay, who seems to take nicely to the judge's life.
I hope that I run into you this summer, either in Richmond
or elsewhere.
In the meantime, my warm regards,

Sit!~
A. E. Dick Howard
White Burkett Miller Professor
of Law and Public Affairs
Enclosure

Two centuries ago, the framers who met at Philadelphia
labored to produce a Constitution crafted to the needs of a free
people living in a republic of extended territory.

Drawing on

the lessons of history, they sought to give the central
government sufficient authority to deal with such national
concerns ·as commerce among the states, while dispersing power in
such a way as to protect individual liberty and local selfgovernment--two of the ends for which the war of independence had
been waged.
A linchpin of that constitutional order is federalism.

One

has but to read the text of the Constitution--which refers to the
states at least fifty times--to realize how central the concept
of federalism was to the founders' thinking.

Indeed, it was a

concern about the potential power of the new federal government
that led to the adoption of the Bill of Rights.
In the nineteenth century, that perceptive French traveler,
Tocqueville, lavished praise on American federalism in his
~mocracy

in America.

On the link between self-government and

liberty, he commented, "A nation may establish a free government,
but without municipal institutions it cannot have the spirit of
liberty."
As Americans prepare to celebrate the Constitution's
bicentennial, the Supreme Court appears to have forgotten both
the framers' intent and the teachings of the nation's history.
In February the Court decided Garcia y. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority.

Five justices joined in a majority opinion

concluding, in effect, that if the states "as states" want
protection within the constitutional system they must look to

'.
Congress, not to the courts.

The "principal means," Justice

Blackmun wrote, by which the role of the states in the federal
system is to be ensured "lies in the structure of the Federal
Government itself."
The states and localities, to be sure, will survive the
impact of Garcia's immediate holding, which involves the
application of the Fair Labor Standards Act to a muncipally owned
mass-transit system.

The holding is bound to be both burdensome

and expensive, but most local governments will find ways to
adjust, as they have done to other fiscal and legal vicissitudes.
But far more than labor laws and bus drivers' pay is at stake in
Garcia.
Garcia raises fundamental questions about the role of the
Supreme Court as the balance wheel of the federal system.

Garcia

abdicates a function which history, principle, and an
understanding of the political process argue strongly that the
federal judiciary should undertake.

For those who care about the

health of American constitutionalism--including, but not limited
to, federalism--Garcia should be an unsettling decision.
Although the ultimate reach of Garcia is unclear, the
decision adopts a variation on a theme asking the Court to hold
its hand when a 1 i tigant claims that a federal action is beyond
the authority of the Federal Government in that the action
encroaches upon some protected right of the states.

Final

resolution of such claims, this thesis runs, should be left to
the political branches of the government.
Such a position reads an important part of the founders'
assumptions out of the constitutional order.
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One may debate--

,

.

though the point has long since been academic--whether the{

-hw.nJ~,..,

intended the Supreme Court to have the power of judicial review.
But assuming the legitimacy of that doctrine, it is hard to
escape the conclusion that the founders assumed that limiting
national power in order to protect the states would be as much a
part of the judicial function as any other issue.
James Madison, in Federalist No. 39, was explicit:

there

must be a tribunal empowered to decide "controversies relating to
the boundaries between the two jurisdictions."

The nature of the

ratification contest--especially the Federalist' need to reply to
anti-Federalist charges--supports the conclusion that the
proponents of the Constitution saw the necessity that federalism
be among the institutional arrangements to be protected in the
constitutional system.
The principle of the rule of law adds force to what this
history teaches.

A basic tenet of Anglo-American

constitutionalism is that no branch of government should be the
ultimate judge of its own powers.

The principle that one cannot

be a judge in one's own cause is of centuries' standing.

This

principle is stated by Sir Edward Coke in Dr. Bonham's Case
(1610) and, in our own time, bas been reinforced by United states
v. Nixon (1974).

The principle is especially important in a

system which, in addition to being federal, looks to checks and
balances and the separation of powers to restrain arbitrary
government.
A further flaw in Garcia is its resting upon erroneous
suppositions about the ways in which the nation's political
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process actually works.

Essential to any argument that the Court

. "
should abstain from adjudicating limits on national power V1S-avis the states is the notion that the states have ample
protection in the processes of politics.
This assumption has two dimensions.

One is institutional--

that the ·states have a major part in structuring the national
government.

The other is political--that the ways in which the

process actually works (such as in the political parties and in
Congress) focus on the states.

In fact, neither branch of the

argument reflects current realities.
There was a time when the states had considerable influence
over the shape of federal politics.

Under the original

Constitution, u.s. senators were elected by the legislatures of
their respective states.

The Constitution did not set federal

standards for congressional elections; the states controlled the
franchise.

And it was up to the state legislatures as to how to

draw the boundaries of congressional districts.
All this has changed.

The Seventeenth Amendment (adopted in

1913) brought direct election of senators.

Judicial decisions

(such as that striking down the poll tax) and acts of Congress
(notably the Voting Rights Act of 1965) have federalized much of
the law respecting the franchise.

The 1965 statute, for example,

requires preclearance (by the Attorney General or the District
Court for the District of Columbia) of voting changes in areas
covered by the act.

State power to apportion congressional seats

has been circumscribed by decisions such as the Supreme Court's
1964 opinion in Wesberry v. sanders,

districts based on population.
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requiring that congressional

Accompanying these significant shifts in institutional
arrangements has been a palpable decline in the "political"
safeguards.

Political parties, especially at the state level, no

longer are the force they once were.

Increased use of primaries

and the impact of "reforms" have had the unintended consequence
of encouraging the development of alternative institutions.

Most

striking has been the rise of PACs, which now number in the
thousands.
The "nationalization" of campaign finance has led to the
weakening of the federal lawmakers' loyalties to constituents.
Special interest politics has tended to replace consensus
politics.

Moreover, the explosive growth of the Federal

Government in modern times has brought the emergence of the "iron
triangle"--the convergence of bureaucrats, interested legislators
(often powerful committee chairmen), and lobbyists to determine
the shape of federal programs.
In defense of having the Court abdicate Tenth Amendment
questions, as it did in Garcia, one sometimes hears the argument
that the Court cannot resolve empirical questions.

Thus, it is

argued, assessing the facts of a given case so as "balance"
competing state and federal interests requires the Court to
undertake a mode of enquiry that more properly belongs to
legislators.

Yet in other areas of constitutional litigation the

Court resolves empirical questions as a matter of course.

Every

case involving claims that a state act burdens commerce requires
the resolution of economic and other such data, but the Court
does not shirk this task.
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Another objection to the Court's having a role in Tenth
Amendment cases is that the justices cannot draw workable
distinctions, such as deciding (as precedents before Garcia had
sought to do) what is and what is not a "traditional governmental
function" (and hence entitled at least to some presumptive
measure of protection against federal intrusion).
drawing is, of course, difficult.

such line-

But its being difficult does

not mean that it should not be undertaken, any more than the
conceptual difficulties of deciding what constitutes "speech" or
"religion"--the thorniest of problems--are grounds for not
deciding First Amendment cases.
Whatever the tangles confronting the Court, there are even
graver reasons to question Congress' competence or willingness to
make considered judgments on constitutional questions--especially
when the question is that of the limits of Congress' own power.
The judicial process may have its flaws, but it aspires to a
degree of rationality, including analytical reasoning, that one
does not associate with the legislative process.

The limits of

time, the pressures of lobbyists, the temptations of expediency,
undue reliance on staff, and other distractions often have more to
do with the final shape of legislation than any thinking about
constitutional issues.

Martin Shapiro makes the point well:

"The nature of the legislative process, combined with the nature
of constitutional issues, makes it virtually impossible for
Congress to make independent, unified, or responsible judgments
on the constitutionality of its own statutes."
Shl!
~another argument for the Court's leaving the states and

localities to the tender mercies of Congress is that the Court
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needs to husband its scarce political capital.

This argument

raises the spectre of a return to "dual federalism"--the
ancien

regim~,

before 1937, when the supreme Court often derailed

federal social and economic legislation in the name of states'
rights.
such a risk is chimerical.
protecting the states as

stat~s

For the Court to play a role in
under the Tenth Amendment, as the

majority set out to do in the Court's 1976 decision in National
League of Cities v. Usery (overruled in Garcia), raises no
question about Congress' power over the private sector.
As to keeping the Court out of unnecessary controversies,
most of the debate over "judicial activism" in recent decades has
involved such issues as school prayer, criminal justice, and
abortion.

Federalism cases may provoke academic debate--and, of

course, matter enormously to state and local officials--but they
stir little outrage in the country at large.

It is individual

rights decisions that, by and large, stir passions.

One doubts

that the partisans of Garcia would be content to see individual
rights matters, because they may be controversial, left likewise
to the political process.
Garcia betrays a glaring disregard of a basic truth about
American constitutionalism:

that institutional rights, under our

Constitution, are a form of individual rights.

Even such basic

guarantees as those in the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth
Amendment do not secure absolute personal rights.

The protection

created is against governmental (that is, institutional) actions,
not against infringements by private parties.
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Thus, for

individual rights to be secured requires assurances as to the
stability of the institutional safeguards explicit or implicit in
the Constitution.
The individual American--as the heir to those who brought
the Constitution into being and agreed to its adoption--has a
fundamental entitlement to living under the form of government
spelled out in the Constitution.

The separation of powers is not

to be abandoned simply because it may be inconvenient.

Likewise,

one of the predicates of the constitutional order is that the
Supreme Court adhere to the values of federalism as manifestly
implicit in the Constitution.
Federalism may be an elusive idea, but it is no mere
abstraction.

And, while it was essential to the adoption of the

original Constitution, it is more than simply a political
compromise adopted to get the Constitution underway.

Federalism

is linked with individual liberty and with the health of the body
politic.
It is through participating in government at the local level
that the citizen is educated in the value of civic participation.
A robust federalism encourages state and local governments as
schools for citizenship.

Moreover, federalism both reflects and

encourages pluralism, allowing individual idiosyncracies to
flouish.

One often hears Justice Brandeis quoted on the states'

serving as "laboratories" for social and economic experiments.
The states are more than mere laboratories; to the extent they
encourage pluralism the states are handmaidens of the open
society.
Ultimately, the case for federalism rests on a concern to
8

preseve the right of choice--the essence of political freedom.
States and local governments have, of course, often trampled this
very right, for example, when they have denied the vote because
of one's race.

The remedies for such abuses lie in vigorous

judicial enforcement of constitutional guarantees and in
Congress' power to protect civil rights.

But the need to guard

against trespasses by states or localities on individual
liberties does not undermine the conclusion that federalism as
such can operate as part of the very matrix of protection fcc
individual liberties.
In refusing to enforce the Tenth Amendment--to play the role
they regularly undertake in respect to other provisions of the
Bill of Rights--the Garcia majority leaves an important
constitutional sentry post unmanned.

What recourse do those who

care about the health of federalism have?
There are other opportunities for courts to vindicate the
underlying values.

Federal statutes may be interpreted in light

of their impact on state and local governments.

For example, the

Court's 1981 Pennhurst decision lays down the salutary rule that
federal grant conditions, to be binding on state and local
governments, must be clearly identified as such when grant funds
are accepted.

Notions of comity can come into play when

reviewing lower courts' use of their equity powers to reform
state institutions (such as prisons) or when deciding how far a
federal court may go in intervening in state court proceedings
(as in the Court's 1971 decision in Younger v. Harris).
Ultimately, one may hope for the undermining or demise of

9

Garcia.

The majority decision stops short of saying that under

no circumstances could the constitutional structure impose

.

affirmative limits on federal actions affecting the states.

A

more favorable fact situation than that ~Garcia, one entailing
a more serious intrusion on the states and a more marginal
~;,;,s. +~
~occasion

federal interest, might

to begin the movement away

from that unfortuate decision.
Early and outright reversal of Garcia should not lightly be
predicted, even assuming new justices are appointed to the Court.
Reversals typically come only after a precedent has been robbed
of vitality.

The Court decided Gideon y. Wainwright (1963),

requiring states to appoint counsel for felony defendants unable
to afford a lawyer, only after twenty years of experience under
Betts y. Brady proved that an ad hoc approach would not do.
Likewise, it was easier for Justice Blackmun to rationalize the
result in Garcia by pointing to the Court's difficulties in postNational League of Cities decisions such as EEOC y. Wyoming and
FERC y. Mississippi.
Still, one can hope that eventually a majority of the
justices will come to realize the mistake made in Garcia.
Because federalism is an intrinsic component of the
constitutional system--indeed, bolsters other constitutional
values--safeguarding that process cannot be left to the
unrestrained discretion of the political branches.

It may be that

the authority pronounced in National League of Cities (and
renounced in Garcia) ought to be sparingly used.

But it is

salutary that the political branches know that the Court has
power to step in when the facts point to intervention.
10

It is no less legitimate and proper for the supreme court to
concern itself with assuring the health of federalism as it is
for the Court to uphold individual liberties as such.

In neither

case is abdication of the Court's proper role consistent with the
principles inhering in the Constitution.
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September 12, 1985

Hon. Lewis F. Powell, Jr.
United States Supreme Court
Washington, DC 20543
Dear Justice Powell:
I have arranged with the Boar's Head to have two bottles of
German wine -- a 1983 Graacher JosephshOfer Riesling Sp!tlese and
a 1982 Avelsbacher Altenberg Riesling Kabinnet -- provided to the
Chief Justice and Mrs. Burger when they visit the law school this
month. The Boar's Head will tell the Burgers when they arrive
that the bottles are available and will deliver them to the
Burgers' room upon request. I have asked that a note saying
"From Jo and Lewis Powell with affection" accompany the gift.
Because the Boar's Head had only one German wine on its list, I
obtained the two bottles elsewhere in Charlottesville. They are
both nice wines and are close to the ones you suggested. If you
would like to change the arrangements at all, just let me know.
The Boar's Head, I'm sure, will not mind a change in plans.
Yours sincerely,

SCHOOL OF LAW

POSTA~

DEC 2 ~ 1985

CODE Z7706

December 12, 1985

The Honorable Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Associate Justice
United States Supreme Court
Supreme Court Bu{lding
Washington, D.C.
20543
Dear Justice Powell:
Last term the Court abandoned any seriousness in federalism
questions, in Garcia's overruling of the User~ case.
Many of my
colleagues in constitutional law think it is JUSt as well, but I
believe they are mistaken.
It is not clear to me on what legitimate basis the Court may abdicate its obligation of judicial
review piecemeal, or presume to apply less rigorous standards of
constitutional compliance in some areas of its work than in other
areas of more intense personal interest to some of its members.
Your dissent in Garcia, like the conscientiousness of your
work on related federalism issues (indeed, your work overall) is
not subject to the reproach of selective enthusiasm.
I was much
moved by it and the written consequence is enclosed.
I hope you
may find it of some interest, especially as you are, in a manner
of speaking, quite responsible for my having written it.
Some years ago our mutual acquaintance, Gerald Gunther,
wrote an appreciative article in which he compared your contributions and position within the Court to those of the late Justice
Harlan.
He was entirely right in doing so.
The passing years
have more than confirmed the compliment. Not the least important
contribution you have made has been to those of us who regularly
teach this subject and who thus cannot help but desire that the
subject reflect an integrity of its own. Your opinions have been
tremendously important in furnishing that assurance over the
years.
I would feel seriously remiss in allowing any more time
to go by without having written to say how much your work has
meant to me.
I trust the current term goes well.
Sincerely,

?r~.//~~
William Van Alstyne

January 7, 1986

Dear Professor Van Alstyne:
Since coming on the Court, I cannot recall having
received a letter that pleased me as much as yours of December 12. I was deeply dlsturbed by the Court opinion in Garcia. It can be read - and probably will be - as an abdication of the riqht to judici~l review of congressional action
under the Commerce Clause. As your article so eloquently
makes clear, the Court's reasoning and decision ~eem almost
oblivious to the fact that the Constitution provided the
structure for a federal nation. Otherwi<3e, the Constitution
would never have been adopted.
I would have benefited greatlv in writi.nq my dissent, if I had had your brilliant article. I recall meeting
you when we were on the proqram together at William and Mary
in 1979. I admire both the substance of what you write even
when I may not agree, and particularJ.y the grace with which
you write.
With appreciation and best wishes.
Sincerely,

Professor William Van Alstyne
School of Law
Duke University
Durham, North Carolina 27706
lfp/ss

June 20, 1988

Mr • J a bl o ns k i :
This is a belated thank you for your letter, and the working master copies of the articles
you have written on the 11th Amendment.
I have
hoped to find an opportunity to read at least one
of them.
I sat on the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals earlier this month, and now have three
opinions to write that will keep me fairly busy.
As you know fran my dissent in Garcia, I
think it reasonably clear that the federal judiciary has a responsibility to preserve the federal
structure contemplated by the Constitution, the
debates in Philadelphia, and the history of its
ratification.
I congratulate you on your fine education
and record, and on the expected publication of
your articles in the De Paul and Richmond Law Reviews.
I also recall meeting you in front of the
statue of Chief Justice Marshall, and send best
wishes.
Sincerely,

I

Joseph John Jablonski, Jr., Esquire
1126 South Carolina Avenue, s. E.
washington, D. c. 20003
lfp/ss
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April 20, 1988
Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.
Supreme Court of the United States
1 First Street, N.E.
Washington, D.C. 20543
Dear Justice Powell:
It was a great honor to meet you today in front of the
statue of Chief Justice John Marshall in the ground floor of the
Supreme Court.
As promised, please find enclosed working masters of the two
articles I have authored on the eleventh amendment. Undaunted by
colleagues' remarks that the eleventh amendment was not "worthy
of comment," I continued my efforts with encouragement from Judge
Boggs, Dean Robert H. Mundheim, and Professor Clyde w.
Summers,
Jefferson B. Fordham Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania
Law School.
The article entitled The Eleventh Amendment: An Affirmative
Limitation on the Commerce Clause Power of the Congress - ~
Doctrinal Foundation is scheduled to be in print by the end of
the summer in Volume 38 of the De Paul Law Review.
Instead of
distinguishing between the limits the eleventh amendment imposes
on the federal courts, from the limits it imposes on the
Congress, as Professor Tribe has clearly done (See L. TRIBE,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 185 (1988)), I present a stronger more unified
view of eleventh amendment doctrine cohering around the principle
of the states' "constitutionally secured immunity" from
unconsented federal jurisdiction over private suits against them
- a principle even the Congress's clear will must respect, with
the exception of enactments pursuant to section 5 of the
fourteenth amendment.
The article entitled Does Garcia Preclude an Eleventh
Amendment Affirmative Limitation on the Commerce-clause Power of
the Congress? is scheduled to be in print by November 1988 in
Volume 23 of the University of Richmond Law Review.
I suggest
that the eleventh amendment may be one of those other
"affirmative limits the constitutional structure might impose on
federal action affecting the States under the Commerce Clause."
Garcia ~· San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S.
528, 556 (1985). Far from representing a form of "common law
sovereign immunity," the eleventh amendment might be viewed as
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Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.
Supreme Court of the United States
addressing the problems of jurisdiction in a system of dual
sovereignties in which the states have no representation in the
federal judiciary. Thus, the eleventh amendment would bear its
own structural justification, despite the Wechsler thesis.
Further, the eleventh amendment might have broad implications for
federalism law, as it may justify the Garcia dissenters' position
that the Constitution does contemplate judicially enforceable
affirmative protection for states from federal power.
As indicated, I am currently with Judge Boggs in the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. Because Judge
Boggs's Louisville chambers are not yet ready, we are temporarily
situated in The James Forrestal Building, Room 6Bl04, 1000
Independence Avenue, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20585, (202) 5869440. Every five weeks we fly to Cincinnati, Ohio for the oral
arguments, then back to Washington, D.C. to write our opinions.
I might add that the mutual trust and respect we have in one
another has been the greatest reward the clerkship has thus far
given me.
With best wishes.

Jr.
Law Clerk to the Honorable
Danny J. Boggs, United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit

JOSEPH JOHN JABLONSKI, JR.
1126 South Carolina Avenue, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 (202) 543-3909
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Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.
c/o Supreme Court of the United States
One First Street, N.E.
Washington, D.C. 20543
Dear Justice Powell,
It was in the interplay between you and Justice Stevens, for
whom I clerked during the 1982 Term, that I first became fascinated by
questions of federalism. Both you and Justice Stevens wrote separately
in EEOC v. Wyoming to express divergent views on the National League of
Cities doctrine, and the two of you took leadership roles in the battle
over Pennhurst II.
Enclosed is a copy of my latest foray into the area of federalism.
In a symposium issue of the Urban Lawyer arranged by the State and Local
Legal Center, I explored the extent to which the "political safeguards of
federalism" worked in four Congressional case studies. In each instance,
Congress responded to the after-effects of Supreme Court decisions on state
or local liability -- mitigating the effects of the antitrust laws and the
Fair Labor Standards Act, and on the other hand attempting to impose liability
on states under various civil rights statutes and the Superfund Act. On the
whole, my article supports your conclusion in dissent in Garcia that there
is little evidence of automatic, inherent respect for state and local interests
in the Congressional process; on the other hand, state and local governments
sometimes have a significant impact when they undertake active lobbying
and pressure campaigns on issues of critical importance. I think that
there are other, more persuasive grounds for the majority's conclusion in
Garcia; but on "political safeguards" I think you have the better of the
argument.
I take the liberty of sending you a copy of the article because
I know that federalism is one of the areas in which you took great personal
interest.
Sincerely,

Carol F. Lee

September 27, 1.988

Dear Caro :
Thank you f.or. your lnt. ere~t ng
. 7, and for the copyr of your article on

l~tter of September
fede~al
m.

At +-h; s time, I have not had an ooportuni ty to read
it. I note from your letter that you think I was right in
suqqesting that rongress has 1E="ss resoect for st, te and
local interests than state legis atures and local governments.
Yet, I t•dll be interested i.n readinq your reasons
for thinking that other grounds adequately support the m jor i ty' s conc1us i.on in Garc a. 'A though Justice StPVPns and
I have "duel Pel" with enthusiasm over several issues, I hold
him n high regard as a Justice an we share a warm friendship.

You
to have you.

r.e with a fine law firm,
Sincerely,

Ms. Carol F. Lee

Wilmer, Cut er & P ckering
2445 M Street, N.~.
W~shington, n. C. '20037-1420
lfp/ss

nd it is fortunate

